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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
Introduction 
Aim of the t h e s i s : 
(a) to show to what extent Condorcet's ideas were influenced 
by those of the eighteenth century "philosophes"; 
(b) to show how the inconsistencies i n h i s behaviour were not 
as important as has been said; and were due to the need to 
adapt the reform project he had drawn up before 1789 to the 
events of 1789-93; 
(c) to show to what extent the Girondin constitutional project 
grew out of Condorcet's o r i g i n a l reform plan; 
(d) to i l l u s t r a t e the d i f f i c u l t i e s experienced generally by 
p o l i t i c a l theorists when seeking to put th e i r ideas into 
practice. 
Chapter I 
An examination of Condorcet's reform plans between 1775 and 1789. 
1. The doctrine of the Rights of Man: i t s ideological basis. 
2. The reform plans: 
(a) Constitutional reform: how Condorcet wished to e s t a b l i s h 
a "democratic" constitution which would reconcile the idea l 
of "popular sovreignty" with the necessity for a represent-
ative system of government. 
(b) The reforms of the major abuses in the judicature, the penal 
system and the tax system. 
Chapter I I 
An examination, of Condorcet's ideas between August 1788 and June 1791. 
1. The summoning and opening of Etats-Generaux. Condorcet's 
disappointment and his attempts to ensure that they were trans-
formed into a National Assembly. 
2. The Constituent Assembly: 
(a) Condorcet's work as a member of the Commune's general assembly 
i n the f i e l d of l o c a l government and e l e c t o r a l reform. 
(b) His attempt to e s t a b l i s h a centre party between May 1790 and 
May 1791. 
(c) His reactions to the Constituent Assembly's reforms of the 
judicature, the penal system, the tax system and the organisation 
of the Church. 
Chapter I I I 
An examination of the evolution of Condorcet's ideas between the King's 
f l i g h t and the 10th August revolution. 
1. From the King's f l i g h t to the meeting of the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly. 
The evolution of Condorcet's ideas in the f i e l d of executive 
reform. 
2. The L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly: 
(a) The " l o y a l t y " policy, October 1791. 
(b) The s l i d e into war, November 1791 to A p r i l 1792. 
(c ) The 10th August revolution and Condorcet's reaction to i t . 
Chapter IV 
An examination of Condorcet's a c t i v i t i e s and writings between 10th 
August 1792 and h i s death. 
1. From 10th August to the meeting of the Convention. 
2. The Convention: 
(a) His relat i o n s with the Girondins and the Montagnards. 
(b) His attitude towards the King's t r i a l . 
( c ) His election to the constitutional committee. 
3. An examination of the Girondin constitutional project. 
4. The rejection of the project and Condorcet's end. 
Conclusion 
Condorcet's behaviour during the Revolution was dictated by one 
important need - that of adapting a long-term project for p o l i t i c a l 









CHAPTER I I : 
CHAPTER I I I : 
CHAPTER IV: 
Condorcet's plans for reform 
between 1775 and 1789 
1. The doctrine of the Rights of Man 
2. The reforms 1775 -1789 
The evolution of Condorcet's ideas from 
the summoning of the Etats-Generaux to 
t h e i r opening and from the formation of 
the Constituent Assembly to the f l i g h t 
of the King. 
1. The summoning and opening of Etats-Generaux 
2. The Constituent Assembly .. 
(a) The Commune Assembly 
(b) La Societe de 1789 .. 
(c ) The Journalist 
From the King's f l i g h t to the dis s o l u t i o n 
of the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly. 
A. From the King's f l i g h t to the meeting 
of the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly 
B. The L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly 
1. The "loyalty" policy 
2. The war question 
3- The 10th August insurrection 
a) Condorcet's a c t i v i t i e s and writings 
between 10th August 1792 and 
20th January 1793 
1. From 10th August - 20th September 1792 
2. The Convention 
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THE EVOLUTION OF CONDORCET'S 
IDEAS DURING THE REVOLUTION. 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the the s i s 
Though he did not belong to the same generation as the French 
"philosophes" of the l8th century, Condorcet i s generally regarded 
as the man who, more than any other, attempted to make a synthesis 
of what they had written concerning the problems facing the France 
of t h e i r day. In the words of L i t t r e : 
"Le l8eme s i e e l e se resume en un type ide a l qui depuis 
longtemps excite en moi une supreme veneration, j e veux 
parler de Condorcet. Tout c e ^ u i f a i t l a vie et l a pen-
see du l8eme s i e c l e e t a i t en l u i " . 1 
By 1789, however, nearly a l l the great thinkers who had con-
tributed so much to the ideas of the century had died - Voltaire 
and Rousseau i n 1778, Turgot i n 178l, d'Alembert i n 1783, Diderot 
i n 1784, etc. To what extent were t h e i r ideas - i n so f a r as they 
are absorbed into Condorcet's reform plans prior to 1789 - re f l e c t e d 
i n , or distorted by, the changes made by the men who ac t u a l l y par-
t i c i p a t e d i n the French Revolution? 
One of the aims of the the s i s i s to answer t h i s question. But 
i t i s impossible to do so without broaching another question of more 
general i n t e r e s t . What are the d i f f i c u l t i e s experienced by p o l i t i c a l 
t h e o r i s t s who attempt to adapt reform plans based on abstract philo-
sophical p r i n c i p l e s to concrete p o l i t i c a l situations? From t h i s 
angle, an examination of Condorcet's a c t i v i t i e s and ideas between 
1775 and 1789 and between 1789 and 1793 i s extremely valuable. 
1. "Du suicide politique en France depuis 1784 jusqu'a nos jours." 
(Journal des debats. 3rd August, 1860.) 
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By 1789* Condorcet had drawn up a vast plan for the complete 
overhaul of the p o l i t i c a l system on which the Ancien Regime was 
based. The Revolution presented t h i s sole surviving exponent of 
the doctrines expressed by the "philosophes" with an i d e a l oppor-
tunity for putting h i s reforms into effect. However, the coherence 
of the reform plan drawn up cautiously and methodically between 
1775 and 1789 contrasts s t r i k i n g l y with the apparent inconsistency 
of Condorcet's behaviour and ideas once the Revolution had got 
underway. 
Rene Doumic, although excessively h o s t i l e towards Condorcet, 
has nevertheless c l e a r l y brought out the extent of t h i s contrast. 
"(:Condorcet) a commence par etre d'avis que l a France doit 
r e s t e r une monarchie ... et i l sera l'un des premiers a manifester 
des sentiments republicains. I I deteste l a guerre, et vote l a de-
cl a r a t i o n de guerra a l'Europe ... Philosophe, i l n'attend de bien 
que de l a d i f f u s i o n des lumieres, non du recours a l a force bru-
t a l e ... (Or), i l s ' i n c l i n e r a devant toutes l e s violences (et) 
trouvera pour l e s crimes eux-memes de l a foule des tresors d'in-
dulgence ... Apres l e 10 aout, q u ' i l appelle "un grand acte de 
j u s t i c e autant que de prudence", i l pousse au ministere Danton 
q u ' i l meprise. Apres l e s massacres de septembre, et dans l'impos-
s i b i l i t e ou i l est de l e s approuver, i l a soin du moins d'y decou-
v r i r des excuses ... Dans l e proces de Louis XVI, s' i l ne vote pas 
l a mort, c'est uniquement parce que cette peine "est contre mes 
principes". Quand l a question du s u r s i s e s t mise en deliberation, 
i l monte a l a tribune pour se recuser par ces mots: "Je n'ai pas 
de voix". 1 
1. "Condorcet et l a Revolution" i n Etudes sur l a l i t t e r a t u r e 
francaise, Volume V 1906 p. 171 - 190. 
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In our view, however, these inconsistencies should not be 
exaggerated. While i t i s c l e a r that Condorcet's ideas went through 
a d e f i n i t e evolution between 1789 and 1793, i t i s equally certain 
that h i s conduct throughout the Revolution was dictated by a fixed 
purpose from which he never wavered, namely the need to salvage the 
e s s e n t i a l part of h i s reform plan by adapting h i s ideas to the very 
uneven progress made by the various p o l i t i c a l movements which suc-
ceeded each other during these four years. For, as the study of the 
Girondin constitutional project which makes up Chapter IV of the 
the s i s indicates, the nucleus of the 1793 plan was contained in 
ideas which Condorcet had discussed before 1789. The origin and 
development of these ideas are described i n Chapter I . 
Those sections of the 1793 project which go beyond ideas 
put forward before 1789 have t h e i r origin i n the reforms and 
events which took place between the summoning of the Etats-Gene-
raux and the opening months of the Convention and i t i s with 
Condorcet's a c t i v i t i e s during these important years that Chapters 
I I and I I I of the th e s i s are concerned. 
One of the purposes of these three parts i s to prepare the 
way for a f i n a l aim of the t h e s i s , which i s to show to what extent 
the constitutional project of 1793 may be said to represent the 
l a s t complete statement of ideas which had been germinating in 
Condorcet's mind throughout the eighteen years which he devoted 
to the problems of constitutional reform. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CONDORCET'S PLANS FOR REFORM BETWEEN 1775 AND 1789. 
1. The doctrine of the Rights of Man 
The doctrine of the Rights of Man l i e s at the heart of Con-
dorcet's vast plan for overhauling the p o l i t i c a l system of the 
Ancien Regime. His f i r s t complete description of the doctrine 
i n 1788 came at the end of a s e r i e s of attempts l a s t i n g several 
years to e s t a b l i s h the new constitution of which he dreamed on 
firm philosophical p r i n c i p l e s . As these p r i n c i p l e s are fundamen-
t a l to an understanding of Condorcet's views on a l l aspects of 
p o l i t i c a l and constitutional reform, i t i s important to examine 
the ideas out of which they grew. 
The ideological basis of the doctrine. 
Condorcet's d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the p o l i t i c a l system of 
the Ancien Regime originated partly i n h i s b e l i e f that i t was 
founded on a theological basis whose v a l i d i t y was dependent on 
f a i t h and not on reason, on a blind adherence to tr a d i t i o n and 
not on experience and observation. 
His own experiences at the J e s u i t school i n Reims and l a t e r , 
at the J e s u i t College de Navarre i n Paris, are re c a l l e d i n the 
pamphlet which he wrote i n answer to the Abbe Sabatier de Castres 
i n 1774: 
"Apres s i x ans d'etudes, a huit heures par jour, un enfant 
s a i t par coeur son rudiment, son catechisme et sa mythologie et 
parvient a l'age de douze ou quinze ans sans jamais avoir r i e n 
compris de ce qu'on l u i a d i t . Ce p l i une f o i s p r i s , i l repetera 
toute sa vie des choses q u ' i l n'entendra point". 2 
1. A l l quotations from Condorcet's works are taken from the 1847 
Arago edition: Oeuvres completes. 12 Volumes. 
2. O.C. V.293 "Lettres a un theologien". 
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This does not mean to say that Condorcet denied the ex i s -
tence of God. In the "Avertissements" which he added to the Kehl 
edition of Voltaire's works he stated: "Des metaphysiciens hardis 
ont conclu qu'on ne pouvait se former une idee de Dieu; cette 
assertion e s t trop absolue.""'" j but he went on to add st r a i g h t 
afterwards: "On ne peut se former de Dieu ... que des idees i n -
completes, et seulement d'apres l e s f a i t s observes."^ God may 
ex i s t , but h i s existence i s a question of probability and should 
not be the basis of positive laws. 
The problem presented by Catholicism, however, was quite 
di f f e r e n t . God, as an abstract p r i n c i p l e , was not a threat to 
the idea of reform and progress. But Catholic dogma, with i t s 
insistence on the e s s e n t i a l corruption of man and i t s psychology 
of fear, presented an insuperable obstacle to any improvement i n 
the laws of the nation. 
The theme of superstition and fear recurs i n nearly a l l Con-
dorcet's pre-revolutionary writings. In the "Lettres d'un Laboureur 
de Picardie" (1775)> for example, he r e l a t e s c e r t a i n anecdotes 
about the prejudices which abounded i n the r u r a l areas concerning 
the free sale of grain: 
"... un fermier a d i t , en reniant Dieu, q u ' i l aimait mieux 
etre mange des r a t s que de vendre son ble a une pauvre femme; et 
v o i l a soudainement que l e s r a t s viennent l e manger jusqu'aux os ... 
un pauvre a propose a un fermier de l u i vendre du ble a bon marche, 
quoiqu'il s o i t cher; l e charitable fermier ya remplir l e sac, et 
en revenant i l trouve son pauvre, transforme en un grand c r u c i f i x , 




O.C. IV. 221 
O.C. IV. 221-222 
O.C. XI. 13 
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Fourteen years l a t e r (1789), i n the "Notes" which he appended to 
the edition of Voltaire's works, he contrasted the eighteenth century 
favourably with the sixteenth when " l e s biens des citoyens dependaient 
de magistrats qui croyaient que l e diable avait du sperme et que ce 
sperme e t a i t f r o i d . " 1 
In short, Condorcet was t e r r i f i e d by the manner i n which super-
s t i t i o n could be manipulated by sectarian groups within society to 
further t h e i r i n t e r e s t s ; hence h i s attack i n the "Lettres d'un theologien" 
I ! A 
on the morale barbare ... qui f a i s a n t des pretres juges de l a morale 
generale et des actions de chaque p a r t i c u l i e r , n admet reellement d autre 
vertu que ce qui est u t i l e aux pretres, et d autres crimes que ce qui leu r 
The ideas of Pascal and Leibniz were among those which he attacked 
most severely. Leibniz's optimism and Pascal's view that man was 
e s s e n t i a l l y corrupt constituted b e l i e f s which were c l e a r l y incompatible 
with the axiom which became the basis of a l l h i s plans for constitutional 
and s o c i a l reforms: the axiom which stated that man was e s s e n t i a l l y good 
and was i n d e f i n i t e l y perfectible. The idea was expressed as early as 
1785 i n the "Eloge de Michel de l'Hopital": 
"C'est parce que j e cr o i s l'homme naturellement bon que j e 
m'indigne contre ceux qui l e rendent 1'instrument du malheur de ses 
semblables ... Le philosophe qui c r o i t l'homme mechant doit voir 
tranquillement des crimes qui ne sont a ses yeux que l a suite neces-
s a i r e de l'ordre du monde." 3 
I t i s again found i n the "Eloge de Pascal" of the same year: 
" I I fut aise a Pascal de prouver combien l'homme est f a i b l e et 
corrompu; peut-etre i l eut ete plus philosophique de chercher comment 
i l l ' e s t devenu, puisque c'est l e seul moyen d'apjjpndre ce qui pourrait 
l e corriger. 4 ... S i Pascal a toujours raison l o r s q u ' i l peint l a corrup-
tion des hommes, i l cesse de 1'avoir l o r s q u ' i l regarde cette corruption 
comme generale, e t surtout comme naturelle et incurable." 5 
1. O.C. IV. 347 
2. O.C. V. 334 
3. O.C. I I I . 460 
4. O.C. I I I . 615 
5. O.C. I I I . 624 
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Speaking of Volt a i r e ' s poem on the Lisbon earthquake di s a s t e r , 
he stated: "La doctrine que tout est bien est aussi decourageante que 
c e l l e de l a f a t a l i t e " , an obvious a l l u s i o n to the theories of Leibniz. 
The idea of indef i n i t e p e r f e c t i b i l i t y , or the doctrine of progress, 
was taken to i t s extreme in the speech which he made to the Academie 
Francaise on the occasion of h i s reception there on 2nd February 1782. 
Having stated that morals would improve i n r e l a t i o n to the progress of 
s c i e n t i f i c knowledge - "Peut-etre l e progres necessaire des sciences 
11 1 
physiques a u r a i t - i l s u f f i pour assurer l e progres des sciences morales 
- he proceeded to speak i n glowing terms of an age when "dirige par (des) 
i n s t i t u t i o n s s a l u t a i r e s , l'homme n'aurait besoin que d'ecouter l a voix 
de son coeur et c e l l e de sa raison pour remplir par un penchant naturel 
l e s memes devoirs qui l u i coutent aujourd hui des e f f o r t s 'et des s a e r i -
2 
f i c e s " . He saw evidence of progress i n the improvements which had taken 
place i n the eighteenth century, contrasting i t with the barbarity of 
previous ages i n which one could see "une corruption plus grossiere 
s unir dans l e s moeurs avec plus de fe r o c i t e des vices, presque 
inconnus aujourd hui, former l e caractere et l e s moeurs de nations en-
t i e r e s . 
I t i s c l e a r from the somewhat r h e t o r i c a l emphasis which Condorcet 
gave to h i s ideas i n the speech that he was assuming the role of a pro-
pagandist who was obliged to impress h i s view on others by exaggerating 
them. In f a c t , h i s attitude was not at a l l dogmatic. He was prepared 
to acknowledge what was good i n a l l systems of government and was driven 
to search desperately for a s o l i d foundation for the existence of man i n 






This open-minded attitude i s revealed, for example, by the 
manner i n which he praised the reforms made by Michel de l'Hopital 
who was nevertheless a product of that sixteenth century whose 
numerous weaknesses he described at length i n the "Eloge". S i m i l a r l y , 
while attacking the e v i l s of the seventeenth century i n the "Notes 
sur V o l t a i r e " , he nevertheless admitted that i t was an age when " l e 
cultivateur, 1 a r t i s a n , l e manufacturier, l e marchand etaient surs 
de r e c u e i l l i r l e f r u i t de leur t r a v a i l , sans craindre n i l e s brigands 
n i l e s p e t i t s oppresseurs." 
The major problem which he faced was to discover the way i n 
which such benefits could be permanently guaranteed. As he said i n 
the same passage: "De ce qu'un etat t r a n q u i l l e a prospere, i l ne 
faut point en conclure q u ' i l a i t eu n i de bonnes l o i s , n i une bonne 
constitution, n i un bon gouvernement." Something more profound, which 
transcended a l l these, had to be found and i t was with t h i s end i n 
mind that Condorcet examined i n turn the philosophical systems of 
c 
h i s time, not as the a n t i - r e l i g i o u s iconoclast depicted so intfac^urately 
2 
by Sainte-Beuve i n the Causeries du Lundi. 
I t was thus with respect that he spoke of speculative philo-
sophy i n the preface to the "Eloge de Pascal": " I I n'y a point, dans 
l a philosophie speculative, de dogmes importants qui n'aient ete 
soutenus et combattus par des hommes egalement celebres. He d i s a -
greed with Pascal but admired h i s attempt to ground moral standards 
on b e l i e f i n God, describing t h i s as the work of a man "qui ne voyait 
dans l a morale humaine aucune base f i x e sur laquelle on put appuyer 
l a d i s t i n c t i o n du juste ou de 1'injuste." 
1. IV. 469 
2. 3rd edition (Gamier) Volume I I I p.337, 3rd February 1851. 
3. O.C. I I I . 575 
4. I I I . 623 
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Condorcet could sympathise with a man who, l i k e himself, was 
seeking firm p r i n c i p l e s on which to build society and i t i s s i g n i -
f i c a n t that he defended Pascal against the J e s u i t s whose c a s u i s t r y 
consisted pr e c i s e l y i n blurring the d i s t i n c t i o n s between such basic 
notions as good and e v i l : "... i l s voulurent tracer, entre l e juste 
et l ' i n j u s t e , une ligne imperceptible, sans songer que c e l u i qui ne 
veut s ' i n t e r d i r e que ce qui est in j u s t e a l a rigueur est bientot 
emporte par ses passions bien l o i n des l i m i t e s de l a morale." 
In Condorcet's view, pragmatism could never serve as a basis 
for organising society. However he f e l t that Pascal's ideas were 
such that they defeated h i s purpose. For, by reminding man of h i s 
weakness and es s e n t i a l corruption, he encouraged him to f a l l back on 
purely arbitrary standards of morality: "... cette methode e s t - e l l e 
surtout propre a raffermir en general l e s hommes dans leur r e l i g i o n , 
2 
fausse ou v r a i e . " 
Condorcet rejected the idea that r e l i g i o n could serve as the 
basis of morality. But he was equally convinced that atheism did 
not provide the solution either. Apart from anything else i t was too 
much out of keeping with the b e l i e f s of the mass of the population to 
have any v a l i d i t y as a scale of values: "... on accusera toujours 
l e s athees de detruire toute morale, et i l l eur sera toujours im-
possible de f a i r e a cette objection une reponse s a t i s f a i s a n t e , sur-
/ v i .."5 tout de mettre cette reponse a l a portee du commun des hommes. 
He also suspected that atheism, i n France, often took the form of a 
somewhat negative scepticism which led those who professed i t to 
believe i n the value only of material goods and hence to support the 




I I I . 596 
I I I . 622 
"EloKe de Pascal" O.C. I I I . 57^ 
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d athees qui ont pretendu qu une r e l i g i o n , meme fausse, pouvait 
etre bonne politiquement, et qui, en consequence, se sent con-
duits avec un zele plus ardent que c e l u i des croyants l e s plus 
M1 
convaincus. 
On every side, therefore, he could discover no adequate basis 
for guaranteeing the permanence of those benefits which ce r t a i n sec-
tions of the French population had enjoyed for a time i n past ages. 
C h r i s t i a n i t y had played a useful role i n the past by cementing 
society around a uniformly accepted set of b e l i e f s . He did not 
question the people's right to share these b e l i e f s s t i l l but he 
noticed that many of the leading figures of the age openly denied 
them. A society whose laws and i n s t i t u t i o n s were so d i r e c t l y linked 
to p r i n c i p l e s based on b e l i e f s which were now openly disputed was 
naturally i n a state of potential decadence and i t was thus Condor-
cet's wish, together with that of the other "philosophes", to recas t 
moral pr i n c i p l e s i n a non-religious mould. 
His fears were most c l e a r l y expressed i n h i s Vie de Turgot of 
1786: "On ebranle l a certitude des principes de l a morale, en l a l i a n t 
avec des opinions qui, partout, sont ouvertement combattues, ou r e j e -
tees en secret par un grand nombre d'hommes, et surtout par ceux qui 
ont l e plus d'influence sur l e sort des autres." 
This negative scepticism, which was eating away at the f i b r e s of 
the Ancien Regime, threatened not only to destroy i t - which was what 
the "philosophes" desired - but to put i n i t s place a society based on 
no pr i n c i p l e s at a l l . I t i s t h i s form of negative doubt which Condor-
cet attacked i n the l a s t great work he wrote, the Esquisse d'un tableau 
historique des progres de 1*esprit humain.: 
1. I I I . 575 
2. O.C. V.145 
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"(Le) doute ... quand i l conduit a ne point raisonner sur 
l e s mots auxquels nous ne pouvons attacher des idees nettes et 
precises, a. proportionner notre adhesion au degre de l a pro-
b a b i l i t y de chaque proposition, a determiner pour chaque classe 
de connaissances l e s l i m i t e s de l a certitude que nous pouvons 
obtenir ... s ' i l s'etend aux v e r i t e s demontrees, s ' i l attaque l e s 
principes de l a morale, devient ou stupidite ou demence, i l favorise 
l'ignorance et l a corruption." 1 
In place of unthinking b e l i e f and destructive scepticism, 
he wished to e s t a b l i s h a moral code founded on an optimistic form of 
scepticism which did not lose i t s e l f i n abstract metaphysical specu-
l a t i o n s but concerned i t s e l f with the immediate p r a c t i c a l problem of 
discovering means whereby men could best l i v e together i n society. 
He proposed to discover these means empirically, by looking 
cl o s e l y into the motives which governed men's actions, by delving into 
t h e i r psychological processes. He came to the conclusion that the 
driving force behind men's desires was s e l f - i n t e r e s t : 
"L'interet e s t l e mobile general des actions des hommes, non 
seulement dans ce sens, que c e l u i meme qui agit d'apres l e s motifs 
l e s plus purs est determine par l e p l a i s i r q u ' i l trouve a remplir 
ses devoirs, mais dans ce sens moins. metaphysique, que s i on excepte 
certains moments d'enthousiasme, l ' i n t e r e t de notre conservation, de 
notre fortune, de nos p l a i s i r s , de nos affections, de notre repos, 
de notre reputation, de l a paix de notre conscience, de notre s a l u t , 
nous determine toujours." 2 
With the optimistic school of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Adam 
Smith (whose "Theory of the Moral Sentiments" Mme Condorcet trans-
lated into French), he believed also i n the value of altruism as a 
moral force: 
Lorsque j e suis s o r t i du college, j e me suis mis a r e f l e c h i r 
sur l e s idees morales de l a j u s t i c e et de l a vertu. J ' a i cru obser-
ver que 1'interet que nous avons a etre justes et vertueux e t a i t 
fonde sur l a peine que f a i t necessairement eprouver a un etre sensible 
l'idee du mal que souffre un autre etre sensible". 3 and he even went 
so f a r as to describe love of humanity, rather than pure s e l f - i n t e r e s t , 
as " l a plus inebranlable de toutes l e s bases". 
1. VI. 87 
2. "Notes sur V o l t a i r e " O.C. IV. 321-322. 
3. Lettre a Turgot, 13 decembre 1773 O.C. 1.220. 
4. Le t t r e a Voltaire, mars 1774 O.C. 1.32. 
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However, he was too much a r e a l i s t not to appreciate the more 
pessimistic views of Helvetius whose ideas he defended against Turgot 
i n a l e t t e r of 1773: 
" I I y a beaucoup de gens que l a nature ou 1'education ont des-
tine s a etre fripons, et qui ne deviendront honnetes gens qu'a l a 
maniere et par l e s principes dl-Helvetius" 1 
and i t was i n t h i s s p i r i t that he considered u t i l i t a r i a n i s m as one of 
the surest methods for reconciling the contradictory-
d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s : 
S i l peut y avoir equilibre entre ceux qui ont tout et ceux 
qui n'ont r i e n , c'est seulement entre l e besoin qu'on a de 1'argent 
du riche et c e l u i qu'a l e riche du t r a v a i l du pauvre que cet e q u i l i -
bre peut s ' e t a b l i r . " 2 
Altruism and s e l f - i n t e r e s t were thus both considered by him to 
be important forces working i n favour of establishing laws which would 
enable men to l i v e together i n society. His view of human nature was 
not o r i g i n a l i n so f a r as i t was taken very l a r g e l y from Locke, but 
because of the importance attached to i t by Condorcet f o r discovering 
the basis of the new laws, i t i s worth quoting i n d e t a i l that part of 
the "Esquisse" i n which i t i s expressed: 
"L'homme n a i t avec l a faculte de recevoir des sensations, 
d'apercevoir et de distinguer l e s sensations simples dont e l l e s sont 
composees, de l e s r e t e n i r , de l e s reconnaite, de l e s combiner, de 
comparer entre e l l e s ces combinaisons, de s a i s i r ce qu'elles ont de 
commun et ce qui l e s distingue, d'attacher des signes a. tous ces ob-
j e t s , pour l e s reconnaitre mieux, et f a c i l i t e r l e s combinaisons nou-
v e l l e s ... Les sensations sont accompagnees de p l a i s i r et de douleur, 
et l'homme a de meme l a faculte de transformer ces impressions momen-
tanees en sentiments durables doux ou penibles, d'eprouver ces sent-
ments a. l a vue ou au souvenir des p l a i s i r s et des douleurs des autres 
etres sensibles. Enfin, de cette faculte unie a celle- de former et 
de combiner des idees naissent entre l u i et ses semblables des r e l a t i o n s 
d'interet et de devoir, auxquelles l a nature meme a voulu attacher l a 
portion l a plus precieuse de notre bonheur et l e s plus douloureux de 
nos maux." 3 
1. Correspondance inedite de Condorcet et de Turgot, ed. C. Henry, 
Paris, 1883, p . l ^ l , l e t t r e du 4 decembre 1773. 
2. "Reflexions sur l e commerce des bles" O.C. XI.166 (1776). 
3. O.C. VI. 11-12. 
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Altruism and s e l f - i n t e r e s t are seen as products of the reason 
acting under the sensations of pain and pleasure, fear and sympathy, 
and a l l men, by virtue of the very f a c t that they e x i s t , possess the 
faculty to f e e l and to reason. A man's capacity to do so may be greater 
or l e s s than that of h i s fellows, but the bond which unites a l l men -
a common human nature - i s fundamental. The q u a l i t i e s which separate 
them are incidental. 
This i s the basis on which Condorcet f i n a l l y established h i s 
doctrine of the Rights of Man. The doctrine stated that a l l men, 
because of t h e i r common human nature, possessed equal rights and that 
the sole aim of society was to ensure that these rights were guaranteed: 
"... x l n'existe aucun autre motif de se mettre en societe que l a con-
servation des droit s dont on j o u i t dans l ' e t a t de nature." 
As for the d e f i n i t i o n of the actual rights themselves, i t would 
seem that Condorcet was guided by two things. In the f i r s t place there 
was the undeniable influence of the American Revolution. As early as 
2 3 1771 and i n various other works of the time , he had referred to the 
"droits des gens", but i t was not t i l l 1781, i n the essay "Sur l ' e t a t 
des Protestants" that he f i r s t provided a l i s t of these fundamental 
ri g h t s : 
Les principes sur lesquels l e s societes sont etablies doivent 
etre l e s memes pour tous l e s Etats. Les societes ont done ete etab-
l i e s pour proteger l a l i b e r t e , l a propriete, l a surete des citoyens." 4 
This l i s t bears a s t r i k i n g resemblance to the one contained i n the 
Declaration of Rights adopted by the State of V i r g i n i a on 12th June 1776, 
the f i r s t a r t i c l e of which went as follows: 
1. "Sur l ' e t a t des Protestants", O.C. V.463. 
2. Lettre a Turgot, 17 decembre 1771* Corr. avec Turgot, p.77. 
3. "Reflexions sur l e s corvees" (1775) O.C. XI. 59-87; "Monopole et 
monopoleur" (.1775) O.C. XI. 37-58; "Reflexions sur l e commerce 
des b l e s " (1776) "Reflexions sur l a jurisprudence criminelle" 
(1775) V I I . 3-34; "Sur l a l i b e r t e de l a presse (1778) XI." 255-5l4. 
4. V.440. 
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"That a l l men are by nature equally free and independent and have 
cer t a i n inherent r i g h t s , of which when they enter into the state of 
society, they cannot by any compact, deprive or divest t h e i r posterity, 
namely, the enjoyment of l i f e and l i b e r t y , with the means of acquiring and 
possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t also that the next summary of these r i g h t s was 
provided by Condorcet i n h i s essay of 1786 "De 1'influence de l a revolution 
d'Amerique sur l 1Europe", written at a time when the American Federation 
was drawing up i t s Declaration, and that the most detailed and e x p l i c i t 
presentation was given i n the "Lettres d'un citoyen des Etats-Unis sur l e s 
a f f a i r e s presentes" } published i n 1788, the year af t e r Condorcet had 
translated the American Declaration into French. 
I t i s c l e a r therefore that the various American declarations helped 
Condorcet to systematise h i s ideas on the question of natural r i g h t s . A 
more obvious source, however, lay i n the very s i t u a t i o n of France during 
the 1770's and 178o's. The doctrine of natural rights represented for 
the "philosophes" i n general the ideal to be attained by society; i n other 
words, i t was the exact opposite of a l l that they saw about them i n the 
France of the Ancien Regime. "Ne trouvant pas leur j u s t i f i c a t i o n dans 
l a r e a l i t e , l e s partisans d'un ordre nouveau l a chercherent dans l e s 
principes de dro i t naturel, c est-a-dire dans l e s aspirations de leur 
coeur elevees au rang de principes eternels. 
The doctrine was thus a programme of action aimed at overhauling 
the Ancien Re'gime. Consequently, the most detailed description of these 
rights provided by Condorcet before 1789 ^ was accompanied by an elaborate 
summary of a l l the abuses of the time and, naturally, of a l l the reforms 
which he desired. For t h i s reason i t i s worth quoting i n f u l l : 
"Quel but se sont propose l e s hommes en se reunissant en societe' 
reguliere, en se soumettant a des l o i s ? C'est sans doute de s'assurer, 
par ces memes l o i s , l a jouissance de leurs d r o i t s naturels. 
1. O.C. IX. 101-102. 
2. M. & F. Hincker, Introduction to "Esquisse d'un tableau historique, 
etc.", Ed. Sociales, p.20. 
3. In the "Lettres d'un citoyen des Etats-Unis. e t c . " (1788), O.C. DC. 101-102. 
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Mais l a surete est un de ces d r o i t s , et l e s hommes en j o u i s -
s e n t - i l s , s ' i l reste quelque chose d ' a r b i t r a i r e dans l e s jugements 
criminels, s i des actions indifferentes sont erigees en crimes, s i 
l e d r o i t de se defendre est enleve aux accuses, s i l e s preuves alle'-
guees contre eux sont pour eux un secret, s i l e s tribunaux formant 
des corps perpetuels ont des passions ou des prejuges, des i n t e r e t s 
ou des pretentions? La reforme de notre jurisprudence criminelle, 
et c e l l e de nos tribunaux, est done necessaire au maintien du premier 
de nos dr o i t s , l a surete'. 
"La l i b e r t e en est un autre, or, jouit-on de l a l i b e r t e par- t 
tout ou l a l o i i n t e r d i t aux citoyens, sous peine d'amende, des 
actions indifferentes et un usage de leurs f a c u l t e s , une disposition 
de leur propriete, qui n'est pas contraire au d r o i t d'autrui? Jugez 
d'apres c e l a nos l o i s de commerce, nos jurandes defendues avec tant 
d'opiniatrete par nos parlements, nos l o i s de police etablies par 
eux, notre jurisprudence f i s c a l e , etc. 
La propriete est encore un dro i t naturel des hommes; or, ce 
dro i t e x i s t e - t - i l partout ou i l est attaque par des impots i n d i r e c t s , 
necessairement r e p a r t i s avec i n j u s t i c e ? ... Ce d r o i t e x i s t - t - i l , 
lorsqu'en vertu de cette d i s t r i b u t i o n des tribunaux, toute propriete, 
au-dessous de ce que coute un proces, n'est garantie qu'autant qu'elle 
ne vaut pas l a peine d 1 etre usurpee? ... La reforme de nos imp'ots et de 
nos tribunaux est done necessaire au maintien de nos dr o i t s de propriete. 
"L'egalite n'est pas moins un des droit s naturels de l'humanite. 
Les hommes naissent egaux, et l a societe est f a i t e pour empecher que 
l ' i n e g a l i t e de force, l a seule qui vienne de l a nature, ne produise 
impunement des violences i n j u s t e s . Toute inegalite qui, dans l'ordre 
s o c i a l , e s t etablie par une l o i , et n'est pas l a suite necessaire du 
merite r e e l , du d r o i t de propriete, de l'opinion, de 1'importance des 
fonctions s o c i a l e s , est une v i o l a t i o n de ce dr o i t . Comparez maintenant 
cette maxime de l a raison et de l a nature avec l e s pretentions de nos 
premiers ordres, de nos magistrats. 
"Enfin, l e d r o i t de concourir a l a formation des l o i s e s t un des 
dr o i t s de l'homme dans l ' e t a t de societe ... Ce droit, presque nul pour 
l e plus grand nombre, n'est important pour l a prosperite publique qu' 
autant q u ' i l assure l a jouissance des autres ... S i ce dro i t n'est pas 
egal pour tous l e s citoyens, s i un noble ou un pretre y a plus de part 
qu'un proprietaire du nombre de ceux que vous nommez r o t u r i e r s , alors ce 
dro i t cesse absolument d'exister." 
These f i v e basis rights represented the aim for which Condorcet 
was to struggle during the four years of the Revolution. 
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2. The reforms 1775 - 1789. 
In Condorcet's opinion, the greatest weakness of the p o l i t i c a l 
system of the Ancien Re'gime lay i n the absence of any method whereby 
the people could participate i n the government of the nation. 
However, i t was not u n t i l 1788 that he wrote a f u l l - l e n g t h work 
on the organisation of a system of public p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The f a c t 
that t h i s work was published some eighteen years a f t e r h i s e a r l i e s t 
written comments on p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s ( h i s correspondence with Turgot 
i n 1770) does not indicate that he attached l i t t l e importance to the 
question. On the contrary, as we s h a l l see l a t e r , t h i s problem appeared 
to him to be of fundamental importance; indeed, public p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
ultimately became, i n h i s eyes, the v i t a l reform which had to be made 
and the basis of a l l the others. 
The f a c t that he took so long to devise a method whereby the 
people could participate i n the making of laws may be put down, i n 
the f i r s t instance, to the very important p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s 
created by the theory of the sovreignty of the people. 
The foremost p o l i t i c a l thinkers of the eighteenth century shared 
the b e l i e f that the sole purpose of society was to ensure the protection 
of the i n t e r e s t s of a l l i t s members. On the question of how t h i s pro-
tection could best be ensured there was, however, l i t t l e agreement. 
In order to put Condorcet's views i n perspective, i t i s useful to take 
a glance at the ideas which were c i r c u l a t i n g at the time he approached 
the subject. 
Two currents of thought may be detected, both with a common origin, 
but each one emphasising a d i f f e r e n t aspect of the problem. On the one 
hand there was Montesquieu who, while recognising the axiom that a l l power 
lay with the people, believed nevertheless that society could not function 
without a powerful government. 
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This view i s stated i n that part of the E s p r i t des Lois which deals 
with the theory of representative government: 
"Le peuple qui a l a souveraine puissance doit f a i r e par l u i -
meme tout ce q u ' i l peut f a i r e , et pe q u ' i l ne peut pas bien f a i r e , 
i l faut q u ' i l l e fasse par ses minjstres ..." 1. 
Comme dans un Etat l i b r e , tout homme qui est cense avoir une ame 
l i b r e doit etre gouverne' par lui-meme, i l faudrait que l e peuple en 
corps eut l a puissance l e g i s l a t i v e . Mais comme c e l a e st impossible dans 
l e s grands E t a t s , et est sujet a beaucoup d'inconvenients dans l e s p e t i t s , 
i l faut que l e peuple fasse par ses representants tout ce qu ' i l ne peut 
f a i r e par lui-meme ... I I n'est pas necessaire que l e s representants, qui 
ont recu de ceux qui l e s ont c h o i s i s une instruction generale, en regoi-
vent une p a r t i c u l i e r e sur chaque a f f a i r e . " 2. 
Against t h i s , there were the ideas of those thinkers who preferred 
to emphasise the predominance of the people over the government and who 
distrusted any delegation of power on the part of the masses. The prin-
c i p a l exponent of t h i s view was Jean-Jacques Rousseau: 
La Souverainete ne peut etre representee par l a meme raison 
qu'elle ne peut etre aliene'e; e l l e consiste essentiellement dans l a 
volonte generale, et l a volonte generale ne se represente point: e l l e 
est l a meme, ou e l l e est autre; i l n'y a point de milieu. Les depute's 
deiL-peuple ne sont done n i ne peuvent etre ses representants, i l s ne sont 
que ses commissaires; i l s ne peuvent r i e n conclure definitivement. Toute 
l o i que l e Peuple en personne n'a pas r a t i f i e e est nulle; ce n'est point 
une l o i . " 3. 
Rousseau's opinion was echoed fourteen years l a t e r by Thomas Paine 
i n h i s essay on "Common Sense" (1776). Paine contrasted society, which 
he saw as a unity, with government, which he saw as something a r t i f i c i a l 
and fragmentary: 
"Some writers have so confounded society with government as to 
leave l i t t l e or no d i s t i n c t i o n between them, whereas they are not only 
d i f f e r e n t but have d i f f e r e n t origins. Society i s produced by our wants 
and governments by our wickedness; the former' promotes our happiness 
p o s i t i v e l y by uniting our affections, the l a t t e r negatively by r e s t r a i n -
ing our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates d i s -
t i n c t i o n s .... Government, even i n i t s best state, i s but a necessary e v i l 
.... For were the impulses of conscience c l e a r , uniform and i r r e s i s t i b l y 
obeyed, man would need no other law-giver; but that not being the case, 
he finds i t necessary to surrender up a part of hi s property to furni s h 
means for the protection of the r e s t ; and t h i s he i s reduced to do by 
the same prudence which i n every other case advises him, out of two e v i l s , 
to choose the l e a s t . " 4. 
1. E s p r i t des Lois (1748) Li v r e I I Ch. 2 Paris, Les B e l l e s L e t t r e s 195Q. 
4 volumes, Volume 1 p.36. 
2. Ibid. L i v r e XI Ch. 6 Volume I I p.66 - 67. 
3. Du Contrat Social (1762) Li v r e I I I Ch. 15 Paris. 
Gallimard 1964 Collection Peiade; 3 volumes Volume I I I pp. 428-429. 
4. Selected work of Tom Paine ed. H. Fast; Dull, Sloan & Pearce New York 
1945 p.6. 
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So, here again, the emphasis i s placed c l e a r l y on the importance 
of the power of the people as a whole and on the notion that the role 
of government should be reduced to a minimum. 
For several years, Condorcet was to struggle with the problem of 
reconciling these two attitudes, of seeking a compromise between the 
respect of the people's right to have a f u l l say i n the running of t h e i r 
nation and the d i f f i c u l t i e s placed i n the way of t h i s , not only by the 
sheer complexity of finding a method whereby the people could make t h e i r 
wishes known, but also by the t o t a l lack of p o l i t i c a l experience and 
tr a i n i n g of even the wealthier elements of the population. 
To see how h i s views on t h i s question developed up t i l l 1788, i t 
w i l l be necessary to examine h i s thoughts on the subject as they occur 
i n h i s e a r l i e r writings. 
These ref l e c t e d h i s desire to end the a r b i t r a r y nature of the laws 
and i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Ancien Regime. In h i s l e t t e r s to Turgot and 
Voltaire, the e a r l i e s t of which date from 1770, he unceasingly attacked 
the claims of the Parlements to exercise l e g i s l a t i v e and executive powers. 
His f i r s t published work on p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s , the "Reflexions sur 
l e s corvees"of 1775» although very moderate with regard to the n o b i l i t y 
and the king, nevertheless suggested that the ultimate sanction for 
l e g i s l a t i v e power was respect for the rights of the people. In t h i s work, 
he mentioned two interpretations of l e g i s l a t i v e power: 
"Les uns disent que l a puissance royale n'a d'autres l i m i t e s que 
c e l l e s qu'elle veut s'imposer a elle-meme. D'autres croient que l a 
puissance ne peut legitimement v i o l e r l e d r o i t naturel; que, par exemple, 
e l l e ne peut empecher l e s hommes de disposer librement de l e u r s per-
sonnes et de leurs biens dans tout ce qui n'est pas contraire au d r o i t 
d'un autre". 1. 
1. O.C. XI. 74. 
- 22 -
I t i s c l e a r that Condorcet favoured the second of these i n t e r -
pretations. This view i s substantiated by another passage i n which he 
pointed out the dangers inherent i n a system i n which the people had 
no say i n the settlement of disputes which d i r e c t l y concerned t h e i r 
welfare: 
"Les paysans se sont souleves contre leurs seigneurs lorsque, 
pousses au desespoir, i l s ne voyaient aucune puissance sur l a t e r r e 
qui put ecouter-leurs reclamations." 1. 
Their only hope, as Condorcet went on to indicate i n the follow-
ing sentence, lay i n the goodwill of the king to whom they were allowed 
to appeal. The implication seems to be that t h i s was not s u f f i c i e n t , 
* 2 
but i t was two years l a t e r only, i n the "Eloge de Michel de l'Hopital", 
that he mentioned for the f i r s t time the d e s i r a b i l i t y and p o s s i b i l i t y 
of electing representatives to defend the rights of the people. Speaking 
of the use made by Michel de 1 Hopital of administrative bodies consis-
ting of the leaders of the di f f e r e n t Orders, he said: 
Ces deputes ne pouvaient sans doute representer l a nation,^ 
puisqu'elle ne l e s avait pas c h o i s i s : nommes par l a cour, appeles pour 
l ' a i d e r de leurs conseils et raffermir sa puissance chancelante, i l s 
n'avaient pas l a force n i l e dr o i t d'opposer des barrieres au pouvoir 
a r b i t r a i r e . " 3. 
He was even more emphatic when, i n the same work, he i n s i s t e d on 
the importance of the part i c i p a t i o n of the people i n matters of taxation. 
t "Le produit des impots appartient a l ' E t a t , et ne peut'etre, 
legitimement employe' que pour l'avantage du peuple qui l e s a payes. 
Fidele a cette maxime, l'Hopital refusa constamment d e ^ a t i f i e r des 
dons que l e suffrage de l a nation n'aurait pas confirmes." 4. 
Admittedly, the reference i s to a remote period of French history, 
but i t seems impossible to ignore the inference of a passage written 
only a year a f t e r the''beginning of the American revolution, e s p e c i a l l y 
when we bear i n mind that t h i s was precipitated by a r b i t r a r i l y imposed 





O.C. I I I . 463-566. 
o.c. i n . 526-527. 
Ibid I I I . 474 
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to challenge the system of Orders on which i t was based and hence the 
entire p o l i t i c a l machinery of the nation. Condorcet quite understood 
the gravity of the changes which had to be made, but, at t h i s stage, he 
could think of no method of effecting these changes beyond the summoning 
of the Etats-Generaux, an assembly whose weakness and cumbersomeness he 
was among the f i r s t to recognise. ^ 
Throughout the following years he was to give a great deal of 
thought to the problem of public p a r t i c i p a t i o n in government. An i n -
teresting example of t h i s i s to be found i n the essay Sur 1 etat des 
Protestants" of 1781 where we find him struggling with the p r a c t i a l 
• necessity for a representative system of government and the need to em-
phasise the important f a c t that the representatives could, i n no way, go 
against the wishes of the people with whom the authority ultimately lay: 
f "Quelques p u b l i c i s t e s ont pretendu, a l a v e r i t e , que l a puissance 
l e g i s l a t i v e , l orsqu'elle reside dans l e corps de tous l e s citoyens sans 
exception, avait l e droit de f a i r e toutes l e s l o i s qu'elle jugeait 
u t i l e s au plus grand nombre; mais aucun n'a jamais pretendu que ce d r o i t 
put appartenir dans l a meme etendue a un homme ou a un corps devenu de-
p o s i t a i r e s du pouvoir l e g i s l a t i f , n i meme a une assemblee de represen-
tants, c h o i s i s par l a nation. L'opinion de ces p u b l i c i s t e s nous para i t 
meme outrie. Parce que, a i n s i que l ' a remarque' M. de Beccaria, 
l e s enfants non majeurs et l e s femmes ne f a i s a n t point partie de l'assem-
blee generale de l a nation, e l l e n'est jamais dans l a r e a l i t e qu'un corps 
de representants plus nombreux. Puisqu'il n'existe aucun autre 
motif de se mettre en societe que l a conservation des d r o i t s dont on 
jo u i t dans l ' e t a t de nature, l e premier acte de l a societe' ne peut etre 
l'abandon de ses d r o i t s . " 2 
Or again: jamais un homme"Ja pu dire a. d'autres hommes: 
j e mets entre vos mains ma personne, ma vie et mes biens, a cette 
seule condition, que ma voix sera comptee dans vos assemblees; vous 
aurez l e d r o i t de m'ordonner, sous peine de l a vi e , de dire et meme _, 
de c r o i r e que l a neige est noire, et que deux et deux font cinq, e t c . " 
The passage i s interesting, not because i t indicates that Condor-
cet firmly accepted the axiom that power lay s o l e l y with the people 
taken as a whole, but because i t shows also that he was s t i l l unable to 
discover a method whereby t h i s power could manifest i t s e l f . Of the two 
forms of l e g i s l a t i v e power mentioned, i t would seem that he preferred 
1. Ibid I I I . 527-528. 
2. O.C. V. 46>465. 
3. Ibid 464. 
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"line assemblee de representants, c h o i s i s par l a nation", but the 
passage i s not so much concerned with t h i s problem as with the 
purely theoretical one of what constituted a "democracy". I t i s worth 
mentioning, on t h i s point, that, i n 1781, Condorcet had not yet i n c l u -
ded the "droit de concourir a l a formation des l o i s " among h i s l i s t of 
natural r i g h t s . 
That he was to do so only a few years l a t e r , however, s i g n i f i e s 
that h i s i n i t i a l reluctance was not due to doctrinal objections but to 
the awareness of the huge d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n setting up the 
machinery whereby t h i s p a rticipation could take place. 
An insight into these d i f f i c u l t i e s i s given i n the important work 
which he published i n 1786, the Vie de Turgot . This work i s a land-
mark among the early writings i n so f a r as i t transcends h i s previous 
abstract expositions of general p r i n c i p l e s concerning the reform of the 
l e g a l and f i s c a l system and attacks on p a r t i c u l a r abuses and attempts to 
es t a b l i s h a method whereby the administrative system of the Ancien Re'gime 
could be overhauled. 
This method takes as i t s basis the reforms which Turgot unsuccess-
f u l l y attempted to introduce i n 1775- Turgot's plan, which i s described 
i n d e t a i l i n Condorcet s biography, was to abolish the "generalites" 
which had t i l l then comprised the administrative d i v i s i o n s of the nation 
and replace them by a network of assemblies elected i n each area by the 
property owners. 
Condorcet, who occupied an o f f i c i a l post i n Turgot's administration" 1" 
and was thus very close to the events of the time, had had no i l l u s i o n s 
concerning the dangers of the enterprise and, i n h i s biography, he l i s t e d 
some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s which Turgot had had to overcome. 
1. He was "Inspecteur des Finances". 
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I I ' ' * 
Une assemblee de representants ne peut etre u t i l e , s i sa forme 
n'est pas t e l l e , que l e voeu de 1'assemblee s o i t en general conforme 
a l a volonte et a l'opinion de ceux qu'elle represente; s i l e s mem-
bres qui l a composent ne connaissent^pas ^le v e r i t a b l e interet^de l a 
nation: s i , enfin, i l s peuvent etre egares par d'autres i n t e r e t s , et 
surtout par des i n t e r e t s de corps." 1 
Turgot's plan was as follows. Hie nation would be divided into 
u 
/ 
thousands of what he c a l l e d "communautes de campagne". Each "com-
munaute" (from now on referred to as "country community") was to con-
s i s t of an amalgamation of small v i l l a g e s and hamlets and was to have 
the same status as a single small town. The property owners i n each 
community and town would e l e c t from among themselves a general assem-
bly. The members of t h i s assembly would then e l e c t people to admini-
s t e r the a f f a i r s of the community or town concerned. 
Turgot then proposed to l i n k several country communities and small 
towns into what he referred to as a "canton". Each "canton" would also 
have an assembly of representatives who would be elected by the combined 
general assemblies of the country communities and small towns which were 
2 
situated within the l i m i t s of the "canton". 
Condorcet f e l t that, i n t h i s way, Turgot had done a l l that was 
necessary to meet the demands which he considered v i t a l for the work-
ings of an elected administration. In h i s view, the system had four 
main advantages over the existing one: 
F i r s t , even by l i m i t i n g representation to the lowest l e v e l of 
small towns and country communities, i t granted the people a greater 
measure of representation than anywhere els e i n the world. 
Secondly, i t enabled the peasants to defend t h e i r i n t e r e s t s on a 
par with the l o c a l "seigneurs" and p r i e s t s and i t protected the country 
dwellers against the ambitions of the powerful town municipalities. 
1. O.C. V. 114. 
2. O.C. V. 114 - 116. 
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Thirdly, by ending the d i v i s i o n by Orders, i t discouraged the 
p r i e s t s and the nobles from thinking only in terms of "castes"; by 
obliging them to share t h e i r i n t e r e s t s with people from a d i f f e r e n t 
Order, i t stimulated the s p i r i t of co-operation. This s p i r i t was fur-
ther stimulated by allowing men from any of the Orders to be elected. 
F i n a l l y , by establishing these assemblies throughout the nation, 
i t helped to create a national s p i r i t which would protect the masses 
from the d i v i s i o n s which could so e a s i l y be exploited by the numerous 
ambitious castes of the time."'" 
In the context of the Ancien Regime, Turgot's reforms would appear 
to be very sweeping. However a closer examination indicates that they 
f e l l f a r short of what was to be achieved only fourteen years l a t e r . 
I t i s clear, for example, that the p o l i t i c a l role of the c i t i z e n s was 
extremely limited, consisting as i t did i n the sole act of voting for 
representatives. The representatives themselves had no p o l i t i c a l power 
and were merely to administer the areas which came under t h e i r control: 
"C'etait uniquement a des fonctions d'administration que M. 
Turgot croyait devoir appeler ces assemblees: et i l ne pensait pas que 
que ces fonctions dussent' s'etendre au-dela de l ' e x e c u t i o n des r e g l e -
ments generaux, des l o i s emanees de l a puissance souveraine." 2. 
i . e . from the government acting under the orders of the King. 
Condorcet was well placed to understand Turgot's reluctance to go 
any further, for he r e a l i s e d that i t would have been impossible to im-
plement a scheme consisting of elected administrative assemblies lacking 
a d i v i s i o n by Orders unless the entire tax system of the Ancien Regime 
was overhauled, a point which was underlined i n 1781 by the f a i l u r e of 
Necker's attempt to e s t a b l i s h elected municipal administrators while 
maintaining the d i s t i n c t i o n of Orders and inequality of taxation within 
the parishes. 
1. Ibid 114 - 119. 
2. O.C. V. 119. 
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The complexity of the problem i s i l l u s t r a t e d most c l e a r l y by 
Tocqueville i n h i s book L'Ancien Regime: 
"Lorsque Turgot, en 1775> proposa au r o i de reformer 1'admini-
s t r a t i o n des campagnes, l e plus grand embarras q u ' i l rencontra .... 
vin t de l'inegale r e p a r t i t i o n des impots; car comment f a i r e agir en 
commun et deliberer ensemble sur l e s a f f a i r e s de l a paroisse, dont l e s 
principales sont l ' a s s i e t t e , l a levee et l'emploi des taxes, des gens 
qui ne sont pas tous a s s u j e t t i s a l e s payer de l a meme maniere, et dont 
quelques uns sont entierement s o u s t r a i t s a leurs^charges? Chaque 
paro.isse contenait des gentilshommes et des e c c l e s i a s t i q u e s qui ne 
payaient point l a t a i l l e , des paysans qui en etaient en partie ou en 
t o t a l i t e exempts, et d'autres qui 1 1aequittaient toute entiere. C'etait 
comme t r o i s paroisses d i s t i n c t e s , dont chacune eut demande une admini-
s t r a t i o n a. part. La d i f f i c u l t e e t a i t insoluble. 1 
Turgot r e a l i s e d that the reforms could be made only i f there was a 
fundamental evolution i n the p o l i t i c a l outlook of the people. He wished, 
therefore, to es t a b l i s h the new assemblies at grass-roots l e v e l only so 
that they could act as the instruments for changing the tax system 
without which no p o l i t i c a l reform was possible. At the same time, he 
f e l t that these assemblies, by allowing the people a small share i n the 
administration of the nation, would lead to the creation of a new p o l i -
t i c a l consciousness which could ultimately act as the basis of an en-
t i r e l y new system of government. 
Condorcet approved of Turgot's wish not to press ahead too f a s t 
as he was quite aware of the magnitude of the task facing a l l p o l i t i c a l 
reformers at the time. This i s c l e a r from the passage i n which he ex-
plained why Turgot would not have gone further: 
"La, i l se fut arrete, d'abord parce que cet etablissement eut 
s u f f i a 1'execution de l a plupart de ses vues, ensuite pour l a i s s e r 
l e temps a 1'esprit public de se former, aux citoyens de s ' i n s t r u i r e 
et a ceux que leurs lumieres, leurs t a l e n t s , leurs intentions, ren-
daient dignes de fonctions plus etendues, de s'y preparer et de se 
f a i r e connaitre. I I est f a c i l e d ' e t a b l i r des assemblies; mais leur 
u t i l i t e depend uniquement de 1'instruction de leurs membres, de 
1'esprit qui l e s anime; et i l s ' a g i s s a i t en France de dormer une 
education nouvelle a tout un peuple, de l u i creer de nouvelles idees 
en meme temps qu'on l'appelait a des fonctions nouvelles ... I I f a l l a i t 
affermir l e s fondements de l ' e d i f i c e avant de penser a en poser l e comble. 
Avant de songer a dormer des chefs aux citoyens, i l f a l l a i t q u ' i l y eut 
des citoyens en etat de l e s c h o i s i r . " 2 
1. Ancien Regime Ed. Headham. Oxford Univ. Press 1925. Ch. 7 p.203. 
2. Vie de Turgot O.C. V. 121-122. 
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Unlike Turgot, however, Condorcet did give precise indications 
as to the p o l i t i c a l potential of the l o c a l assemblies. He showed how 
the "canton" assemblies of a "province" could meet so as to e l e c t an 
assembly at the "provincial" l e v e l and, f i n a l l y , how t h i s provincial 
assembly could e l e c t someone to represent the province i n a national 
assembly possessing l e g i s l a t i v e powers."'' 
In 1775 Turgot had considered that the reforms were too vast and 
complicated to be made by an assembly of elected members and he had 
wished the task to be accomplished by one man acting on h i s own i n i -
t i a t i v e . 
"(M. Turgot) croyait que l a destruction d'abus compliques et 
multiples, l a reforme d'un systeme d'administration, l a refonte d'une 
l e g i s l a t i o n , ne pouvaient %tre bien f a i t e s que d'apres un plan regulier, 
un systeme combine et lie', que tout devait y etre l'ouvrage d'un seul 
homme." 2 
I t i s obvious from the comments which he made about Turgot's 
views on t h i s question that Condorcet himself f u l l y sympathised with 
the idea that the reforms should be undertaken on the monarch's orders 
and not by a hypothetical assembly elected by the people. 
11 s ' " Dans une monarchie ou un etablissement de cette espece s e r a i t 
1 1 ' 1 ' nouveau, qu attendre d une assemblee d hommes, presque tous etrangers 
aux a f f a i r e s publiques, indociles a. l a voix de l a v e r i t e , prompts a. 
se l a i s s e r seduire a. c e l l e du premier charlatan qui t e n t e r a i t de l e s 
seduire? La generosite qui porterait a leur l a i s s e r l e soin de se pro-
noncer sur leurs i n t e r e t s , ne s e r a i t qu'une cruaute hypocrite. Ce 
s e r a i t abandonner en pure perte l e plus grand avantage des monarchies, 
c e l u i de pouvoir detruire l ' e d i f i c e des prejuges avant q u ' i l se s o i t 
ecroule de lui-meme, et de f a i r e des reformes u t i l e s , meme lorsque l a 
foule des hommes riches et puissants protegent l e s abus; c e l u i , enfin, 
de suivre un systeme ^ e g u l i e r , sans etre oblige d'en s a c r i f i e r une 
partie a l a necessite de gagner l e s suffrages." 3 
I t may of course be argued that Condorcet was here re f e r r i n g to 
the sit u a t i o n which existed i n 1775 but that t h i s i s not the case may 
11 1 ' 
be shown by a quotation from the essay Sur 1 influence de l a revolution 
T ' I I 
d Amerique en Europe which appeared i n the same year as the biography 
of Turgot: 1. Ibid V. 116. 
2. Ibid 119 - 120. 
3- O.C. V. 121. 
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"Des republicains zeles ont regarde ( l e d r o i t de concourir 
a l a formation des l o i s ) comrae l e premier de tous; et i l est v r a i 
sans doute que, dans une nation eclairee, degagee de toute super-
s t i t i o n , ou i l appartiendrait en realit e ' a. tout citoyen qui pour-
r a i t ou voudrait l'exercer, l a jouissance de ce d r o i t assurerait 
celle de tous les autres. Mais i l perd ses avantages les plus pre-
cieux s i l'ignorance, s i les prejuges ecartent ceux qui doivent 
l'exercer du sentier e t r o i t que l a regie immuable de l a t j u s t i c e 
leur a trace', et, relativement au bonheur public, une republique 
qui aurait des l o i s tyranniques peut etre f o r t au-dessous d'une 
monarchie." 1 
Both passages indicate to how great an extent Condorcet was 
t e r r i f i e d of the powerful influence of the Parlement n o b i l i t y and 
the clergy and of the very real danger that they could exploit the 
Tiers Etat's d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the existing regime and use i t as 
a weapon against the i n s t i t u t i o n which symbolised the greatest obs-
tacle i n t h e i r s t r i v i n g f o r power - the monarchy. 
In short, he was determined to show the Tiers Etat how they could 
tackle the existing abuses without being misled by Utopian demands f o r 
r i g h t s such as the r i g h t to elect a l e g i s l a t i v e assembly, which could 
not possibly be guaranteed. I t was f o r t h i s reason that he spoke l i t t l e 
about elections i n the Vie de Turgot but concentrated more on the re-
form of concrete abuses and on general principles which had to be 
assimilated by the people before they could elect an assembly which 
t r u l y represented t h e i r interests. 
1786 nevertheless marks a watershed i n the evolution of Condorcet's 
ideas. The fa c t that the Vie de Turgot did give some mention of a 
method whereby the people could elect a national l e g i s l a t i v e assembly 
indicates that he was aware, despite a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s , that the 
time had come to give serious attention to the question once again. 
Perhaps the single greatest influence behind t h i s evolution was 
the American revolution where, f o r the f i r s t time, constitutions were 
being drawn up according to the wishes of ordinary citizens and p r a c t i c a l 
steps were being taken to ensure that the people could elect t h e i r rep-
1. O.C. V I I I . 7 
- 30 -
resentatives. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that Condorcet's f i r s t inclusion among 
the natural r i g h t s of man of the r i g h t to participate i n the making of 
laws occurred i n his essay on the Influence de l a revolution d Amerique 
sur l'Europe". I t i s worth noting also that t h i s essay was inserted by 
P h i l i p Mazzei i n his Recherches historiques et politiques sur les Etats-
Unis of 1788, a work w r i t t e n to defend Jefferson and the Pennsylvania 
constitution with i t s emphasis on elections against Abbe' Mably and other 
French partisans of the more r e s t r i c t e d Massachusetts constitution."'" 
But another important event occurred i n I787 which was to inspire 
Condorcet to write his f i r s t f u l l length t r e a t i s e on a method whereby 
the people could exercise a d i r e c t influence on the drawing up of a new 
co n s t i t u t i o n and on the making of laws. This was Calonne's attempt to 
extend the elected provincial assemblies established by Necker i n 1781 
to several other parts of France and to abolish the d i v i s i o n i n t o Orders 
which Necker had maintained. The members of these provincial assemblies 
were to have been elected by the members of the " D i s t r i c t s " i n t o which 
each province was divided and the members of the " D i s t r i c t " assemblies 
by those of the "assemble'es municipales", themselves elected by the 
property owners of the area. 
Although Calonne's assemblies were only to have consultative force, 
the f i n a l decisions remaining w i t h the Intendants, and although he him-
se l f was dismissed on 8th A p r i l 1787 a f t e r the "Assemblee des Notables" 
had rejected his plan i n February, there i s no doubt that t h i s f u r t h e r 
attempt to give the people a greater say i n the running of t h e i r a f f a i r s 
must have f i r e d Condorcet's imagination, f o r , the same year, he published 
2 
the four very important "Lettres d'un bourgeois de Newhaven" which pro-
vide a detailed examination of a method whereby the ex i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l 
system could be overhauled. 
1. Cf. The Age of the Democratic Revolution, Vol. I , Ch. 9, R.R. Palmer 
Princetown University Press 1959 2 Volumes, Volume I p.277. 
2. O.C. EC. >93. 
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Only the second letter"*" concerns us here as i t describes the 
way i n which a national assembly could be elected, the extent of i t s 
powers and the method by which i t would arrive at i t s decisions. 
Condorcet proposed, f i r s t of a l l , that the nation be divided at 
i t s base i n t o thousands of regions which he referred t o as " d i s t r i c t s " . 
These " d i s t r i c t s " were t o be equal i n size and population and t h e i r 
main function was to be t o allow the people l i v i n g i n them t o assemble 
so as t o establish the main laws (or categories of laws) on which the 
new con s t i t u t i o n was to be based. 
The f i r s t of these laws concerns the formation of a single l e g i s -
l a t i v e assembly. I n discussing i t , Condorcet gave his views on two 
important questions, the f i r s t being: t o whom should the r i g h t t o 
elect be given? 
Condorcet, at t h i s stage i n his career, was against universal 
suffrage for two reasons. F i r s t , he considered that the masses were 
too ignorant of p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s to be able t o vote i n a meaningful 
manner; secondly, he considered that the poor were so dependent on 
the r i c h and powerful elements of the population that t h e i r votes 
would most l i k e l y serve only the interests of those who were most 
ho s t i l e to true reforms of the exis t i n g regime. He put his f a i t h i n 
the masses of small property owners who he f e l t were most able to 
r e s i s t the influence of the n o b i l i t y and who had a d i r e c t interest i n 
ensuring that the administration of the nation be both peaceful and 
orderly.^ 
1. O.C. IX. 10 - 56. The f i r s t one, dealing with the d i f f e r e n t 
divisions of laws, w i l l be considered l a t e r . 
2. O.C. IX. 10 - 14. 
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He also considered that women should be allowed to vote as they 
were j u s t as capable as men of acquiring moral ideas and of being able 
to reason. To the argument that women were e n t i r e l y dependent on t h e i r 
husbands, he replied by showing that t h i s state of a f f a i r s was due pre-
cisely to the fact that they had never been able to make t h e i r opinions 
f e l t . Fearing that people would only laugh at his views, he was keen 
to point out that the question was one of great importance as i t con-
cerned the natural r i g h t s of half of humanity."'" 
The second question concerned the actual method of election. Con-
dorcet f e l t that the " d i s t r i c t s " could serve as the basic electoral 
areas, each " d i s t r i c t " assembly electing two representatives to s i t i n 
the national assembly. However, he was unable to decide on what the 
actual size of these areas should be. On the one hand, he f e l t that i f 
they were too big they would not allow the members to discuss a new 
system of government i n an orderly and ef f e c t i v e manner. On the other 
hand, the only alternative was the establishment of another series of 
2 
assemblies at a higher l e v e l , that of the provinces f o r example , but 
Condorcet f e l t that t h i s would only complicate the elections and make 
i t even less easy to ensure that the people's choice was respected"^ 
That he remained rather vague and undecided on t h i s question i s indica-
t i v e of the theoretical nature of the work and of the long-term nature 
of the project described i n i t . 
Nevertheless the problems of elections were taken very seriously 
by Condorcet. Perhaps more than any of his contemporaries he devoted 
a great deal of his time to the task of discovering an electoral method 
which would ensure that the successful candidates corresponded f u l l y to 
the wishes of the electors. To t h i s end he had w r i t t e n two works i n 
1. I b i d 15 - 20. 
2. An idea no doubt derived from the Vie de Turgot , O.C. V.116, cf. 
above p. 24. 
3. "Lettres d'un bourgeois de Newhaven", O.C. DC. 24. 
- 33 -
1785 which are not included among his complete works, taut to which he 
alludes i n his second l e t t e r , the "Essai sur l e calcul des probabilites" 
and the "Essai sur l'a p p l i c a t i o n de l'analyse "a l a probabilite des deci-
sions". I t would be superfluous to describe the method which he recommen-
ded; suffice i t to say that i t went well beyond the system whereby the man 
with the greatest number of votes was automatically elected and attempted, 
by a complicated system of l i s t s and repeated rounds of voting, to ensure 
that the second choices of the voters could be shown cl e a r l y and taken i n t o 
consideration when deciding who was the man who they most wanted to repre-
sent them."'" 
Condorcet's fear of the danger that unsuitable men might be elected 
to power was such that i t conditioned numerous aspects of his plans f o r 
electoral arrangements. Thus he called f o r the electoral periods to be as 
short as possible, not only because of the obvious weakness of a system 
which would keep men away from t h e i r work f o r too long, but because t h i s 
would l i m i t the danger of i n t r i g u i n g and the formation of "cabales" . He 
backed t h i s up with a very complicated system of preliminary l i s t s , aimed at 
reducing the number of candidates^. Furthermore, an elected representative 
would only be able i n the f i r s t instance to keep his seat f o r two years. 
Should he stand again a f t e r t h i s period he would require a greater majority 
4 
of the votes i n order to be elected, and s t i l l more i f he stood a t h i r d time. 
Condorcet hoped thereby to reconcile the necessity f o r t r u l y able men to re-
main i n o f f i c e with the risks that a too lengthy period would induce the rep-
resentatives to acquire a "caste" s p i r i t such as the one which dominated the 
Parlements. 
1. Condorcet's work on electoral systems represents one of his most o r i g i n a l 
contributions to knowledge and i t s relevance today i s i l l u s t r a t e d by an 
a r t i c l e on i t which appeared i n Le Monde during the French l e g i s l a t i v e 
elections of 1973* For a detailed examination of t h i s system, cf. Cahen 
Condorcet et l a Revolution francaise Paris, Alcan, 1904, 592 pages, p.36. 
Alengry: Condorcet, guide de l a Revolution francaise, theoricien du d r o i t 
constitutionnelle, et precurseur de l a science soeiale. Paris, Criard et 
Briere, 1904, 891 pages, pp.425-426.and, above a l l , Gilles-Gaston Granger: 
La mathematique Sociale de Marquis de Condorcet, C h . I I I pp. 94-136, P.U.F. 
(1956); K.M. Baker: Condorcet: from natural history to social mathematics 
University of Chicago Press 1975> 538 pages. 
2. O.C. IX. 24 3- I b i d 24-25. 4. I b i d 22. 
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Condorcet was confident that his scheme offered a l l the necessary 
guarantees; t h i s i s shown by the f a c t that he placed no l i m i t s , either 
of age or sex, on the r i g h t of a l l people to stand f o r election'''. 
Having thus established the f i r s t law, namely the method to be 
followed i n order to elect a national l e g i s l a t i v e assembly, the "dis-
t r i c t " assemblies would now pass on to the second law concerning the 
l i m i t s to be imposed on the power of the elected representatives. This 
i s where the notion of a declaration of the ri g h t s of man takes on a l l 
i t s importance. 
"On sent que cette l o i n'est proprement qu'une declaration des 
d r o i t s de l'homme, qu'on peut appeler naturels, qui sont supposes 
anterieurs a. l ' e t a t de society, pour l e maintien desquels e l l e est 
eta b l i e , et qu'elle d o i t conserver dans leur e n t i e r . " 2 
As the sole purpose of the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly was to represent 
the people i t was obvious that the people alone could draw up the code 
according to which t h i s representation would take place. Condorcet 
thus suggested that t h i s be done, once again, i n the " d i s t r i c t " assem-
b l i e s . An a r t i c l e would be proposed to the citizens i n each assembly 
and i f a quarter or one-third of those present accepted i t , i t would go 
before the other assemblies. I f one-third or a quarter of a l l the "dis-
t r i c t s " accepted i t , i t would become part of the Declaration of Flights.^ 
The t h i r d and f o u r t h laws would establish the l e g i s l a t i v e assem-
bly's functions and the manner i n which they would be carried out. 
The f i r s t point on which Condorcet insisted was that the national 
assembly, i n no case, should be able to a l t e r a single a r t i c l e of the 
Declaration of Rights. This was the prerogative of the people. How-
ever, i n order to avoid too many alt e r a t i o n s , he suggested that the 
majority required before any a r t i c l e of the Declaration could be abolished 
4 
or amended should be raised considerably. 
1. I b i d O.C. IX. 17. 
2. I b i d 28. 
3. I b i d 28 - 29. 
4. I b i d 30. 
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Passing on to the actual making of laws, he insisted again on 
the very important role of the " d i s t r i c t " assemblies. The l e g i s l a t i v e 
assembly would be responsible f o r the drawing up of a law, but the law 
could not come int o e f f e c t without the sanction of the people. The law 
would come before them i n each " d i s t r i c t " assembly and they would have 
to decide., f i r s t , i f any a r t i c l e i n i t went against any of the a r t i c l e s 
i n the Declaration of Rights and, secondly, i f the law should be accepted 
i n i t s e n t i r e t y or should be amended. For less urgent laws Condorcet 
suggested that t h i s procedure should be employed even before the law 
had been f u l l y drawn up, i.e. when i t was s t i l l a b i l l " ' " . As a f i n a l 
guarantee that the representatives would not betray the w i l l of the people, 
he even suggested that the " d i s t r i c t " assemblies be allowed to re-examine 
2 
any law at the beginning of each session, i n other words every two years . 
In the case of f i s c a l laws the say of the " d i s t r i c t s " would be even 
greater. The le g i s l a t u r e would only be allowed to propose these laws. 
The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r sanctioning them was to l i e e n t i r e l y w i t h the 
" d i s t r i c t " assemblies. 
The f i f t h part of l e g i s l a t i o n concerns the process whereby the con-
s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f could be altered, i n other words a l l laws concerning the 
Declaration of Rights, the role of the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly and of the 
" d i s t r i c t " assemblies. These laws were described by Condorcet as "con-
s t i t u t i o n a l laws" i n contrast to the other branches of l e g i s l a t i o n deal-
ing w ith the organisation of the administrative bodies, the judicature etc. 
In the case of the l a t t e r , as we have seen, the l e g i s l a t i v e assem-
bly would be quite free to choose the form of a given law once the "dis-
t r i c t s " had indicated that i t did not transgress any of the r i g h t s of 
man. In the case of a "constitutional law", however, such as one d i r e c t l y 
concerned with an a r t i c l e of the Declaration of Rights, not only would the 
1. I b i d 30 - 31-
2. I b i d 32. 
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" d i s t r i c t s " f i r s t have to pronounce on the u t i l i t y and v a l i d i t y of 
a change, but the law, once i t had been drawn up by the l e g i s l a t i v e 
assembly, would s t i l l have to return to the " d i s t r i c t s " f o r a fur t h e r 
examination: "... on exige (une nouvelle sanction) pour les l o i s qui 
reglent l a forme de l a constitution parce qu alors l e corps l e g i s l a t i f 
" i ' i 
ne d o i t pas rester juge, meme de 1 u t i l i t e des avantages d une forme 
' n 1 proposee . 
Having established the basic laws which were to act as the i n -
frastructure of the new con s t i t u t i o n , Condorcet passed on to a more 
detailed study of the actual procedure which was to be followed w i t h i n 
the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly i t s e l f each time i t was considered necessary to 
make a new law. He f i r m l y believed that the qu a l i t y of a law depended on 
two things, the enlightenment and goodwill of the representatives them-
selves, a condition which he considered would be guaranteed by his ele-
c t o r a l system, and the manner i n which the law was discussed. 
This would be as follows. Each time a law had to be made, the 
l e g i s l a t i v e assembly would elect some of i t s members to a committee 
which would have the task of drawing up a b i l l which would then be pub-
lished and d i s t r i b u t e d to a l l the members of the assembly. After a f i r s t 
reading, the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly would appoint a second committee whose 
role would be to. ensure that the b i l l contained no a r t i c l e s which contra-
dicted any of the existing laws. I f i t did not, the b i l l would pass on 
to a second reading. Otherwise the assembly would meet to decide i f the 
committee's views were j u s t i f i e d . I f t h i s was found to be the case, a 
day would be selected f o r debating which a r t i c l e s should be altered, those 
of the b i l l or those of the existing law. The modified b i l l would then 
pass on to the second reading. The proposers would have the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
of d i v i d i n g the b i l l i n t o individual sections which could be discussed i n 
2 
turn and a vote would be taken f o r each section. 
1. I b i d 40 - 41. 
2. i b i d 64 - 65. 
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Condorcet was na t u r a l l y worried about the length of the whole 
process, but he considered that t h i s would be l i m i t e d by the fa c t that 
the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly could devote a l l i t s energies to t h i s one act 
of law-making. Nor would the consultation of the " d i s t r i c t " assemblies 
take long, i n his view, as t h e i r role consisted simply i n deciding, by 
a "yes" or a "no" vote, i f any of the proposed a r t i c l e s i n the b i l l 
v iolated any of the a r t i c l e s of the Declaration.''' 
This section of the "Lettrfis" i s inte r e s t i n g i n so f a r as i t rep-
resents Condorcet's f i r s t attempt t o approach the question of p a r l i a -
mentary procedure which was to absorb him to such a great extent during 
the Revolution. More important than t h i s , however, i t r e f l e c t s his 
desire to establish the new constitution on lines which could not be 
exploited by the pseudo-reformist Parlements. This i s made e x p l i c i t 
at the beginning of the fourth l e t t e r when he attacked the p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s of England so favoured by such people as Montesquieu and 
IT ' ' I ' 
Mably: .... on a parle de forces opposees, de contre-poids, d eq u i l i b r e , 
et ces mots ont eu sur certaines gens une influence d'autant plus f o r t e , 
2 
qu'ils les entendent moins." and when he backed t h i s up with an attack 
on the English system of two Chambers. 
He attempted to show how a system of graded p l u r a l i t i e s w i t h i n a 
single Chamber would be j u s t as ef f e c t i v e i n l i m i t i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of a bad law being passed as the presence of a second Chamber counter-
3 
balancing the influence of the f i r s t . The careful preparation of a b i l l 
was ensured i f the task was l e f t t o committees appointed by the assembly 
and t h i s system was much safer than leaving the task to a second Chamber 
4 
which would only seek to r i v a l the f i r s t . 
In Condorcet's view, i t was absurd to argue that a second chamber 




I b i d 66 - 67. 
I b i d 75. 
I b i d 76. 
I b i d 76 - 77. 
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being rushed through, as one could j u s t as easily say that a second 
chamber would be i d e a l l y placed f o r blocking a l l l e g i s l a t i o n and thus 
bringing the country to a s t a n d s t i l l . The system of successive read-
ings w i t h i n a single chamber had a l l the advantages of the bicameral 
1 
system with none of i t s dangers. 
Parliamentary procedure, therefore, was much more than a mere 
te c h n i c a l i t y as f a r as Condorcet was concerned, f o r i t lay at the 
heart of the problem of proving that i t was possible to establish a 
representative system of democracy based on a single l e g i s l a t i v e as-
sembly while avoiding the weaknesses which the system of two chambers 
was supposed to prevent. 
Having shown that no matter how one combined the organisation 
2 
of two chambers, the r e s u l t was always i n e f f e c t i v e or dangerous , he 
attacked the very reasons f o r desiring a system based on a balance of 
powers, claiming that these systems d i d not exi s t f o r any positive 
reasons but had merely come in t o being i n Europe because of the ar-
b i t r a r y creation of governments by conquest during the breakdown of 
the Roman Empire: 
"Un r o i , des chefs, une arme'e, ont necessairement i n t r o d u i t 
t r o i s pouvoirs d i f f e r e n t s dans tous les pays ou l a co n s t i t u t i o n a 
du sa premiere origine a. l a conquete." 3 
In his view, i t was absurd to say that Greece and Rome had co l -
lapsed because they were incapable of balancing the three powers: 
"... on pourrait en conclure egalement qu'elles ont p e r i parce qu'elles 
ne connaissaient pag les moyens de combiner une democratie represen-
t a t i v e ou i l y eut a l a f o i s de l a paix et de l ' e g a l i t e . " 
The aim of l e g i s l a t o r s should therefore not consist i n seeking 
to preserve the status quo while l i m i t i n g i t s dangers but i n looking 
to the future so as to construct laws which would put an end to the need 
f o r factions. 
1. I b i d 78. 
2. I b i d 81 - 82. 
3. I b i d 83. 
4. I b i d 84. 
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"Les defenseurs de l a d i v i s i o n du pouvoir l e g i s l a t i f ... 
prouvent ... que les hommes sont ambitieux, qu'ils aiment l e pouvoir 
..., mais i l s n'examinent pas s i l e danger qui n a i t de ses vices ... 
n'est pas encore plus l'ouvrage des mauvaises l o i s qui, en formant 
des constitutions compliquees, divisent les hommes au l i e u de les 
reunir." 1 
That Condorcet was nevertheless aware of the strongest argument 
i n favour of a system based on a balance of powers, namely that t h i s 
would prevent the usurpation of power by a single body or in d i v i d u a l , 
i s indicated by the pains he took to show, s t i l l i n the f o u r t h l e t t e r , 
how the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly described i n his system would be incapable 
of such an act. The extremely laborious electoral system described i n 
the second l e t t e r , together with the influence exerted by the " d i s t r i c t " 
assemblies, were s u f f i c i e n t i n his eyes to prevent the national assembly 
from seeking to obtain power i n t h i s way. The negative ro l e was assumed 
by the people who were superior to the national assembly and not by 
2 
another body which would only clash with i t i n a power struggle. 
Despite t h i s , Condorcet was so af r a i d that a single assembly might 
attempt to seize power that he sought to do a l l he could to l i m i t as 
much as possible the autonomy of the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly and i t s i n i t -
i a t i v e . This i s obvious when we see the importance of the role played 
by the " d i s t r i c t " assemblies i n the making of laws, but i t i s perhaps 
even clearer when we examine the s i x t h and l a s t part of l e g i s l a t i o n des-
cribed by Condorcet i n the second l e t t e r , namely the relations w i t h other 
nations, the organisation and use of the armed forces and the organisation 
of a "public force" aimed at ensuring that the laws were enforced. 
Condorcet allowed the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly to deal d i r e c t l y w i t h 
other nations and to draw up tr e a t i e s with them, but the " d i s t r i c t s " 
had f u l l l i b e r t y to meet and decide whether the t r e a t i e s transgressed 
any of t h e i r r i g h t s . 
1. I b i d 86. 
2. I b i d 79 - 80. 
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" I I n'y a jamais de bonne raison pour f a i r e juger par des 
hommes ce qu'ils ne peuvent entendre, mais tous peuvent connaitre 
leurs d r o i t s , et par consequent i l s ne doivent renoncer a c e l u i de 
juger s i ces d r o i t s ont ete violes ou non dans les conventions qui 
les obligent." 1 
Condorcet was aware of the necessity f o r exceptional powers to 
be given to the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly i n an emergency, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n time of war; despite t h i s he was prepared to extend the power of 
the " d i s t r i c t " assemblies to the point where they could demand the 
dissolution of the national assembly and elections f o r a new one, as 
2 
soon as a declaration of war was made. The context of the passage 
indicates that his motives were here very much inspired by his hatred 
of war. He argued, f o r example, that the elections would show the 
3 
people that they had entered in t o a new and unnatural state of a f f a i r s . 
He stated also that the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly would only be able to de-
clare war when another nation had not only violated a peace trea t y but 
4 
had actually backed up i t s v i o l a t i o n by the use of armed force . Thus, 
i n 1787» Condorcet was able, f o r the f i r s t time, to incorporate i n t o a 
coherent programme of reform the strongly p a c i f i s t i c views which he had 
held throughout his l i f e . 
Already, i n 1782, he had strongly denounced war i n the speech he 
Acapnia 
delivered to the Aooemblce francaise a f t e r his reception there on 21st 
February, claiming that i t was contrary to the very laws of human nature 
and could be avoided i f nations sought to co-operate w i t h each other 
rather than engage i n economic c o n f l i c t . To t h i s end he called i n 1786 
f o r the creation of a t r i b u n a l which would draw up a code of laws to 
which a l l nations were to adhere i n peacetime, as well as a l i s t of rules 
to which they were to agree to conform i n time of war. 1. I b i d 41 - 42. 2. I b i d 46. 
3. I b i d 46. 
4. I b i d 45. f t 
5. "Discours de reception a l'Academie francaise" O.C. I . 399* 
6. cf 'be 1'influence de l a Revolution d'Amerique sur 1'Europe" 
O.C. V I I I . 22. 
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This t r i b u n a l would also be used f o r s e t t l i n g disputes between nations, 
before they degenerated i n t o armed conflict''", an idea no doubt inspired 
2 
by l'Abbe de Saint-Pierre, However, an equally strong motive f o r c a l l i n g 
f o r elections immediately a f t e r a declaration of war lay i n his fear 
that war would favour the ambitions of a l e g i s l a t i v e assembly. "Cette 
i n s t i t u t i o n s e r a i t un obstacle aux guerres entreprises ... dans l a vue 
d'augmenter l e pouvoir du corps l e g i s l a t i f . 
The other parts of Condorcet 1s plans are remarkable f o r the power 
they give to the " d i s t r i c t s " . These were to be administered by people 
elected i n each area by the l o c a l assembly and acting on i t s own i n i t i -
ative . In place of a standing army i n time of peace, Condorcet, f o l -
lowing the V i r g i n i a declaration of r i g h t s (Art. 13), suggested that the 
country's security be placed i n the hands of l o c a l m i l i t i a s administered 
d i r e c t l y by the " d i s t r i c t s " . The o f f i c e r s would be elected by t h e i r own 
men - perhaps an attack on the strengthening of hereditary d i s t i n c t i o n s 
i n the army by the Comte de Segur i n 178l - but the chief of each m i l i t i a 
would be elected by t h e " d i s t r i c t " assembly i t s e l f . 
Although the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly could choose where to bui l d sys-
tems of defence etc., the " d i s t r i c t " assemblies would provide the money 
f o r them and they would also be responsible f o r guarding a l l m i l i t a r y 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s v i a the l o c a l m i l i t i a s . Local i n i t i a t i v e plays so great a 
part i n Condorcet's scheme that i t was even possible f o r a " d i s t r i c t " to 
refuse to provide any money f o r the upkeep or construction of a m i l i t a r y 
i n s t a l l a t i o n i f i t had the s l i g h t e s t suspicion that another " d i s t r i c t " 
might be abusing i t s power^. 
Fi n a l l y , the organisation of the "force publique" was to be l e f t 
•7 
e n t i r e l y i n the hands of the " d i s t r i c t s " . 
1. I b i d 21. 
2. cf. also his defence of Voltaire's pacifism i n "Notes sur Voltaire" 
O.C. IV. 507-509. cf. also "Reflexions sur l'esclavage des negres" 
O.C. V I I . 70; "Notes sur Voltaire": "Plus l a c i v i l i s a t i o n s'etendra 
sur l a t e r r e , plus on verra disparaitre l a guerre et les conquetes." 
O.C. IV. 147. 
3. I b i d 46. 4. I b i d 50. 5. I b i d 48 - 49. 
6. I b i d 49. 7- I b i d 50. 
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In addition to the numerous powers he accorded to the " d i s t r i c t s " , 
Condorcet placed several other l i m i t a t i o n s on the autonomy of the l e g i s -
l a t i v e assembly. The most important consisted i n the complete lack of 
control exercised by i t over the executive. As we sha l l see i n greater 
d e t a i l l a t e r , i t controlled neither the treasury nor the judiciary"'' and 
i t s members were debarred from exercising any other functions i n the 
2 
state . Even i n time of war, although i t would have the r i g h t to ap-
point a council to d i r e c t operations, none of the members of t h i s coun-
c i l could be chosen from among i t s ranks.^ 
I t could be argued that Condorcet, i n his eagerness to destroy 
the arguments of the partisans of a system of checks and balances, had 
gone too f a r i n his attempt to curb the power of the central assembly. 
However, before we look at the negative aspects of the scheme, i t w i l l 
be useful to summarise i t s main points by repeating i t s advantages as 
they are given by Condorcet himself i n the t h i r d l e t t e r . 
These may be reduced to seven: 
1) The system was very f l e x i b l e as i t prevented any body 
wit h i n the state from assuming permanent power and gave every oppor-
t u n i t y f o r changing bad laws while preserving the s t a b i l i t y provided 
by the only laws which could not easily be changed, namely the "cons-
t i t u t i o n a l " ones. 
2) The electoral system prevented the formation of "castes" 
and "cabales" and ensured that the representatives t r u l y reflected the 
choice of the electorate and i d e n t i f i e d themselves completely w i t h i t s 
interests. 
3) The uniformity of the laws, especially with regard to taxa-
t i o n and commerce, made a l l the " d i s t r i c t s " interdependent and ensured 




I b i d 32. 
I b i d 22. 
I b i d 49 - 50. 
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4) The power of the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly was l i m i t e d by i t s 
i n a b i l i t y to control taxation and the treasury and by the law which 
forbade i t s members to exercise other functions i n the state. 
5) The r e l a t i v e l y long period which separated a proposition 
that an important law be changed from the actual moment when t h i s 
proposition would be examined, prevented the too frequent disruption 
of the system of laws, while the r i g h t of the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly to 
arrange the actual form of a law, once the " d i s t r i c t s " had decided 
that the law's principles did not viol a t e the r i g h t s of man, enabled 
the new law to f i t smoothly i n t o the system of laws whose form had 
already been established by t h i s same body. 
6) In peace time the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly's power was checked 
by the " d i s t r i c t s " and although the scheme took a great r i s k i n allow-
ing the assembly to levy taxes i n wartime, t h i s was less dangerous than 
the English system where one part of the population could deprive the 
nation of v i t a l f i n a n c i a l support i n wartime by refusing to provide the 
government with the necessary f i n a n c i a l means f o r waging the war: 
"Le principe d'empecher les abus, en opposant les pouvoirs, 
a l e desavantage de f a i r e dependre l e sort de l'E t a t du plus ou 
moins d'opiniatrete, du plus ou moins de corruption de chacun." 1 
7) The pr i n c i p l e that war should be declared only a f t e r another 
nation had actually commenced h o s t i l i t i e s was j u s t i f i e d by the sheer 
e v i l of war and by the danger which i t represented p a r t i c u l a r l y to a 
new regime based on popular sovereignty. The elections which would 
follow a declaration of war gave the people a great opportunity f o r 
expressing t h e i r confidence or lack of confidence i n the assembly at 
2 
a time of national c r i s i s . 
1. I b i d 69. 
2. I b i d 71. 
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Judging by the t h i r d l e t t e r , therefore, Condorcet was very 
pleased w i t h his scheme and considered i t would provide a s o l i d basis 
f o r a France i n which a l l the responsible citizens would par t i c i p a t e 
i n the running of the nation's a f f a i r s i n collaboration w i t h a single, 
united assembly of elected representatives. 
However, i t i s impossible to speak of "weaknesses" when examining 
t h i s project as i t i s obvious that Condorcet did not see i t as a prac-
t i c a l series of reforms which could be imposed overnight on the nation. 
For example, he said p r a c t i c a l l y nothing about the organisation of the 
executive and not much more about the nevertheless overwhelming problems 
posed by the organisation of the numerous meetings of the " d i s t r i c t " 
assemblies which his plan entailed. He said nothing about who would be 
responsible f o r summoning these assemblies i n the f i r s t place. He spoke 
of women's votes at a time when to speak of votes at a l l was unusual. 
A l l t h i s indicates that Condorcet was more interested i n t h i s work 
i n laying down general ideas which could be used l a t e r as the basis f o r 
the setting up of an e n t i r e l y new system of government. That the work 
was experimental and theoretical i n nature i s confirmed by the f a c t that 
Condorcet considered three other systems i n addition to the one already 
mentioned: 
... ou former d i f f e r e n t s ordres de divisions, comme l a reunion 
de d i s t r i c t s en provinces, cell e de provinces en Etats, en s'arretant 
toujiours a un seul corps l e g i s l a t i f ; ou donner a chaque reunion des 
d i s t r i c t s un corps l e g i s l a t i f independant, et former de ces Etats 
separes une republique federative dont les a f f a i r e s communes seraient 
dirigees par un congres; ou enfin combiner ensemble ces deux premiers 
moyens." 1 
These d i f f e r e n t systems are not worth describing i n d e t a i l . The 
important thing to emphasise i s that they r e f l e c t Condorcet's deter-
mination to overcome the problem facing a l l the contemporary theorists 
of popular sovereignty, namely the task of granting the people as great 
1. I b i d 51. 
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a say as possible i n the running of a large nation with a big population. 
His scheme i s a bold one which aims at accepting the dramatic challenge 
made by Rousseau i n L i v r e I I I , Chapitre 4 of the Contrat S o c i a l : 
"A prendre l e terme dans l a rigueur de l'acceptation, i l n'a 
jamais existe de ver i t a b l e Democratie, et i l n'en ex i s t e r a jamais. 
I I est contre l'ordre naturel que l e grand nombre gouverne et que 
l e p e t i t s o i t gouverne. On ne peut imaginer que l e peuple reste 
incessamment assemble pour vaquer aux a f f a i r e s publiques ... 
D'a i l l e u r s , que de choses d i f f i c i l e s a reunir ne suppose Lpas.ce 
GouvernementI Premierement un Et a t t r e s p e t i t ou l e peuple s o i t 
f a c i l e a rassembler et ou chaque citoyen puisse aisement connaitre 
tous l e s autres." 1 
The d i v i s i o n of the nation into thousands of " d i s t r i c t s " , and 
the l i m i t s applied to the power of the central representative assem-
bly, though they do not constitute a "democracy" i n the sense which 
Rousseau gave to t h i s word, r e f l e c t Condorcet's great e f f o r t s to recon-
c i l e popular participation i n the government of a big nation with the 
necessity for some form of representation. 
I t would be quite wrong to assume, because of the somewhat 
abstract nature of the scheme described i n the "Lettres d'un bourgeois 
de_ Newhaven", that Condorcet was a p o l i t i c a l i d e a l i s t working i n a 
vacuum. When he wrote t h i s work i n 1787* he could look to at l e a s t two 
great precedents. F i r s t , there was Hume who attempted i n h i s essay on 
the "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" to describe a vast scheme of rep-
resentation for Great B r i t a i n based on the parishes and counties and 
ended with a bold statement of confidence i n h i s work: 
"We s h a l l conclude t h i s subject with observing the falsehood of 
the common opinion that no large state, such as France or B r i t a i n , 
could ever be modelled into a commonwealth ... The contrary seems evident. 
Secondly, and even more important as i t had j u s t come into being, 
there was the federal system of the United States of America. 
1. Ibid p. 404. 
2. Essays moral, p o l i t i c a l and l i t e r a r y . Part I I , Essay XVI (1752). 
Grant Richards, London 1903 pp. 513 - 514. 
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In 1787> therefore, Condorcet was f u l l y aware of the poten-
t i a l of a scheme such as the one he described i n the "Lettres". He 
r e a l i s e d , however, that no form of democracy was possible unless there 
had been i n s t i l l e d into the people a unity of purpose which transcended 
regional and c l a s s differences and he r e a l i s e d that t h i s could not be 
done unless the e x i s t i n g laws had been changed. I t was thus on a 
s l i g h t l y pessimistic note that he concluded the fourth l e t t e r : 
M l ' ' 
I I s e t a b l i t necessairement deux cla s s e s de citoyens, partout 
ou i l y a des gens tres-pauvres et des gens t r e s - r i c h e s : et l ' e g a l i t e 
republieaine ne peut e x i s t e r dans un pays ou l e s l o i s c i v i l e s , l e s 
l o i s de finance, l e s l o i s de commerce rendent possible l a longue 
duree des grandes fortunes." 1 
Despite t h i s , he continued to give h i s f u l l attention to the 
question of discovering a way of setting up a representative system 
of government. Naturally the subject of most of h i s research was the 
constitution of the United States, as i s witnessed by the detailed study 
of the workings of the House of Representatives and the Senate which he 
2 
published i n 1788. 
But i t was an event which took place i n Prance which was to i n s -
pire him to write h i s most coherent and detailed work on the subject 
on the eve of the Revolution, the "Essai sur l a constitution et l e s 
' 11 3 fonctions des assemblees provinciales . 
This event consisted i n the important reforms introduced by 
Lomenie de Brienne i n May 1788 against the powers of the Parlements. 
They were to lose t h e i r j u d i c i a l authority to appeal tribunals set up 
i n f o r t y - f i v e areas known as the "grands b a i l l i a g e s " , and the Paris 
Parlement's pri v i l e g e of registering the Royal edicts was to pass to 
a "cour pleniere". The "Etats provinciaux" were abolished and Necker's 
1. "Lettres d'un bourgeois de Newhaven", O.C. DC. 93-
2. Supplement to the essay "Sur 1 'influence de l a revolution d'Amerique 
sur l'Europe" O.C. V I I I . 9. 
3. o.c. V I I I . 115 -659. 
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"assemblies provinciales" were to be extended to several other parts 
of France. They were, i n addition, to have more than a purely consul-
t a t i v e role to play and were gradually to replace the Intendants. 
Although the d i s t i n c t i o n of Orders was to be maintained, the T i e r s 
E t a t were to be allowed a double representation and voting was to be 
carried out by head and not Orders. 
Condorcet was at f i r s t more anxious than pleased when he heard 
of these reforms. As we have seen, the bulk of h i s attacks on the 
Ancien Regime had been directed against the privileged bodies within 
the nation, namely the Parlement n o b i l i t y and the clergy, i n favour 
of the propertied cl a s s e s who constituted the majority of the T i e r s 
E t a t . Unfortunately for him, the Tiers Etat, as a recent piece of 
s t a t i s t i c a l analysis has confirmed ^, were inclined to side with the 
parlements against what they considered as the "despotism" of the 
government. 
Condorcet's f i r s t reaction, therefore, was to embark on a pro-
paganda campaign aimed at winning the approval of the Tiers Etat f or 
the edicts. Shortly a f t e r they were issued on 8th May 1788 he wrote 
a pamphlet i n the form of two "Lettres d'un citoyen des Etats-Unis a 
' 2 
un Franc^ais sur l e s a f f a i r e s presentes" , concluding t h e . f i r s t with a 
dramatic appeal to the Tiers not to be deluded by the f a l s e l y progres-
sive claims of the "parlementaires": 
"... dans 1 annee ou l e r o i a forme, dans toutes ses provinces 
des corps de representants, ... l o r s q u ' i l a a i n s i pose' l e fondement 
d'une constitution dans laquelle ces pouvoirs opposes, toujours s i 
dangereux pour l a t r a n q u i l l i t e publique, l e progres de l a l e g i s l a t i o n , 
l a reforme des abus, deviendraient i n u t i l e s au maintien des d r o i t s des 
hommes; l o r s q u ' i l a donne par l a aux peuples l e s plus l i b r e s un exemple 
que peut-etre i l s auront un jour l a sagesse de suivre; lorsque ces assem-
b l i e s gene'rales dans toutes l e s provinces offrent a l a nation l a faculte 
1. Greenlaw; "Pamphlet l i t e r a t u r e i n France during the period of the 
a r i s t o c r a t i c revolt 1787 -88" i n Journal of Modern History (1957), 
PP. 349 - 354. 
2. O.C. IX. 95 - 123. 
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d'avoir, toutes l e s f o i s qu^elle l e voudra, une assemblee reguliere et 
legitime de veritables representants du peuple; lorsqu'on s a i t que l ' i n -
e galite qui reste dans ces assemblees est moins l';ouvr,age du gouverne-
ment que l ' e f f e t de sa condescendence pour des prejuges malheureusement 
encore puissants parmi vous ... quand tout annonce que l e s d r o i t s des 
citoyens sont enfin reconnus et respectes, de bonne f o i , est-ce l e moment 
qu ' i l f a l l a i t c h o i s i r pour c r i e r contre l e despotisme? Est-ce lorsqu'on 
vient d'obtenir des moyens reguliers de reclamer, qu'on doit recourir aux 
actes de violence, de sedition, etc.?" 1 
That Condorcet's optimism here i s more than a r h e t o r i c a l device 
i s indicated by the f a c t that the right of the c i t i z e n s to participate 
i n the making of laws i s included without any reservations i n the l i s t 
2 
of r i g h t s given i n the f i r s t l e t t e r and, above a l l , by the f a c t that, 
despite the r e j e c t i o n of the project i n September 1788, he continued to 
write the long "Ess a i sur l e s assemble'es provinciales" which presents 
h i s l a s t attempt before 1789 to consolidate and elaborate on the theore-
t i c a l systems of government sketched i n the Vie de Turgot and the 
"Lettres d'un bourgeois de Newhaven". 
The " E s s a i " , therefore, i s a work which grew out of the ideas 
already expressed i n the "Lettres d'un bourgeois de Newhaven". How-
ever, though i t goes over much of the ground covered i n the previous 
work, i t w i l l be seen to be much more precise and elaborate and l e s s 
inclined to leave too many loose ends. 
An indication of the way the " E s s a i " pays greater attention to 
p r a c t i c a l requirements than the more theoretical "Lettres" may be found 
i n the very f i r s t a r t i c l e , dealing with the right to vote. As i n the 
"Lettres" t h i s i s granted only to people who were considered to be i n -
dependent, namely property owners, but we find no lengthy d i s s e r t a t i o n s 
about the rights of women, as i f Condorcet feared that such digressions 
would only cloud the r e a l i s s u e s . ^ 
1. Ibid 104 - 105. 
2. Ibid 102. 
3. Ibid O.C. V I I I . 130. 
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A r t i c l e I I , dealing with the t e r r i t o r i a l divisions, also contains 
t h i s combination of r e p e t i t i o n of old ideas together with an awareness 
of p r a c t i c a l necessities. Realising that the " d i s t r i c t " assemblies 
described i n the "Lettres" could never act as the basic electoral units 
f o r a national assembly on account of t h e i r excessive numbers, he reverts 
1 . 1 ' to the t h r e e - t i e r system of the Vie de Turgot , namely communautes de 
campagne" - "canton" (though here called " d i s t r i c t s " ) - "province". 
However, Condorcet introduces two new ideas not mentioned i n the 
"Lettres" or the Vie de Turgot . F i r s t , not only would the "country 
communities" s t i l l consist of country villages grouped together to balance 
the smaller towns, but the equilibrium would be consolidated by allowing 
the larger towns to place themselves on a par w i t h the " d i s t r i c t s " , t h e i r 
own "municipal" assemblies thus acquiring the status of the smaller towns 
and the "country communities". As i n the Vie de Turgot ', the " d i s t r i c t " 
assemblies would then elect the "provincial" assemblies and i t was the 
l a t t e r who would elect the national assembly. 
Secondly, Condorcet replaces the old scheme whereby, at each l e v e l , 
one assembly elected from among i t s own members both the administrative 
body of the area and the people who were to represent the assembly at the 
2 
l e v e l above i t and introduces instead a new scheme based on three assem-
bl i e s f o r each area, an electoral assembly whose sole function was to elect 
and an administrative body elected by the l a t t e r but which met only on 
occasions to review the work done by a small, permanent administrative 
3 
body, also elected by the electoral assemblies. 
Condorcet's aim i n separating the functions of electing and admini-
s t r a t i n g was to l i m i t the dangers of each assembly's acquiring an inward 
looking " e s p r i t de corps", but the project i s far-sighted i n so f a r as i t 
t i ' 
anticipated the creation by the Constituent Assembly of the assemblees 
primaires" i n 1789-1. Cf. above p.24 2. Cf. above p.p. 21 - 22. 
3. I b i d O.C. V I I I . 146. 4. I b i d O.C. V I I I . 184 - 185. 
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Another element which i l l u s t r a t e s the contrast between the Essai 
and the"Lettres"is that, i n the former, Condorcet i s not content j u s t 
to mention the d i f f e r e n t areas i n t o which the nation should be divided 
but provides p r a c t i c a l advice about how t h i s i s to be done. The most 
important c r i t e r i o n , i n his view, was the necessity f o r preserving the 
uni t y of areas which had natural geographical and c u l t u r a l a f f i n i t i e s . 
Thus the reformers were to unite only "les parties dont l a communication 
est f a i t e , et aux-quelles une ressemblance dans l e climat et dans l e sol 
donne une culture, des habitudes, des usages communs."''" 
For t h i s purpose he suggests that the existing divisions be used 
as the basis f o r the new ones. The dioceses, f o r example, could be used 
to form the " d i s t r i c t s " , and the "generalites" could be used as a basis 
f o r the provinces. 
Another important p r a c t i c a l consideration to be borne i n mind was 
the size of the divisions. The "chef-lieu" of each country community was 
to be easily accessible so that a l l the citizens of the area could go there, 
discuss t h e i r business f o r a few hours and return home wi t h i n a single day. 
Condoreet estimates three leagues t o be the most reasonable distance which 
should separate the "chef-lieu" from the furthest l i m i t of the area. A 
" d i s t r i c t " "chef-lieu" was not to be more than h a l f a day's walk from 
the furthest l i m i t s ; the "chef-lieu" of the province was not to exceed 
a day's walk from the "chef-lieu" of the furthe s t " d i s t r i c t " w i t h i n the 
3 
province. 
A r t i c l e I I deals once again with the question of what mandates the 
electors should give to t h e i r representatives, a question which, despite 
i t s importance, i s not mentioned i n the "Lettres". Once again t h i s 
section provides an indication of the more p r a c t i c a l nature of the "Essai". 
1. I b i d 273. 
2. I b i d 273 - 274. 
3. I b i d 273. 
- 51 -
In the "Lettres" we are given an image of a rather passive l e g i s l a t i v e 
assembly acting to a large extent on the orders of a vast network of 
" d i s t r i c t s " , but, apart from assuming that the uniformity of the law 
system would be such as to ensure that a l l the " d i s t r i c t s " would work 
i n harmony, l i t t l e i s done to approach the question of how deadlock i n 
the assembly could be avoided i f each representative merely stated the 
views of his electors. I t i s to resolve t h i s very real problem that 
Condorcet c a l l s f o r the representatives to be allowed a certain amount 
of i n i t i a t i v e i n the way they voted: 
Ne f a u d r a i t - i l pas p l u t o t chercher a detruire qu a favoriser 
l'idee que les communautes, les d i s t r i c t s , ont des in t e r e t s separes 
ou contraires, et l'idee, non moins dangereuse que les deputes ou 
representants doivent voter, non d'apres l a raison ou l a j u s t i c e , 
mais suivant l ' i n t e r e t de leurs commettants?" 1 
He has here put his finger on a question which was to assume great 
importance during the meeting of the Etats-G^neraux a few months l a t e r . 
2 
A r t i c l e I I I deals with the question of e l i g i b i l i t y , another sub-
j e c t which the "Lettres" had only very b r i e f l y considered. Condorcet's 
general views on the matter echo more or less what he had said i n the 
"Lettres", namely that l i m i t a t i o n s on e l i g i b i l i t y were to be avoided"^, 
but he does suggest that they be the same as those imposed on the r i g h t 
4 
to vote, thus excluding people who did not own property. 
This r e a l i s t i c a t t i t u d e i s maintained i n the second section when 
he condemns the idea that a man should not be allowed to stand as a 
candidate outside his own Order. Condorcet's argument i s here not based 
i 
solely on the f a c t that he f e l t the system of Orders to be an anachronism' 
which threatened a l l hopes of creating a united representative assembly , 
but also on his awareness that the experience of the n o b i l i t y would be 
absolutely v i t a l should such an assembly come i n t o being. 1. I b i d 148. 
4. I b i d 151. 
2. I b i d 150 - 177-
5. I b i d 157. 
3. I b i d 177. 
6. I b i d 151-154. 
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An example of Condorcet's acute anticipation of events to come may 
be found i n the four t h section when he attacks the r u l i n g that the man 
who wished to be elected to a provincial assembly should possess greater 
wealth than i f he wished merely to be e l i g i b l e f o r a " d i s t r i c t " assembly. 
Condorcet's argument i s that wealth was not a guarantee against corrup-
tion''". He argues also that the electors alone should decide who were 
the r i g h t men f o r each post and thus anticipates the attacks he was to 
make on the f i n a n c i a l c r i t e r i a f o r e l i g i b i l i t y which the Constituent 
2 
Assembly was to establish shortly afterwards. 
F i n a l l y , i n section three, Condorcet again shows an eye f o r prac-
t i c a l d e t a i l s which i s lacking i n the "Lettres d'un bourgeois de New-
haven". This i s when he objects to the reforms to prevent men who exer-
cised important functions from being allowed to stand as candidates. I t 
was dangerous f o r judges, f o r example, to be away too long from t h e i r 
3 
posts. 
This eye f o r d e t a i l and precision i s nowhere better i l l u s t r a t e d 
4 
than i n A r t i c l e IV dealing w i t h the composition of the d i f f e r e n t assem-
bli e s . We are here very f a r from the purely schematic outline given i n 
5 6 the ''Vie de Turgot and the "Lettres" . The a r t i c l e goes as follows: 
The assembly of each country community and small town would elect 
t h e i r respective administrative assemblies and a president, one "depute" 
to represent them at the d i s t r i c t electoral assembly and one"depute" f o r 
the administrative assembly of the " d i s t r i c t " . 
The electoral assembly of the d i s t r i c t would elect the o f f i c e r s 
and president of the d i s t r i c t ' s administrative assembly, the members and 
the president of the d i s t r i c t ' s intermediary administrative body, one 




I b i d O.C. V I I I . 174 - 176. 
I b i d O.C. V I I I . 171 
Cf. above p. 21 - 22. 
2. Cf. below p. 
4. Ibid'178 - 193. 
6. Cf. above p. 28. 
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F i n a l l y , the electoral assembly of the province would elect the 
o f f i c e r s and president of the province's administrative body, the members 
and president of the intermediary administrative body and three deputies 
to the national l e g i s l a t i v e assembly.^" 
At every l e v e l a deputy would stay i n o f f i c e f o r three years, at the 
end of which time he could stand f o r re-election. However he would need 
a greater majority of the votes to be successful on the second occasion 
and s t i l l more i f he presented himself a t h i r d time. As i n the "Lettres", 
Condorcet hoped that t h i s method would act as a guarantee that a certain 
amount of continuity would be preserved without the danger that men would 
2 
stay i n o f f i c e f o r several years. 
He was natur a l l y very pleased w i t h his plan and he contrasts i t s 
coherence and smoothness with the complicated theories of Montesquieu who 
he accuses of having been "plus souvent occupe de trouver des raisons a 
ce qui est, que de chercher ce qui devrait etre, et de v o i r comment des 
abus contrebalancaient d'autres abus, que d'examiner les moyens de les 
* ,,3 envelopper tous dans l a meme destruction. 
His only fear concerned the " d i s t r i c t " assemblies which because of 
t h e i r large size, notably i n the big towns, could exercise a p o t e n t i a l l y 
d i v i s i v e influence. However he f e l t t hat the electors would be i n t e l l i g e n t 
enough to choose men who shared t h e i r own interests. I t i s nevertheless 
t y p i c a l of his s l i g h t l y ambiguous a t t i t u d e at t h i s time that he proposes 
that the presidents of the various assemblies be chosen exclusively from 
5 
the f i r s t two Orders. 
The same thoroughness with which Condorcet describes the d i f f e r e n t 
assemblies which were to function at each l e v e l i s to be found again i n 
A r t i c l e when he b r i e f l y summarises the role which the administrative 
bodies of the provincial assemblies were to play. These include some of 




I b i d O.C. V I I I . 180 - 182. 
I b i d 190. 
I b i d 190. 
2. I b i d 178 - 180. 
4. I b i d I85 - 186. 
6. I b i d 268 - 271. 
- 54 -
Here, however, he has broadened his scope and has systematised his ideas. 
In the "Lettres" the d i s t r i c t ' s functions were mentioned only incidentally^ 
and were not summed up i n a separate a r t i c l e , as here. The functions of 
the provincial assemblies under the scheme were to be as follows: 
1) the levying of a l l d i r e c t taxes; 
2) the administration of public works w i t h i n the province; 
3) the administration of a l l State property - the royal 
domains, the revenue from hospitals, colleges, f a c t o r i e s , 
corporations and church properties; 
4) the inspection of a l l public i n s t i t u t i o n s such as poor 
r e l i e f and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of money to promote enter-
prise i n the factories, villages and shops; 
5) the administration and organisation of the m i l i t i a ; 
6) the administration of the j u d i c i a r y and police; 
7) the discovery of ways to redeem the national debt. 
Another i l l u s t r a t i o n of the consolidation of Condorcet's ideas i s 
2 
provided by A r t i c l e V I I of the "Essai" where he approaches the important 
question of what prerogatives should be granted to the members of the 
provincial and " d i s t r i c t " assemblies. 
F i r s t , they were not to be l i a b l e t o arrest i n c i v i l actions while 
the assembly was i n session. This was not only to allow them to carry 
out t h e i r public duties i n peace, but to protect them from the a c t i v i t i e s 
of opponents who might be tempted to invent a charge w i t h the aim of en-
3 
suring the removal of a deputy who was opposed to t h e i r interests. 
Secondly, they were not to be prosecuted or arrested f o r crimes 
unless the assembly, a f t e r having examined the evidence, voted by a 
4 
two-thirds majority that they should be. 
Thirdly, no member was to be arrested as the re s u l t of a speech 
delivered i n an assembly. This was a very important point as free speech 1. Cf. above p. 31. 3. I b i d 260 - 261 
2. I b i d O.C. V I I I . 258 - 268. 
4. I b i d 261. 
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alone could ensure that the assemblies would carry out t h e i r role of 
defending the people's int e r e s t and wiping out the abuses of the existing 
system. 
"Si un t e l p r i v i l e g e n'est point accorde aux assemblees provinciales 
et de d i s t r i c t s , i l n'est guere possible d'esperer qu'elles deviennent 
reellement u t i l e s . " 1 
Members would of course be allowed to attack each other, but only i n 
so f a r as they l i m i t e d t h e i r remarks to matters concerning t h e i r o f f i c i a l 
functions. Libellous personal attacks, which undermined a deputy's repu-
t a t i o n by questioning his i n t e g r i t y , would not be covered by the pr i v i l e g e 
2 
of immunity. 
F i n a l l y , deputies would be guaranteed immunity f o r a l l works which 
they wrote on matters of l e g i s l a t i o n and administration. These works 
represented the only way whereby the public could examine proposals which 
had been rejected by the assemblies. They would thus act as a useful check 
on the workings of the representatives and would contribute towards the 
3 
p o l i t i c a l education of the masses. 
4 
The f i f t h a r t i c l e dealing w i t h the form of elections does not con-
5 
cern us here as i t repeats more or less what was said i n the "Lettres" . 
I t i s interesting only i n so f a r as i t r e f l e c t s Condorcet's continuing 
struggle to arrive at a method which was both simple and accurate. Once 
again, however, there are innovations i n t h i s work which i l l u s t r a t e a 
greater awareness of pr a c t i c a l necessities than i s seen i n the e a r l i e r 
"Lettres". The provision that the electors vote i n w r i t i n g , f o r example -
t h e i r choice being delivered i n a sealed box on the day fi x e d by the 
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4. I b i d 193 - 211. 
6. Essai, etc. O.C. V I I I . 200 - 201. 
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keeping people away from t h e i r homes and work for too long, as well as 
the need to protect people from coercion and the eloquence of demagogues. 
A r t i c l e VI"'" concerns the method of debating within the d i f f e r e n t 
assemblies. In e f f e c t t h i s method i s merely an adaptation of the one des-
cribed i n the "Lettres" for the passing of a law by the l e g i s l a t i v e assem-
2 
bly . In the same way as a b i l l was to be divided into several clauses 
which could be debated individually by the assembly, so would the motions 
"5 
which came before the regional assemblies . In both cases t h i s task was 
4 
to be allocated to working committees elected for t h i s purpose . 
Returning to the question of mandates, Condorcet adopts a compro-
mise solution; on complicated matters of general policy, the deputies 
were to vote according to t h e i r personal judgement; on basic matters 
d i r e c t l y concerning t h e i r electors they were to vote at the l a t t e r s ' 
5 
bidding. 
On the question of the majority which would be required before a 
motion or b i l l would be accepted, Condorcet gives i n d e t a i l a project 
which he had already touched on i n the "Lettres d'un bourgeois de Newhaven", 
namely the idea of "graded p l u r a l i t i e s " . He believed firmly that there was 
no better way of ensuring both that necessary laws could be made smoothly 
and that no laws were rushed through c a r e l e s s l y . He suggests, for example, 
that a law dealing with an important constitutional question such as the 
equality of the c i t i z e n s could not be passed unless i t was favoured by 
three-quarters of the provincial assemblies and three-quarters of the 
" d i s t r i c t s " . Non-constitutional laws, on the other hand, could be passed 




Ibid 211 -221. 
Ibid V I I . 211-213. 
Ibid 215. 
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A r t i c l e V I I , dealing with the formation of a national assembly, 
underlines more than any of the others the d i f f e r e n t approach which Con-
dorcet adopts to the problems of the day i n the "Essai" as opposed to the 
"Lettres". 
In the l a t t e r work, imagining a nation i n which a l l hereditary d i s -
t i n c t i o n s had been abolished, Condorcet had discussed the the o r e t i c a l 
p o s s i b i l i t y of establishing a constitution i n which a national assembly, 
elected by the property owners of the state, would govern the country i n 
d i r e c t collaboration with the " d i s t r i c t " assemblies. But he had passed 
over such important short-term questions as who would be responsible f o r 
organising the election of the national assembly i n the f i r s t place. 
The reason why he now deals with t h i s question i s that the "Essai" 
was w r i t t e n i n a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t climate from that which existed i n 
1787. The May edicts had precipitated events and Condorcet f e l t that the 
formation of a national assembly was the only way i n which the ambition 
of the Parlements could be forestalled. For t h i s reason he was prepared 
to accept a method which had nothing to do with the one described so 
painstakingly i n the "Lettres". 
In the f i r s t place he emphasises the necessity f o r the King to take 
2 
the i n i t i a t i v e f o r arranging that such an assembly come i n t o being . I f 
Condorcet had not mentioned t h i s method i n the "Lettres" i t was no doubt 
because of his awareness of the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of reconciling i t with the 
new system of government which he had i n mind. Not only was i t absurd to 
expect the King to take steps to c a l l a national assembly which would exer-
cise l e g i s l a t i v e power i n his place, but he did not even have the authority 
to do so as his power had not been given to him by the people. By 1788, 
Condorcet had come to realise that t h i s contradiction had to be accepted 
as there was no other solution."^ 
1. I b i d 221 - 258. 
2. I b i d O.C. V I I I . 222; 
J. I b i d 222. 
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Secondly, Condorcet, while admitting that the system he had des-
cribed e a r l i e r was the only one which guaranteed that the national as-
sembly would be established on principles which transcended the pragmatic 
considerations which had governed the establishment of a l l French i n s t i -
tutions u n t i l then"*", goes on to describe a method whereby the exi s t i n g 
i n s t i t u t i o n s could be used to form a national assembly. 
The provincial assemblies which already existed i n the Pays d'Etats 
would elect a certain number of deputies to represent them i n the national 
assembly and the new provincial assemblies i n the rest of France would do 
the same . Condorcet preferred t h i s to using the " b a i l l i a g e s " as the 
electoral areas. The provinces were fewer i n number and t h i s would make 
fo r a r e l a t i v e l y small national assembly which would be able to function 
3 
with greater efficiency than a huge body. 
The scheme i s r e a l l y nothing more than a brave attempt to make the 
best out of a bad state of a f f a i r s and Condorcet was quite aware of i t s 
inadequacy. No sooner had he finished describing i t than he embarked on 
the description of another method whereby one man from each parish would 
be appointed w i t h the specific task of choosing a body of electors i n each 
province who would then proceed to elect the representatives f o r the 
4 
national assembly. 
There i s no need to go further i n t o the d e t a i l s of the various 
schemes which Condorcet described at t h i s time f o r setting up a national 
assembly. The important question to investigate i s the influence which 
a l l t h i s had on the development of his ideas. 
Perhaps the most important point to make here i s that t h i s period 
was largely responsible f o r an idea which was to become a matter of great 
importance f o r him as the Revolution progressed, namely that of adapting 
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"conventions" whose role was to examine and revise the constitution. 
In the "Lettres d'un bourgeois de Newhaven." the i n i t i a t i v e f o r revising 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n was l e f t to the citizens i n the " d i s t r i c t " assemblies 
who, every two years, would have the r i g h t to bring to the national as-
sembly's notice any alterations which they f e l t needed to be made i n the 
existing laws.''' 
Not only had these assemblies not yet come int o being but the nation-
a l assembly which was to be formed according to the methods described 
above would natura l l y not correspond to the ideals expressed by Condorcet 
i n the e a r l i e r work. In his view i t should nevertheless be allowed to 
function f o r a certain number of years during which time i t could set-
about reforming the abuses of the existing system and allow the masses to 
develop a p o l i t i c a l consciousness. The time would then be ripe f o r the 
election of a national assembly which would have the specific function of 
examining and revising the existing constitution. 
However, as the f i r s t national assembly had been summoned by the King 
and had been formed without any consultation of the people's wishes, i t 
would not have the authority to f i x the form of the assembly which would 
l a t e r examine i t s work: "... ou bien i l f a udrait pretendre que les assem-
blees formees par une premiere constitution ont seules l e d r o i t de l a 
/ !> 2 
changer et de se reformer elles-memes. In the absence of any precedent 
f o r t h i s , one would have to f a l l back on reason: "... c'est a l a r.aison 
seule a juger s i l a representation est r e e l l e , s i e l l e est assez egale pour 
, . ' / / ..3 
que les d r o i t s d aucun citoyen n aient ete blesses. What Condorcet has 
i n mind i s a system of election based on the method described i n the 
"Lettres d'un bourgeois de Newhaven" and completed i n the early part of the 
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From here he proceeds to express the need f o r such an assembly to 
be called regularly, about every twenty years, to revise the constitution. 
Otherwise the consequences, i n his view, would be extremely serious: 
... i l faudrait admettre que toute constitution, une f o i s e t a blie, 
ne peut jamais changer legitimement, ce qui s e r a i t ... condamner l a 
suite entiere des generations a etre les victimes des fautes dans les-
quelles 1'ignorance a pu entrainer leurs predecesseurs." 1 
The need to make arrangements f o r the speedy creation of a national 
assembly also had two other important consequences f o r the development 
of Condorcet's ideas. 
F i r s t , i t obliged him to narrow down the various alternatives which 
he had described f o r the setting up of a new constitution. Thus there i s 
no mention at a l l i n the "Essai" of the federal constitution described i n 
the "Lettres". 
Secondly, i t led him to examine more closely important d e t a i l s con-
cerning the status which was to be given to the members of a national 
assembly. For example, he mentions f o r the f i r s t time the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
the deputies' receiving salaries , an idea borrowed most probably from 
3 
the American constitution . He deals also with the question of the elec-
' 4 
t i o n of the assembly o f f i c e r s - the "syndics", " g r e f f i e r s " and "president", 
fro 
d e t a i l s which are absent i s the "Lettres d'un bourgeois de Newhaven". 
The "Essai sur les assemblies provinciales" i s the l a s t major work 
which Condorcet wrote before the meeting of the Etats-Generaux. I t 
therefore marks the l a s t stage i n the development of his ideas concerning 
the r i g h t of the people to participate i n the making of laws and the ad-
ministration of the nation. 
1. I b i d O.C. V I I I . 224. 
2. I b i d O.C. V I I I . 275 - 276. 
3- Cf. "Reflexions sur 1'influence de l a Revolution d'Amerique sur 1'Europe" 
O.C. V I I I . 97. 
4. I b i d O.C. V I I I . 246 - 248. 
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We may summarise the development of these ideas by di v i d i n g them 
in t o four stages. The f i r s t corresponds to the period i n which Condor-
cet accepted the p r i n c i p l e of popular sovereignty but was too aware of 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved to attempt to describe a method whereby i t could 
be put in t o practice. The second stage i s represented by that part of the 
Vie de Turgot i n which Condorcet describes the p o t e n t i a l of Turgot's 
reform plans f o r the eventual election of a national assembly, an idea 
which he develops, i n the t h i r d stage, in t o the detailed and coherent 
plan f o r setting up a new constitution which i s described as the ideal to 
be attained i n the "Lettres d'un bourgeois de Newhaven" and the "Essai sur 
les assemblers provinciales". The four t h and l a s t stage i s represented 
by that part of the "Essai" i n which Condorcet, turning away from his 
long-term project, describes a more immediate method whereby a national 
assembly could be created out of the existing t e r r i t o r i a l divisions. 
These stages must be borne i n mind i f we are to understand Condor-
cet's reactions to events once the Revolution had started. 
Having looked at the plans put forward by Condorcet f o r setting up 
the assemblies which would remedy the abuses of the existing regime, i t 
w i l l now be necessary to examine the d i f f e r e n t kinds of law corresponding 
to the reforms which he f e l t should be made. 
He described them f o r the f i r s t time i n the f i r s t of the "Lettres d'un 
bourgeois de Newhaven": 
"Nous trouvons, 1°) les l o i s qui ont pour but l e maintien de l a 
surete, de l a l i b e r t e , de l a propriete des citogens, contre l a violence 
et contre l a fraude, ou les l o i s criminelles; 2 ) ensuite les l o i s qui 
ont pour objet de prescrire suivant quelles regies l a propriete s'acquiert, 
se transmet et se prouve, et de determiner l a forme des conventions, les 
l i m i t e s que l e d r o i t naturel et l a raison peuvent mettre a l a l i b e r t e de 
les former; enfin l a maniere dont seront jugees les contestations elevees 
sur 1'execution de ces conventions, ou les l o i s c i v i l e s ; 3 ) celles qui, 
dans les cas ou l'usage de l a l i b e r t e et de l a propridte n u i r a i t a l a 
surete, a l a l i b e r t e , a. l a propriete d'autrui, soumettent l'exercice de 
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ces d r o i t s a des regies communes, et doivent les d i r i g e r p l u t o t que les 
restreindre; et ce sont les l o i s de police." 1 
The fou r t h and l a s t part of l e g i s l a t i o n was made up of the laws 
concerning f i s c a l matters: "... e l l e regie: 1°) l a forme sous laquelle 
l'impot d o i t etre leve; 2°) l a forme sous laquelle l a somme de l'impot 
d o i t etre determined j 3°) l a forme sous laquelle cette somme d o i t etre 
employee."2 
Like the laws dealing w i t h the sovereignty of the people and the 
establishment of means whereby t h i s sovereignty could express i t s e l f , 
these laws were to be based on the natural r i g h t s of man and on the 
general principles which were derived from them. 
This idea was of great importance to Condorcet and i t recurs i n 
nearly a l l his writings of the period. His f i r s t target was, once again, 
Montesquieu and his theory that the difference i n the laws which existed 
i n various countries was j u s t i f i e d by the d i f f e r e n t circumstances (wealth, 
r e l i g i o n , climate) which prevailed i n these countries. This idea i s attacked 
i n the "Observations sur l e 29eme Livre de 'L'Esprit des Lois'" of 1780: 
"Comme ... les d r o i t s des hommes ... sont les memes partout, on ne 
v o i t pas pourquoi toutes les provinces d'un Etat, ou meme tous les Etats, 
n'auraient pas les memes l o i s ... Une bonne l o i d o i t etre bonne pour tous 
les hommes, comme une proposition vraie est vraie pour tous." 3 
The point i s made again i n the "Notes sur V o l t a i r e " when Condorcet 
attacks Voltaire's statement - " i l importe assez peu par quelles l o i s un 
Etat se gouverne, pourvu que les l o i s ... soient executees" - with the 
following remark: " I I ne s u f f i t pas que les individus se conforment aux 
l o i s etablies, i l faut que ces l o i s elles-memes se conforment a ce qu exige 
l e maintien du d r o i t de chacun ... L a r b i t r a i r e n a i t de notre ignorance, 
4 
et non de l a nature des choses." 
1. I b i d O.C. DC. 6. 
2. I b i d O.C. IX. 6. 
3. O.C. I . 378. , p 
4. O.C. IV. 620. Cf. also: "L'interet de puissance et de richesse d'une 
nation d o i t disparaitre devant l e d r o i t d'un seul homme" ("Reflexions 
sur 1'esclavage des negres," O.C. V I I . 81 (1781). 
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The a r b i t r a r y nature of the legal system of the Ancien Regime, 
which had i t s o r i g i n i n "les coutumes de differentes peuplades que l e 
seul hasard a reunies" , represents one of the main targets of Condorcet's 
reform programme. This i s seen cl e a r l y i n the essay "Sur l a l i b e r t e de l a 
presse" (1776) dealing with the reform of the criminal laws. 
In t h i s essay, Condorcet sets the l e g i s l a t o r two p r i n c i p a l tasks: 
the f i r s t was to define with precision which acts could be considered 
crimes. His own d e f i n i t i o n of a crime went as follows: 
Un crime est une action de laquelle i l resulte necessairement, 
pour un ou plusieurs autres hommes, un t o r t grave que c e l u i qui a commis 
1 'action a eu l ' i n t e n t i o n de f a i r e . " 2 
Gravity and premeditation were thus necessary prerequisites before 
an act could be considered a crime^. Condorcet elaborates on t h i s i n the 
essay, showing the considerations to be borne i n mind by the authorities 
when deciding what a t t i t u d e to adopt towards a specific act. For example, 
a w r i t e r who attacked the principles on which a given society was based 
could not be considered g u i l t y of having committed a crime. He could be 
considered g u i l t y , however, i f he advocated v i o l e n t resistance against 
the regime. Here again, however, the gravity of the crime would depend on 
i t s consequences; i f the people did actually r e v o l t , i t would be considered 
more serious than i f they did not. Similarly, acts which were quite i n -
nocuous i n peace time could become extremely dangerous i n time of war. 
I t was thus very important f o r the l e g i s l a t o r s to f i x the conditions where-
by an act could be considered a crime and to establish the c r i t e r i a f o r 
1 . Eloge de Michel de l'Hopital O.C. I I I . 535. 
2 . O.C. XI. 255. 
3. Cf. also: "Notes sur l e code de Toscane" (cited by Cahen op.cit. p.48) 
" i l n'y a de veritables crimes, que ceux qui blessent l e d r o i t naturel, 
... qui 1'attaquent immediatement, necessairement, et avec intention. 
Si l'on s'ecarte de ce principe, toute l o i penale devient une violence, 
plus ou moins tyrannique." 
4. "Sur l a l i b e r t e de l a presse," O.C. XI. 263 - 264. 
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evaluating the crime's gravity. These should be stated c l e a r l y to avoid 
misunderstandings which could lead to tyranny or bloodshed."'" 
The second p r i n c i p a l task of the l e g i s l a t o r s was to f i x the legal 
procedure. Condorcet had taken great i n t e r e s t i n the legal cases of the 
period, notably the controversy concerning the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the 
Chevalier de l a Barre i n 1774 and the famous t r i a l of the three inhabitants 
of Chaumont who, i n 1786, were condemned to the wheel on suspicion of armed 
2 
robbery , and many of his reform plans stem from his disgust at the pro-
cedure which was followed i n both of these cases. 
In his view, the fundamental basis f o r a l l criminal procedure lay i n 
the protection of the accused. This point i s made i n the "Notes sur l e 
Code de Toscane" : 
r ' ' 
"Tout homme non convaincu d'un crime d o i t etre presume innocent ... 
Les bonnes dispositions sont celles qui font l a surete' de 1'innocent sans 
contribuer k l a surete du coupable." 
In the ' Vie de Turgot also, Condorcet says that the accused should 
be treated "avec l a meme humanite, les memes egards qu'on l u i devrait s i 
son innocence e t a i t prouvee. 
The f i r s t step was to grant the accused the assistance of a legal 
adviser or counsel: 
" . . . l a l o i ( d o i t accorder) a l'accuse ... l e secours d'un defenseur j -
p ublic, sans l u i oter cependant l e d r o i t de se choi s i r d'autres conseils". 
The accused and his counsel were to be allowed to discuss the case 
together i n secrecy. They were to be e n t i t l e d to a f u l l and clear ex-
planation of the accusations made against the defendant and, to ensure 
1 . I b i d 268 - 269. 
2. "Reoonse au Dlaidoyer de M. d'Espremenil',' O.C.^VII. 27 - 59; 
"Reflexions d'un citoyen non gradue' sur un proces tres connu," 
O.C. V I I . 143 - 166. 
3- Not i n O.C., cited by Cahen op.cit. p.50. 
4. O.C. v. 191. 
5. I b i d 191. 
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that the testimony was- authentic, the witnesses were to give t h e i r e v i -
dence i n public."'" 
Borrowing from the English system, Condorcet states that the power 
of the judges, whose i m p a r t i a l i t y was so easily impaired by an unhealthy 
"esprit de corps" and the boredom of a routine job, should be l i m i t e d by 
the creation of j u r i e s consisting of laymen against whom the accused had 
no objection. 
I t was not u n t i l 1786, however, that Condorcet dared to suggest so 
fundamental a reform as the election of j u r i e s and not u n t i l 1788 that 
he described i n d e t a i l how the entire j u d i c i a l system of the Ancien Regime 
could be transformed. 
This i s done i n the "Essai sur les assemblees provinciales" where 
he underlines the valuable role which the provincial assemblies could 
play not only i n providing information about t h e i r areas on such matters 
as the regions which the law-courts should cover, the number of t h e i r 
members, etc.^, but above a l l i n electing the judges and j u r i e s of the 
4 
provinces . Condorcet was an admirer of the English and American system, 
whereby the judges concerned themselves only with the legal d i f f i c u l t i e s 
and forms of a case and l e f t theverdicts to properly constituted j u r i e s . 
His main target here was the "venalite des charges , a practice 
which he had b i t t e r l y attacked as early as 1777 when, speaking of the 
posts of judge, he declared: 
La venalite des charges les rend bientot hereditaires; les t r i -
bunaux se remplissent d'hommes ignorants et vains, qui dedaignent 1'etude 
et 1'abandonnent a. ceux qui ont leur fortune a f a i r e ; l a venalite ferme 
l'entre'e de l a magistrature et a l a nobless pauvre, et aux juriconsultes 
e l l e d e t r u i t toute emulation; i l ne s u f f i t plus de meriter les pre-
mieres places, i l faut etre assez riche pour les aeheter." 5 
1. Notes .sur l e Code de Toscane, Cahen op.cit. p.50. 
2. This idea i s only mentioned i n passing i n the "Let.t.res d'un bourgeois, 
etc." O.C. EC. 60. 
3. I b i d 498 - 500. 
4. I b i d O.C. V I I I . 499. 
5. "Eloge de Michel de l'Hopit a l " , O.C. I I I . 539-
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Turning to the organisation of the elections, he states that the 
function of electing the judges and j u r i e s should be l e f t , not to the 
administrative bodies of each province, whose task was already considerable, 
but to the assembly of electors.''" 
The remainder of t h i s part of the "Essai" mentions a number of 
important innovations. 
In the f i r s t place, Condorcet states that c i v i l .and criminal eases 
2 
should be dealt with i n separate courts , a clear attack on the monopoly 
of the parlements^. 
Secondly, he recommends the creation of a supreme court whose task 
would be to supervise the work of the judges. Should t h i s court quash 
a sentence, the case would pass to another court. A special court would 
immediately be set up to examine the conduct of the judges during the 
4 
or i g i n a l t r i a l . However, Condorcet rejects the idea of allowing appeals 
to be made to a higher body, considering that t h i s would c a l l i n question 
the whole basis of the legal system and would r e f l e c t the custom of an age 
5 
when j u s t i c e was conducted along a r b i t r a r y l i n e s . 
Similarly he rejects the idea of a two - t i e r system whereby each 
case was judged by two courts placed one above the other. He considered 
that a single j u r y provided a l l the necessary guarantees against an ar-
b i t r a r y verdict, while a two-tier system would only undermine the authority 
of the j u r i e s and create chaos. 
A t h i r d important innovation consists i n the idea of creating a post 
of "juge de police". Such a post would be established i n each "communaute" 
1. I b i d 500. 
2. Many of Condorcet's e a r l i e r writings deal with t h i s question, cf. 
"Reflexions sur l e commerce des ble's" (1776) O.C. XI. 192 - 193 J, 
"Lettre d'un laboureur de Picardie" (1775) O.C. XI. 15 - 16; "Reflexions 
sur l a jurisprudence criminelle"(1775) O.C. V I I . 6 et sq ; cf. also 
the "Lettres d'un citoyen des Etats-Unis", etc. O.C. I X . I l l dealing 
w i t h the a b o l i t i o n of a l l j u r i s d i c t i o n s concerned solely with the 
a f f a i r s of the Church and the n o b i l i t y . 
3. I b i d O.C. V I I I . 502. 
4. I b i d 503. 
5. I b i d 503. 
6. I b i d 503 - 504. 
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and the men who occupied i t would have the duty of w r i t i n g a preliminary 
on-the-spot report each time a crime was committed, as well as ensuring 
that the accused was conveyed to the "chef-lieu" of the area. In certain 
areas they should even be granted the permission of the judges to conduct 
preliminary enquiries in t o cases. 
Condorcet's view of the j u d i c i a r y , therefore, was that of an orga-
nisation, made up of about 150 courts^" spread out throughout the country 
and dealing either w i t h criminal or c i v i l cases. Each court would have 
allocated to i t two or three judges, elected by the provincial electoral 
assemblies f o r a period of eight to ten years; i t would have i n addition 
sixty-four jurymen, elected f o r a period of four years, sixteen of whom 
2 
would take part i n any given t r i a l . 
The remainder of Condorcet's works on the question are given over 
to the creation of a code of c i v i l and criminal laws, a matter which he 
•5 
considered t o be of the greatest importance , and also to the important 
question of punishment. His views on t h i s question are expressed suc-
c i n c t l y i n the "Vie de Turgot". 
"... (les peines) doivent etre proportionnees aux crimes, c'est-a-
dir e diminuer et c r o i t r e en meme temps que l'importance du t o r t f a i t a 1' 
individu qui en a ete l a victime, ou l ' i n t e r e t qu'a l a societe' de les re-
primer. " 4 
The g u i l t y person should be punished, but i f the punishment exceeded 
5 
what was necessary to protect society, i t became unjust. I t i s here that 
the o r i g i n of Condorcet's d i s l i k e f o r the death penalty l i e s . This i s clear 
from a l e t t e r which he wrote to the King of Prussia on 2nd May 1785» arguing 
that the absolute nature of the death penalty could not be reconciled w i t h 
1. I b i d 506. 
2. I b i d O.C. V I I I . 502 - 503; 506. 
3. Cf. "Vie de Turgot" O.C. V. 189,; Lettres d'un citoyen, etc. O.C. IX.115. 
4. "Vie de TurgoV O.C. V.190. 
5. Cf. "Fragements sur l a l i b e r t e de l a presse" O.C.XI. 256 - 257. 
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the notion that the extent of a man's g u i l t at any time was purely re-
l a t i v e . ^  
Condorcet's works dealing with what he described as the " l o i s 
c i v i l e s " are of importance i n so f a r as they are concerned with two of 
the major problems facing the reformers of the day, the great inequality 
of wealth which characterised the Ancien Regime and the role played by 
the Church i n the day to day administration of the country. 
Condorcet approaches the problem of wealth when he deals w i t h the 
question of inheritance. He considered inheritances to be perfect l y 
natural and legitimate: 
La propriete de 1 homme devient ... l e propriete de ses enfants 
et de sa femme." 2 
However, t h i s view, which was based on the axiom that a man's pro-
perty was automatically that of his wife and offspring, came int o c o n f l i c t 
w ith one of the important " r i g h t s " recognised by the Ancien Regime, the 
r i g h t to dispose f r e e l y of one's property by w i l l . 
Condorcet attacked t h i s r i g h t i n his biography of Turgot: 
Le d r o i t de propriete n est, pour chaque individu, que cel u i 
d'user librement de ce qui l u i appartient. On ne peut regarder l e d r o i t 
de tester, c'est-a-dire d'avoir une volonte toujours revocable, de di s -
poser de ce qu'on possede au moment ou on cesse de l e posseder, comme une 
suite de l a propriete'. Ainsi, point de testament." 3 
He was p a r t i c u l a r l y c r i t i c a l of the way i n which inheritances were 
effected. The " d r o i t d'ainesse", whereby the l i o n ' s share of the property 
4 
went to the eldest son, he found unacceptable as i t enabled some people 
to accumulate property at the expense of others and thus to create serious 
r i f t s w i t h i n society. 
1. O.C. I . 305 - 306. 
2. "Sur l ' e t a t des Protestants", O.C. V. 495. 
3. "Vie de Turgot", O.C. V. 188. 
4. "Dans l ' d t a t de nature, l a propriete du pere, f r u i t de son industrie 
et de son t r a v a i l , d o i t etre egalement partagee entre ses enfants" 
("Vie de Turgot", O.C. V. 187). 
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I t i s clear from the notes which he made on Voltaire's Le Mon-
dain ^ that Condorcet was not against inequality of wealth as such, 
believing that t h i s acted as an incentive f o r people to s t r i v e to inc-
rease t h e i r standard of l i v i n g and thus stimulate productivity; however 
he f e l t that too great an inequality had the opposite e f f e c t of discour-
aging enterprise, hence his remark: 
... moins cette i n e g a l i t e est grande, plus l a societe est heureuse. 
One of the solutions to the problem, i n his view, lay i n the equal 
sharing of inheritances and i n the l i m i t i n g of the freedom to dispose of 
one's property as one wished. 
Condorcet does not object to the cession of property by one i n d i v i -
dual to another provided that t h i s was done according to laws l a i d down 
by the State. However, he objects to a l l clauses which concerned the use 
made of the property of an individual a f t e r his death when i t could no 
longer l e g a l l y be considered his own. He thus supported the remarks 
made by Turgot i n his Encyclopedie a r t i c l e on the "Fondations", re-
peating the argument that i t was quite absurd f o r a man who could not 
4 
foresee the future to s e t t l e any matter on a permanent basis. 
However, Condorcet's d i s l i k e of any form of perpetuity led him 
na t u r a l l y i n t o a confrontation with the Church. This confrontation had, 
as i t s s t a r t i n g point, the question of marriage. True to his distaste f o r 
i n s t i t u t i o n s which prevented people from going back on an agreement once 
i t had been made, Condorcet was a fervent supporter of divorce and ex-
5 
pressed his support f o r i t i n several of his works . To attack marriage 
i n the Ancien Regime was, however, to attack by implication the r i g h t of 
1. "Notes sur V o l t a i r e " , O.C. IV. 233 - 234. 
2. I b i d O.C. IV. 234. 
3. I b i d 234, 464, 479-
4. "Vie de Turgot", O.C. V. 23. Cf. Turgot: "Fondation"Oeuvres ed. 
F. Daire Osnabruck Otto Zeller 1966, 2 Volumes. Volume 1 pp. 299-309. 
5. Cf. "Notes sur V o l t a i r e " , O.C. IV. 326; "Notes sur l e Code de Toscane", 
Note 5; "Eloge de Michel de l ' H o p i t a l , " O.C. III.508, where he c a l l s 
f o r the r i g h t of the Protestants to have t h e i r marriages registered 
outside the Church. 
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the Church to monopolise the o f f i c i a l r e g i s t r a t i o n of marriages and 
b i r t h s and to question the very r i g h t of the Church to intervene i n such 
matters. 
That t h i s was Condorcet's intention i s clear from his defence of 
the cause of the Protestants, a cause to which he devoted a complete work 
i n 178l, showing the contradictions of a system which obliged members of 
a re l i g i o u s sect to submit themselves on very personal matters to the 
intervention of a body whose f a i t h they did not share.''" 
Condorcet's concern f o r the status of persecuted minorities such as 
the Protestants led him to defend also other categories of people who 
were the victims of abuses. He thus attacked a l l forms of feudal dues, 
such as "mainmorte, cuissage", etc. which were unproductive and vicious 
and called f o r t h e i r a b o l i t i o n without compensation i n the "Essai sur les 
assemblees provinciales". 
He campaigned notably on behalf of the a b o l i t i o n of slavery and 
described i n d e t a i l i n his "Reflexions sur l'esclavage des negres"^ 
how the slaves could be released from t h e i r bondage. 
Condorcet distinguished what he called "les l o i s de police", which 
were concerned w i t h those r i g h t s "qui n'existeraient pas sans les c i r -
Constances p a r t i c u l i e r e s que 1 etat de societe a f a i t n a i t r e , from laws 
of j u s t i c e which concerned the natural r i g h t s of man which were anterior 
to society. 
These laws were to govern such matters as the d e f i n i t i o n of public, 
as opposed to private, property. For example, they would ensure that 
roads and parks were accessible to a l l , that the products used by an i n -
d u s t r i a l i s t i n his factory did not contaminate the people i n the area, etc. 
1. "Sur l ' e t a t des Protestants", O.C. V. 391 - 573-
2. O.C. V I I I . 509 - 510. 
3. O.C. V I I . 63 - 140. 
4. "Essai sur les assemblees provinciales", O.C. V I I I . 512. 
- 71 -
Condorcet was a f r a i d that these laws could easily lead to the des-
t r u c t i o n of freedom - "La police v e i l l e pour l a surete et la . t r a n q u i l l i t e 
publique, mais c'est en menagant l a liberte."''' - and he was extremely 
2 
anxious that they be defined c l e a r l y and without ambiguity . 
However, he was aware also how essential they were to the ending of 
vio l a t i o n s carried out by certain people at the expense of others. For 
example, i n a country where freedom of conscience was i n constant jeopardy, 
such laws could prevent people who gathered together peacefully from being 
set upon by the police. 
Before the State could intervene, he says, " i l f a udrait ... q u ' i l 
y eut de fo r t e s presomptions que ces assemblies sont criminelles"^. 
These laws would also be instrumental i n curbing such abuses as 
those represented by the notorious " d r o i t de chasse". Condorcet had 
4 
attacked these r i g h t s i n several of his works , pointing out the damage 
which they caused to crops and the c r i p p l i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s which they im-
1! ' 
posed on the work of the peasants, and i n the Essai sur les assemblees 
provinciales" he called f o r t h e i r a b o l i t i o n without compensation. 
By the time he came to write the "Essai sur les assemblees provin-
ciales", Condorcet, as we have seen, had been able to systematise many 
of his ideas concerning the overhaul of the Ancien Regime. The essay thus 
includes the most coherent account of t h i s category of laws and i s p a r t i -
c u l a r l y interesting f o r three reasons. 
F i r s t , t h i s work contains some very far-reaching reforms, notably 
the creation of a police force whose task would be to protect the public 
against criminals.^ 
1. "Notes sur l e Code de Toscane" Cited by Cahen op.cit. p. 53-
2. "Essai sur les assemblies provinciales", V I I I . 516. 
3. Sur I ' e t a t des Protestants, 0.~C. V.~475. 
4. Cf. i n p a r t i c u l a r "Remarques sur 'Les Pensees'de Pascal", O.C. I I I . 6 5 I 
5. O.C. V I I I . 519 - 522. 
6. I b i d 514. I t was not u n t i l 1793* however, that he gave d e t a i l s as to 
what t h i s force was to consist of (cf. below IV. 23). 
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Secondly, i t represents a desire to replace the numerous vague and 
a r b i t r a r y ordinances of the past by a series of coherent regulations. 
Thirdly, and most int e r e s t i n g of a l l , i t places great emphasis on 
the importance of l o c a l i n i t i a t i v e f o r the elaboration of these regulations. 
Condorcet i n s i s t s that these laws could be made only w i t h the approval of 
the people i n each "communaute" expressed v i a t h e i r representative . Fur-
there, they could only be enforced under the supervision of judges elected 
by each "communaute". The judges were to be supervised themselves by 
2 
the administrative assembly of the " d i s t r i c t " i n which they functioned . 
In the emphasis given to local decisions and i n the d i s t i n c t i o n made 
between such laws, which were essentially l o c a l and functional i n nature, 
and the major laws of the land, we have the basis of the organisation of 
the "communes" about which Condorcet was to write so much i n 1789. 
However, i t was i n the f i e l d of f i s c a l laws that Condorcet exerted 
most of his energy before 1789. A mathematician by t r a i n i n g and Inspec-
teur des Monnaies under Turgot, he was i n his element when dealing with 
f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s . His main preoccupation throughout t h i s period was the 
elaboration of a l o g i c a l theory of taxation that would sweep away the mass 
of i n d i r e c t and d i r e c t taxes that crippled the economy of the nation and 
created serious inequalities among the citi z e n s . As we have seen, t h i s 
reform, by destroying the system of Orders, was v i t a l to the success of 
his c o n s t i t u t i o n a l plans. 
Condorcet's onslaught on the f i n a n c i a l system of the Ancien Re'gime 
follows three d i f f e r e n t , but p a r a l l e l l i n e s . 
In the f i r s t place he wished to show how the privileges of the clergy 
and n o b i l i t y were no longer j u s t i f i e d now that the fwecLal system had come 
to an end. 
1. I b i d 514 - 518. 
2. I b i d 516. 
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As early as 1777, he had questioned the r i g h t of the Church to own 
her own lands independently of the State"1", and, nine years l a t e r , had 
contested her r i g h t to exact payment from people who did not require her 
services . Both matters are taken up again i n the "Essai sur les assem-
blees provinciales when Condorcet, i n an important passage which summarises 
most of the arguments directed against the remains of the feudal system 
i n pre-revolutionary France, maintains that the privileges and property 
of the Church had been acquired several centuries before i n order to f u l -
f i l needs which no longer existed: 
^ "L*existence (des biens ecclesiastiques) est absolument in d i f f e r e n t e 
a. une r e l i g i o n qui a subsiste avec spjendeur, pendant plusieurs siecles, 
sans que ses ministres possedassent aucune propriete'. On a dans l a suite 
attache aux eglises des dimes ou des biens p a r t i c u l i e r s , destine's a entre-
t e n i r les pretres qui les desservaient, a payer les depenses du culte; 
mais c' e t a i t dans un temps ou cette maniere de donner des appoindents ... 
e t a i t l a seule qui pu*t permettre une veri t a b l e s o l i d i t e : aussi l a plupart 
des autres fonctions publiques etaient egalement payees par des d r o i t s de 
place, par des terres. A mesure que les gouvernements ont acquis une forme 
moins variable, moins incertaine, on a substitue l'usage des appointe-
ments en argent a une coutume dont les inconvenients m u l t i p l i e s frappaient 
tous les esprits." 3 
The role of the n o b i l i t y also had changed considerably since feudal 
times and Condorcet questions the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the preservation of 
the prerogatives which derived from that r o l e : 
" I I est impossible de trouver quelques rapports entre l e corps de 
l'ancienne noblesse et c e l u i des possesseurs de f i e f s ou des pri v i l e g e s . " 4 
Condprcet's second approach i s to show how the privileged orders not 
only benefited from advantages which were no longer j u s t i f i e d , but used 
t h e i r position to obtain greater privileges s t i l l . Hence the reference 
i n his writings to one of Voltaire's works published i n 1750 when Mac-
hault was attempting to impose a new tax, the Vingtieme, on the whole nation 
1 . "Eloge de Michel de l'Hopi t a l " , O.C. I I I . 530. 
2 . "Vie de Turgot", O.C. V. 145. 
3. O.C. V I I I . 442 - 443. 
4 . "Reflexions sur les corvees',' O.C. XI. 64. 
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"... proprietaire d'un cinquieme des biens du royaume, ( l e clerge) 
r e f u s a i t de porter une par t i e du fardeau des taxes sous lequel l e reste 
de l a nation paraissait pret a succomber." 1 
In addition to t h i s , the clergy had means of obtaining wealth 
through such shameful devices as the sale of r e l i c s and the organisation 
2 
of l o t t e r i e s and, above a l l , through the imposition of the notorious 
"dime". 
Ainsi, en France, non-seulement l e clerge ne paye point les impots, 
mais i l en leve a. son p r o f i t de tres-considerables" 3 
The t h i r d , and most important approach by Condorcet to the problem 
of taxation consists i n showing how the f i s c a l privileges of the clergy 
and n o b i l i t y together with a l l the i n d i r e c t taxes and regulations inherited 
from the past were not only u n j u s t i f i e d but were responsible f o r the eco-
nomic distress of the nation. "... les privileges en argent, comme ceux 
de l a noblesse francaise, sont une des principales causes de l a mauvaise 
administration des finances et de l a misere du peuple." 4 
Among the most odious of these privileges was the "corve'e", whereby 
the peasants were obliged to abandon part of t h e i r valuable time to work 
without p r o f i t and i n the interests of other people. This contributed, 
i n addition to the numerous others checks on incentives, towards lowering 
the rate of production and hence putting up prices. Such was Condorcet's 
concern f o r t h i s question that he devoted an entire work to i t i n 1775> 
' f 5 the "Reflexions sur les corvees , i n which he also called f o r the a b o l i t i o n 
of such r i g h t s as the "banalite", "minage", "banvin" etc. He was na t u r a l l y 
delighted when Turgot attempted to abolish the "corve'e" i n 1776.^ 
1 . "Avertissements", etc. O.C. IV. 248. 
2 . I b i d 374. 
3. "Avertissements", etc. O.C. IV. 249. 
4 . "Notes sur Voltaire',' O.C. IV. 533-
5. O.C. XI. 6 l - 97 . For a detailed account of Condorcet's economic 
views of Shapiro: "Condorcet & the r i s e of Liberalism" New York, 
Octagon books 1963. passim. 
6. Cf. I b i d 89 - 97; "Vie de Turgot", O.C. V.33 - 34. 
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I n d i r e c t taxes generally, quite apart from being vague and impos-
sible to assess accurately, were excessively harsh, f a l l i n g as they did 
on people and not on property. They affected v i t a l foodstuffs, particu-
l a r l y i n the case of customs duties either at the f r o n t i e r s of the nation 
or those of the provinces. Condorcet argued that t h e i r f u l l weight could 
only be relieved i f they were spread over a great v a r i e t y of items, but 
t h i s would increase t h e i r number and consequently the cost of levying them} 
He saw that the great number of i n t e r n a l customs barriers disrupted 
the free exchange of goods and created areas where prices were greatly 
i n f l a t e d . Essential goods were thus hard to obtain and, as t h i s hurt 
the poor more than the r i c h , the true r e s u l t of i n d i r e c t taxation was to 
permit the levying of taxes to take place i n inverse proportion to what 
was f a i r and reasonable.^ 
Rising prices eroded the number of people who were able to s e l l and 
thus added to the already c r i p p l i n g state monopolies on the sale of to-
bacco and s a l t a series of "monopoles de f a i t " and hence created yet 
another form of p r i v i l e g e . ^ 
Having looked at Condorcet's c r i t i c i s m s of the f i n a n c i a l system of 
the Ancien Regime, we must now examine what he proposed to put i n i t s 
place. 
His axiom that a l l men are equal implies that a l l should pay the 
same amount of tax. However, as such a proposition was absurd, the only 
manner i n which equality could be maintained was through the imposition 
of a proportional tax: 
1. Cf. "Essai sur les assemblees provinciales", O.C. V I I I . 300 - 302. 
2. "Essai sur les assemblees provinciales", O.C. V I I I 361 - 385-
3. Cf. "Monopole et monopoleur", O.C. XI. 37 et sq; "Vie de Turgot", 
O.C. V. 33-
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"L'impot, pour etre juste, ( d o i t ) etre r e p a r t i avec eg a l i t e ; 
et par consequent i l f a ut q u ' i l s o i t proportionnel au produit net, 
puisque les avantages qui resultent des etablissements payes avec 
l'impot sont l a jouissance plus assuree et l'amelioration de ce meme 
produit." 1 
As people's riches, t h e i r c a p i t a l , represented an advantage i n -
2 
dependent of the work they actually did , they should be taxed on t h i s 
c a p i t a l alone. I t followed that the man who l i v e d e n t i r e l y o f f the money 
given to him d i r e c t l y i n exchange f o r his labour should be exempted from 
tax: 
Dans toute administration bien reglee, l e necessaire physique de 
chaque homme d o i t etre exempt de tout impot." 3 
In addition to t h i s , a tax could only be considered v a l i d i f i t was 
used by the government i n the i n t e r e s t of the people: 
"Le produit des impots appartient a l ' E t a t , et ne peut etre legitime-
ment employe que pour l'avantage du peuple qui les a paye's." 4 
This implies that a l l expenses wasted i n the c o l l e c t i o n of taxes 
were inacceptable and i n consequence the highly complicated system of 
i n d i r e c t taxes should be replaced by a single d i r e c t tax which was easy 
to f i x and to c o l l e c t . 
This idea of a single, d i r e c t tax on land, borrowed from Turgot and 
the Physiocrats, l i e s at the heart of Condorcet's reform plans and i s 
most cl e a r l y expressed i n the "Vie de Turgot": 
" I I est de'montre que sous quelque forme qu'un impot s o i t e t a b l i , 
i l se leve en entier sur l a partie de l a production annuelle de l a terr e 
qui reste apres qu'on' a retranche tout ce qui a ete' depense' pour l'obtenir 
... Le produit net du t e r r i t o i r e etant l a seule richesse qui se reproduise 
annuellement, c'est sur e l l e seule que peut etre assis un impot annuel." 5 
Condorcet then attempts to show that a l l the ex i s t i n g taxes were 
levied, i n the l a s t resort, on the net produce of land and the net i n t e r e s t 
of c a p i t a l . I f a l l taxes were to be levied only on land, money-owners 
1 . "Essai sur les assemblies provinciales", O.C. V I I I . 292. 
2 . I b i d 292. t 
3. "Remarques sur les 'Pensees' de Pascal," O.C. I I I . 652; Cf. "Eloge 
de Trudaine", O.C. I I . 474. 
4 . "Eloge de Michel de l'Hopitaiy O.C. I I I . 474. 
5- O.C. V. 124 - 125. 
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would be able to lend at a low rate of i n t e r e s t , hence encouraging the 
landowner to buy more land and. increase his net produce. . I f a l l taxes 
were then reorientated towards the net i n t e r e s t of c a p i t a l , the same 
money-owners could no longer do t h i s without making a loss. The rate of 
i n t e r e s t would thus revert to what i t was before. The net i n t e r e s t of 
money, i n his view, was meaningless unless seen i n r e l a t i o n t o the c a p i t a l 
spent on the purchase of new lands"'". In other words, landowners were 
2 
u l t i m a t e l y the only people to pay tax . 
Having said t h i s , the big question facing Condorcet on the eve of 
the Revolution was how to convert the exi s t i n g f i s c a l system, based on 
i t s masses^ of i n d i r e c t taxes and regulations, i n t o a system based on a 
single, d i r e c t land tax. 
. His major aim was to abolish the residue of feudal dues which existed 
throughout the nation. These he divided i n t o three categories. 
The f i r s t consisted of payments, whether i n money or kind, which 
had originated i n concessions of lands but which had since become taxes. 
Condorcet includes i n t h i s category such payments as the "cens"and "cham-
part" and recommends that those who paid them be allowed to free themselves 
3 
from the obligation forever by paying compensation to the owner . 
The second category consisted of r i g h t s which had originated i n 
agreements between the peasants and the owners of the dues at a time when 
such agreements f u l f i l l e d a genuine need. Among these were to be found 
the various "banalites", the t o l l s on bridges etc., the dues known as 
r 
"lods et ventes", the "corvee", etc. These would a l l have to be abolished, 
but t h e i r owners would be e n t i t l e d to compensation-
1. I b i d 125 - 126. 
2. Condorcet. provides a much more detailed analysis of t h i s question i n 
the "Essai sur les assemblers provinciales", c.f. O.C. V I I I . l 8 l et sq. J. "Essai sur les assemblers pro vino, i ales", O.C. V I I I . 507 - 508. 
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In his t h i r d category he includes dues which emanated from what 
he c a l l s " l a souverainete"''', presumably r e f e r r i n g to r i g h t s which had 
been granted to the owners of f i e f s by the King i n return f o r m i l i t a r y 
2 
duties , e.g. payments on r i v e r s , taxes on market sales, etc. These 
dues were to be abolished w i t h compensation.^ 
The big problem now, however, was to f i n d a method whereby the 
operation of buying up a r i g h t with compensation could be effected. The 
d i f f i c u l t i e s were great and of several kinds. 
In the f i r s t place, there was the danger of creating chaos by d i s -
rupting the customs which several generations of people had come to 
accept. The a b o l i t i o n of the "dime", f o r example, although much desired 
4 
by Condorcet , implied the reorganisation of the entire f i n a n c i a l basis 
5 
of the Church and could only be achieved over a long period of time by 
properly constituted bodies. 
"... s i l e peuple est accoutume a v o i r prendre sur les fonds 
publics les f r a i s du culte ... i l y a du danger, et meme une sorte 
d'i n j u s t i c e , a choquer ses habitudes par une reforme trop prompte." 6 
In the case of laymen, the problem was even more acute. In so f a r 
as the Church lands belonged to the State, a l l dues on them could be 
abolished without compensation. This, however, was not possible i n the 
case of laymen whose r i g h t s were inext r i c a b l y linked with t h e i r property. 
How then was compensation to be organised? I f too high, i t would be 
unjust to the State: i f too low, unjust to the "seigneur". But there were 
other d i f f i c u l t i e s . For example i t was impossible to deal with the "bana-
l i t e s " without taking i n t o consideration the d i f f e r e n t kinds of "banalites" 
which existed. In the case of ovens and wine presses, the compensation 
1. I b i d 507. 
2. Cf. "Reflexions sur les corvees? O.C. XI. 76. 
3. "Essai sur les assemblees provinciales", O.C. V I I I . .509. 
4. Cf. "Vie de Turgot", O.C. V. 146. 
5. Cf. "Essai sur les assemblees provinciales", O.C. V I I I . 442 - 445. 
6. "Vie de Turgot",,0.C. V. 145. 
- 77 -
would be able to lend at a low rate of i n t e r e s t , hence encouraging the 
landowner to buy more land and increase his net produce. I f a l l taxes 
were then reorientated towards the net i n t e r e s t of c a p i t a l , the same 
money-owners could no longer do t h i s without making a loss. The rate of 
in t e r e s t would thus revert to what i t was before. The net i n t e r e s t of 
money, i n his view, was meaningless unless seen i n r e l a t i o n to the ca p i t a l 
spent on the purchase of new lands"'". In other words, landowners were 
2 
ultimately the only people to pay tax . 
Having said t h i s , the big question facing Condorcet on the eve of 
the Revolution was how to convert the existing f i s c a l system, based on 
i t s massest of i n d i r e c t taxes and regulations, i n t o a system based on a 
single, d i r e c t land tax. 
His major aim was to abolish the residue of feudal dues which existed 
throughout the nation. These he divided i n t o three categories. 
The f i r s t consisted of payments, whether i n money or kind, which 
had originated i n concessions of lands but which had since become taxes. 
Condorcet includes i n t h i s category such payments as the "cens"and "cham-
part" and recommends that those who paid them be allowed to free themselves 
from the obligation forever by paying compensation to the owner^. 
The second category consisted of r i g h t s which had originated i n 
agreements between the peasants and the owners of the dues at a time when 
such agreements f u l f i l l e d a genuine need. Among these were to be found 
the various "banalites", the t o l l s on bridges etc., the dues known as 
"lods et ventes", the "corvee", etc. These would a l l have to be abolished, 
but t h e i r owners would be e n t i t l e d to compensation. 
1. I b i d 125 - 126. 
2. Condorcet provides a much more detailed analysis of t h i s question i n 
the "Essai sur les assemblees provinciales", c.f. O.C. V I I I . l 8 l et sq. 
3. "Essai sur les assemblies provinciales", O.C. V I I I . 507 - 508. 
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could be based on the value of the net produce of the oven and wine 
press excluding the value of the oven and wine press themselves and the 
building i n which they were situated. In the case of a m i l l , however, 
the problem was not so simple. The m i l l was dependant f o r i t s very 
functioning on the place where i t was located, namely by the stretch of 
water from which i t drew i t s power. This belonged to the m i l l ' s owner 
and, without i t , he could not exercise his r i g h t . I n t h i s case, there-
fore, the only way i n which the people who were subjected to t h i s r i g h t 
could deliver themselves of i t was to buy the m i l l i t s e l f and then s e l l 
i t to other people."'" 
The evolution of Condorcet's ideas on t h i s question i s of some 
interest. When he f i r s t approached the problem i n w r i t i n g i n 1775* he 
was so overwhelmed by the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the task that his reaction was 
one of resignation: 
,, /> 
Tous les projets ne sont, sans doute, que des reves; mais i l est 
doux de j o u i r du bonheur public, ne fut-ce qu'en songe". 2 
He took the l i n e that i t was wrong f o r the l e g i s l a t i v e power to 
oblige the "seigneurs" to put an end to feudal r i g h t s , even w i t h com-
pensation, save i n the case when these r i g h t s were mere abuses and had 
no h i s t o r i c a l v a l i d i t y . 
•t ' ' ' 
Lorsque les d r o i t s representent l a propriete i l s e r a i t i n j u s t e de 
forcer les seigneurs a. vendre ces d r o i t s , ou les vassaux a les racheter."3 
By 1786, however, his opposition to t h i s solution had become much 
less pronounced: 
11 * ' ' ' ...tout acte qui donne a l a propriete une forme eternelle, ren-
ferme l a condition i m p l i c i t e que l e souverain pourra r e t a b l i r l e d r o i t 
commun aussitot q u ' i l l e jugera u t i l e , parce qu'aucun proprietaire ne 
peut etendre a l ' e t e r n i t e l e d r o i t q u ' i l a sur son bien." 4 
1. "Reflexions sur les corvees? O.C. XI. 69 - 70. 
2. I b i d 69. 
3. I b i d O.C. XI. 75-
4. "Vie de Turgot", O.C. V. 142. 
- 79 -
I t was not u n t i l 1788, however, that Condorcet, delighted with the 
idea of the setting up of elected assemblies throughout the nation, 
actually went ahead to suggest a method whereby the a b o l i t i o n of ri g h t s 
with compensation could be effected. 
The parishes would f i r s t evaluate the t o t a l cost of the compensation 
which t h e i r members would have to pay to the "sSsgneurs". The prov i n c i a l 
assembly would advance a l l the money required f o r t h i s and the parishes 
would then repay t h i s loan i n instalments drawn out over several years. 
The operation would not s t a r t u n t i l a l l r e s t r i c t i o n s on sales had been 
l i f t e d and two-thirds of the population of each parish had given t h e i r 
approval. While i t was i n progress, any individual or parish would be 
allowed to negotiate with a "seigneur" on his or i t s own i n i t i a t i v e , 
provided that the d i s t r i c t assembly approved. 
Par ce moyen, tous les d r o i t s feodaux payes par l e peuple s etein-
draient a l a longue, et sans meme que cet achat l u i coutat des sacrifices 
onereux." 1 
The conversion of the old tax system was also to take place very 
gradually. Since the new taxes were to be fixed i n proportion to the 
revenue of lands, they could not be evaluated u n t i l the net product of 
2 
a l l the lands i n the nation had been assessed. 
Once t h i s had been done, the income of each individual would have to 
be assessed. This was impossible, however, u n t i l the actual cost of 
3 
col l e c t i n g the i n d i r e c t taxes had been deducted from the t o t a l . Mean-
while, however, the nation would not be able to survive unless the i n -
d i r e c t taxes were maintained. 
1. "Essai sur les assemblers provinciales", O.C. V I I I . 511 - 512. 
2. "Vie de Turgot", O.C. V. 128. 
3. "Essai sur les assemblies provinciales", O.C. V I I I . 3^1. 
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Here again, a s l i g h t evolution i n Condorcet's thinking may be 
detected. When he approached the problem i n the "Vie de Turgot", he 
hesitated over two methods of ef f e c t i n g the transformation. 
F i r s t , one could calculate the cost of a l l the i n d i r e c t taxes and 
assess what the net produce of a l l the lands would be a f t e r they had 
been removed. The new tax would then be imposed so as to restore the 
equilibrium. 
Otherwise, one could r e t a i n a l l the i n d i r e c t taxes and gradually 
impose the new tax i n proportion to the old, removing the cost of col-
l e c t i n g the l a t t e r . 
In I 786 , Condorcet seemed to prefer the second of these methods. "*" 
In 1788, however, he gave his preferences to a modified form of the f i r s t . 
In the "Essai sur les assemblies provinciales" he c a l l s f o r the drawing 
up of a cadastral survey which would serve as the basis f o r the conver-
sion of a l l the d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t taxes i n t o a single, d i r e c t t e r r i -
t o r i a l tax: 
• His plan may be divided i n t o four parts: 
- the transformation of those taxes which did the most harm to 
the nation and to the r i g h t s of the people, e.g. the "gabelle", the 
various "corvees" and a l l i n t e r n a l customs duties and t a r i f f s ; 
- the elimination of a l l immoral methods of making money, e.g. 
l o t t e r i e s , and of a l l unjust taxes such as those which struck at con-
sumer goods; < 
- the a b o l i t i o n of the major d i r e c t taxes such as the " t a i l l e " and 
"capitation"; 
2 
- and, f i n a l l y , the elimination of a l l external customs duties. 
1 . "Vie de Turgot", O.C. V. 129. 
2 . "Essai sur les assemblies provinciales", O.C. V I I I . 396 - 406. 
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I t i s important to mention that Condorcet believed the operation 
would take at least .twenty or t h i r t y years to carry out. This i s sig-
n i f i c a n t f o r two reasons. F i r s t , as we shall see, i t was to have con-
siderable repercussions on his a t t i t u d e towards the events of 1789; 
secondly, i t led him to c a l l f o r other fundamental reforms which struck 
at the very heart of the Ancien Regime. 
These reforms grew d i r e c t l y out of the need to discover short-term 
methods of obtaining money f o r the State. Condorcet called f i r s t of a l l 
f o r the sale of the old Crown lands which, i n his view, r e a l l y belonged 
to the nation. Realising, however, that these lands were r e l a t i v e l y poor, 
he pressed i n addition f o r the sale of the much more extensive lands 
which belonged to the Church.^ 
He believed that t h i s was a perfectly l o g i c a l and legitimate step, 
f o r , even i f given to the State, the Church's wealth would s t i l l be i n 
keeping with the conditions of i t s origins. This was to give r e l i e f to 
the poor, a purpose which could now best be f u l f i l l e d by r e l i e v i n g them 
of t h e i r taxes. 
But Condorcet's plan had far-reaching consequences. Education, f o r 
example, could now be placed i n the hands of the State; the l a t t e r ' s new-
found wealth could contribute to the setting up of a central education 
fund which would be di s t r i b u t e d proportionately among the d i f f e r e n t schools. 
The priests were now to be considered as c i v i l servants and were thus 
to receive salaries from the State. One of the consequences of t h i s was 
that monks and canons, those members of the clergy who l i v e d o f f revenue 
which they did not receive i n exchange f o r work done i n the service of the 
2 
State, were to be removed. 
1. 
2. 
"Essai sur les Assemblees provinciales", O.C. V I I I . 442 - 450, 
649 - 655. 
I b i d 443. 
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Once again, however, Condorcet wanted the sale of these lands to 
take place gradually. He feared that a s w i f t sale would lead to a drop 
i n t h e i r value and would thus deprive the State of one of the strongest 
weapons i t possessed to redeem the national debt, the money of the capi-
t a l i s t s . *The l a t t e r would only lend t h e i r money to the State i f they 
were convinced of the potential wealth which the lands would bring i t . 
By the beginning of 1789* therefore, Condorcet had described his 
plans f o r the complete overhaul of the Ancien Regime. I t s basis lay i n 
the doctrine of the Rights of Man; i t s aim was embodied i n the reforms 
mentioned as part of the f i v e major groups of laws described by him i n 
the Lettres d'un bourgeois de Newhaven"; i t s weapon lay i n the elected 
provincial assemblies set up throughout the nation who, under the King's 
guidance, would set about the gradual transformation of the existing 
regime and would pave the way f o r the election of a national l e g i s l a t i v e 
assembly. 
This was Condorcet's long-term project. We must now examine the 
ef f e c t which the summoning of the Etats Generaux and the events which 
followed was to have on his ideas and how he attempted to adapt his plans 
i n the l i g h t of these events which he had not foreseen. 
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C HA PEER TWO 
August 1788 - June 1791 
THE EVOLUTION. OF CONDORCET'S IDEAS FROM THE SUMMONING OF THE 
ETATS-GENERAUX TO THETR OPENING. (8 AUGUST 1788 - 5 MAY 1789) 
AND FROM THE.- FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO THE FLIGHT 
OF THE KING (MAY 1789 TO JUNE 1791) 
. The summoning and opening of the Etats Generaux 
Even i n the process of w r i t i n g the "Essai sur les Assemblies 
provinciales", Condorcet was aware that the f i n a n c i a l p l i g h t of the nation 
and the p o l i t i c a l squabbles which divided i t presented a serious threat t o 
the implementation of his long-term plan for transforming the f i s c a l system 
of the Ancien Regime. As we have seen, his essay already mentioned a method 
whereby a National Assembly could be formed immediately. Towards the end of 
1788, he actually went so far as to publish a pamphlet requesting that the 
King take the necessary steps f o r t h i s t o be done\ 
His dismay when Brienne announced that no steps would be taken t o form 
a national assembly u n t i l 1792 and that the Etats-Generaux would be summoned 
instead, i s to be seen i n his essay on the "Sentiments d'un republicain sur 
' / # 2 
les Assemblees provinciales et les Etats-Generaux" and i n the postface 
which he added t o his essay on the provincial assemblies'^ shortly a f t e r he 
had heard the news. 
Quite apart from the fact that the Etats-Ge'neraux were associated 
4 ' 
i n his mind with some of the least glorious periods of French h i s t o r y , 
1. "Requete au r o i pour demander l a transformation des assemblees 
provinciales en assemblees elues et l a convocation d'une Assemblee 
Nationale." (Cited by Cahen op.cit. p.86). 
2. O.C. IX. 127 - 143. 
3. o . c . V I I I . 655 - 659. 
4. Cf. Eloge de Michel de l'Hopital," O.C. I I I . 497, 527; 
Notes sur V o l t a i r e , O.C. IV, 364 - 365. 
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he considered that they were quite incapable of solving the nation's 
r e a l problems. These were not merely economic, but p o l i t i c a l , and 
could only be approached by the nation as a whole v i a t h e i r represent-
atives i n the provincial assemblies. The Etats-Generaux, i n t h e i r 
organisation and purpose, were the very antithesis of t h i s ideal of 
u n i t y and representation. 
"Vous voyez comment tous les i n t e r e t s aristrocratiques ont 
du se re'unir contre les assemblies provinciales, et prendre, 
pour y reussir, deux moyens; l'un l a demande des Etats-Generaux; 
l'autre l a reclamation des privileges p a r t i c u l i e r s aux differentes 
provinces." 1. 
I t i s true t o say, however, that the Etats-Gene'raux of 1789 were 
to be d i f f e r e n t from t h e i r predecessors, and t h i s for two reasons. 
An Arret du Conseil of 5th July 1788 requesting that a l l Frenchmen 
give t h e i r advice f r e e l y on a method by which the Etats-Generaux could 
be transformed i n t o "une assemblee vraiment nationale par sa composition 
2 
comme par ses e f f e t s " had resulted i n the publication of numerous 
pamphlets defending the Tiers Etat. The consequence of t h i s was the 
ordinance of 27th December 1788 which doubled the representation of the 
Tiers and prevented the clergy and n o b i l i t y from being e l i g i b l e for a 
3 
place i n i t s ranks. 
Condorcet was unsure how t o react to these developments. He 
could only be pleased with the fact t h a t , for the f i r s t time, the 
nation was to have a say i n the formation of a national assembly: 
1. Sentiments d un republicain, O.C. IX. 133-
2. Egret: Pre-Revolution francaise 1787 - 89 , P.U.P. 1962, p. 325. 
3. I b i d 365. 
-85-
" . . . l a nation est consultee sur l a forme de cette assemble'e 
d'un maniere aussi reguliere que sa constituion actuelle 
peut l e permettre." 1. 
On the other hand, the l i m i t e d time available for the elections, 
the p o l i t i c a l immaturity of the masses, the complexity of the task at 
hand and the lack of any un i t y of purpose among the citizens threatened 
to lead t o the formation of an assembly which would prove quite unable 
to cope with the problems of the day. I n Condorcet's view, i t was 
chimerical to imitate the American system whereby a preliminary assembly 
or "convention" would f i r s t be formed to lay down the basis f o r the 
election of a national assembly which would then proceed to make the 
desired reforms i n an orderly manner: 
Cette i n s t i t u t i o n . . . ne pourrait etre employee dans un pays 
ou les pretentions des ordres d i f f e r e n t s , comme celles de 
plusieurs provinces, ne permettent pas d'esperer qu'une t e l l e 
assemblee formee d'apres les principes d'egalite qui en sont 
l a base necessaire, obtint une approbation necessaire." 2 . 
Confronted with the " f a i t accompli", he was obliged t o adapt him-
s e l f as well as he could t o the new s i t u a t i o n . He did so by ignoring 
both the long-term and short-term methods described i n the essay on the 
provincial assemblies for the election of a national assembly and the 
drawing up of a new co n s t i t u t i o n , replacing these with a simpler 
system whereby the Declaration of Rights and the constitution were t o 
be established e n t i r e l y by the elected representatives of the people 
acting under the obligatory mandates given to them by t h e i r electors. 
From the beginning of the Revolution, therefore, Condorcet found 
himself under the obligation t o modify the grandiose project which he 
1. Lettres d'un citoyen des Etats-Unis, O.C. IX. 122. 
2. Lettres d'un citoyen des Etats:Unis, O.C. IX. 122. 
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had devised i n the l a s t years of the Ancien Regime t o concentrate 
instead on the question of mandates to which he had paid r e l a t i v e l y 
l i t t l e attention e a r l i e r on. 
This adaptation to circumstances i s further revealed by the 
way i n which he was forced to reduce his ambitious projects f o r a 
complete reform of the abuses of the time to a few fundamental de-
mands. From t h i s point of view, a study of the two works which he 
wrote during the election campaign, the Reflexions sur les pouvoirs 
et instructions a donner par les provinces a leurs deputes aux Etats-
Generaux" and the "Lettres a Messieurs du Tiers-Etat"^ i s of some 
in t e r e s t . 
The fundamental demands l i s t e d by Condorcet i n these works 
corresponded to each of the major groups of reforms and were to be 
presented i n the form of obligatory mandates given by the electors 
to t h e i r representatives. 
The f i r s t task of the Etats-Generaux, once they had been formed, 
was to draw up a Declaration of Rights. The representatives were 
to receive an imperative mandate forbidding them to consider any 
measures f o r r e l i e v i n g the debt or to vote on any other matter u n t i l 
t h i s had been done. However, unlike the scheme described i n the 
"Vie de Turgot", the actual wording of the Declaration would be l e f t 
to the representatives and would not require the sanction of the 
c i t i z e n s . 
1. O.C. IX 281 - 284. 
2. O.C. IX. 215 - 259-
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Condorcet considered that the reforms required i n the j u d i c i a l 
system were too complex to be undertaken immediately by the represent-
atives. Their primary task here was to i n s i s t on such fundamental 
reforms as the a b o l i t i o n of "Lettres de cachet" 1 and the s e t t i n g up 
of machinery whereby only elected judges appointed by the nation 
and responsible to i t for t h e i r decisions could pass sentence on a 
2 
man . 
These principles having been established with the force of 
the imperative mandate, the task of e f f e c t i n g the actual reforms 
would be l e f t t o a specially constituted committee whose findings 
would be presented to the Etats-Generaux on a l a t e r session . 
Because of t h e i r complexity and great importance, no f i s c a l 
I 
reforms were to be undertaken by the Etats-Generaux. Hence, Con-
dorcet's advice t o the electors: 
" I I faut...borner vos pouvoirs a ce q u ' i l est c l a i r que vos 
deputes pourront bien f a i r e . " 4 
He proposes that these reforms be undertaken slowly and thoroughly 
by administrators elected for the purpose i n each provincial assembly 
presumably according t o the methods he had described i n detail., i n 
the essay on the functions of these bodies. Once again, the r o l e of 
the representatives was only to proclaim the basic principles on which 
these reforms were t o be based. 
1. Reflexions, etc. O.C. IX. 273-
2. I b i d 275. 
3- Lettres, etc. O.C. IX 228 - 245. 
4. I b i d 241. 
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Condorcet's b e l i e f i n evolution and his desire to reconcile 
powerful, but isolated, demands f o r reform with the need f o r the 
uniform overhaul of an entire system of government comes through 
p a r t i c u l a r l y c l e a r l y i n the question of the reform of l o c a l govern-
ment. Before these were effected, every v i l l a g e was t o be given 
the opportunity t o express i t s desire as to which other v i l l a g e s i t 
would wish to be joined i n order to form a "communaute de campagne", 
as to which other "communautes" i t wished the one t o which i t belonged 
to be attached to form a " d i s t r i c t " , and so on. The wishes of the 
various v i l l a g e s would be made known t o a committee appointed by the 
Etats-Generaux with the task of reconciling l o c a l requests and 
desires with the national i n t e r e s t . 
For example, i t would ensure that areas divided by forests 
or mountains would not be grouped together as t h i s would make 
t r a v e l impossible and hinder communications between the "chef-lieu" 
and the outlying areas; s i m i l a r l y , areas subjected t o d i f f e r e n t 
kinds of taxation were not to be combined. The r o l e of the repre-
sentatives here was t o i n s i s t that the vil l a g e s be consulted be-
fore any reforms were undertaken 
Condorcet's desire f o r progressive reform rather than revolution 
i s also apparent i n his a t t i t u d e towards the monarchy and the executive. 
Numerous passages i n his e a r l i e r writings indicate that he was at 
heart a republican; t h i s i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n the following quotation 
1. Cf. Lettres, etc. O.C. IX. 236, 249 - 252. 
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from the "Notes sur V o l t a i r e " : " I I n'est qu'un esclave qui puisse 
. / \. / \ / / i l l 
d i r e qu i l prefere l a royaute a une republique bien constituee. , 
or i n another one from the "Vie de Turgot": "Une c o n s t i t u t i o n 
repulicaine est la. meilleure de toutes." 
These statements do not occur i n the "Reflexions sur les 
pouvoirs", however, where, on the contrary, Condorcet expresses 
his attachement "aux formes de l a monarchie" as well as his respect 
"pour l a personne et pour l a prerogative royale"^. 
I n e f f e c t , Condorcet was pe r f e c t l y aware of the dangers of 
too profound a change i n the p o l i t i c a l system of the nation and 
he was prepared t o admit the value of r e t a i n i n g the monarchy: 
"La Prance restera une monarchie, parce que cette forme de 
gouvernement est l a seule peut-etre qui convienne a sa 
richesse, a sa population, a son etendue et au systeme 
pol i t i q u e de l'Europe". 4 
I I t i s clear however, that the monarchy he had i n mind was 
not the monarchy of the Ancien Re'gime. Thus, while acknowledging 
the wisdom of vesting the King with executive power - " l u i seul... 
distingue 1 i n t e r e t general mieux que l a nation elle-meme - and 
granting him the r i g h t to sanction the laws - " l a sanction du r o i . . . 
rend les l o i s obligatoires par son approbation et par son sceau , 
he underlines the fact that the King's authority was not given to 
1. O.C. IV. 393-
2. O.C. V.209; c f . also, a very early work cite d by Cahen, op.cit. 
p. 30, e n t i t l e d "Memoires sur les conseils qu'un zele republicain, 
devenu par hasard f a v o r i d'un monarque, d o i t dormer au prince pour 
favoriser sa chute." 
3- O.C. IX. 267. 
4. O.C. IX. 266 
5- I b i d 271. 6. I b i d . 372. 
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him by Divine Right, but by the w i l l of the people, the nation. 
La volonte generale etant l a l o i , l e pouvoir l e g i s l a t i f , 
en entier...appartient a l a nation...Elle a l e d r o i t de 
re j e t e r tout pouvoir qui ne viendrait pas d'elle: e l l e 
cree, modifie les l o i s q u ' i l l u i importe d'observer, et e l l e 
en confie l'execution a un ou plusieurs de ses membres." 1 
This places Condorcet's defence of the monarchy i n i t s true 
perspective. To him i t was not only a s t a b i l i s i n g factor at a time 
of p o l i t i c a l upheaval, but also a powerful weapon i n the struggle 
with the Parlements whose prerogative i t had been under the Ancien 
Re'gime to sanction the edicts of the government. 
He thus c a l l s on the electors to give t h e i r representatives 
imperative mandates to i n s i s t that the Etats-Generaux be granted 
f u l l l e g i s l a t i v e power and that the King be allowed to sanction 
the laws and maintain control over the executive. 
Condorcet's f i n a l reason for supporting the monarchy was 
purely u t i l i t a r i a n : i n the absence of an organised administration 
i t was more convenient t o make one man responsible f o r ensuring 
that the directives of the l e g i s l a t i v e body were carried out. The 
big problem here was that the monarch, because he was not elected 
by the people, could not be judged according t o the c r i t e r i a 
which would be applied to members of the le g i s l a t u r e who were 
accused of betraying the nation. How could a King who did not 
occupy his position as the d i r e c t r e s u l t of the national w i l l be 
accused of betraying i t ? 
Condorcet's solution, and one which he was to have recourse 
1. I b i d . 271-
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t o on a much greater scale l a t e r i n the Revolution, was t o assume 
the axiom t h a t t h e monarchy, as an i n s t i t u t i o n , could not be h e l d 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r any mistakes made by the executive, but t h a t the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r these mistakes could be placed on the shoulders 
of the m i n i s t e r s . The e l e c t o r s were consequently t o give t h e i r 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s an imperative mandate i n s i s t i n g t h a t any m i n i s t e r 
suspected of n e g l e c t i n g t o c a r r y out the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s orders i n 
an e f f i c i e n t manner could be brought t o t r i a l . ^ " 
I t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t Condorcet says n o t h i n g here about 
the o r g a n i s a t i o n of the executive. A reason f o r t h i s may be t h a t 
at t h i s stage, he was more concerned w i t h the establishment o f 
p r i n c i p l e s r a t h e r than w i t h d e t a i l s which could be l e f t t o l a t e r 
assemblies. An even more p l a u s i b l e explanation, however, i s q u i t e 
simply t h a t he had given l i t t l e thought t o the question. I t i s 
h a r d l y mentioned i n h i s w r i t i n g s p r i o r t o 1789 and seems t o have 
been completely clouded over by h i s b e l i e f , echoing t h a t of Tur-
got, t h a t important reforms could be c a r r i e d out i n a coherent 
manner only i f undertaken by the p r o v i n c i a l assemblies a c t i n g 
2 
under the d i r e c t i o n of a s i n g l e "enlightened" i n d i v i d u a l . 
I t i s a t the l e v e l o f basic p r i n c i p l e s t h a t Condorcet con-
cludes h i s words t o the e l e c t o r s on the question of executive 
reform. Repeating arguments he had put forward before 1789* 
he c a l l s f o r the separa t i o n of the executive from c o n t r o l over 
1. o.c. i x . 278. 
2. Cf. L e t t r e s , e t c . O.C. IX. 237-
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t a x a t i o n . The e l e c t o r s were t o make i t c l e a r t o t h e i r represent-
a t i v e s by imperative mandate t h a t they wished t o have t h e i r taxes 
c o l l e c t e d by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e bodies i n the provinces a c t i n g d i r e c t l y 
under orders from the l e g i s l a t u r e . ^ " 
The l a s t two p r i n c i p l e s l a i d down by Condorcet f o l l o w l o g i c a l l y 
from what has come before. According t o h i s scheme, the opening 
sessions of the Etats-Gene'raux were t o e s t a b l i s h only the p r i n c i p l e s 
behind the reforms; the reforms themselves were t o be made by the 
Etats-Ge'neraux at l a t e r s i t t i n g s i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h the committees 
which had been set up t o examine the p r a c t i c a l aspects of each r e -
form. I t was obvious, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s were t o 
i n s i s t on the f a c t t h a t t h e Etats-Generaux should become a permanent 
body, meeting a t f i x e d periods and responsible f o r i t s o r g a n i s a t i o n 
2 
and d u r a t i o n . 
F i n a l l y , the e l e c t o r s were t o i n s i s t t h a t t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
c a l l f o r a popular r a t i f i c a t i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n once i t had 
been drawn up. I t was obvious t h a t the plan which Condorcet 
had described before 1789 ( v i z . the examination by the c i t i z e n s 
of each a r t i c l e of the D e c l a r a t i o n o f Rights and o f every b i l l ) 
was i m p r a c t i c a b l e and t h a t a l l the d e t a i l s o f these a r t i c l e s were 
t o be l e f t t o the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I n Condorcet's view t h i s was 
i n e v i t a b l e , but he b e l i e v e d t h a t the essence of h i s former p l a n 
would be preserved i f i t was announced t h a t the r a t i f i c a t i o n of 
1. R e f l e x i o n s , e t c . IX. 276. 
2. R e f l e x i o n s , e t c . IX. 280. 
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the c o n s t i t u t i o n would be undertaken, not by a l l the c i t i z e n s , 
but by "une assemblee convoquee expres pour c o r r i g e r l a c o n s t i t u t i o n " 
An imperative mandate was thus t o be given t o the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
c a l l i n g on them t o i n s i s t on the summoning of t h i s body which 
Condorcet does not yet c a l l a "convention". 
The phase of Condorcet's development which has j u s t been 
described lends i t s e l f t o a few general remarks. 
F i r s t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t h i s adaptation t o events which 
had c l e a r l y caught him o f f guard r e f l e c t s a change more i n t h e 
form o f h i s ideas than i n t h e i r content. The somewhat l a b o r i o u s 
machinery described i n the "Essai sur l e s Assemblies p r o v i n c i a l e s " 
i s replaced by a system whereby the n a t i o n a l assembly, l i m i t e d 
a t one end by the imperative mandates and, at the other, by a 
solemn r a t i f i c a t i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n by the people, was f r e e 
t o e s t a b l i s h the contents of the new laws; however, the p r i n c i p l e s 
which are described i n Condorcet's mandates add n o t h i n g t o the 
views mentioned i n the "Essai". 
Secondly, t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t Condorcet's idea of u s i n g 
imperative mandates was t o have consequences which he would have 
p r e f e r r e d t o avoid. I t i s t r u e t o say t h a t he considered them 
a p u r e l y temporary measure, j u s t i f i e d only by the absence of any 
precedent f o r ensuring t h a t the Etats-Generaux t r u l y r e f l e c t e d the 
2 
nation's wishes . I s i s d o u b t f u l whether he considered them t o 
be compatible w i t h parliamentary democracy. Nevertheless, h i s 
1. L e t t r e s , e t c . O.C. IX. 2J6 
2. Cf. L e t t r e s , e t c . O.C. IX 228 - 229-
-94-
i n s i s t e n c e on them forced him i n t o i n c r e a s i n g the gap, already 
v i s i b l e i n h i s e a r l i e r works, between basic p r i n c i p l e s and the 
a c t u a l d e t a i l s of the laws which were t o correspond t o these 
p r i n c i p l e s . 
Apart from the f a c t t h a t h i s a t t i t u d e has the disadvantage 
o f preventing us from knowing e x a c t l y how f a r h i s views on c e r t a i n 
matters of d e t a i l had developed by t h i s p e r i o d , i t was t o present 
him w i t h a great problem f o r one very important reason. I t . l e f t 
him no time t o examine methods whereby the o l d p o l i t i c a l system 
could be maintained i n t h e c r u c i a l period s e p a r a t i n g the d e c l a r -
a t i o n of the new p r i n c i p l e s which s t r i p p e d i t of i t s v a l i d i t y and 
i t s replacement by the new system. The consequences o f t h i s are 
seen i n the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n h i s ideas when he came t o examine 
the work of the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly l a t e r on. 
But the idea of u s i n g imperative mandates was t o have other 
consequences. I f they were t o work, the n a t i o n as a whole had 
t o agree on the basic p r i n c i p l e s which these mandates sought t o 
impose. I f some of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s received imperative 
mandates which went against the views of t h e i r colleagues, the 
proceedings would degenerate i n t o anarchy. I f these representa-
t i v e s were then allowed t o r e t u r n t o t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s i n order 
t o consult them as t o what l i n e they should f o l l o w , the proceedings 
would have t o be t e m p o r a r i l y suspended and chaos would f o l l o w . 
That Condorcet feared t h i s danger i s c l e a r from a passage 
i n the " L e t t r e s " where he underlines the g r a v i t y of a s i t u a t i o n 
i n which a number of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s could simply withdraw from 
-95-
the assembly. 
" I I f a u t , pour qu'uneprovince puisse legitimement renoncer 
a l ' a s s o c i a t i o n , q u ' e l l e prenne, pour d e c l a r e r ce voeu, 
une forme t e l l e , que chaque canton, chaque communaute 
puisse exercer ce meme d r o i t de se separer; d ' a i l l e u r s , 
e l l e ne peut se separer legitimement sans a v o i r entendu 
l e s autres membres de l ' a s s o c i a t i o n p o l i t i q u e , sans a v o i r 
pese l e s inconvenients d'une s c i s s i o n , e t ceux de l a d i s -
p o s i t i o n q u i en est l e m o t i f , sans a v o i r t r a n s i g e avec l e s 
autres provinces sur l e s dettes contractees ensemble, sur 
l e s conventions f a i t e s en commun." 1 
The l e g a l i s t i c language b a r e l y conceals Condorcet's great 
f e a r of a break-down of the discussions i n the Etats-Generaux. 
L a t e r i n the l e t t e r , he makes i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t the represen-
t a t i v e s were t o pass over the wishes of t h e i r e l e c t o r s i f these 
went against the w i l l o f the m a j o r i t y : 
Apres a v o i r donne a i n s i des l i m i t e s aux pouvoirs des depu-
tes pour toutes l e s questions ou i l s v o t e n t comme repre s e n t -
ants, i l r e s t e a observer que ces pouvoirs doivent e t r e 
absolus pour c e l l e s ou i l s v o t e n t comme juges; c ' e s t - a - d i r e , 
en general, pour c e l l e s ou i l s v o t e n t d apres une d e c i s i o n 
deja p r i s e a l a p l u r a l i t e . " 2 
I t would seem, however, t h a t , by w i l l o f the m a j o r i t y , Cond-
orce t had i n mind those ideas which he h i m s e l f considered t o be 
fundamental t o the new c o n s t i t u t i o n . I t was t o ensure t h a t the 
m a j o r i t y ' s ideas corresponded w i t h h i s own t h a t he expounded them 
at such l e n g t h i n h i s propaganda works of the per i o d , even going 
so f a r as t o d i c t a t e t o the T i e r s E t a t e l e c t o r s the q u a l i t i e s 
which they were t o look f o r i n the men they were t o r e t u r n t o 
power. Defenders of the n a t u r a l r i g h t s of man were t o be pre-
f e r r e d t o p h i l a n t h r o p i s t s , those who put the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t 
1. L e t t r e s , e t c . O.C IX. 231; c f . also Sentiments d un r e p u b l i c a i n , 
e t c . O.C. IX. 141. 
2. L e t t r e s , e t c . O.C. IX. 245. 
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f i r s t t o the champions of s p e c i f i c l o c a l i t i e s , those whose views 
were acceptable t o most elements of the community t o r a d i c a l ex-
t r e m i s t s , and so o n \ 
What he desired, i n f a c t were carbon copies of h i m s e l f , men 
who could endorse the slogan which, more than any other, epitomises 
h i s a t t i t u d e i n 1789 "Celui q u i va t r o p v i t e , ou s ' a r r e t e , ou 
s el o i g n e . 
This leads us t o a t h i r d p o i n t , t h i s time concerning Condor-
cet's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the T i e r s E t a t . I t i s a moot p o i n t whether 
he was r e a l l y aware of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o t e n t i a l of the T i e r s 
i n 1789 and whether h i s d e s i r e f o r u n i t y d i d not t h r e a t e n t o 
i s o l a t e him d e f i n i t i v e l y and hence t o destroy h i s plans. 
Not only d i d he a t t a c k those who wished t o complain q u i t e 
l e g i t i m a t e l y v i a the cahiers de doleances about the day t o day 
i n j u s t i c e s t o which they were subjected i n t h e i r l o c a l i t i e s -
" j e c r o i s qu'on ne s a u r a i t e t r e t r o p reserve sur ( l e s ) demandes 
( p a r t i c u l i e r e s ) . Souvent e l l e s sont c o n t r a i r e s aux d r o i t s des 
autres p a r t i e s de 1 E t a t , et quelquefois a 1 i n t e r e t de ceux memes 
qu i l e s forment."^ - but he even went so f a r as t o c r i t i c i s e 
those members of the T i e r s who refused t o accept the candidature 
4 
of noblemen . Against t h i s he c a l l e d f o r u n i t y a t a l l l e v e l s 
of the n a t i o n - "c'est de l ' u n i o n de tous l e s c i t o y e n s , du p a t r i o -
tisme de tous l e s ordres et de t o u t e s l e s provinces, que depend 
!. Re f l e x i o n s , e t c . O.C. IX. 255 - 257-
.2. I b i d 257. 
5. L e t t r e s , e t c . O.C. IX. 2.48 - 249. 
4. I b i d 218 - 219-
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aujourd'hui l e s a l u t de l ' ^ t a t . " 1 - an a t t i t u d e which was t o 
develop i n t o an "idee f i x e " as the Re v o l u t i o n progressed. 
However, i t was an a t t i t u d e which, i n 1789* could only 
i n d i c a t e a l a c k of awareness of the clashes of i n t e r e s t which 
d i v i d e d the Orders at t h i s time. Condorcet was of course aware 
of the T i e r s E t a t ' s importance and he addresses i t i n the " L e t t r e s " 
i n words reminiscent of Abbe Sieye's pamphlet: " j e vous regarde 
2 
comme formant vraiment l a n a t i o n " . But h i s i n s i s t e n c e on the 
d i v i s i o n s t h a t e x i s t e d w i t h i n the ranks of the T i e r s i t s e l f ^ seems 
c u r i o u s l y s h o r t s i g h t e d at a time when the t r u e s t r u g g l e was between 
the T i e r s and the other two Orders. His view i s perhaps j u s t i f -
i a b l e i n the long term, but i t seems considerably out of temper 
w i t h the times i n 1789. 
This i s q u i t e c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e d by the great d i f f i c u l t i e s 
which he was t o face d u r i n g the e l e c t i o n s t o the Etats-Ge'ne'raux 
when he attempted t o act as a mediator between the d i f f e r e n t Or-
ders, f i r s t a t Mantes and then i n P a r i s . 
On the second day of the e l e c t i o n proceedings at Mantes (10th 
March 1789)* he made a speech c a l l i n g f o r u n i t y among the Orders 
and f o r the drawing up of one "Cahier de doleances" which would 
4 
serve as a model f o r the r e s t of the n a t i o n . The c l e r g y , how-
ever, refused t o agree t o a request which had been made by a dep-
u t a t i o n of the T i e r s E t a t on the previous day c a l l i n g f o r the f i r s t 
1.Reflexions, e t c . O.C. IX. 264. ' 
2.O.C. IX. 215 
3 - I b i d . 217 
4.Arch. nat. B . I I I 80. 459 - 484; c f . Cahen o p . c i t . p. 101. 
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two Orders t o renounce t h e i r f i s c a l p r i v e l e g e s . At t h i s , the 
T i e r s r e j e c t e d Condorcet's request t h a t they accept candidates 
from among the n o b i l i t y and decided t o draw up t h e i r own "Cahier" ^. 
I t was c l e a r , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a t Mantes, the Order which proved 
the main obstacle i n the way of u n i t y was the c l e r g y . 
When Condorcet presented h i m s e l f as a candidate i n Paris i n 
A p r i l 1789, he was t o discover t h a t the obstacle, t h i s time, was 
represented by the n o b i l i t y . Here again, the T i e r s E t a t refused 
2 
t o accept the drawing up of a s i n g l e "Cahier" , a d e c i s i o n which 
i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g when we see some of the p o i n t s made by the 
nobles i n t h e i r "Cahier" of May 5th, 1789- They r e j e c t e d an amend-
ment c a l l i n g f o r the Etats-Generaux t o have the r i g h t t o f i x the 
date of i t s sessions and even gave t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s an imper-
a t i v e mandate t o r e j e c t a m a j o r i t y vote on t h i s p o i n t . They also 
refused such reasonable requests as t h a t the members of a l l t h r e e 
Orders should r e c e i v e the same punishment f o r the same crime, or 
even t h a t judges should not be allowed t o keep t h e i r posts on a 
permanent b a s i s ^ . 
I t i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t , i n these circumstances, Condor-
cet should have had l i t t l e chance of being elected and t h i s d e s p i t e 
the importance of the r o l e which he played at both e l e c t o r a l assem-
b l i e s . At Mantes, notably, he was chosen by the nobles t o be spokes-
man of the s i x "commissaires" who were responsible f o r drawing up 
the "Cahier" of the order. This "Cahier", which many b e l i e v e t o 
1. I b i d 155 Cahen o p . c i t . 108. 
2. Cf. Chassin: E l e c t i o n s de Paris - I I . 4. c i t e d by Cahen o p . c i t . p.lYf. 
3. I b i d . I I I . 270, 322. Cahen p. 123. 
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be the work of Condorcet h i m s e l f , i s remarkable i n t h a t i t 
transcends p u r e l y l o c a l i n t e r e s t s and p a r t i s a n demands. 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , i t contained no demands which could be considered 
i r r e c o n c i l a b l e w i t h the i n t e r e s t s o f t h e T i e r s E t a t and the more 
enlightened nobles. 
Although h i s i n f l u e n c e was much weaker i n Parish despite the 
f a c t , t h a t , here t o o , he was chosen t o be one of the Commissaires-
resp o n s i b l e f o r the nobles' "Cahier", i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t he 
was a c t u a l l y recommended t o the T i e r s E t a t as a s u i t a b l e candidate 
i n the " l i s t e des amis de peuple q u i m e r i t e n t de f i x e r l e choix 
des e l e c t e u r s de Paris''^. And y e t , despite a l l t h i s , he was 
elected n e i t h e r at Mantes nor at P a r i s . 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e of Condorcet's f a i l u r e here should not be 
underestimated, f o r two reasons. F i r s t , i t reveals t o how great 
an extent the people who were t o make the R e v o l u t i o n were d i v i d e d 
among themselves and how d i f f i c u l t i t was seen t o r e c o n c i l e t h e i r 
d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s . Secondly, i t f o r c e d him t o f o l l o w the 
events of the two f o l l o w i n g years from the s i d e l i n e s , a b i t t e r 
disappointment f o r a man who had spent the previous f i f t e e n years 
working out plans f o r a new system of government. 
1. Arch. nat. B. I l l 80. 159* Cahen o p . c i t . p. 110. 
2. Chassin o p . c i t . I I 311 - 312; Montjoye: H i s t o i r e de l a Re v o l u t i o n " 
pp. 64-65, c i t e d by Cahen o p . c i t . p. 125. 
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The Opening of the Etats-Generaux y 
Condorcet's sense o f i s o l a t i o n at the beginning of the 
I r 
meeting of the Etats-Generaux i s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e somewhat alarm-
i s t manner i n which he reacted towards the deadlock caused by 
the refusal of the f i r s t two Orders t o allow t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
t o meet w i t h the T i e r s E t a t i n one assembly. Though t h i s was 
c l e a r l y the f a u l t of the pr i v e l e g e d Orders, Codorcet i n a s h o r t , 
unpublished piece c a l l e d "Reflexions sur l e s a f f a i r e s publiques 
' ' i l l 
par une s o c i e t e de citoyens , claimed t h a t t h i s was j u s t as 
much the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the T i e r s E t a t who had refused t o accept 
candidates from the n o b i l i t y , and t h i s d e s p i t e h i s experiences of 
the i n t r a n s i g e n c e of the nobles a t Mantes and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , a t 
P a r i s . 
I n order t o break the deadlock, he recommends a somewhat f a r -
f etched method whereby the T i e r s E t a t was t o c a l l f o r summoning 
of a second assembly which would meet t o decide whether the 
system of Orders was t o be maintained or not ( t h e answer, i n h i s 
mind, being a foregone c o n c l u s i o n ) . I t would then draw up a 
D e c l a r a t i o n of R i g h t s , f i x a date beyond which none of the o l d 
taxes were t o be c o l l e c t e d , and c a l l on the King t o summon a 
t h i r d assembly which would meet w i t h o u t any d i s t i n c t i o n of Orders 
2 
i n order t o set up a c o n s t i t u t i o n ! ' . 
1. p. 6, c i t e d by Cahen o p . c i t . p. 130. 
2. Hincker: I n t r o d u c t i o n t o "Esquisse d'un tab l e a u h i s t o r i q u e 
des progres de l ' e s p r i t humain" p. 40, E d i t i o n s Sociales, 
P a r i s , 1966. 
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I t i s s c a r c e l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t h i s plan passed q u i t e unnot-
i c e d . Undaunted, he proceeded t o c a l l on the T i e r s E t a t t o c o n f r o n t 
the motives of the other two Orders d i r e c t l y by asking them t o 
give t h e i r approval t o a manifesto i n nine p a r t s which contained 
a l l the fundamental reforms which he had mentioned i n h i s works. 
A l l f i s c a l p riveleges were t o be abolished; the assembly 
of the n a t i o n was t o meet every year and be renewed by e l e c t i o n s 
organised by i t s e l f ; no man was t o be convicted unless he had 
been found g u i l t y by a c l e a r m a j o r i t y of a p r o p e r l y c o n s t i t u t e d 
j u r y and a f t e r having received every guarantee; c a p i t a l punish-
ment was t o be abolished f o r a l l crimes except murder; no man 
was t o be detained f o r more than 24 hours unless a l e g a l l y 
c o n s t i t u t e d judge had examined the evidence against him and found 
t h a t i t j u s t i f i e d such a d e t e n t i o n ; no sentences were t o exceed 
two years u n t i l the Etats-Generaux had e s t a b l i s h e d a penal code; 
freedom of press was t o be proclaimed; no p r o p e r t y was t o be 
taken from a man u n t i l he was guaranteed compensation; a l l taxes 
not.approved by the Etats-Generaux were t o be abolished a t the 
same time as they themselves were d i s s o l v e d ; f i n a l l y , a l l r e s t r i c -
1 
t i o n s on commerce and i n d u s t r y were t o be l i f t e d . 
Once again, t h i s i n i t i a t i v e l e d t o not h i n g . However, these 
two f u t i l e attempts t o break the deadlock are i n t e r e s t i n g not so 
much because they i l l u s t r a t e the e f f o r t s of a man who had w r i t t e n 
a great deal about p o l i t i c a l reform before the R e v o l u t i o n t o 
adapt h i m s e l f t o events f o r which he was unprepared, as t h a t o f 
1. I b i d . p. 40. 
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someone, overtaken by the events of the time, desperately s t r i v i n g 
t o cut h i s losses by f o r c i n g the opponents o f reform t o r e v e a l , once 
and f o r a l l , t h e i r t r u e i n t e n t i o n s . 
By abandoning c o n c i l i a t i o n f o r c o n f r o n t a t i o n , Condorcet found 
h i m s e l f obliged t o press on the n a t i o n reforms which he had r i g h t l y 
considered would take s e v e r a l years t o e f f e c t . His a c t i o n c o n t r a s t s 
s t r i k i n g l y w i t h the advice against p r e c i p i t a t i o n which he had given 
t o the T i e r s E t a t e l e c t o r s d u r i n g the e l e c t i o n campaign. I n f a c t 
Condorcet was here moving on t o dangerous ground f o r , almost un-
awares, he was committing the very mistake f o r which he was t o 
blame the Constituent Assembly - the making of promises which 
could not p o s s i b l y be kept. 
His dilemma may be considered as the i n e v i t a b l e consequence 
of h i s a t t i t u d e towards c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform before 1789* an 
a t t i t u d e which may i t s e l f be explained by h i s temperament. A 
scholar by nature, he had approached the question of reform very 
much as an academic, expanding h i s views i n long, c a r e f u l l y argued 
t r e a t i s e s . Now, however, unless he was t o abandon a l l hope of 
seeing h i s ideas put i n t o p r a c t i c e , he was f o r c e d t o t u r n h i m s e l f 
i n t o a man of a c t i o n , a r o l e f o r which he was q u i t e unsuited. 
Even at the h e i g h t of the deadlock, h i s s o l u t i o n r e f l e c t s . 
s t r o n g d e s i r e t o ensure t h a t a l l was done v i a the proper channels, 
t h a t i s v i a e l e c t i o n s and the w r i t t e n commitments of the l e g a l l y 
e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the n a t i o n . 
The paradox i s u n d e r l i n e d somewhat i r o n i c a l l y by the manner 
i n which the deadlock was f i n a l l y broken, not by p o l i t i c a l manoeuv-
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r i n g and w r i t t e n manifestoes, but by the s t r i c t l y n o n - l e g a l i s t i c 
and d i r e c t a c t i o n of the P a r i s i a n mob on l 4 t h J u l y . 
This event, which was t o have a d e c i s i v e e f f e c t on the 
development of Condorcet's ideas d u r i n g the Rev o l u t i o n , exacerbated 
the d u a l i t y of h i s p o s i t i o n as t h i n k e r and man of a c t i o n . On the 
one hand, h i s i n s t i n c t i v e fear of the masses and of any d i r e c t , 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n , was t o lead him i n c r e a s i n g l y t o defend t h e 
p r i n c i p l e of l o y a l t y t o the l e g a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d assembly of the 
n a t i o n ; on the other hand, the mob's i n i t i a t i v e revealed t o him 
the amazing f a c t t h a t the o r d i n a r y people i n the n a t i o n were not 
so l a c k i n g i n p o l i t i c a l consciousness as he had be l i e v e d and were 
q u i t e prepared t o act f o r themselves i f they f e l t t h a t t h e i r r e p -
r e s e n t a t i v e s were not defending t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . 
This r e v e l a t i o n was t o strengthen h i s r e s o l u t i o n t o ensure 
t h a t the Asssmbly's reforms met t h e demands of the people and t h i s 
i n t u r n was t o lead him i n c r e a s i n g l y t o defend the p o l i t i c a l 
r i g h t s of th e lower s t r a t a of the po p u l a t i o n as the Revol u t i o n 
progressed. 
2. The Constituent Assembly 
The d u a l i t y of Condorcet's p o s i t i o n must be borne i n mind 
i f we are t o understand h i s a c t i v i t i e s d u r i n g the f i r s t two and 
a h a l f years of the Rev o l u t i o n . 
These a c t i v i t i e s may be d i v i d e d i n t o three p a r t s ; h i s work 
as a member of the Paris Commune assembly, h i s attempts t o form 
a centre p a r t y between J u l y 1789 and June 1791 and, most important 
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of a l l , h i s use o f j o u r n a l i s m as a means of forming p u b l i c o p i n i o n 
and educating the general p u b l i c by keeping i t informed o f the 
me r i t s and defects of the reforms made by the Constituent Assembly 
throughout 1789, 1790 and up t o June 1791-
a) The Commune Assembly 
As a member of the Commune's assembly''" Condorcet, f o r the 
f i r s t time, came i n t o close contact w i t h t h a t element of the 
po p u l a t i o n which was t o become the d r i v i n g f o r c e of the R e v o l u t i o n 
i n i t s l a t e r years. I t was i n e v i t a b l e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h i s should 
have c o n t r i b u t e d t o a development i n some of h i s ideas on c o n s t i t -
u t i o n a l reform, t u r n i n g them i n a more "popular" or " l e f t - w i n g " 
d i r e c t i o n . We may appreciate t h i s b e t t e r by examining very 
b r i e f l y the atmosphere i n which the Commune assembly came i n t o 
being. 
As we have seen, Condorcet's plans f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a 
new a d m i n i s t r a t i v e system i n France had placed great emphasis on 
the s e t t i n g up of assemblies a t the l e v e l of the small country 
parishes and the towns. From t h e r e , he had wished t o pass on t o 
the c r e a t i o n of assemblies a t the l e v e l of the " d i s t r i c t s " , the 
"provinces" and, u l t i m a t e l y , the n a t i o n , the emphasis a l l the time 
being on c o - o r d i n a t i o n . 
As i t was, the impetus o f the l4th J u l y r e v o l t l e d t o the 
1. He was elected by the Abbaye de St Germain q u a r t i e r on l8th 
September 1789 ( c . f . below). 
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f o r m a t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n a r y assemblies a t a l l l e v e l s of the community, 
which had n o t h i n g t o do w i t h those described by Condorcet and which, 
i n some cases, even proceeded t o assume l e g i s l a t i v e power. 
At t h i s stage, the C o n s t i t u t e n t Assembly had not even begun 
t o consider plans f o r the s e t t i n g up of a new a d m i n i s t r a t i v e system 
and had no o p t i o n but t o recognise the " f a i t accompli". As e a r l y 
as 23rd J u l y 1789 Mirabeau had c a l l e d f o r the establishement of 
a r e g u l a r l y e l e c t e d municipal government f o r P a r i s , t h i s being the 
f i r s t mention of the word " m u n i c i p a l i t e " i n the Assembly. 
The e l e c t i o n s which f o l l o w e d consolidated what had been 
achieved by spontaneous a c t i o n , so t h a t , before the Assembly had 
even approached the question of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e reform, France 
found i t s e l f equipped w i t h some 44,000 " m u n i c i p a l i t i e s " , e l e c t e d 
according t o a system which s a t i s f i e d none of the c o n d i t i o n s which 
Condorcet had mentioned i n h i s works, and which v a r i e d i n importance 
according t o the s i z e of the towns, or even v i l l a g e s , t o which 
they corresponded''". 
Faced w i t h these developements so c o n t r a r y t o the plan which 
he had described i n h i s works before 1789* one might have expected 
Condorcet t o withdraw from the r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement i n d i s g u s t . 
That he d i d not do so may be put down t o the f a c t t h a t he feared 
t h a t , i f he d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n events from the beginning, he 
would lose a l l contact w i t h a Revolution towards whose p r e p a r a t i o n 
he had devoted much of h i s l i f e . 
1. Cf. Soboul: H i s t o i r e de l a R e v o l u t i o n f r a n c a i s e , Ed. Idees N.R.F. 
(1962), I . 159 - l63; Cobban: Aspects of the French Revolution, 
Ed. Paladin (1968), Ch. 6, pp. 115 - 116. 
-106-
But i t i s also q u i t e evident t h a t the capture of the B a s t i l l e , 
and the outburst of r e v o l u t i o n a r y fervour which f o l l o w e d , had a 
de c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e on the development of h i s ideas by opening up 
t o him an e n t i r e l y new perspective as t o the way i n which the 
reforms which he so a r d e n t l y d e s i r e d could be e f f e c t e d . This 
i s the view of one of the few major h i s t o r i a n s of the R e v o l u t i o n 
who has paid a t t e n t i o n t o Condorcet's a c t i v i t i e s o f the time. 
I n h i s H i s t o i r e p o l i t i q u e de l a R e v o l u t i o n f r a n c h i s e , F.U. Aulard 
sees a progressive e v o l u t i o n i n Condorcet's a t t i t u d e "depuis que 
le s p r o l e t a i r e s avaient f a i t acte de citoyens en aidant l a bourg-
e o i s i e a prendre l a B a s t i l l e , depuis que l a populace de P a r i s , par 
c e t t e o p e r a t i o n raisonnable e t heroique, s e t a i t elevee a l a 
' ..1 d i g n i t e de peuple. . 
Par from r e t i r i n g from events, t h e r e f o r e , Condorcet threw 
h i m s e l f w i t h renewed f e r v o u r i n t o the r e v o l u t i o n a r y "melee". He 
2 
was one of the f i r s t t o j o i n the N a t i o n a l Guard i n Paris and 
on l8th September was el e c t e d t o the Commune's general assembly 
by the " q u a r t i e r " of Abbaye de St Germain . On the 3rd December 
he was elected t o the committee of 24 set up by the general assem-
b l y , i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h the N a t i o n a l Assembly, t o draw up the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of the Paris Commune. 
I n other words, f o r the f i r s t time, he found h i m s e l f entrusted 
w i t h the task of making reforms i n a concrete s i t u a t i o n . The 
1. P a r i s . A. C o l i n , 1901, p. 73-
2. c f . Le Rodeur , n ° 2 pp. 27 et 28, c i t e d by Cahen op.cit.p.138. 
3- L a c r o i x : Actes de l a Commune , I I . 679; Rabiquet: Personnel 
municipal de Paris , 215; P a t r i o t e f r a n c a i s " 9th Sept. 1789* 
c i t e d by Cahen o p . c i t . p. 138. 
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essence of these reforms i s contained i n a t r e a t i s e which he 
proposed t o the committee on 6th December 1789 i n h i s capacity as 
Chairman''". This i s included among h i s complete works under the 
2 
t i t l e "Sur l a f o r m a t i o n des communes" . 
He defines a "commune" as c o n s i s t i n g of "une reunion des 
citoyens a q u i l a proximte de l e u r s h a b i t a t i o n s a donne des i n t e r e t s 
communs e t f a i t s e n t i r l ' u t i l i t e de former entre eux une a s s o c i a t i o n " 
I t was t o be a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d e n t i t y , possessing a c o n s t i t u t i o n 
approved by i t s members and sanctioned by the State. 
I t s r o l e r e f l e c t s i t s autonomous, u n i f i e d o r g a n i s a t i o n . I t s 
f i r s t duty was t o create a "force publique" t o ensure the p r o t e c t i o n 
4 
of i t s members and the enforcement of the law . I t also had the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r guaranteeing t h a t p u b l i c p r o p e r t y - s t r e e t s , 
paths, market-places - was accessible t o the general p u b l i c , and f o r 
f i x i n g the l i m i t a t i o n s t o t h i s access, i n the case, f o r example, of 
5 
provocative p o l i t i c a l gatherings . 
I t would supervise the b u i l d i n g programme of the area under 
i t s c o n t r o l and the upkeep of b u i l d i n g s such as schools constructed 
i n the community's i n t e r e s t s . F i n a l l y , i t would finance a l l p u b l i c 
works undertaken i n the "commune" w i t h the money provided by the 
State according t o the "commune's" own estimates .and would have 
the r i g h t t o make use of t h i s money as i t saw best. 
The "commune", t h e r e f o r e , was t o be a s t a t e w i t h i n the State, 
i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a r e p l i c a , on a smaller scale, of the n a t i o n ' s . 
1. A p o s i t i o n t o which he was e l e c t e d on 4th December; c f . La-
c r o i x : "Actes de l a Commune" I I I . 147, Cahen 140. 
2. O.C. IX. 403 - ^10. 
3. I b i d 405 
4. O.C. IX. 407 
5. I b i d 407 
6. I b i d 408 
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L i k e i t , i t was t o recognise the u n i v e r s a l r i g h t s of man, i t was 
t o be renewable and i t was t o be es t a b l i s h e d by a s i n g l e body-
rep r e s e n t i n g a l l the "commune's" members^. 
These ideas of Condorcet are contained i n embryo i n some of 
h i s e a r l i e r works. However, they represent q u i t e an e v o l u t i o n 
from the d e s c r i p t i o n of the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e bodies given i n the 
"Essai sur l e s Assemblees p r o v i n c i a l e s " . The important d i f f e r e n c e 
i s t h a t Condorcet has here t r a n s f e r r e d t o the "communes", and thus 
t o the or d i n a r y people a t the l e v e l of the grass r o o t s , the adminis-
t r a t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and the autonomy i n matters of finance 
he had o r i g i n a l l y reserved f o r the provinces. That i t had f o r long 
been h i s i n t e n t i o n t o enable the people t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the 
running of t h e i r own a f f a i r s should not lead us i n t o underestimating 
the g r e a t n o v e l t y of h i s new ideas. 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e of these i s a l l the g r e a t e r i f we bear i n 
mind t h a t he was con c e n t r a t i n g most of h i s a t t e n t i o n on the c a p i t a l 
c i t y , and consequently on by f a r the most powerful "commune" i n 
the n a t i o n . That the power of Paris was g r e a t l y feared by many 
of the resp r e s e n t a t i v e s i n the Constituent Assembly i s c l e a r from 
the debate which l a s t e d through December 1789 on the question of 
the s t a t u s t o be given t o the c i t y w i t h i n the new a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
system. 
The debate was c l o s e l y f o l l o w e d by the members of the Commune's 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l committee and i t reached a head on 14th December when 
they were asked t o express an op i n i o n concerning the two a l t e r n a t i v e s 
f a c i n g Paris. Was i t t o be amalgamated w i t h the suburbs t o form 
p a r t of a l a r g e "departement", or was i t t o remain d i r e c t l y under 
2 
the c o n t r o l of the Nation a l Assembly? . 
1. I b i d 409 - 410. 
2. L a c r o i x : "Actes de l a Commune I I I . 185 - 188. 
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0n 24th December the P a r i s i a n " d i s t r i c t s " decided i n favour 
of the f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e by 23 votes t o 10 and, s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the 
task of e x p l a i n i n g the Commune's choice f e l l t o Condorcet''". The 
"Ad^resse a l'Assemblee n a t i o n a l e pour que Paris fasse p a r t i e d'un 
grand departement" , read t o the Assembly an 28th December , i s an 
eloquent " p l a i d o y e r " i n favour of a strong c a p i t a l . 
Condorcet's main arguement here i s t h a t i t was v i t a l f o r a 
c i t y which contained so great a co n c e n t r a t i o n of the p o p u l a t i o n 
t o be w e l l stocked w i t h wheat, f l o u r , wood, c o a l , e t c . and t o 
have r e l i a b l e communications w i t h the outside. 
"Une v i l l e q ui n o u r r i t t a n t d'hommes sur un espace s i 
e t r o i t ne peut e t r e assuree, nk de subsistances, n i 
des denrees necessaires a sa consommation, sans des 
magasins de b l e s , de f a r i n e s , de b o i s , de charbon, 
et c . ...Que ces magasins... appartiennent a l a commune 
ou a des p a r t i c u l i e r s , ... i l est necessaire que l a v i l l e 
de Paris a i t des moyens prompts ... de v e i l l e r a l e u r s u r e t e . " 
t i ' 
This could only be done i f these stores were r e u n i s sur un 
t e r r i t o i r e soumis a une meme a u t o r i t e , a une a u t o r i t e q u i ne s o i t 
4 * „4 pas etrangere a l a v i l l e de Pari s . 
S i m i l a r l y , Condorcet a t t a c k s the idea t h a t , i f Paris d i d 
form p a r t of a "departement", the " c h e f - l i e u " should l i e elsewhere 
i n one of the suburban towns. 
L i n t e r e t de ce ... departement est que c e t t e assemblee 
re s i d e dans l a c a p i t a l e , dans ce centre de tou t e s l e s 
grandes a f f a i r e s , dans c e t t e v i l l e ou des m o t i f s pressants 
a p p l e l l e n t presque tous l e s Frangais." 5 
F i n a l l y , he att a c k s the idea t h a t the N a t i o n a l Assembly 
should not meet i n the c a p i t a l . 
1. I b i d 200 
2.O.C. EC. 393 - 401. 
3.Lacroix: o p . c i t I I I . 283, 302, 304, 305. 
4.O.C. IX. 397-
5 . I b i d 399-
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a strong and u n i t e d c a p i t a l centred on the Hotel de V i l l e which 
has already been described. 
A l l t h i s i s f a r removed from the Condorcet who, before 1789> 
had envisaged the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a f e d e r a l system based on the 
provinces. As w i l l be seen l a t e r when we examine h i s views on 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e reform as a whole, the r o l e which he planned f o r 
the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e assembly of each "departement" was l e s s import-
ant than the one which he had o r i g i n a l l y destined f o r the " p r o v i n -
c i a l " assemblies. Their r o l e was i n f a c t t o be p u r e l y a d m i n i s t r a -
t i v e and they were t o have none of the v i t a l i t y and popular s t r e n g t h 
of the "communes". 
Having sa i d t h i s , however, i t i s pos s i b l e t o r a i s e two o b j e c t -
ions t o the idea t h a t Condorcet's support f o r a str o n g , u n i t e d 
P a r i s , r e f l e c t e d a swing i n a popular d i r e c t i o n . F i r s t , i t has been 
said t h a t the Commune was very much a "bourgeois" c r e a t i o n . Against 
t h i s , one can say t h a t i t was the a c t i o n of the populace which had 
l e d , both t o i t s formation a f t e r the 14th J u l y , and t o i t s formal 
r e c o g n i t i o n by the King a f t e r the October days. I n both cases, the 
"bourgeoisie" merely consolidated what the people had achieved. 
This i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the f a c t t h a t the King was escorted back 
t o Paris by the N a t i o n a l Guard under L a f a y e t t e a f t e r the people's 
i n v a s i o n of the palace had force d him t o leave V e r s a i l l e s . 
At t h i s stage of the Revolution, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o speak 
of any fundamental clash of i n t e r e s t between the "bourgeoisie" 
and the populace; however, i t must have been c l e a r t o many t h a t 
the "Commune" was the o r g a n i s a t i o n which was c l o s e s t t o the people 
and t h a t i t s r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o t e n t i a l was considerable. I t i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t , f o r example, t h a t the general assembly d i d not give 
i t s o p i n i o n concerning the s t a t u s t o be given t o Paris u n t i l i t 
had consulted a l l the members of the Commune. Not only d i d 
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"Paris j o u i t de l'honneur d'etre l a c a p i t a l e de l a France 
depuis l ' o r i g i n e de l a monarchie, e t nous croyons pouvoir 
d i r e sans o r g u e i l que, par sa conduite dans c e t t e heureuse 
r e v o l u t i o n , Paris n'a p o i n t merite de l a perdre." 1 
The second p a r t of the q u o t a t i o n c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s the o r i g i n 
of Condorcet's s p i r i t e d defence of the c a p i t a l . He i s r e f e r r i n g 
of course t o the P a r i s i a n mobs who opened the way t o the Revolution 
on l4th J u l y and who f o r c e d the King t o move t o Paris on 6th 
October. 
Condorcet was p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l placed t o appreciate the mob's 
i n i t i a t i v e . Already, on 23rd September, he had been e l e c t e d by 
the Commune's general assembly t o examine w i t h three other "commiss-
2 
a i r e s " the t r u t h of rumours t h a t troops were advancing on Paris . 
J u s t before the October days he had been appointed t o the d e l e g a t i o n 
sent by the Commune t o V e r s a i l l e s t o c o n s u l t the King about the 
best method of b r i n g i n g order t o P a r i s ^ . 
That he was r i g h t t o put h i s f a i t h i n the c i t i z e n s of Paris 
i s u n d erlined by the a c t i v i t i e s of such people as Mounier who, 
s h o r t l y a f t e r the October days, attempted t o r a i s e the " e t a t s " 
of Dauphine against the Etats-Generaux and thus p r e c i p i t a t e d the 
Assembly's d e c i s i o n t o t u r n away from reforms, envisaged before 
1789, which would have granted each province a much g r e a t e r auton-
4 
omy than before . 
I t i s a measure of Condorcet's p o p u l a r i t y a t t h i s time t h a t , 
s h o r t l y afterwards, he was e l e c t e d Chairman of the committee which 
was t o draw up the Commune's c o n s t i t u t i o n . I t was against t h i s 
background of popular euphoria t h a t he envisaged the scheme f o r 
1. I b i d 401. 
2. L a c r o i x : op. c i t . I I . 59, 40, 51-
5. I b i d 201 - 202. 
4. Cf. Cobban o p . c i t . Ch. 6: "Local government d u r i n g the French 
Revolution", p. 115-
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Condorcet approve of t h i s a t t i t u d e , but he went even f u r t h e r than 
t h i s , c a l l i n g f o r the c i t i z e n s t o have the r i g h t , n o t only t o 
p e t i t i o n the a u t h o r i t i e s , but t o assemble on t h e i r own i n i t i a t i v e 
i n order t o come t o an understanding on any p o i n t of d i v i s i o n among 
themselves. 
"...Les citoyens doivent conserver, non seulement l e d r o i t 
de s'assembler pour e l i r e , e t c e l u i de f a i r e des p e t i t i o n s , 
... mais, de plus , c e l u i de pouvoir s-assembler, e t de 
former un voeu commun, meme dans l e cas ou i l s s e r a i e n t 
d i v i s e s en p l u s i e u r s s e c t i o n s . " 1 
This very democratic p r o j e c t i l l u s t r e s Condorcet's ever 
growing wish t o i n v o l v e the or d i n a r y c i t i z e n s of the n a t i o n as 
much as pos s i b l e i n the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the areas i n which they 
l i v e d . 
The second o b j e c t i o n which may be made concerns the f a c t 
t h a t , i f Condorcet had r e a l l y d e s i r e d a strong c a p i t a l , he would 
have supported the proposal t h a t Paris become a "departement" i n 
her own r i g h t . He himse l f admitted t h a t t h i s would have given 
Paris more power than any of the other "departements": 
...L assemblee de ce departement, formee presque en 
e n t i e r des citoyens de l a c a p i t a l e , e&t ete en quelque 
s o r t e une autre m u n i c i p a l i t e , chargee seulement de 
f o n c t i o n s d i f f e r e n t e s . " 2 
One must not f o r g e t , however, t h a t the aim of Condorcet's 
address was t o calm the f e a r s of the p r o v i n c i a l members of the 
Assembly concerning the dangers of too powerful a c a p i t a l . 
But, even then, i t i s d o u b t f u l whether he r e a l l y believed 
t h a t the new "departement" assembly, which he i n s i s t e d should 
always meet i n Paris i t s e l f , could escape the i n f l u e n c e of the 
Hotel de V i l l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y as he was unaware a t t h a t time t h a t 
the N a t i o n a l Assembly planned t o place the "co n s e i l s generaux" of 
1. Sur l a fo r m a t i o n des communes, O.C. IX. 409. 
2. Ad^fresse a 1'Assemblee n a t i o n a l e , O.C. IX. 396. 
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the "departements" above those of the "communes": the f i r s t were 
i n f a c t t o be elected by the "Electeurs" and the second by the 
"citoyens a c t i f s " . This leads us t o the important question of 
E l e c t o r a l reform. 
The Constituent Assembly's e l e c t o r a l reforms c o n s t i t u t e d a 
d e f i n i t e t h r e a t t o Condorcet's conception of a u n i f i e d n a t i o n , 
h e l d i n place a t one end by an assembly e l e c t e d by the pro p e r t y 
owners and, a t the other, by the numerous a c t i v e and popular 
"communes", l i n k e d i n the middle by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e assemblies, 
themselves elected by the p r o p e r t y owners and operating a t the 
l e v e l o f the " d i s t r i c t s " and "departements". 
Since Condorcet made h i s most important a t t a c k s on. t h i s 
s e c t i o n of the Assembly's reforms as a member of the Commune's 
general assembly, they w i l l best be examined a t t h i s p o i n t . 
During the e l e c t i o n s t o the Etats-Generaux, Condorcet wrote 
a work on e l e c t o r a l reform c a l l e d "Sur l a forme des elections""'" 
i n which he attempted t o s i m p l i f y the l a b o r i o u s system which he 
had described i n the "Essai sur l e s Assemblies p r o v i n c i a l e s " 
He suggested two methods whereby the r e l a t i v e ignorance of 
the m a j o r i t y of the e l e c t o r s could be r e c o n c i l e d w i t h t h e i r r i g h t 
t o vote. E i t h e r the e l e c t o r s would meet t o e l e c t "Electeurs" who 
would vote on t h e i r behalf, or else they would e l e c t "Presentateurs" 
who, using t h e i r s u p e r i o r knowledge and experience, would s e l e c t 
a number of r e l i a b l e candidates from whom the e l e c t o r s would then 
2 
be bound t o choose . 
1. O.C. IX. 285 - 330. 
2. O.C. IX. 290 - 292. 
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He also considered methods whereby the number of those e l i g i b l e 
could be reduced t o ensure t h a t the e l e c t o r s should also be able 
t o i n d i c a t e t h e i r second choices''". But the important p o i n t t o 
be remembered'about a l l these methods i s t h a t the e l e c t o r s were 
t o be f r e e t o decide themselves about the d i s t i n c t i o n s which were 
t o be made between them; these were not t o be d i c t a t e d by e x t e r n a l 
circumstances such as the ownership of property. 
The Constituent Assembly, however, decided t o c a r r y out i t s 
reforms p r e c i s e l y on such l i n e s . Despite A r t i c l e 6 of the Declar-
a t i o n of Rights - "La l o i est l'expression de l a vol o n t e generale. 
Tous l e s citoyens ont l e d r o i t de concouri r personnellement ou par 
l e u r s representants a. sa fo r m a t i o n " - i t placed a l l those who could 
n o t pay a ta x equal t o three days' work i n the category of "citoyens 
p a s s i f s " , thus d e p r i v i n g some three m i l l i o n people of the r i g h t t o 
vote. 
The bulk of the small p r o p e r t y owners of the n a t i o n were 
classed as "citoyens a c t i f s " , but t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s b o i l e d 
down t o not h i n g more than the e l e c t i o n of the municipal a u t h o r i -
t i e s and the "Electeurs". The l a t t e r , who had t o pay taxes equal 
t o ten days' work, numbered only 50*000 (compared t o 4 m i l l i o n 
"citoyens a c t i f s " ) and yet i t was on t h e i r vote alone t h a t the 
r e a l power of the n a t i o n was t o depend. 
To crown i t a l l , the Assembly declared t h a t , t o be e l i g i b l e 
f o r e l e c t i o n t o i t s ranks, a man would have t o pay a ta x equal t o 
2 
one "marc d'argent", or 52 l i v r e s , and would have t o own p r o p e r t y . 
A l b e r t Soboul has a p t l y summed up t h i s p a r t of the Constituent 
Assembly's reforms. 
1. O.C. IX. 294. 
2. C o n s t i t u t i o n de 1791. T i t r e I I I , Ch. I , s e c t i o n I I , a r t i c l e s 1 - 7 . 
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"A l ' a r i s t o c r a t i e de naissance, ce systeme e l e c t o r a l 
c e n s i t a i r e a deux degres, f a l s a i t succeder l ' a r i s t o c r a t i e 
de l ' a r g e n t . Le peuple e t a i t e l i m i n e de l a v i e p o l i t i q u e . " 1 
The " l e f t - w i n g " press n a t u r a l l y reacted very s t r o n g l y t o 
these reforms and Condorcet was among the f i r s t t o p r o t e s t . As 
e a r l y as 12th December 1789 he presented the assembly of the 
Commune w i t h a sho r t t r e a t i s e on the subject. I t was w e l l received, 
but the v e r s i o n of i t published i n the f i r s t e d i t i o n of the Journal 
de l a Societe de 1789 of the 5th June 1790^ and included i n 
Condorcet's complete works under the t i t l e of "Adresse a l'Assemble'e 
1 ' ' «3 
n a t i o n a l e sur l e s c o n d i t i o n s d e l i g i b i l i t e i s a watered-down 
v e r s i o n of the o r i g i n a l . 
I n i t he argues t h a t the Assembly's reforms were not s u f f i c i e n t 
t o f u l f i l the aims f o r which they were intended. I n other words 
the sum of one marc of s i l v e r was too small t o ensure t h a t o nly 
educated men would be e l e c t e d , w h i l e i t had the opposite e f f e c t 
of encouraging people t o r e s o r t t o such devices as the b r i b i n g 
of t a x - c o l l e c t o r s or the borrowing of l a r g e sums of money which 
would be reimbursed when the e l e c t i o n s were over. I f the sum 
5 
were r a i s e d , however, many good men would become i n e l i g i b l e . 
Ey separating the e l e c t o r a l assemblies from the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
ones , the Assembly had done a l l t h a t was r e q u i r e d t o ensure t h a t 
the e l e c t i o n s took place normally; the c r e a t i o n of a t h i r d category 
of c i t i z e n s - the "Electeurs" - (a move which Condorcet q u i t e 
r i g h t l y p o i n t s out had been taken before i t was decided t o separate 
1. Op. c i t . p. 210. 
2. Delsaux: Condorcet J o u r n a l i s t e P a r i s , H.Champion 1931,. p'. 38. 
3. O.C. X. 77 - 91. 
5. O.C. IX. 82 - 83. 
6. Const, de 1791, T i t r e I I I , Ch. I , Sect IV, A r t . 1. 
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the assemblies) - was thus q u i t e superfluous''". 
Condorcet believed t h a t a d i v i s i o n of the e l e c t o r a t e i n t o 
two by the i m p o s i t i o n of a s p e c i a l tax., destined t o separate those 
who were r e a l l y poor from the r e s t would be q u i t e s u f f i c i e n t t o 
2 
guarantee t h a t only independent people would have the vote . 
He had never y e t suggested t h i s method, but i t represents l e s s a 
new departure i n h i s ideas than a temporary expedient f o r recon-
c i l i n g the r i g h t t o vote w i t h the u n c e r t a i n t y of the times, an 
u n c e r t a i n t y which made i t so easy f o r the masses t o be misled by 
demogues. 
With h i s new method, a l l but the very poor would p a r t i c i p a t e 
i n the e l e c t i o n s t o the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e bodies. He was f u l l y aware 
of the danger of l e a v i n g the choice of the f i r s t e l e c t e d adminis-
t r a t i v e bodies which the n a t i o n had ever had t o c e r t a i n classes 
of people, f o r the a c t i v i t i e s of these f i r s t a d m i n i s t r a t o r s would 
serve as the only g u i d e - l i n e s f o r a l l f u t u r e e l e c t o r s t o f o l l o w . 
"Tous l e s corps municipaux, toutes l e s assemblies de d i s -
t r i c t , de departement, s e r a i e n t d i v i s e s en deux classes, 
l'une des e l i g i b l e s , l ' a u t r e des n o n - e l i g i b l e s pour 
l'assemblee n a t i o n a l e ; e t c e t t e d i s t i n c t i o n l e s partag-
e r a i t b i e n t o t en p a r t i e s , y ' d e t r u i r a i t c e t t e base s i noble 
de n o t r e heureuse c o n s t i t u i o n . " 3 
However, Condorcet's most e f f e c t i v e arguments are t o be found 
a t the l e v e l of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . I n h i s view, the e l e c t o r a l 
reforms v i o l a t e d a t l e a s t two of the a r t i c l e s of the D e c l a r a t i o n 
of Rights, A r t i c l e 6 - "Tous l e s cltoyens ... sont egalement 
admissibles a toutes d i g n i t e s , places e t emplois p u b l i c s , selon 
l e u r capacite e t sans autre d i s t i n c t i o n que c e l l e s de l e u r s v e r t u s 
e t de l e u r s t a l e n t s " - and A r t i c l e 14 - "Tous l e s citoyens ont l e 
1. O.C. IX. 84, 89 - 90. 
2. I b i d 80. 
3. O.C. LX. 86. 
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d r o i t de constater par eux-meme.s ou par l e u r s representants, l a 
necessite de l a c o n t r i b u t i o n publique, de l a c o n s e n t i r l i b r e m e n t , 
t I I ' ' ! 
d en s u i v r e 1 emploi e t d en determiner l a q u a l i t e , 1 a s s i e t t e , 
' t . l 
l e recouvrement e t l a duree . 
2 
Secondly they l i n k e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l laws t o f i n a n c i a l laws , 
a very dangerous step a t a time when the whole tax system 
was under review. For example, by merely decreasing the number of 
Church or army appointments, one could a l t e r the p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s 
of 200,000 people; the suppression of the T a i l l e would deprive 
thousands of people of t h e i r " a c t i v e " c i t i z e n s h i p and would thus 
encourage them t o r e v o l t against reforms which were i n themselves 
good and necessary^. 
The "Adresse a 1'Assemblee n a t i o n a l e " does not c o n s t i t u t e a 
good example of Condorcet's changing a t t i t u d e d u r i n g h i s p e r i o d 
of o f f i c e as a member of the Commune's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l committee. 
His tone i s moderate, the arguments are expressed i n a very l e g a l -
i s t i c manner, w h i l e the m a j o r i t y of h i s comments c o n s i s t i n ex-
pressing h i s dismay a t the f a c t t h a t the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly 
had not paid any heed t o reforms which he had already suggested 
i n 1788 and the e a r l y p a r t of I789. 
4 
The o r i g i n a l t r e a t i s e , however, i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t , perhaps 
because i t was w r i t t e n much c l o s e r t o the events which i t des-
c r i b e d . I t mentions n o t a b l y three important p o i n t s which do n o t 
appear i n the published work. 
F i r s t , Condorcet p o i n t s out the s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t t h a t i t was 
1. I b i d . 79-
2. I b i d . 79. 
3. I b i d . 80. 
4. For an account of the f a t e of t h i s t r e a t i s e and of the reasons 
why only i t s abridged form appeared, c f . Cahen o p . c i t . p. 159. 
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e a s i e r t o acquire p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y i n the country than i n the towns. 
I t must have come as q u i t e a shock t o him t o discover how few 
p r o p e r t y owners l i v e d i n Paris and i t i s c e r t a i n t h a t t h i s discovery 
was t o make him doubt more and more the v a l i d i t y of what he, as 
l a t e as August 1789 i n h i s p r o j e c t f o r a D e c l a r a t i o n of Rights, 
had s t i l l considered as the fundamental p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r being 
allowed t o vote"*". 
Secondly, he became aware t h a t d i r e c t taxes were much easier 
t o assess i n the country than i n the towns and t h a t t h e r e f o r e , 
there was always the danger t h a t a town d w e l l e r could be deprived 
of h i s vote through the mistake, i n t e n t i o n a l or n o t , of a t a x -
c o l l e c t o r . This was a l l the more scandalous as the only d i r e c t 
t a x which was l e v i e d i n the towns was the p a r t i c u l a r l y odious 
" C a p i t a t i o n " . 
F i n a l l y , Condorcet's observations l e d him t o discover t h a t 
the i n d i r e c t taxes were more d i f f i c u l t t o t o l e r a t e i n the towns 
than i n the country and t h a t , of the towns, Paris was the worst 
h i t . 
I t i s evident, from a l l t h i s , t h a t h i s changing a t t i t u d e 
towards e l e c t o r a l reform was c l o s e l y l i n k e d t o h i s experience 
as a member of the Paris Commune, and though h i s i n f l u e n c e i n 
the Commune's general assembly began t o wane between January 
and August 1790, the new s l a n t given t o h i s ideas was t o have 
considerable consequences as the Revolution progressed. 
b) La Societe de 1789 
Condorcet's move towards the people, although s i n c e r e , d i d 
not put an end t o h i s i n s t i n c t i v e f e a r of the masses or of a l l 
1. Cf. P r o j e t de d e c l a r a t i o n des d r o i t s , Sect. V, Div. I , O.C. 
IX. 207. 
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forms of spontaneous p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n . He was aware t h a t the 
speed w i t h which events had taken place sine the summoning of the 
Etats-Generaux, and the passions which they had aroused, threatened 
t o lead the makers of the c o n s t i t u t i o n t o lose s i g h t of the fundamental 
p r i n c i p l e s which were t o govern i t . 
I t was t o prevent t h i s t h a t he founded the "Societe de 1789" which 
held i t s f i r s t meeting a t the Palais Royal on 13th May 1790. I t s aim 
was t o avoid a method of d e a l i n g w i t h p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s which consisted 
i n t a k i n g l e p a r t i q ui para-it l e p lus expedient, e t a chercher 
ensuite quels p r i n c i p e s on d o i t a v o i r l ' a i r d'adopter, pour s o u t e n i r 
l e p a r t i auquel on s'est decide d'advance""^" and t o f o l l o w instead the 
method of those who sought "des p r i n c i p e s i n a l t e r a b l e s e t univers&Ls... 
dans l a nature e t e r n e l l e de l'homme e t des choses" . 
Condorcet was t o s t r u g g l e w i t h the choice of which of these 
two l i n e s of conduct t o f o l l o w throughout the Revolution and one 
can understand the importance f o r him of the existence of a s o c i e t y 
which, through a l l the v i c i s s i t u d e s of the times, could a c t as an 
a n t i d o t e t o the temptation t o s a c r i f i c e i d e a l i s m t o expediency. 
I t i s i n d i c a t i v e of the temper of the time, however, t h a t the 
plan f a i l e d . Although the Society had f o u r hundred and f i f t y members, 
almost a l l of whom belonged t o the more progressive element of the bour-
g e o i s i e , only one hundred and f o r t y seven subscribed t o the paper e d i t e d 
3 
by Condorcet, and only twenty three helped t o finance i t . The l a s t 
4 
issue came out on 5th September 1790, only f o u r months a f t e r the f i r s t . 
1. L e t t r e a Monsieur XXX sur l a Soci^te de I789, O.C. X. 70. • • ' -
2. I b i d 71. 
3. Cf. Cahen o p . c i t . p. 240. 
4. For an account of the newspapers' h i s t o r y , c f . Delsaux o p . c i t . 
Ch. 3- PP. 37 - 43. 
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I n the opening months of 1791, the Society's s u r v i v a l was 
i n grave jeopardy and the f i n a l blow came when the more conservative 
element among i t s members broke away t o form t h e i r own group 
c a l l e d "Les Amis de l a c o n s t i t u t i o n monarchique". The progressives 
j o i n e d the Jacobin Club and Condorcet, d i s i l l u s i o n e d by the f a i l u r e 
of h i s e f f o r t s , f o l l o w e d them i n May 1791 1. 
The whole episode i s i n t e r e s t i n g as a key t o the understanding 
of Condorcet's works between 1789 and 1791 and t o h i s l a t e r develop-
ment. His works were dominated by the d e s i r e t o transcend p a r t y 
p o l i t i c s and t o seek t o u n i t e the n a t i o n around fundamental 
p r i n c i p l e s . The abandonment of the Soeiete de I789, which he had 
considered as e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t from those s o c i e t i e s "que des 
citoyens p o u r r a i e n t former dans l ' - i n t e n t i o n de r e u n i r l e u r s f o r c e s 
pour l e succes d une reforms dans l a c o n s t i t u t i o n e t dans l a l e g i s -
2 
l a t i o n de l e u r pays" and h i s adherence t o a body such as the 
Jacobin Club which had a much more " o r i e n t a t e d " a t t i t u d e towards 
the p o l i t i c a l problems of the day, i l l u s t r a t e the e v o l u t i o n of 
h i s ideas i n a more committed d i r e c t i o n . 
However, so l a t e an adherence t o the Jacobins i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
he was r e l u c t a n t t o i d e n t i f y h imself too c l o s e l y w i t h any p o l i t i c a l 
groups. Thus, on h i s own admission, he i n c u r r e d the h o s t i l i t y of 
both the n o b i l i t y and the progressives and t h i s was t o increase the 
i s o l a t i o n i n t o which he had already been forc e d by h i s i n i t i a l 
i n a b i l i t y t o adapt t o the speed of the. events of 1789. 
The tensionshidden behind h i s a c t i v i t i e s d u r i n g the p e r i o d 
of the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly are thus important and must be under-
stood. But i t i s i n h i s w r i t i n g s of the time t h a t these tensions 
are f e l t the most. Thus i t i s v i t a l t o examine h i s work from 1789-
1. Cf. J u s t i f i c a t i o n , O.C. I . 580. 
2. Sur l a Societe de 1789, O.C. X. 72. 
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1791 as a j o u r n a l i s t and commentator on the reforms c a r r i e d out 
d u r i n g these three years by the Constituent Assembly. 
c) The j o u r n a l i s t 
Condorcet's j o u r n a l i s m probably represents the most important 
branch of h i s a c t i v i t i e s of the time as i t enabled him, i s o l a t e d 
as he was, t o c o n t r i b u t e i n h i s own way t o the Revolutionary 
movement. Helene Delsaux has w e l l summed up the importance 
which j o u r n a l i s m was t o take on from 1789 onwards: 
"Enseignement p o p u l a i r e , d i f f u s i o n de l ' i d e e t o u t e f a i t e , 
f a c i l e m e n t accessible, ... propagande r e v o l u t i o n n a i r e , 
coup de fo u e t q u o t i d i e n aux passions des "demos", ... 
V o i l a , vers 1789, l e but d*Ljournalisme, dont l a puissance 
date de l a Revolution." 1 
I t was v i a j o u r n a l i s m t h a t Condorcet made h i s most determined 
e f f o r t t o adapt t o events. The long, a b s t r a c t t r e a t i s e s g i v e way 
t o s h o r t , i n c i s i v e a r t i c l e s w r i t t e n d i r e c t l y i n r e l a t i o n t o t o p i c s 
being discussed by the Assembly. The d e t a i l e d s t y l e of the p h i l o s -
opher i s replaced by the racy, impassioned eloquence of the j o u r n -
a l i s t and t h i s n a t u r a l l y a f f e c t s our comprehension of Condorcet's 
views. 
As the tone of h i s a r t i c l e s i s u s u a l l y argumentative, he uses 
r h e t o r i c a l devices such as i r o n y and exaggeration which may some-
times mislead one as t o the r e a l s t r e n g t h of h i s f e e l i n g s about 
a p a r t i c u l a r subject. This d i s t o r t i o n i s exacerbated by the 
dual aim which he gave t o h i s jo u r n a l i s m . 
On the other hand, he wished t o w r i t e f o r the b e n e f i t ' of the 
Assembly and, when he does so, he i s u s u a l l y c r i t i c a l . On the other 
hand, he r e a l i s e d t h a t j o u r n a l i s m was an i d e a l v e h i c l e f o r e x p l a i n i n g t o 
the people what the Assembly was doing and f o r r a l l y i n g them around 
1. Op.cit. Ch. 3« PP. 36 - 37.: Cf. also : H i s t o i r e de l a l i t t e r a t u r e 
f r a n c a i s e Lanson, Par i s , Hachette 1895- P- 857-
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t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s so as t o consolidate the Revolution's gains. 
This t e n s i o n , which i s inher e n t i n h i s w r i t i n g s , adds t o the 
t e n s i o n which we have already noted i n h i s general a t t i t u d e towards 
the events of the day. 
A l l t h i s must be borne i n mind when we examine the numerous 
a r t i c l e s w r i t t e n by Condorcet from 1789 t o 1791 i n the -Journal 
de l a Societe de 1789 and the Bouche de Fer". They c o n s t i t u t e 
a very f u l l review of the reforms undertaken d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d 
by the Co n s t i t u e n t Assembly"1" and rev e a l h i s attempts t o r e l a t e 
these reforms, not only t o the plans he had devised before 1789, 
but also t o the adaptation of these plans t o the events of 1789 
v i z . the demands embodied i n the imperative mandates and i n the nine 
p o i n t ultimatum t o the c l e r g y and the n o b i l i t y . 
As was only t o be expected from a body c o n s i s t i n g of 1,200 
men repre s e n t i n g a wide range of op i n i o n and a l l new t o the task 
of r eforming the e n t i r e p o l i t i c a l system of a n a t i o n , the Assembly 
paid no heed t o the reform method so m e t i c u l o u s l y described by 
Condorcet i n the e a r l y months of 1789. Instead of approaching the 
problems w i t h c a u t i o n and w i t h reference t o basic p r i n c i p l e s , i t 
proceeded by f i t s and s t a r t s , sometimes rushing ahead r e c k l e s s l y 
as on the n i g h t of 4th August, sometimes seeking t o reach deparate 
compromises which s a t i s f i e d nobody. As a r e s u l t , i t d i d much 
harm i n Condorcet's eyes, but, i n e v i t a b l y , a number of the reforms 
were such as he wished. 
His r e a c t i o n s thus waver a l l the time between several shades 
of approval and di s a p p r o v a l , passing from the f u l l acceptance or 
r e j e c t i o n of a reform, t o the temporary acceptance of one. I n 
order t o gauge how f a r h i s views i l l u s t r a t e a development from h i s 
l . H i s views are also given i n the form of speeches d e l i v e r e d t o 
the Jacobins, and other s i m i l a r clubs. 
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e a r l i e r ideas or a d i s t o r t i o n of them, we s h a l l now study his 
wri t i n g s on each main group of reforms. 
The speed with which events were taking place i n 1789 made 
Condorcet even more aware than he had been before the Revolution 
of the importance of a coherent and clear declaration of fundamental 
principles of reform. 
I t i s not surprising, therefore, that he drew up his own 
project f o r such a declaration"'" shortly a f t e r the deadlock i n 
the Etats-Generaux had been broken. In f a c t , his project goes much 
furth e r than the mere l i s t i n g of basic r i g h t s ; i t follows his 
advice to the National Assembly by i l l u s t r a t i n g the laws which 
should stem d i r e c t l y from these r i g h t s and even goes so f a r as to 
indicate how these laws should be executed i n such a way as to 
ensure that they f u l f i l l e d t h e i r intentions. 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t , i n the context of the times, that Condorcet' s 
"A/ivertissement" placed great emphasis on the p r a c t i c a l aspects of 
the project and less on abstract maxims and general the o r e t i c a l 
principles. In t h i s he was i n agreement wi t h the arguments advanced 
by moderates such as Malouet who considered that i t was dangerous 
at a time of c r i s i s to pass reolutions which could not be carried 
out. Unlike them, however, he retained his b e l i e f i n the necessity 
of a Declaration; i n his view, i t was a v i t a l safeguard against 
a r b i t r a r y rule. In f a c t , he considered that the value of a 
Declaration lay i n i t s "negative"purpose: i t was not to state 
1. O.C. IX. 176 - 211. 
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which laws were to be made, but rather those which were not"1-, 
and would thus be free from the danger of making promises which 
could not be f u l f i l l e d . 
Many of the members of the Constituent Assembly had other 
views on t h i s question; some of them contested, i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
the opportuneness of a Declaration, the acceptance of which would 
have symbolised the end of an entire p o l i t i c a l system. I t i s 
hardly surprising i n these circumstances that the Declaration which 
was eventually published on 26th August 1789* aft e r three weeks of 
fie r c e debating, was so f u l l of compromises and inconsistencies. 
Condorcet was quick t o point out where i t s weaknesses were t o be 
2 
found . 
One of the most important of these lay i n the use of vague 
words such as 'bidre public", " u t i l i t e " " i n t e r e t commun" . The 
f i r s t a r t i c l e i n pa r t i c u l a r , which j u s t i f i e d social d i s t i n c t i o n s 
provided they were based on " l ' u t i l i t e commune", not only sought 
to base fundamental human r i g h t s on u t i l i t a r i a n grounds, a complete 
contradiction, but thereby also jeopardised the v a l i d i t y of other 
parts of the Declaration such as A r t i c l e 10: "Nul ne d o i t etre 
inquiete pour ses opinions, meme religieuses, pourvu que leur mani-
fe s t a t i o n ne trouble pas l'ordre e t a b l i par l a l o i . " I n Condorcet's 
view, such u t i l i t a r i a n considerations could have no part i n a 
Declaration which was to be non-contingent by d e f i n i t i o n . 
1. Cf. unpublished fragment, I n s t . MSS. NS 20, dossier B i n° 3, 
cit e d by Cahen op.cit. p. 179-
i i ' ' ' f 
2. I n the essay Reflexions sur ce qui a ete f a i t et sur ce qu i l 
reste a f a i r e " , O.C. IX. 44j - 468, which i s the work which contains 
the bulk of his comments on the reforms of the Constituent Assembly. 
3- I b i d . 448, 449. 
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I n our opinion, however, Condorcet was here on extremely 
dangerous ground. To attack the Declaration's f a u l t s was merely 
to beg the question concerning the reason for i t s mistakes. This 
lay i n the quite legitimate awareness of the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of re-
conciling the aims embodied i n the Declaration - aims which were 
desired by many - with the means available t o a t t a i n these aims. 
Condorcet himself i n fact f a i l e d t o overcome t h i s d i f f i c u l t 
His policy of urging on the Assembly the necessity f o r f i r s t est-
ablishing basic principles before s e t t i n g up the machinery whereby 
these principles would be put i n t o practice - i t s e l f the r e s u l t 
of his attempt t o salvage the essence of his reform plans out of 
the turmoil of 1789 - led him i n t o the trap facing a l l the reformers 
of the time and i n t o the inconsistencies which he attacked i n others. 
For example, he reproaches the Assembly with having included 
i n i t s declaration "des d r o i t s dont les citoyens ne jouiront pas 
i\ \ . > / 1 „1 
meme apres 1 execution des decrets de cette assemblee . Among 
these r i g h t s he includes " l a l i b e r t e de l'industrie et du commerce", 
st a t i n g that they were implied i n the Declaration, even though 
2 
i t did not mention them e x p l i c i t l y . Despite t h i s , he l a t e r 
praises the Declaration precisely f o r t h i s reason saying: 
"... l a l i b e r t e entiere du commerce et de l ' i n d u s t r i e 
e t a i t un a r t i c l e essentiel de l a declaration des d r o i t s " 3 
and even blaming the Assembly, for not having gone f a r enough i n 
t h i s d i r e c t i o n . 
1. I b i d 448. 
2. I b i d i b i d . 
3. Reponse a 1'adresse aux provinces O.C. IX. 496. 
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Admittedly, i n the f i r s t work, he was addressing the Assembly 
as a c r i t i c a l adviser; i n the second, he was defending i t s decisions 
before the people. However, t h i s explanation of the inconsistency 
should not lead us t o underestimate what was a very serious problem. 
Condorcet was acutely aware of i t s importance and there i s 
no doubt that t h i s was the reason which impelled him t o i n s i s t at 
t h i s time that the Declaration include among i t s a r t i c l e s a proviso 
fo r the revision of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . He had of course called 
for t h i s e a r l i e r , notably i n the Essai sur les Assemblees provin-
ciales". However, his arguments i n 1790 were inspired by d i f f e r e n t 
motives. H". was no longer concerned with c o n s t i t u t i o n a l consid-
erations, but wished, at a time of unrest, to unite the nation 
around i t s representatives i n the absence of a slow and regular 
method for making the co n s t i t u t i o n . 
The sense of urgency i s c l e a r l y f e l t i n the f i r s t l e t t e r 
which he wrote to Count Mathieu de Montmorency on j50th August 
1789 concerning the absence of the all-important proviso. 
"Les hommes ne j o u i r a i e n t - i l s vraiment de leurs d r o i t s 
qu'aux epoques ou des maJbsurs devenus intolerables, 
conduiraient les peuples a changer par l a force une 
con s t i t u t i o n qui les opprime?" 1 
I t was true t o say that anarchy could only be avoided i f 
people were prepared to obey laws which they f e l t were unjust; 
however, t h i s could only be v a l i d i f they knew they had at t h e i r 
disposal a legal method f o r changing the laws. 
1. Lettres a Montmorency O.C. IX. 368. 
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Admittedly, i n the f i r s t work,, he was addressing the Assembly 
as a c r i t i c a l adviser; i n the second> he was defending i t s decisions 
before the people. However, t h i s explanation of the. inconsistency 
should not lead us t o underestimate what was a very serious problem. 
Condorcet was acutely aware of i t s importance and there i s 
no doubt that t h i s was the reason which impelled him t o i n s i s t at 
t h i s time that the Declaration include among i t s a r t i c l e s a proviso 
fo r the r e v i s i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . He had of course called 
for t h i s e a r l i e r , notably i n the "Essai sur les Assemblers provin-
cial e s " . However, his arguments i n 1790 were inspired by d i f f e r e n t 
motives. Hw was no longer concerned with c o n s t i t u t i o n a l consid-
erations, but wished, at a time of unrest, to unite the nation 
around i t s representatives i n the absence of a slow and regular 
method f o r making the c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
The sense of urgency i s . c l e a r l y f e l t i n the f i r s t l e t t e r 
which he wrote t o Count Mathieu de Montmorency on 30th August 
1789 concerning the absence of the all-important proviso. 
"Les hommes ne j o u i r a i e n t - i l s vraiment de leurs d r o i t s 
qu'aux e'poques ou des raaJheurs devenus intolerables, 
conduiraient les peuples a changer par l a force une 
co n s t i t u t i o n qui les opprime?" .1 
I t was true t o say that anarchy could only be avoided i f 
people were prepared t o obey laws which they f e l t were unjust; 
however, t h i s could only be v a l i d i f they knew they had at t h e i r 
disposal a l e g a l method f o r changing the laws. 
1. Lettres a Montmorency O.C. IX. 368. 
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This l i n e of approach i s carried even further by Condorcet 
i n another work of 1789 i n which he appealed f o r a l l the 
citizens of France, no matter t h e i r social origins, t o r a l l y 
around the con s t i t u t i o n . The beginning of this work, the 
"Reflexions sur ce qui a ete f a i t et sur ce q u ' i l reste a f a i r e " , 
c l e a r l y r e f l e c t s the ambivalence of Condorcet's a t t i t u d e at t h i s 
stage of the Revolution. 
On the one hand, he praises the mobs for t h e i r p o l i t i c a l 
i n i t i a t i v e following the events of l 4 t h July, claiming that t h e i r 
action was j u s t i f i e d by the intransigence of the privileged Orders. 
On the other hand, he espresses his fear of the danger represented 
by popular i n i t i a t i v e at a time when the nation was undergoing 
such an important upheaval: 
"Le peuple est venu au secours de l'assemblee nationale, 
et l a cause de l a l i b e r t e a triomphe; mais l e pouvoir 
executif, comme l e pouvoir j u d i c i a i r e , sont restes sans 
force. Les l o i s anciennes sont devenues l ' o b j e t du mepris, 
avant d'avoir ete remplacees par de meilleures l o i s ; l a 
v i e i l l e c o n s t i t u t i o n . . . e t a i t d e t r u i t e , et l a nouvelle 
n ' e t a i t pas meme commencee." 1 
By depriving the people of a legal method of reforming the 
cons t i t u t i o n , the Assembly had not only paved the way for anarchy 
and mob r u l e , but had j u s t i f i e d d i r e c t action on the part of the 
people. As Condorcet says i n another work of the period: 
"L.'insurrection contre les l o i s n'est un exercice de d r o i t 
de r e s i s t e r a 1*oppression, que dans l e cas ou l a c o n s t i t -
u t i o n n'offre aucun moyen legal d'obtenir l a revocation 
d'une l o i i n j u s t e . " 2 
1. Reflexions sur ce qui a ete' f a i t , O.C. IX 445. 
2. Aux amisde l a l i b e r t e , O.C. X. 184. 
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The consequences of the Assembly's f a i l u r e i n t h i s matter 
are incalculable as far as Condercet's l a t e r development i s 
concerned. I t was to enable him psychologically t o j u s t i f y 
the mob's f r u s t r a t i o n and t o defend them each time they rebelled 
against the c o n s t i t u t i o n . This w i l l be seen c l e a r l y when we come 
to examine his writings a f t e r 10th August 1792. 
I n 1789, however, i t i s important i n so far as i t led t o a 
fresh evolution i n his ideas. Although he repeated his early 
arguments i n favour of a convention which would meet regularly 
every 20 years\ he also made i t clear that t h i s alone did not 
su f f i c e . The present c o n s t i t u t i o n was being drawn up i n cond-
i t i o n s which had nothing t o do with those described i n the 
works he had w r i t t e n before 1789- The Assembly, divided w i t h i n 
i t s own ranks, was rushing through l e g i s l a t i o n on a wave of 
enthusiastic fervour without making any allowances f o r a method 
whereby the people could either sanction t h e i r reforms or suggest 
changes to be made i n them. 
This led Condorcet, i n the f i r s t instance, t o describe a 
method whereby the people could express t h e i r opinion on the new 
cons t i t u t i o n ; from t h i s , he passed on t o an e n t i r e l y new scheme 
whereby the people were to be able t o c a l l for changes i n l a t e r 
constitutions without having to wait for the fixed periodical 
convention which would meet automatically every twenty years. 
This second idea represents a new departure and i t was 
born d i r e c t l y out of his fears that one approval l i m i t e d t o 
1. Lettres a Montmorency, O.C. IX. 372. 
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the f i r s t c o n s t i t u t i o n only would not be s u f f i c i e n t to remedy 
the defects of the organisation being established i n so abrupt a 
manner by a large body of inexperienced men. The people should 
also be e n t i t l e d to suggest changes. 
The novelty of the idea i s indicated by the fact that Condor-
cet was unable to come out, i n 1789 and 1790, with one coherent 
plan whereby i t could be put i n t o practice. I n f a c t , two schemes 
are described i n the a r t i c l e s which he wrote on the subject during 
t h i s period, the f i r s t "Lettre au Comte Mathieu de Montmorency""'" 
and the "Reponse a l'adresse aux provinces"^. 
I n both works, Condorcet expresses his fear that too many 
revisions could undermine the people's confidence i n the c o n s t i t -
u t i o n and encourage the subversive a c t i v i t i e s of "agents provoc-
ateurs" : 
"On d o i t ... redouter l a trop grande d i f f i c u l t e de 
changer, (mais) on d o i t craindre (egalement) les change-
ments trop frequents qui ouvrent un champ vaste a 
l ' i n t r i g u e , qui empechent de jamais consulter l a voix 
de 1'experience." 3 
His task was therefore to f i n d the r i g h t balance between the 
need fo r change and the danger of too frequent changes. 
I n the f i r s t work, he described a system which i s adapted 
s l i g h t l y from the one described i n the "Lettres d'un bourgjbis de 
Newhaven". Each time the electors met t o choose the members 
of the National Assembly, they would give an imperative mandate 
1. O.C. IX. 365 - 376. 
2. O.C. IX. 489 - 5^1. 
3. I b i d 526. 
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t o t h e i r representatives obliging them to c a l l for the changes 
which they desired. I f a majority of the representatives agreed 
that certain basic changes had to be made, the Assembly would 
transform i t s e l f immediately i n t o a Convention and would make the 
desired reforms"'". 
I n the second work, Condorcet by-passed the e l e c t r o l assemb-
l i e s , perhaps because of the Assembly's decision t o l i m i t the 
vote to the Electeurs. However, t h i s led him i n t o d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
I f one ignored the electoral assemblies, one could only t u r n to 
the primary assemblies set up by the Assembly. As these did not 
elect the Assembly's members, the only way t h e i r views could be 
known lay i n asking each c i t i z e n i n d i v i d u a l l y i f he wished t o see 
2 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n altered and, i f so, which a r t i c l e s . 
But Condorcet was quick t o point out the inconvenience of 
t h i s system. The discussions i n the assemblies would be intermin-
able and i t was dangerous t o plunge the entire nation i n t o the 
turmoil of discussion when there was no guarantee that the changes 
which needed t o be made were r e a l l y important. Nor was i t possible 
to l i m i t the changes t o certain a r t i c l e s only as a c o n s t i t u t i o n 
was a whole i n which every a r t i c l e depended on the other-^. 
He therefore suggested that the primary assemblies meet t o 
elect a convention for the area i n which they found themselves. 
1. Lettres a Montmorency, O.C. IX. 373 - 374. 
2. Reponse a l'adresse, etc. O.C. IX. 530. 
3- I b i d 531-
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These conventions would examine the c o n s t i t u t i o n more or less on 
a permanent basis and would c a l l for a national convention i f they 
f e l t an important change needed t o be made. This convention would 
meet when a majority of the " l o c a l " conventions desired i t \ How-
ever, i t would not be allowed to a l t e r such fundamental sections 
of the constitution as the Declaration of Rights; t h i s was t o 
remain the concern of the Convention which was to meet every 
twenty years. 
Condorcet believed th a t , between them, these two types of 
convention would of f e r a l l the guarantee necessary f o r ensuring 
both that the c o n s t i t u t i o n could be changed and that t h i s change 
would not play i n t o the hands of demagogues or p o l i t i c a l saboteurs. 
One may argue the i m p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of Condorcet's scheme, 
but the deta i l s of organization do not matter much here. The 
important point t o note i s that his b e l i e f i n conventions called 
i n d i r e c t l y by the people to buttress the work of the main conven-
tions meeting every twenty years represents a t r a n s i t i o n from the 
old scheme described i n the works which he wrote before 1789 
and the plan f o r massive popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the running of 
the country which he was to set out i n 1793* 
I t i s important also as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of his attempts 
throughout t h i s period to ensure the Assembly's reforms did 
not alienate the people and make them the v i c t i m of "agents 
provocateurs". I t was i n fact for t h i s reason that he concluded 
1. Lettres a Montmorency, O.C. IX. 373-37^. 
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his essay with a v i o l e n t attack against those who wished t o c a l l 
elections as soon as the Constituent Assembly had finished i t s work, 
showing how t h i s would be j u s t the way to divide the nation at 
a time of great unrest^". 
He also attacked the proposition that the power of running 
the nation be granted d i r e c t l y to the primary assemblies: 
"... comme s i , dans un pays ou plus de t r o i s quarts des 
citoyens sont soumis ... a des travaux journaliers, cet 
exercise immediat de leurs d r o i t s ... ne devait pas amener 
l a destruction absolue de l ' e g a l i t e , et par consequent de 
l a liberte'." 2 
However, despite these attacks on the ideas put forward by 
the more "progressive" elements, the implication of Condorcet's 
wor-k i s that more d i r e c t methods of r u l e would nevertheless be 
necessary i f the Assembly did not set about the organisation of 
orderly methods of change. When we consider that i t did not i n 
fac t do anything along these l i n e s , we may already have an idea 
of how Condorcet's views were t o develop at a l a t e r date. 
Condorcet's a t t i t u d e towards the next important section of 
the Constitution,that dealing with parliamentary procedure and 
the making of laws, i s characterised by the same desire t o reconcile 
the necessity for ensuring that important laws were passed without 
too great a delay and the need t o prevent laws from being passed 
with excessive p r e c i p i t a t i o n or recklessness. 
1. Reponse a 1 adresse, etc. O.C. IX. 53° - 539-
2. I b i d 539-
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Needless to say, the Assembly paid no att e n t i o n t o the cautious 
systems for making laws which Condorcet had described before 1789 
and, again, during the election of the Etats-Generaux, but rushed 
instead i n t o the reforms of 4th August without so much as consult-
ing the wishes of the electorate. 
Thus, once again, Condorcet found himself i n the position of 
having to discover methods of l i m i t i n g the damage by adapting his 
old ideas to new events. I n order t o see how he did t h i s , i t 
would be best t o deal w i t h the l e g i s l a t i v e process according to 
the parts described by Condorcet i n the long-term plans which 
he.wrote before 1789* namely i n the procedure which was to be 
followed w i t h i n the Assembly and outside i t . 
I n the new co n s t i t u t i o n which i t was drawing up, the Constit-
uent Assembly had adopted one of the reforms advocated by Condorcet 
before the Revolution, namely the procedure whereby a b i l l would 
have t o go through several readings before becoming law"*"; however, 
i t had ignored the theory of graded p l u r a l i t i e s which he had 
considered v i t a l i f important laws were to be passed while petty 
ones were held up. 
I t would seem, however, that his f a i t h i n t h i s system was 
soon t o crumble before his experience of the Assembly's methods. 
"La methode des p l u r a l i t e s graduees ne par.ait p l a i r e a 
personne; e l l e demande d' a i l l e u r s , pour %tre employee 
avec u t i l i t e une precision et une finesse qui ne permettr-
aient de l a proposer qu'a une assemblee peu nombreuse." 2 
1. Constitution de 1791* T i t r e I I I , Ch. 3, Sect. 2, Arts. 4 - 6 . 
2. Reflexions sur ce qui a ete f a i t , O.C. IX. 450. 
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He was therefore obliged to tu r n to another method of cont-
r o l l i n g l e g i s l a t i o n and i t i s a further i n d i c a t i o n of his uneasi-
ness throughout t h i s period and of his desperate e f f o r t s t o adapt 
old ideas t o new situations that he should have had recourse t o 
the idea of a two-chamber system. 
He had paid scant attention t o t h i s question before 1789 
contenting himself w i t h a somewhat academic description of the 
workings of the American Senate and House of Representatives i n 
a supplement t o his essay on the "influence de l a Revolution 
d'Amerique aur 1'Europe"''". 
I t should be made c l e a r however, that his support for the 
idea of a second Chamber did not mean that he agreed with the 
"Anglomanes" Mounier and Clermont-Tonnerre. I n the essay "Est-
i l u t i l e de diviser une assemblee nationale en plusieurs chambres?"' 
(w r i t t e n between the 1st and 9th September 1789* when the question 
was being debated), he attacked, not only the idea that l e g i s l a t i v e 
power should be divided between a Chamber of nobles and one made 
up of commoners, but any d i v i s i o n of the Assembly i n t o Chambers 
3 
wit h equal powers. 
He showed, by an acute mathematical analysis, how i t was 
possible, even wi t h a two or three Chamber system, f o r an important 
4 
law t o be passed by a t i n y majority or rejected by a huge one . 
1. O.C. 94 et sq. 
2. O.C. IX. 333 - 364 
3. I b i d 350 - 352 
4. I b i d 339 - 3^3-
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He showed also how i t was easier t o bribe the representatives of 
the nation i f these were divided i n t o two small Chambers''". Furthermore, 
he attacked the idea that a divided Assembly would be less easily swayed 
2 
by demogogues and concluded by underlining the d i v i s i v e influence which 
would be exercised by a second Chamber of specialists possessing the 
power of vetoing the l e g i s l a t i o n of the f i r s t ^ . 
What he desired, i n short, was a second Chamber which would check 
the p r e c i p i t a t i o n of the Assembly while presenting no threat t o i t s u n i t y . 
There i s something Utopian about t h i s wish, and t h i s i s seen c l e a r l y 
i n the scheme which he himself proposed. 
According to t h i s , the second Chamber would not have the power 
to veto a b i l l , but could only suspend i t for a given time. I t could 
only do t h i s , however, i f i t gave i t s reasons i n w r i t i n g w i t h i n a 
period stipulated by the Assembly. I t would not be allowed to suspend 
4 
a b i l l which came before i t for the t h i r d time. 
Condorcet hoped that t h i s Chamber, with i t s l i m i t e d powers, 
would a t t r a c t only disinterested and enlightened people whose q u a l i t i e s 
would complement those q u a l i t i e s of zeal and energy which were expected 
of the Assembly's members. 
He l i s t e d the advantages of such a Chamber as follows: 
1 . Reflexions sur ce qui a ete f a i t , O.C. IX. 348-349. 
2 . I b i d . 344-345. 
3 . I b i d . 353. 
4 . I b i d . 355-356. 
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"Comme ce corps n'aurait pas l e d r o i t de r e s i s t e r , mais 
seulement de suspendre, et pour un temps determine, on n'aurait 
aucun i n t e r e t a l e corrompre; i l ne cederait point par crainte 
aux mouvements de l a chambre nationale, ou a ceux dej peuple, 
parce que des representations n'excitent point l a colere autant 
qu'une resistance peut l e f a i r e . On n'aurait pas a craindre 
q u ' i l f l i t seduit parce q u ' i l doit etre peu nombreux, et forme de 
personnes tres eclairees. -1-
There i s a degree of wishful thinking about t h i s which suggests 
that Condorcet was not e n t i r e l y s a t i s f i e d with the project. There i s no 
doubt that the scheme threatened to compromise him i n the eyes of the 
progressives; indeed his advocacy of a second Chamber was to be 
included among the charges the Montagnards were l a t e r t o make against 
him. However, he was more or less driven to i t , not only because of his 
fear of p r e c i p i t a t i o n , but also i n an t i c i p a t i o n of the desire of many 
members of the Assembly to invest the King with the power of veto. 
This i s e x p l i c i t i n the second l e t t e r which Condorcet addressed 
to Montmorency when he states that the second Chamber, which he refers 
to as the "Senat", would not have the r i g h t of veto as t h i s would put i t 
above the law and would c a l l i n question the entire basis of the power and 
2 
authority of the Assembly. 
For the same reason, he states that the "Senat" would have to be 
elected as only an elected body could be j u s t i f i e d i n suspending decisions 
made by the nation's representatives. I n other words, he challenges the 
King's r i g h t of veto on two counts: he was not superior t o the national 
w i l l and his hereditary status did not j u s t i f y his intervention i n 
l e g i s l a t i o n . 
1. 
2. 
Reflexions sur ce qui a ete f a i t , etc. O.C. IX. 356. 
Lettres a Montmorency O.C. IX.385-387. 
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When the Assembly f i n a l l y decided to invest the King with the 
r i g h t of veto, Condorcet, faced once more with the " f a i t accompli", 
decided to advise the representatives on a method whereby they could 
get round the Royal veto. The de t a i l s are not important''", but the 
t a c t i c i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n so f a r as i t i s the f i r s t sign of the a t t i t u d e 
he was to adopt more openly and much more systematically a f t e r the 
f l i g h t of the King. 
I t was inevitable that a man i n his position should have 
attempted q u i e t l y to surmount the d i f f i c u l t i e s placed i n the way of 
his plans by poor laws, but this a t t i t u d e could nevertheless easily be 
confused with an attempt t o subvert the law of the land. I n fact we 
have here one of the f i r s t signs of how the absence of a process whereby 
the laws could be- changed was to lead Condorcet automatically t o j o i n the 
forces of those who were prepared to undermine laws to which they objected. 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , however, he refused the appeal to force and preferred to 
resort t o the t a c t i c of exploiting the weaknesses of the laws so as t o 
overcome the d i f f i c u l t i e s which they created for the r e a l i s a t i o n of his 
ide a l . 
Condorcet's problem when he came to study the procedure t o be followed 
outside the Assembly was t o adapt the plan described i n d e t a i l before 1789 
to the s i t u a t i o n as i t existed i n 1789 and 1790. 
2 
He began his essay on the subject with an admission that the 
system given i n the "Lettres d'un bourgeois de Newhaven" was now quite 
11 ' ' ' 
1. They are given i n the essay Reflexions sur ce qui a ete f a i t , 
etc. O.C. IX. 452. 
2. Sur l a necessite de f a i r e r a t i f i e r l a co n s t i t u t i o n par les 
citoyens, O.C. IX. 419-450. 
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impracticable. The assemblies which would be formed to r a t i f y the 
co n s t i t u t i o n were a part of i t and could therefore not pass judgement 
on i t " * " . On the other hand, i f i t was submitted for approval to the 
popular bodies which had established themselves at the beginning of the 
Revolution, how would i t be possible to gauge the people's true opinions 
from the mass of demands and views expressed by the 40,000 or so 
assemblies concerned? 
The problem could be avoided i f a convention was immediately elected, 
but Condorcet was very sceptical as t o the success of so early a questioning 
of a c o n s t i t u t i o n which had not yet had any time t o prove i t s e l f . 
Furthermore, the idea of a convention raised a whole series of new questions. 
For example, while the convention was i n session, should the nation 
continue to be governed according t o laws which had been passed without 
the sanction of the people and which were under revision? Was the 
convention to have constituent and l e g i s l a t i v e powers l i k e the 
Constituent Assembly and, i f so, would i t s own reforms have to be 
sanctioned by another convention? 
These were the problems which he had t o face as a r e s u l t of the 
events of 1789 and the consequent i n v a l i d i t y of his e a r l i e r plans. 
His solution lay i n abandoning the old idea whereby the people 
were to deliberate on each a r t i c l e of the con s t i t u t i o n . This task was 
now to be reserved solely t o t h e i r representatives. 
S i m i l a r l y the people were t o accept without discussion a l l those 
parts of the co n s t i t u t i o n which did not emanate d i r e c t l y from the 
1. O.C. IX. 424. 
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Declaration of Rights, but only on condition that the c o n s t i t u t i o n contained 
the provision that i t would be revised automatically w i t h i n the next 
twenty years.^" 
Condorcet affirmed that t h i s system was practicable as the a r t i c l e s 
which would v i o l a t e the Declaration of Rights "sont en p e t i t nombre, 
et sont necessairement les plus simples." 
I n f a c t , t h i s whole scheme r e f l e c t s a quite remarkable a l t e r a t i o n 
i n his a t t i t u d e . I t i l l u s t r a t e s how the force of circumstances had 
obliged him temporarily t o forget that the Assembly which was making 
the f i r s t c o n s t i t u t i o n France had ever had had neither been elected 
according t o the c r i t e r i a which he had described i n 1787, but had been 
summoned by a man who himself held his authority according to c r i t e r i a 
which Condorcet did not accept, nor had set about making the c o n s t i t u t i o n 
i n the manner he had suggested at that time. 
Short of denouncing the Revolution, however, there was l i t t l e he 
could do but support the Assembly's r i g h t t o make the laws and change them. 
I t was thus with a s p i r i t e d defence of the Assembly and of i t s r i g h t to 
combine both constituent and l e g i s l a t i v e powers that he concluded his 
i t ' v 1 
major defence of i t s work, the Reponses a 1 adresse aux provinces, ou 
Reflexions sur les e c r i t s publies contre l'Assemblee nationale."^ 
Once again, Condorcet was prepared t o accept changes which went 
against his principles i n the hope that i t was only by reconciling the 
people with the only body which could remotely represent them at the time that 
the Revolution could be protected and the hopes of progress kept a l i v e . 
1. O.C. IX. 427- This a r t i c l e was w r i t t e n before Condorcet described 
his plans f o r more frequent conventions. 
2. Sur l a necessite, et . O.C. IX. 428. 
3. O.C. IX. 536. 
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The temporary acceptance of a l i e n principles also characterises 
Condorcet's a t t i t u d e towards the laws concerning the monarchy and the 
executive. 
As he had already expressed his b e l i e f i n the value of the monarchy 
during the Etats-Generaux elections, i t i s not surprising that he was 
to do so again when considering the Constituent Assembly's reforms. However, 
one may point out that his defence of the monarchy here was excessively 
enthusiastic and reflected a rather strong fear that too s w i f t a change of 
regime would alienate the people's support for the Revolution. 
Thus, despite his claim i n the essay "Sur l e choix des ministres""'" 
11 ' ' 
that ce s e r a i t une absurdite ... que de croire une nation l i e e par ce 
qu e l l e a e t a b l i une heredite perpetuelle , he asserts emphatically i n the 
same essay that t o claim that a monarchical system was incompatible with 
l i b e r t y "c 'est parler d'apres ses prejuges et ses passions, et non 
d apres sa raison. 
What i s p a r t i c u l a r l y remarkable i s the mildness of his reaction to 
the decision t o allow the King a degree of l e g i s l a t i v e power. I n the f i r s t 
l e t t e r t o Montmorency, he contented himself with the remark that such a 
sharing of power was acceptable provided one knew that there was a method 
of r e v i s i n g a decision i n the future^, while, i n the essay "Sur ce qui a 
ete f a i t ... , as has already been shown, he took refuge i n purely 
4 
technical advice on how the effe c t of the Royal veto could be reduced . 
1. O.C. X. 49-66. 
2. I b i d . 51. 
3- O.C. IX. 369. 
4. O.C. IX. 452. 
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One reason f o r t h i s moderate a t t i t u d e may l i e i n his r e l i e f that 
the Constituent Assembly had decided to maintain the hereditary character 
of the monarchy rather than replace i t by an elected monarchy or a 
Senate with the power of veto. However, the argument which he advances 
against an elected monarchy - "... l ' e l e c t i o n d'un monarque peut entrainer 
des troubles""'" - conceals the true purpose of his support for an 
hereditary monarchy, namely the maintenance of a co n s t i t u t i o n based on 
two cl e a r l y separate principles. 
An elected monarchy would have a l l the vices of the old system, but 
would give people the i l l u s i o n that a profound change had been made. 
Being i n t h i s way integrated i n t o the revolutionary movement and i d e n t i f i e d 
w ith i t , t h i s new form of monarchy would be much more d i f f i c u l t t o remove. 
Condorcet thus wished to emphasise the contradiction inherent i n the new 
constitution the better t o pave the way for a genuine change l a t e r , 
namely the establishment of a republic. This must be borne i n mind i f we 
are to understand his l a t e r behaviour. 
Another important matter which should be mentioned at t h i s stage i s 
the manner i n which the debates w i t h i n the Assembly led Condorcet t o 
carry out a close examination i n t o the nature of executive power. The 
bulk of his t h e o r e t i c a l writings before 1789 had been concerned with the 
l e g i s l a t u r e ; he had considered that i t was t h i s which would determine the 
form of the executive. I t i s f o r t h i s reason that executive power i s 
barely discussed i n these e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s . Now that l e g i s l a t i v e power 
had been given t o the people, he was obliged to examine how the laws made 
by the people's representatives were t o be executed. 
1. Sur l e choix des ministres, O.C. X. 50. 
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I n the work which he devoted t o t h i s question i n 1790 - "Sur 
1 'etendue des pouvoirs de 1'Assemblee nationale""*" - he l a i d down the 
basis of the plan which was eventually to be revealed i n his c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
project of 1793-
I n Condorcet's view, executive power did not stem from l e g i s l a t i v e 
power. Both were d i s t i n c t and had a common source i n a natural law which 
existed before society was formed, namely i n the r i g h t of the people 
both to make the laws and to execute them: 
"Dans une co n s t i t u t i o n l i b r e , l e pouvoir executif est 
independant du pouvoir l e g i s l a t i f , dans ce sens, q u ' i l est oblige 
d'executer les l o i s , en vertu d'une l o i anterieure, de laquelle 
tous deux ont egalement recu leur autorite et leurs fonctions, 
qui a f i x e leurs d r o i t s et leurs devoirs respectifs. eL 
I n 1790, however, Condorcet was by no means w i l l i n g t o put i n t o 
practice t h i s p rinciple of a d i v i s i o n between the executive and the 
l e g i s l a t i v e powers. Indeed, i t i s i n t h i s section of the Constituent 
Assembly's reforms that he most c l e a r l y showed his fear of the masses and 
of those who wished t o exploit t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . Not only does he 
mention no method whereby the people could elect the ministers of t h e i r 
choice, but he even refuses t o consider a method whereby the people could 
choose the candidates. This task he leaves t o the Assembly or to a body 
3 
of Electeurs chosen by the people . Nor are the people even allowed t o 
exclude any names which they f e l t unsuitable, the r i g h t t o r e j e c t up to 
o n e - f i f t h of the candidates presented to him by the Assembly being l e f t 
4 
to the King . 
1. O.C. X. 25-34. 
2. I b i d . 27-
3. Sur l e choix des ministres, O.C. X. 55* 57• 
4. I b i d . 53-
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I n other words, the formation and running of the cabinet i s l e f t 
e n t i r e l y t o the Assembly, on the one hand, and t o the King, on the other. 
The former chose the candidates while the l a t t e r actually chose the 
ministers^. The King had the power t o dismiss any minister with whom 
he was displeased, but the Assembly was e n t i t l e d to make any changes 
i t wished i n the l i s t of candidates at the beginning of each session and 
could even replace one minister. 
This system represents a d e f i n i t e evolution i n Condorcet's ideas. 
Before 1789* he had considered the executive as forming one block 
consisting of the King and his ministers working i n perfect harmony. 
I n his new plan, the cabinet owes i t s existence as much to the authority 
of the people's representatives as t o the King. Although the King, by 
v i r t u e of his hereditary authority, i s allowed a cer t a i n amount of control 
over the ministers, i t i s clear t h a t , i n Condorcet's plan, t h e i r f i r s t 
allegiance was to be t o the Assembly. Their very existence i s seen to 
emanate from the c o n s t i t u t i o n made by the Assembly: 
Puisque, dans une monarchie hereditaire, l e hasard seul nomme 
l e chef du pouvoir executif, i l faut que l a l o i constitutionnelle 
f i x e l'organisation et regie les fonctions du ministere, dont 
l a concurrence est necessaire dans tous les' actes de ce pouvoir." 
This view of the cabinet as emanating d i r e c t l y from the Assembly's 
laws i s i m p l i c i t i n the wide powers which Condorcet allows the ministers. 
For example, they were t o be able to discuss, and even question, the laws 
3 
passed by the l e g i s l a t u r e . 
1. O.C. X. 53-55-
2. Sur l e choix des ministres, O.C. X. 52. 
3- I b i d . 57-63. 
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This idea, which would have had no part i n Condorcet's " i d e a l i s t i c " 
schemes prior t o 1789* i s symptomatic of his attempts t o come t o terms 
with the new s i t u a t i o n . He believed that collaboration between the 
executive and leg i s l a t u r e was absolutely v i t a l at a time when an absolute 
monarchy was being replaced by a co n s t i t u t i o n a l one: 
"Si cette concurrence de l a l e g i s l a t u r e n'est qu'utile dans une 
con s t i t u t i o n l i b r e et monarchique, deja consacree par l e temps, 
e l l e devient presque necessaire au moment ou cette c o n s t i t u t i o n 
remplace une monarchie absolue; e l l e d e t r u i t cette defiance qui, 
autrement, s'eleverait sans cesse contre les ministres, empecherait 
de dormer au gouvernement l ' a c t i v i t e necessaire, et f e r a i t n a i t r e 
bientot l a tyrannie des factions."^-
However he makes i t quite clear that the ministers were not t o be 
allowed to abuse t h e i r position by working against the interests of the 
le g i s l a t u r e . To ensure t h i s , he underlined the fact that they were t o 
be considered f u l l y responsible for a l l t h e i r acts and were not to benefit 
from the i n v i o l a b i l i t y which would be granted only t o the King and the 
members of the Assembly. Secondly, they could be dismissed at any time 
by the Assembly. 
2 
The Constituent Assembly s a t i s f i e d Condorcet on the f i r s t point . 
However, i t s decision t o place the sole r i g h t of appointing and dismissing 
the ministers i n the hands of the King"^ threatened, i n his view, t o destroy 
the Assembly's very functioning. I n his essay "Sur l'etendue des pouvoirs 
de l'Assemblee Nationale", he sought to make i t clear t o the general public 
that a constituent assembly was not the same as a l e g i s l a t i v e one. Not 
only did i t have t o make a co n s t i t u t i o n which would be put i n t o practice 
at a l a t e r date, but i t also passed laws destined to be executed immediately. 
1. O.C. X. 64. 
2. Cf. Constitution de 1791* T i t r e I I I , Ch. I I , Sect.. IV, Arts 5 et 6. 
3. I b i d . A r t . 1. 
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I n other words, i t would have to work hand i n glove with the executive. 
I n f a c t , Condorcet even desired that the ministers of the f i r s t government 
be elected from among the members of the Assembly: 
"Un premier pouvoir constituant ... a l e d r o i t d'etablir tous 
(les pouvoirs) qui sont necessaires a l'accomplissement du 
devoir qui l u i est impose; et par consequent l e pouvoir qui 
execute ses decrets d o i t §tre dans sa dependance."! 
This f i n a l hope was dashed by the Constituent Assembly's decision 
2 
not t o allow any of i t s members to become ministers . 
The significance of Condorcet's ideas on the executive l i e s , 
therefore, i n the fact that they evolved out of his attempts t o come 
to terms with a s i t u a t i o n which he had not considered before 1789* 
namely the need t o organise the executive i n such a way as t o solve 
the incom p a t i b i l i t y of an elected l e g i s l a t u r e functioning alongside a 
hereditary monarchy. When the l a t t e r disappeared, his views on the 
question, as we s h a l l see l a t e r , were to evolve once more. 
As we have seen, the most important feature of Condorcet's plan 
for the organization of the administrative system of Prance before 1789 
lay i n the powers given t o the elected provincial assemblies i n the f i e l d 
of taxation and general administration. 
I n 1789 he was thus faced with the task of discovering a system 
whereby the absence of these assemblies could be compensated. He was 
helped by the establishment of the "communes", as we have seen, and also 
by the Assembly's decision t o exclude f i s c a l laws from the royal veto. 
1. Sur l e choix des ministres, O.C. X. 28. 
2. Law of 7th November 1789, Constitution de 1791* T i t r e I I I , Ch. I I , 
Sect. IV, Ar t . 2. 
3. Const, de 1791, T i t r e I I I , C h . I I I , Sect. I l l , A r t . 8. 
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Condorcet accepted t h i s decision with r e l i e f as i t enabled him 
t o have f u l l confidence i n the Assembly's sole r i g h t , as le g a l 
representatives of the people, to make the laws dealing with the nature 
of the taxes to be levied, t h e i r amount and the manner i n which they 
were to be assessed and collected. 
He was thus able to abandon his old plan whereby the f i s c a l laws 
were to receive the sanction of the people before becoming v a l i d . This 
change of plan was not inspired only by the fact that the machinery for 
e f f e c t i n g t h i s sanction did not e x i s t ; i t owed as much t o Condorcet's 
awareness that the chaotic f i n a n c i a l state of the nation and the t o t a l 
y 
disruption of the administrative system of the Ancien Regime could be 
alleviated only by the uni f y i n g influence of the National Assembly: 
"Aucun autre corps ne pourrait etre regarde comme un juge 
impartial entre les differentes divisions du t e r r i t o i r e qui 
doivent supporter l'impot d'une maniere proportionnelle, entre 
les diverses classes de citoyens sur l e sort desquels les autres 
genres d'impots peuvent peser avec i n e g a l i t e ; et c'est par cette 
raison que ces fonctions ( l a f i x a t i o n de l a quotite des d i f f e r e n t s 
d r o i t s , l a r e p a r t i t i o n des contributions directes entre les ... 
divisions du pays) sont encore, dans les pays l i b r e s , reunies 
au pouvoir l e g i s l a t i f . " 2 
He was obliged to face the fact that the old idea of d i v i d i n g t h i s 
r i g h t among several elected bodies was chimerical i n the context of the 
times: 
"... les circonstances n'ont pas permis d'examiner ( l a ) question 
(de partager ces pouvoirs entre plusieurs corps de representants), 
peut-etre meme d'en avoir l'idee."^ 
1. Cf. Sur l a c o n s t i t u t i o n du pouvoir charge d administer l a tr e s o r e r i e , 
O.C. X I . 544. 
2. Des l o i s constitutionnelles sur l'administration des finances, 
O.C. X. 108. 
3- I b i d . 108. 
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He was naturally appalled by the Assembly's decision t o allow the 
King to choose, among others, the Finance Minister. At a time when l o c a l 
administration was i n a state of chaos, t h i s was tantamount t o placing 
the entire control of the nation's finances i n the King's hands. I t 
was to prevent t h i s that Condorcet attempted t o produce an e n t i r e l y new 
scheme for the f i n a n c i a l administration of the nation. 
Another important reason lay i n the chaotic state of the finances 
themselves; t h i s was due, not only t o the r i o t s i n the countryside and 
the breakdown of l o c a l administration at a l l leve l s , but also (as we s h a l l 
see when we come to examine the f i s c a l laws) to the panic reforms of 
4th August 1789 which t e r r i f i e d the r i c h and discouraged the bankers from 
coming to the aid of the nation. 
I t i s against t h i s background that we must examine the scheme which 
Condorcet devised as an alternative t o the long-term plan drawn up 
before the Revolution. We may best judge the extent t o which he attempted 
to adapt his plan t o events i f we divide i t i n t o two parts. 
We s h a l l deal f i r s t w ith the organisation of the "Tresorier" and 
then with the reforms made i n the sphere of l o c a l government. 
Condorcet's idea concerning the "Tresorier" was based on the attempt 
to reduce l o c a l i n i t i a t i v e i n f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s by placing the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
fo r spending and watching over the receipts of taxation i n the hands of 
a body created s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r t h i s purpose, and not i n the hands of the 
provincial administration. 
- This body was to consist of a "Tresorier national" elected by the 
Assembly and of a committee of ten "commissaires", also elected, who would 
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be responsible for supervising the work of the "Tresorier"\ 
A l l the money collected i n the d i f f e r e n t parts of the country 
would be kept i n the "Caisse" i n Paris and the supervision of t h i s 
"Caisse" would be entrusted t o the "Tresorier". The departmental 
administrators would only be e n t i t l e d t o spend t h i s money with his 
permission and he i n turn could only be able to grant t h i s permission 
2 
i f he had the authorisation of the committee of Ten. 
Similarly, while each minister would be allowed t o make free use 
of the money granted t o his department, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for a l l o c a t i n g 
the money would l i e with the "Tresorier" and the committee. 
The r o l e of the Finance Minister would merely consist i n informing 
the "Tresorier" of the expenditure of each "departement"^. F i n a l l y , a 
"Procureur des creanciers de l a nation", also elected by the Assembly, 
would be granted the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r paying the interest on loans 
4 
made t o the government by the banks i n order t o reduce the national debt. 
Although t h i s scheme, by the manner i n which i t concentrated power 
i n the hands of a body which represented a v i t a l l i n k between the 
le g i s l a t u r e , executive and administration - anticipates the plan described 
i n the 1793 project, i t s aim was inspired by important short-term issues 
such as the need, very acute at a time of f i n a n c i a l upheaval, to balance 
expenditure and revenue. 
I n i s i n f a c t d i r e c t l y out of t h i s need that the other r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
given t o the "Tresorier" and committee stemmed. As a l l the revenue from 
1. Sur l a con s t i t u t i o n du pouvoir charge d'administrer l a tres o r e r i e , 
O.C. X I . 547-549. 
2. I b i d . 547-548, 549. 
3. I b i d . 550. 
4. I b i d . 550. 
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taxation was to be gathered i n the main "Caisse" i n Paris, the money-
needed by each "departement" would have t o t r a v e l each time t o the "chef-lieu". 
The cost of t h i s transport could be borne only by taxation. I n Condorcet's 
scheme the tax would be fixed a year ahead by the "Tresorier national", the 
Committee of Ten, the "Procureur des creanciers" and the Finance Mainister"*". 
I f the money required for an important payment exceeded the revenue 
from taxation, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r making a loan would f a l l to the 
"Tresorier", but only after the Assembly had fixed a date by which the 
2 
money would have t o be reimbursed. 
I f an exceptional and unexpected payment needed to be made, the 
Committee would have the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r declaring a "dette arrieree" 
which would enable i t t o use an advance from the following year's revenue . 
I f the bankers refused to advance the money unless the rate of inte r e s t 
was raised, or i f the people refused to pay t h e i r taxes - both common 
occurrences i n 1790 - then the Assembly would have the power t o summon 
an emergency meeting to raise the money which was needed u n t i l the c r i s i s 
4 
had passed . 
Condorcet's scheme i s thus very f l e x i b l e , every part of i t being 
designed to meet the eventualities of an uncertain period. His fear of 
chaos i s refl e c t e d i n particular i n his provisions f o r the emergency 
powers which were t o be granted to the Assembly. I t would seem, however, 
that here he succumbed to a temptation which his i n s t i n c t s as a th e o r i s t 
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l matters should have warned him t o r e s i s t . 
1. Sur l a con s t i t u t i o n du pouvoir charge d administrer l a tres o r e r i e , 
O.C. X I . 554-555. 
2. I b i d . 558-559-
3. I b i d . 559-561. 
4. I b i d . 561-562. 
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This i s indicated by a passage of a l a t e r work on the subject i n 
which he reacted against the very idea of emergency powers and called 
instead for the creation of a reserve fund which would be used to meet 
emergencies. This fund would be placed under the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
"commissaires" elected by the people"'". 
This change of plan provides us with another i n d i c a t i o n of the 
tension, which runs through a l l his works of the period, between the 
desire to consolidate the Assembly's power i n order t o save the 
Revolution and the desire t o salvage the theor e t i c a l principles on which 
he had founded his e a r l i e r plans. The creation out of necessity of the 
"Tresorerie nationale" represents his most successful attempt t o reconcile 
eff i c i e n c y with c o n s t i t u t i o n a l principles. 
Condorcet's attempt to adapt t o events i s also seen c l e a r l y i n the 
evolution of his ideas concerning the ro l e to be assigned t o the l o c a l 
administrators. 
I n his f i r s t work on the question, the essay "Sur l a co n s t i t u t i o n 
du pouvoir charge d'administrer l a tres o r e r i e " , the r o l e of the provincial 
administrators consists simply i n d i v i d i n g up among the " d i s t r i c t s " the 
sum of money granted t o t h e i r province by the Assembly. They would also 
have the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r appointing people to c o l l e c t the money at the 
le v e l of the "communautes de campagne", " d i s t r i c t " and "departement". 
The " t r e s o r i e r " of each "departement" would receive the money at the 
le v e l of the province. I f the machinery for electing him did not exist. 
1. Des l o i s constitutionnelles sur l'administration des finances 
O.C. X. 114-115. (19th June 1790.) 
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he would be appointed by the "Tresorier national"^. As a l l the money 
would be centralised i n Paris, there would be no need to elect the 
lo c a l administrators. 
I n his second work, the essay "Des l o i s constitutionnelles sur 
1'administration des finances", the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the "departement" 
administrators have considerably increased. Although the r i g h t t o spend 
money would s t i l l rest with the "Tresorier national", each "departement" 
would not be allowed to possess i t s own "caisse" and would be equipped 
for t h i s purpose with a number of "commissaires" elected i n each 
"departement" to supervise the administrative assembly of the "departement". 
Furthermore, Condorcet even considers the p o s s i b i l i t y of choosing the 
nation's "commissaires" v i a the "departements", and not, as before, v i a the 
2 
National Assembly . 
The evolution i s l i m i t e d i n so far as the influence of the 
"Tresorier national" and the Committee of Ten i s as powerful i n the 
second work as i n the f i r s t . Condorcet's fear of the new "departements", 
where the influence of the Electeurs predominated, was important enough 
for him t o have doubts about the a d v i s a b i l i t y of excessive decentralisation. 
The change i s nevertheless i n t e r e s t i n g as an in d i c a t i o n of his t a c i t 
acceptance of the new administrative divisions created by the Constituent 
Assembly. 
i i ' n 3 
The number of departements"- 83 - corresponded closely enough to 




Op.cit. O.C. X I . 569. 
Op.cit. O.C. X. 113-114. 
Decree of 15th January 1790, 
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new " d i s t r i c t s " and "cantons" did bear some r e l a t i o n t o the two-fold 
d i v i s i o n of " d i s t r i c t s " and "communautes de campagne" which he had also 
desired at that time. Above a l l , the Assembly had refused to divide 
France a r b i t r a r i l y according t o mathematical formulae; on the recommendation 
of Mirabeau, i t had proceeded t o a d i v i s i o n along t r a d i t i o n a l l i n e s , 
u n i t i n g areas which already possessed strong l o c a l affinities''", a method 
which Condorcet had suggested before 1789-
His prin c i p a l objection was to the Assembly's refusal to create 
the "communautes de campagne" which had formed the cornerstone of his 
ea r l i e r plans. He f e l t that the need fo r these was greater than ever 
as a r e s u l t of the events of 1789-90. I n his view, the panic which led 
to the uprisings i n the countryside and eventually t o the "Grande Peur" 
was caused to a great extent by the fear which the peasants had of the 
powerful land-owners, many of whom l i v e d i n the towns. 
I t was for t h i s reason, and not out of nostalgia for his old ideas, 
that he wrote his essay "Sur l a formation des communautes de campagne" , 
urging the grouping of vi l l a g e s which alone could balance the influence of 
the towns. 
i l l n 
" I I n y a aucune egalite r e e l l e entre une v i l l e meme assez p e t i t e 
et un v i l l a g e . Tous les agents du pouvoir l o c a l resident dans 
l a v i l l e ; e l l e est l'entrepot du commerce, l e sejour de l ' i n d u s t r i e ; 
e l l e renferme les habitants riches qui ont retju de 1 education ... et 
qui, moins occupes de leurs besoins, l e sont plus de leur ... 
ambition; une partie considerable des proprietaires des biens de 
campagne resident meme dans les v i l l e s . li. faut done, pour r e t a b l i r 
l ' e g a l i t e ... composer des communautes d'un certain nombre de v i l l a g e s . " 
1. Cf. S»boul, op.cit. pp.226-227. Cf. also Hampson: Social History 
of the French Revolution , Routledge & Kegan, 196?, p.113. 
2. O.C. IX. 431-439. 
3. I b i d . 433-434. 
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His fear of the urban land-owners i s perfectly i n keeping with 
his attempts, already noted., to give greater r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to the 
more forward-looking town dwellers who had set up the revolutionary 
"communes". There i s nothing new about t h i s fear; the work's novelty 
l i e s i n the urgency of i t s tone and i n a greater awareness on Condorcet's 
part of the natural conservatism of the towns and of the need to 
organise the revolutionary potential of the v i l l a g e s ; 
En general, les v i l l e s sont attachees aux regimes p r o h i b i t i f s 
... La plupart des reglements qui s'y exercent blessent les 
d r o i t s des citoyens de l a meme patr i e , mais etrangers a l a v i l l e . 
Si l'on desire que peu a peu toutes ces l o i s abusives soient 
reformees, i l faut donner aux habitants des campagnes l e moyen 
de se f a i r e entendre. 
The renewed fervour with which he attacked the wealthy town-
dwellers i s a further i n d i c a t i o n of his evolution i n a more "popular" 
d i r e c t i o n , i t also i l l u s t r a t e s his desire to win the masses over t o the 
Revolution and to prevent the threat of separatism represented by the 
major towns. The theme of u n i t y runs r i g h t through the essay: 
"Autant ce qu'on appelle, dans les constitutions, balance, 
equilibre du pouvoir, me parait une idee chimerique 
autant i l me parait necessaire d'etablir une egalite suffisante 
entre les diverses divisions d'un Etat."^ 
On both these questions - the organisation of an independant 
treasury and the formation of country communities - Condorcet's suggestions 
passed unnoticed. The Assembly reserved for i t s e l f the sole r i g h t t o 
pass f i n a n c i a l laws, but placed the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for executing these 
laws i n the hands of a minister who would be chosen by the King. 
By neglecting t o form country communities, i t isolated the peasants, 
opened the doors t o the ambitions of the b i g towns and thereby linked the 
1. O.C. IX. 435. 
2. I b i d . 453. 
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Revolution only to the interests of the richer elements of the 
bourgeoisie. 
A l l t h i s was nat u r a l l y to have an influence on Condorcet's future 
development. I t added weight to his increasing d i s l i k e for the monarchy, 
the bourgeoisie of the large towns and the separatist tendencies i n 
Prance which he came to associate increasingly with the counter-
revolution. 
I t was i n the sphere of f i s c a l reforms that Condorcet's 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the Constituent Assembly's work reached i t s height: 
"Les operations de l'Assemblee sur les finances sont celles qui portent 
l e plus a l a censure.""'" 
The Assembly's f i s c a l l e g i s l a t i o n constituted the most important 
part of i t s work f o r , as we have seen, the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Ancien 
Regime depended e n t i r e l y on the f i s c a l system on which i t was based. 
I t i s thus on t h i s question that the tension i n Condorcet's position 
from 1789-90 may be most c l e a r l y seen. 
His reactions here follow the same pattern as those he had shown 
t o the other groups of reforms. On the one hand, he sought to urge on 
the Assembly the necessity for following the slow and regular method 
of reform which he had described i n his early works. On the other hand, 
he expressed views of a very progressive nature which anticipated the 
position which he was to adopt i n 1793-
1. Reponse a 1 adresse aux provinces; O.C. IX. 507• 
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These two attitudes were na t u r a l l y d i f f i c u l t t o reconcile and 
t h i s explains the inconsistencies which may be detected i n his works 
of t h i s period. 
The i n t r i n s i c weakness of the Assembly's reforms lay i n the 
dangerous gap which existed between the sweeping a b o l i t i o n of the abuses 
of the Ancien Regime on 4th August 1789 and the absence of any machinery 
whereby t h i s system could be replaced. 
I t should of course be noted that t h i s weakness would not have been 
avoided had the Assembly followed the method suggested by Condorcet himself 
during the elections to the Etats-Generaux. 
Although apparently unaware of t h i s , he was quick to see the 
danger of the s i t u a t i o n and wrote about i t i n no uncertain terms: 
"La n u i t du 4 aout merite des reproches graves. Pourquoi 
decreter en tumulte, quand l a j u s t i c e , d 1accord avec 
1'interest de l a nation, exigeait qu'on se bornat a 1'engagement 
d'examiner avec maturite? Pourquoi, sur des objets qui pouvoient 
agiter l e peuple, separer l a publication des principes, de celle 
des l o i s qui en auraient regie et modere 1'execution." ^" 
The Assembly's p r e c i p i t a t i o n threatened t o alienate the financiers 
on whom the nation so greatly depended: 
"Les arretes du 4 aout ... n'ont pas ete un moyen de r e t a b l i r 
l e c r e d i t . Les creanciers de 1 Etat ont pu craindre l e retour 
d'un p a r e i l enthousiasme ... Les c a p i t a l i s t e s ... attendront, 
pour se l i v r e r a l a confiance, que l a nouvelle d i v i s i o n de l a 
Prance, que l a nouvelle organisation des provinces a i t ete 
etablie. c'est seulement alors qu'ils croiront a. l'existence, 
a l a s o l i d a r i t e de l a nation dont on leur promet l a garantie."^ 
The Assembly's f a i l u r e t o set up the machinery for making the 
reforms i n a l o g i c a l manner was p a r t i c u l a r l y disastrous i n Condorcet's 
view as i t invalidated some of the worthwhile reforms which had been made. 
1. Reponse a 1 adresse aux provinces, O.C. IX. 505-
2. Reflexions sur ce qui a ete f a i t , O.C. IX. 455-
-156-
For example, the Assembly had quite r i g h t l y abolished a l l i n t e r n a l 
customs bar r i e r s , but t o no purpose: 
"Le decret de l'assemblee nationale, pour l a liberte' de l a 
c i r c u l a t i o n i n t e r i e u r e , n a pas ete respecte. La crainte 
( l ' a ) emporte presque partout."^-
The Assembly's i n i t i a l mistake placed i t i n a d i f f i c u l t position, 
but i n attempting to escape from t h i s , i t had proceeded to accumulate 
yet more errors which served only to exacerbate an already catastrophic 
s i t u a t i o n . 
The f i r s t basic mistake was t o think that the sale of lands would 
act as a kind of miracle which would automatically persuade the bankers 
to lend money t o the State at a low rate of i n t e r e s t . 
"La premiere (erreur de l'assemblee) f u t d'etre trompee par 
l'idee que l a garantie nationale devait ... f a i r e tomber 
l ' i n t e r e t des emprunts."^ 
The panic reforms of 4th August had of course destroyed any chance 
which the sale of lands would have had of i n s p i r i n g confidence i n the 
bankers. 
I n an attempt to cut i t s losses, the Assembly promptly made 
another mistake. The c a l l for a "contribution patriotique", a forced 
loan which would be reimbursed when the rate of in t e r e s t f e l l t o 4$, 
added to the general panic and was put i n t o effect i n so clumsy a manner 
"3 
that i t s results were negligible. 
1. Reflexions sur ce qui a ete f a i t , O.C. IX. 464. 
Reponse a 1 adresse aux provinces, O.C. IX. 505-
2. I b i d . 508. 
3. I b i d . 510-511. 
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I t was i n reaction t o t h i s that Condorcet r e i t e r a t e d his old 
b e l i e f i n the value of a fixed and properly collected tax f o r winning 
the badly needed confidence of the people: "Le public s a i t , depuis 
longtemps, que des impots d'une valeur determined, d'une rentree sure, 
peuvent seuls inspirer l a confiance."^" 
He was i n fact r e f e r r i n g here to the land tax which had represented 
one of the cornerstones of his early plan for f i s c a l reforms. 
However, not only had the Assembly f a i l e d to consider such a tax, 
i t had not even taken the preliminary measures necessary f o r the 
carrying out of a cadastral survey. I n addition to t h i s , i t had made 
no attempt t o calculate the sums required to meet the expenditure of the 
Treasury. By thus f a i l i n g t o put an end to the chaos which prevailed i n 
the accounts of the Ancien Regime i t had encouraged the bankers to carry 
on speculating as they had done under Necker, to the detriment of the 
2 
State's borrowings. 
Paced with t h i s s i t u a t i o n , Condorcet set himself the arduous task 
of establishing the long-term basis of the new tax-system of the nation; 
at the same time he sought t o exploit the existing system to the f u l l i n 
order to ease the burden of the debt. The dual aspect of t h i s task goes 
a long way to explain the tension inherent i n his ideas at t h i s time and 
the consequent inconsistencies i n t o which he was forced. How was i t 
possible, a f t e r a l l , t o obtain the money which could alone reduce the 
national debt at a time when a l l the ex i s t i n g sources of revenue were 
under review? 
1. Reponse a 1 adresse des prdHvinces, O.C. IX. 511. 
2. Cf. Reponse a l'adresse, O.C. IX. 509-510. 
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One of the most notable of his inconsistencies lay i n his desire 
that the "capitation" be retained. On his own admission, t h i s was one 
of the worst of the di r e c t taxes which he had wished t o see abolished 
before 1789: "La capitation est un impot tres mauvais en lui-meme, 
parcequ'il est impossible de l e bien r e p a r t i r . "\ and he f e l t obliged 
to confess that his defence of i t now was a d i r e c t consequence of the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s of the time: " I I est d i f f i c i l e de ne pas l e conserver ... 
parce que, dans l e moment actuel, 1 ebranlement cause par l a maniere dont 
l a revolution s'est operee ne permettra point a l ' i n t e r e t de baisser 
2 
aussi rapidement q u ' i l aurait pu f a i r e . " 
Equally inconsistent was his defence of i n d i r e c t taxes such as the 
" o c t r o i " and the "douanes" which he had also attacked before the Revolution. 
I t i s paradoxical too that he should have defended the Assembly's decree 
ordering the people to continue to pay the "dime" u n t i l i t had been 
replaced by another tax and t h i s despite the fact that i t had been 
"5 
o f f i c i a l l y abolished. 
These somewhat "reactionary" attitudes contrast s t r i k i n g l y w i t h 
the s w i f t evolu.tion. of Condorcet's ideas on other matters. The most 
obvious example of t h i s was his advocacy, fo r the f i r s t time, of the 
necessity f o r a progressive, as opposed to a proportional, tax. 
The nature of the tax i n question provides a clear in d i c a t i o n of 
the fact that i t was d i r e c t l y inspired by his experience as a member of 
the Commune's General Assembly. This taught him that the vast majority 
1. Memoires sur l a f i x a t i o n de l'impot, O.C. XI. 46l. 
2. I b i d . 461. 
3- Reponse a 1 'adresse, etc. O.C. IX. 49^. 
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of Parisians did not own t h e i r houses, but paid rent. By imposing a 
proportional tax on rent, therefore, he f e l t that he could best ensure 
that each man contributed to the nation's welfare according to his 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
The general idea was to establish a minimum rent which would be 
exempt from tax. Starting from one1'sou" per " l i v r e " of rent, the tax 
would then r i s e from "denier" t o "denier 1', according t o the overall rent, 
u n t i l i t reached a maximum of ten "sous" per " l i v r e " . 
However, his repeated claims that the progressive tax was quite 
j u s t i f i e d and perfectly f a i r reveal his uneasiness at so o r i g i n a l and 
bold an idea. 
Having looked at some of the discrepancies i n his attitudes and 
ideas at t h i s time, i t should be emphasised that the bulk of his e f f o r t s 
t o solve the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the period were concentrated on the attempt 
t o reduce class antagonisms and thus t o remain as consistent as possible 
with the l i n e of action which he had followed before the Revolution. 
This i s seen p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the p r i n c i p a l works which he wrote on 
f i n a n c i a l problems i n 1790. I n the two memoires "Sur l a f i x a t i o n de 
l'impot"^, he sought t o adapt his e a r l i e r scheme for overhauling the old 
f i s c a l system by s o l i c i t i n g the help of the " d i s t r i c t " and "departement" 
administrators whom the Constituent Assembly had established. I n the 
2 
essay "Sur l a proposition d'acquitter l a dette exigible en assignats" he 
attempts to warn the Assembly of the danger that class warfare would break 
out i f the plan to s e l l the Church lands r a p i d l y and i n large portions t o 
the bearers of "assignats" was carried out. Those wi t h the greatest 
1. O.C. XI. 405-470. 
2. O.C. X I . 487-515-
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nuraber of "assignats" would be the most determined t o r i d themselves 
of them by buying the maximum amount of land and would thus swamp 
the e f f o r t s of the poorer buyers: 
Admettre les assignats seuls ... c est eloigner des 
acquisitions les cultivateurs, les habitants des campagnes, 
les p e t i t s proprietaires qui econpmisent sur leur revenu ... 
I r o n t - i l s acheter des assignats sans savoir s i l a seule 
piece de te r r e qu'ils desirent, l a seule qui leur convienne, 
ne leur sera pas enlevee par un autre? ... Cette incertitude 
s u f f i t pour eloigner, pour degouter ces hommes simples. 
I t was i n fact the o l . fear of alie n a t i n g from the Revolution 
the support of the masses which inspired his main plan for redeeming the 
2 
debt, the slow sale of the Church lands i n small l o t s . 
Condorcet's desire f o r peace and s t a b i l i t y i s seen also i n his 
a t t i t u d e towards the "Gabelle". He attacked the chaotic manner i n 
which the Assembly had cut t h i s a r b i t r a r i l y by h a l f and recommended 
instead that i t be brought gradually i n t o l i n e with the Vingtieme. 
As the Vingtieme f e l l mainly on w e a l t h , Condorcet's views may be 
interpreted as another in d i c a t i o n of his evolution towards the l e f t ; 
however, the argument which he actually put forward i n support of his 
case was that the Vingtieme was a fixed tax, that i t s c r i t e r i a were 
easy to establish and that i t was therefore less l i k e l y t o arouse 
suspicion i n the public and hence anxiety: 
"On pouvait, en proportionnant l a r e p a r t i t i o n de cette 
imposition aux vingtiemes actuels des nobles ... s assurer 
... une d i s t r i b u t i o n suffisamment exacte, une ressource 
d'une valeur connue et ne pas s'exposer, par des discussions 
entre les non-privilegies et les p r i v i l e g i e s , a fomenter encore 





O.C. XI. 495. 
Cf. Plan d'un emprunt public, O.C. X I . 354-356. 
Reponse a l'adresse, etc. O.C. IX. 519' 
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The examples of c o n c i l i a t i o n which we have examined so far 
indicate that Condorcet was keener to s a t i s f y the interests of the 
masses rather than those of the privileged minority. This was not 
always the case, however. Indeed the tone which runs r i g h t through 
the main work which he wrote i n defence of the Constituent Assembly, 
the "Reponse a. l'adresse aux provinces" i s apologetic. The aim of 
the work was i n fact to assure the land-owners that the Assembly's 
reforms, when they guaranteed compensation, did not v i o l a t e the 
sacrosanct " d r o i t de propriete" 
Si m i l a r l y , the aim of the plan devised f o r the evaluation of 
2 
the land tax was to ensure that the revenue of each parish, " d i s t r i c t " 
and "departement" was calculated i n collaboration with the land-owners 
and potential buyers at every l e v e l of the community. And here, 
Condorcet made i t quite clear that he had the interests of the r i c h 
as much at heart as those of the poor. 
"Ou ce seront les pauvres qui voudront surcharger, s o i t 
un citoyen, s o i t quelques citoyens riches, ou ce seront 
quelques riches qui voudront surcharger un grand nombre 
de pauvres ... La premiere cause d'injustice n'est 
point a craindre, parce qu'un homme riche reclamera 
toujours l a j u s t i c e du d i r e c t o i r e ou de l'assemblee du 
d i s t r i c t . " ^ 
Condorcet was c l e a r l y not the fanatic out to destroy the r i c h . 
His aim seemed to consist i n reconciling the interests of the various 
classes by emphasising the importance of the new administrative assemblies 
set up by the Revolution i n a r b i t r a t i n g between the d i f f e r e n t sections 




O.C. IX. 493-494. 
Cf. Memoire sur l a f i x a t i o n de 1'impot, O.C. X I . 437-448. 
I b i d . 445. 
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His desire for cooperation at a l l levels on the question of 
f i s c a l reforms was proportionate to his deep d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h 
the reforms which the Constituent Assembly actually carried out. He 
was aware that the delicate balance which he attempted t o sustain between 
his desire to see that j u s t i c e was done and that the debt was redeemed 
by the e x p l o i t a t i o n of a l l available resources, was threatened by 
the incompetence of the government. This was l a t e r t o lead him to c a l l 
fo r f a r more drastic measures. 
The Constituent Assembly's legal reforms gave Condorcet considerably 
more s a t i s f a c t i o n than the f i s c a l ones. The evolution which we may 
detect i n his a t t i t u d e i n t h i s f i e l d was no doubt caused by his fear 
of the subversive elements which were working i n France throughout 
t h i s period. 
Thus, despite the fact that he had e a r l i e r called for the Etats-
Gene'raux merely to l a y down the basis for reform, leaving the reforms 
themselves t o a l a t e r date, i n 1790 he uncharacteristically attacked 
those who accused the Assembly of p r e c i p i t a t i o n and argued eloquently 
i n favour of the work which i t had done i n t h i s f i e l d : 
"On regarde comme pre'cipitee l a reforme de l'ordre j u d i c i a i r e 
... Peut-on ... en accuser l a partie de l'assemblee sur 
laquelle tombent tous ces reproches? Si e l l e a paru craindre 
pour l e succes de toute reforme, renvoyee aux legislatures 
suivantes, est-ce envie de tout f a i r e , ou plutot n'est-ce pas 
l a suite i n f a i l l i b l e de 1'esperance trop annoncee par l e p a r t i 
contraire, de parvenir a. d e t r u i r e , dans une autre l e g i s l a t u r e , 
l'ouvrage de celle-ci? Ces eternels regrets de l'ordre ancien 
... ont f a i t de l a p r e c i p i t a t i o n une sorte de devoir ... Les 
maux des partisans des anciens prejuges sont done leur propre 
ouvrage."! 
1. Reponse a 1 adresse aux provinces, O.C. IX. 520-521. 
-163-
So sudden a change of position may not be put down exclusively t o 
his aim i n t h i s work which was to defend the Assembly against gratuitous 
and insincere attacks. These words do not i l l u s t r a t e the desire t o 
concil i a t e a l l ranks of the community which characterises his work on 
the other sections of reforms. 
The answer l i e s most l i k e l y i n the f a c t that the abuses of the 
Ancien Regime's j u d i c i a l system were so flagrant that t h e i r speedy 
a b o l i t i o n was welcomed by a l l but the most reactionary sections of 
the community and presented Condorcet with an ideal opportunity f o r showing 
the masses who were t h e i r friends and who were t h e i r enemies. 
This does not, of course, mean that he agreed with a l l that had 
been done. There are nuances i n his reaction which may only be f e l t 
i f we examine his views on the pr i n c i p a l reforms undertaken by the 
Assembly i n t h i s domain. 
By abolishing a l l the special courts of the Ancien Re'gime, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the Parlements, the Assembly achieved what Condorcet had 
consistently called for before 1789 and had again urged on i t at the 
beginning of the Revolution: 
Les parlements, reduits par l a c o n s t i t u t i o n a n etre que 
des tribunaux, depouilles de l a ju s t i c e criminelle par 1 etablissement 
des jures, et de l a police par ce l u i des municipalites, ne seront 
plus a cudndre. 
The Assembly also took a l l the measures called f o r by Condorcet 
before 1789 t o protect the accused: no man was to be detained without t r i a l 
beyond a period of twenty^four hours; a l l t r i a l s were t o be held i n public; 
2 
the accused were to be given legal aid, etc. 
1. Reflexions sur ce qui a ete f a i t . O.C. IX. 456. 
2. Constitution de 1791, T i t r e I I I , Ch. V, Arts. 9, l 6 , 18. 
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However, though the Assembly decreed that judges and j u r i e s were 
to be elected, the electoral method which i t chose bore no resemblance 
to the one advocated by Condorcet before 1789- By deciding that the 
judges i n c i v i l cases were to be elected by the " d i s t r i c t " electoral 
assemblies i n collaboration with the "ministere public" nominated 
by the King, and those for criminal cases by the electoral assembly of 
the "departement", the Assembly automatically l i m i t e d the vote to the 
active citizens and the Electeurs and thus deprived f i v e m i l l i o n people 
of the r i g h t t o choose the judges. 
Despite t h i s , Condorcet made no objection t o the reform. The most 
plausible explanation for t h i s disturbing silence may l i e i n the fact 
that he did not wish to add weight to the opposition of those who were 
most d i r e c t l y affected by these reforms. So great a step was involved 
i t ' ' 
i n the sudden eradication of such long-standing abuses as the venalite 
des charges" that i t seemed quite superfluous to i n s i s t on matters which, 
though important i n themselves, could be dealt with l a t e r once the 
prin c i p a l reforms had been consolidated. 
Nevertheless, Condorcet's uneasiness on t h i s question i s indicated 
by the fact that he did not keep s i l e n t when he heard of the method 
chosen by the Assembly f o r the election of j u r i e s . He could not accept 
the r u l e which obliged a l l the active citizens to place t h e i r names on 
the j u r y l i s t of the area i n which they l i v e d , nor the considerable 
powers given to the "procureur syndic" of the "departement". 
Realising that his old scheme was impracticable i n the circumstances, 
he attempted t o replace i t by two new methods which he hoped would 
reconcile the electoral system set up by the Constituent Assembly w i t h 
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the need to reduce the influence of the centralised executive 
incarnated, i n t h i s instance, by the King's representative, the 
"procureur syndic". 
According t o the f i r s t method, the "canton" would be divided 
i n t o small sections; the citizens of each section would then choose 
one man from the section i n which they found themselves; the l i s t 
would then be sent to the "chef-lieu" of the "departement" where the 
electoral assembly would meet to draw up a f i n a l l i s t from those 
presented to i t by each "canton". 
I n the second scheme, the l i s t would be drawn up by the outgoing 
members of the " d i s t r i c t " and "departement" administrators who, according 
to the c o n s t i t u t i o n , were t o be elected by the active citizens and the 
Electeurs\ This fact i n i t s e l f i l l u s t r a t e s how f a r Condorcet was 
prepared to compromise with a system which went against his principles. 
Despite the obvious fact that both schemes reflected his attempts 
t o adapt t o events, there i s no doubt that they are nevertheless 
consistent w i t h his other works of the period i n so far as they i l l u s t r a t e 
his e f f o r t s to involve people a l l the time i n l o c a l a f f a i r s so as to create 
the u n i t y of purpose which he f e l t could alone resolve the contradictions 
which abounded at a time of great social upheaval. 
Nowhere was p a r t i c i p a t i o n and collaboration more important than i n 
the sphere of c i v i l and "police" laws which affected people more d i r e c t l y 
than the other laws and which were never more delicate than when a great 
number of t r a d i t i o n a l customs and relationships were being contested. 
I t was precisely.Condorcet's fear on t h i s particular question which led _ __ ^ 
1. Inst." Mass. N.S. 20, dossier B I I I , n° 17. Cited by Cahen op.cit. p.2 
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him to I n s i s t on the importance of consulting the people before 
establishing the l o c a l t r i b u n a l s : 
"L 1execution des arretes du 4 aout exige des tribunaux 
c i v i l s en pleine a c t i v i t e . Tout grand changement dans les 
tribunaux de ce genre demande du temps, entra^ne des 
d i f f i c u l t e s ; i l sera done plus u t i l e de laisser a une autre 
l e g i s l a t u r e l e soin de cette reforme, sur laquelle toutes 
les assemblies provinciales seraient consultees; elles 
seules peuvent eclairer sur les moyens d'execution."1 
He must have been greatly relieved, therefore, t o hear that 
the Assembly had established a network of Justices of the Peace (juges 
de Paix) who were to be elected by the active citizens with the task of 
acting as a r b i t r a t o r s i n disputes between citizens at the l e v e l of the 
"Canton"2. 
This reform, regarded by many historians as one of the most 
eff e c t i v e ones made during the Revolution, had played an important 
part i n Condorcet's e a r l i e r schemes. Now, however, the need f o r a f l e x i b l e 
and popular body of men operating at grassroots l e v e l was greater than 
ever. As the Assembly had paid no heed to his e a r l i e r plans for s e t t i n g 
up j u d i c i a l machinery at the lowest levels of the community, ju s t i c e at 
t h i s l e v e l could now only be carried out by such people as the "juges de 
T l 
pa i x . 
Another reason why Condorcet greeted t h e i r creation with joy lay 
i n his d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the new "tribunaux de d i s t r i c t " . These 
had been set up along quite a r b i t r a r y lines as the people had not been 
consulted either as to the places where they should reside or the methods 
according to which they were to function. Condorcet f e l t t hat the 
1. 
2. 
Reflexions sur ce qui a ete f a i t , O.C. IX. 456-457. 
Const, de 1791, T i t r e I I I , Ch. V, Art. 7-
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"juges de paix" could compensate for t h i s by acting as the intermediaries 
between the people and the t r i b u n a l s . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important 
when we bear i n mind the emphasis placed on bargaining between land-
owners and potential buyers i n Condorcet's plans for f i n a n c i a l reform. 
He was aware of the u t i l i t y , not t o say necessity, of a group of 
elected men who would have the power and the authority to intervene 
e f f e c t i v e l y i n l o c a l disputes. 
A number of steps taken by the Assembly s a t i s f i e d Condorcet as 
they coincided with reforms for which he had already called. This was 
the case, f o r example, with the creation of a "Cour de cassation" to 
examine any breaches of procedure which might occur i n the "tribunaux 
de departement"^, and of an "Haute cour nationale" t o judge any members 
2 
of the executive or any ordinary c i t i z e n who was accused of treason . 
Condorcet's b e l i e f i n the importance of such a court grew d i r e c t l y 
out of the disorders of the time and the need for an o f f i c i a l t r i b u n a l 
to act as a deterrent against the ambitions of the executive and of 
demagogues. He had thus called f o r a t r i b u n a l of t h i s kind i n the 
opening months of the Revolution: 
L anarchie a ete formentee et a ete perpetuee par des manoeuvres; 
i l faut, pour detruire cette cause, e t a b l i r un t r i b u n a l qui 
effraye les coupables, qui assure au peuple une juste vengeance 
... a f i n q u ' i l voie, dans les l o i s , l a j u s t i c e et non 1'oppression." 
However, he had to wait u n t i l 10th May 1791 before the Assembly 
f i n a l l y established t h i s court. I n the early days of the Revolution 
i t had contented i t s e l f w ith the creation of a "comite de recherches" 
1. Const, de 1791, T i t r e I I I , Ch. V, Arts. 19-21. 
2. I b i d . Art. 23-
3. Sur ce qui a ete f a i t , O.C. IX. 462. 
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whose task had been t o look i n t o crimes against the State. Condorcet 
had objected strongly t o t h i s on the grounds that i t exacerbated the 
insecurity of the masses: 
" L T i n s t i t u t i o n de ce comite' ne pouvait qu'augmenter les 
inquietudes, et i l eut ete plus sage de les calmer, par 
l a creation d'un t r i b u n a l charge de "poursuivre les crimes de 
lese-nation, crimes dont l a nature aurait ete determined, 
et les peines fixees par une l o i . " ^ 
Condorcet was obsessed with the idea that disorder and anarchy 
could only be countered by the s e t t i n g up of i n s t i t u t i o n s whose 
purpose would be c l e a r l y f i x e d once and f o r a l l and which could not be 
manipulated according t o the whims of the moment. I n the very early 
days of the Revolution he had argued against the establishment of 
any court set up for the purpose of judging a specific crime: 
"... l a puissance publique ne pourra e t a b l i r , en aucun cas, un t r i b u n a l 
2 
qui s o i t nomme pour une a f f a i r e unique." 
S i m i l a r l y he rejected the idea that the Upper Chamber or Senat 
which he had described i n the second l e t t e r to Montmorency could also . 
have the r i g h t to judge crimes committed against the State, using an 
argument which was to appear i n one of the a r t i c l e s of the new 
constitution"^: 
On d o i t ... maintenir a l a rigueur l a d i v i s i o n du pouvoir 
l e g i s l a t i f et du pouvoir j u d i c i a i r e . 
1. Reponse a 1 adresse, etc. O.C. IX. 502. 
2. Declaration des d r o i t s , 2° Div. Art. 3, O.C. IX. 187. 
3. Cf. Const, de 1791, T i t r e I I I , Ch. V, A r t . 1. 
4. Lettres a Montmorency, O.C. IX. 383. 
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A l l t h i s should be borne i n mind when we come to examine 
Condorcet's a t t i t u d e towards the t r i a l of the King i n 1793-
As fa r as the appeal courts are concerned, we may detect a s l i g h t 
evolution i n Condorcet's ideas. His old fears that the c r e d i b i l i t y of 
the judges would be destroyed i f other men were given the r i g h t t o 
quash t h e i r verdicts has been reduced to an awareness of the danger of 
granting t h i s r i g h t t o people who were not i n a position of supe r i o r i t y 
over those whose verdicts were t o be examined. He thus objected t o 
the Assembly's decision t o refe r the appeals made against a " t r i b u n a l 
de d i s t r i c t " t o another t r i b u n a l of the same king. 
"Lorsque les tribunaux d'appel ont une composition semblable 
a ce l l e du premier t r i b u n a l , i l resulte que 1 on a deux jugements 
prononces de meme sur l e mime objet, qui peuvent etre contradictoires, 
et dont l'un n'etant prefere a l'autre que par l ' a u t o r i t e de l a l o i , 
n'a aucun avantage que cel u i d'avoir laisse aux parties plus de 
temps pour f a i r e v a l o i r leurs moyens."^-
Paced with the accomplished f a c t , he sought to devise a new 
scheme which he hoped would eventually replace the one created by the 
Assembly. According to t h i s the appeal courts would be placed i n the 
2 
hands, not of judges, but of ju r i e s chosen f o r t h i s specific purpose. 
While i t i s true t o say that Condorcet was s a t i s f i e d with the 
bulk of the Constituent Assembly's reforms i n the f i e l d of criminal 
laws, the position i s much less clear when we come t o examine his 
reactions t o the reforms of the c i v i l laws and the " l o i s de police". 
The big question facing him i n t h i s sphere was how to bring 
about the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of the d i f f e r e n t classes of society at a time 
when the entire foundation of the social relationships of the Ancien 
1. Sur les tribunaux d'appel, O.C. X. I67. This a r t i c l e was published 
i n the ninth e d i t i o n of the Journal de l a Societe de 1789 on 29th July 1790. 
2. I b i d . 169-173. 
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s 
Regime was i n a state of collapse. I t i s i n h i s eff o r t s to find an 
answer to t h i s question that we may detect the greatest evolution of 
h i s ideas between 1790 and 1792. 
The task was so d i f f i c u l t that he found i t impossible to remain 
f a i t h f u l to the coherent reform plans which he had made before 1789-
Instead h i s attitude was characterised by three c o n f l i c t i n g tendencies: 
a r e f u s a l to speak out when the Assembly either violated or ignored 
important elements i n his reform plan, a conservative clinging to the 
formal l e g a l i t i e s of th i s plan and a progressive desire to s t r i k e at 
the reactionaries who threatened to undermine the success of the Revolution. 
That he f a i l e d to speak out against the Assembly's f a i l u r e to allow 
women the vote i s understandable. I t would have seemed absurd to pay 
too much attention to a matter which the deputies had ignored to the 
extent of not holding a single discussion about i t \ 
His s i l e n c e i s much more remarkable on the question of slavery. As 
we have seen he had denounced slavery i n no uncertain terms before 1789 
and, during the election campaign, he had questioned the right of the 
I I / ' M ' ' 2 
Saint-Domingue deputes to represent that t e r r i t o r y i n the Etats-Generaux 
and had drawn the attention of the public to the whole question of slavery 
as an important e l e c t o r a l issue . 
Despite a l l t h i s and despite the Assembly's r e f u s a l to take any 
measures to r e l i e v e the burden of the negroes i n the colonies, Condorcet 
did not once r e f e r to the question during the drawing up of the new 
1. Cf. Thompson: Popular sovreignty and the French Constituent Assembly, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1952. p. 62. 
2. Cf. Sur 1'admission des deputes de planteurs de Saint-Dominque 
dans l'assemblee nationale, O.C. IX. 477-486. 
3- Cf. Au corps e l e c t o r a l contre l'esclavage des noirs, O.C. IX. 469-475. 
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constitution. I t may of course be argued that domestic issues were so 
important during t h i s period that the negro question appeared i r r e l e v a n t 
and out of place. 
But how then may we explain h i s s i l e n c e on such important i n t e r n a l 
issues as the emancipation of the Protestants and the Jews? And yet the 
former were not given the r i g h t to vote u n t i l the 24th December 1789 
and the Jews, for t h e i r part, had to wait t i l l as l a t e as the 28th 
September 1791. 
The explanation l i e s surely i n the fact that Condorcet's attitude 
to everything became much more pragmatic after 1789; t h i s meant i n effect 
that he became increasingly a f r a i d of provoking the anger of important 
sections of the community whose support he considered to be v i t a l for the 
Revolution's success. 
Although i t i s u n l i k e l y that the granting of p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s to 
the Protestants and Jews would have greatly affected the material 
i n t e r e s t s of the Assembly's members^, there i s no/ doubt that the 
abolition of salvery would most c e r t a i n l y have alienated the support of 
such powerful figures as the Lameth brothers and the representatives of 
the planters and the merchants of the large ports of Nantes and Bordeaux 
2 
whose influence on the Assembly's l e g i s l a t i o n was quite considerable . 
This explanation seems to be reinforced by Condorcet's remarkably 
moderate approach to the problem of the "emigres" and of the n o b i l i t y as . 
a whole. Thus, despite the massive emigration of important sections of the 
1. Cf. Alfred Cobban op. c i t . Ch. 5, "The myth of the French Revolution" 
p.107. 
2. Cf. Soboul op. c i t . 209, 223-225; c f . also Cobban op. c i t . Ch.8 
"The fundamental ideas of Robespierre", p.l47. 
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community throughout 1789 and 1790, the only v i o l a t i o n s of r i g h t s 
which Condorcet chose to point out i n h i s exhaustive review of the 
Constituent Assembly's work consisted of two decrees which i t had 
passed against the "emigres": 
" j u s q u ' i c i l e s deux decrets contre l e s emigrants sont l a 
seule i n f r a c t i o n des droits des hommes dont nos l e g i s l a t e u r s 
soient coupables."^ 
These decrees suspending the pensions and other sources of income 
of those who had l e f t the country were strongly attacked by Condorcet. 
"Cette l o i est ... une v e r i t a b l e v i o l a t i o n du droit qu'a 
chaque citoyen de c h o i s i r librement l e domicile que sa 
sante, ses i n t e r e t s , ses gouts meme l u i font preferer."^ 
This abstract adherence to principles i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the 
pre-1789 Condorcet; i t seems strangely out of place i n the context of 
1790 and may only be explained by the reason which we have already 
3 
given . 
As regards the clergy, Condorcet's ideas did not change after 
1789. Thus, i n h i s essay "Sur l e De'cret du 13 a v r i l 1790, Religion 
4 
Catholique" , he renewed h i s assaults on the idea of a State r e l i g i o n 
and r e i t e r a t e d h i s support for the abolition of a l l e c c l e s i a s t i c a l 
control over such matters as the r e g i s t r a t i o n of b i r t h s , deaths and 
5 
marriages and the running of schools . 
1. Reponse a l'adresse aux provinces, O.C. IX. 500. 
2. I b i d . 497-498. 
3. The attack on the two decrees was not an i s o l a t e d reaction on 
Condorcet's part. He was j u s t as severe i n h i s attitude towards 
the decree of 17th June 1790 which was also directed against 
the n o b i l i t y . Cf. Reponse a l'adresse, etc. O.C. I C . 505 and the 
Lettre a Mxxx, O.C. I . 327-
4. O.C. X. 95-103. 
5. I b i d . 96-99, 100, 101. 
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These old views were now accompanied, however, by a much more 
pragmatic view of events. Thus, despite h i s revulsion against a 
system whereby a l l the c i t i z e n s of the nation, i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r 
b e l i e f s , were to pay for the upkeep of the Roman Catholic clergy, 
he now attempted to show that i n the context of the times, t h i s 
measure was necessary and j u s t i f i e d : 
" I I est aise' de voir que, dans l ' e t a t actuel des e s p r i t s , 
•A , / 
on aurait plutot augmente que diminue l e pouvoir du 
fanatisme, s i , au l i e u de payer sur l e revenue public 
l e s ministres de l a r e l i g i o n ... on avoit l a i s s e a chaque 
individu l a l i b e r t e de contribuer volontairement aux f r a i s 
du c u l t e . A i n s i , ce n'est point aux f r a i s de culte de 
l ' E g l i s e romaine que l'on oblige l e s non-catholiques de 
contribuer; c'est au maintien de l'ordre et de l a paix, a 
c e l u i de leur propre t r a n q u i l l i t e ' . " ! 
That he was thus prepared to ignore the ideals for which he had 
struggled before 1789 once again i s ind i c a t i v e of the need which he 
f e l t for unity among the dif f e r e n t elements of the population. I n 
fact he was so af r a i d of ali e n a t i n g the support of the Church that 
he pleaded eloquently i n favour of granting compensation to the 
clergy who had been deprived of t h e i r lands, s t a t i n g that p r i e s t s 
2 
were always more dangerous when they were poor. 
He attacked the Assembly's more flagrant a n t i - e c c l e s i a s t i c a l 
measures such as the suppression of the "chanoinesses" and i n s i s t e d on , 
several occasions that the Church was to r e t a i n f u l l autonomy i n the 
4 
running of i t s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s and on questions of doctrine. 
1. O.C. X. 100. 
2. I b i d . 101-102; c f . Sur l a constitution c i v i l e du clerge, O.C. X I I . 7-
3. Reflexions sur ce qui a ete f a i t , etc. O.C. IX. 46l. 
4. Religion catholique, O.C. X. 102; Sur l a const, c i v i l e du clerge, 
O.C. X I I . 5-6. 
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I t i s c l e a r , therefore, that i n the f i r s t two and a h a l f years 
of the Revolution Condorcet found himself i n a position of considerable 
d i f f i c u l t y . 
I n the f i e l d of administrative reform he was obliged to place 
his hopes i n the hands of the "departmental d i r e c t o r i e s " which were 
elected according to a system which violated h i s basic p r i n c i p l e s . 
Short of accepting chaos, he bowed to the new t e r r i t o r i a l d i v i s i o n s 
despite the i s o l a t i o n i n which these l e f t the v i l l a g e s . 
I n the f i e l d of e l e c t o r a l reform, he had to witness the making of 
laws which denied some three m i l l i o n people a say i n the running of the 
nation. Although he protested against t h i s , he said nothing about the 
negroes, Protestants and Jews for fear of dis - u n i t i n g the population. 
I n the f i e l d of l e g i s l a t i v e reform, he accepted the Assembly's 
r i g h t to draw up the new constitution without the part i c i p a t i o n of the 
people on condition that the l a t t e r be allowed to pass the i r opinion on 
i t v i a the imperative mandates which they would give to t h e i r representativ 
i n the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly. The Assembly's neglect to make allowance 
for t h i s l e f t him with no choice but to j u s t i f y the "droit d'insurrection" 
which, as he r e a l i s e d only toowell, could destroy at one stroke the unity 
which he considered v i t a l to the success of the Revolution. 
Faced with the absence of any means whereby the people could 
intervene i n the l e g i s l a t i v e process and with the r e j e c t i o n by the 
Assembly of the bicameral system which he f e l t would compensate for t h i s , 
he t a c i t l y accepted the King's right to veto laws. 
I n the f i e l d of executive reform he del i b e r a t e l y played on the 
paradox of what he c a l l e d the "Constitution a doubles principes" i n 
order to show the value of a compromise at t h i s stage of the Revolution, 
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but above a l l to underline the necessity for an eventual resolution of 
t h i s incompatibility. 
Having accepted the sharing of l e g i s l a t i v e power by the Assembly 
and by the King, he was forced to describe a system whereby the 
executive too was shared by both. But he took care to emphasise that 
the executive was an entity i n i t s e l f which drew i t s power d i r e c t l y 
from the people on an equal footing with the l e g i s l a t u r e . He thus paved 
the way for an executive which could assume the r o l e of monarch. 
However, the Constituent Assembly's decision to give the King 
f u l l control over the executive weighed the scales very much i n the 
King's favour and created a s i t u a t i o n which only a dramatic event could 
resolve. 
We may thus understand Condorcet's r e l i e f and joy when he heard 
of the King's f l i g h t i n June 1791. 
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CHAPTER I I I 
FROM THE KING'S FLIGHT TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 
A. FROM THE KING'S FLIGHT TO THE MEETING OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 
The King's f l i g h t had much the same e f f e c t on the development of 
Condorcet's i d e a s as the capture of the B a s t i l l e . I n the same way 
as the 14th J u l y 1789 had prepared him p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y to g i v e t h e 
masses a much g r e a t e r say i n the running of the country, so the 
events of June 1791 convinced him of the need to a b o l i s h the monarchy 
immediately. The a t t a c k s which he launched a g a i n s t the King a f t e r the 
l a t t e r ' s r e t u r n were extremely v i o l e n t and i n d i c a t e how r e l i e v e d he 
was t h a t the i d e a l opportunity f o r r e s o l v i n g the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s 
inherent i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n had a t l a s t a r r i v e d . So great was h i s 
enthusiasm t h a t he even r e d i s c o v e r e d the s a t i r i c a l verve which 
c h a r a c t e r i s e s the w r i t i n g s of h i s youth.^ His main a s s a u l t on the 
monarchy was given i n a speech which he made to the C e r c l e S o c i a l on 
12th J u l y 1791. 2 
The speech r e v e r s e s completely a l l the arguments he had h i m s e l f 
put forward i n defence of the monarchy during the f i r s t two y e a r s of 
the R e v o l u t i o n . He now maintained notably t h a t "l'etendue de l a 
Fran c e ( e s t ) p l u s f a v o r a b l e que c o n t r a i r e a l ' e t a b l i s s e m e n t d'un 
' 3 
gouvernement r e p u b l i c a i n " and went on to e l i m i n a t e one by one the 
f i v e main arguments commonly put forward by the mon a r c h i s t s : t h a t ah 
e x e c u t i v e whose freedom was l i m i t e d by law was l e s s dangerous than 
4 
the u n b r i d l e d power of a usurper, t h a t a k i n g was n e c e s s a r y i f the 
5 
people were to be pr o t e c t e d a g a i n s t the ambitions of powerful men, 
1. " L e t t r e d'un jeune me'canicien aux au t e u r s du R e p u b l i c a i n " O.C. 
X I I . 2 3 9 ( 1 6 t h J u l y 1791). 
2. "De l a Republique, ou un Roi e s t - i l n e c e s s a i r e a l a c o n s e r v a t i o n 
de l a l i b e r t e ? " O.C. XII.223-237. 
3. I b i d 228-229. 
4. I b i d 228-229. 
5. I b i d 229-230. 
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1 2 
or a g a i n s t the usu r p a t i o n s of the l e g i s l a t u r e or the m i n i s t e r s , 
and, f i n a l l y , t h a t only the King could ensure t h a t the e x e c u t i v e had 
3 
the n e c e s s a r y a u t h o r i t y to accomplish i t s t a s k s . 
H i s approach i n t h i s speech was very s u b t l e . He d i d not attempt 
to show t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n was p e r f e c t , f o r t h i s would have under-
mined the c r i t i c i s m s of i t which he had made before the King's f l i g h t , 
but he i n s i s t e d that i t contained the seeds of a c o n s t i t u t i o n which 
could guarantee that the r i g h t s of man were r e s p e c t e d and hence render 
the monarchy redundant. He thus made i t q u i t e i m p l i c i t t h a t a con-
ve n t i o n would very soon have to be c a l l e d i n order to r e v i s e the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . He was convinced t h a t the King's f l i g h t had shown the 
masses t h a t the monarchy c o n s t i t u t e d a t h r e a t to the R e v o l u t i o n and 
could no longer c l a i m to a c t as a bulwark a g a i n s t anarchy: 
"Le pretendu remede co n t r e l ' a n a r c h i e ne s e r a i t p l u s qu'un^moyen 
de l a perpetuer. Entoure de l a d e f i a n c e e t de l'opprobre, l e trone ne 
peut p l u s q u ' a v i l i r l e s pouvoirs q u i p a r a i t r a i e n t emaner de l u i , e t 
l e s e n e r v e r en appelant c o n t r e eux l a d e f i a n c e du peuple". 4 
He was so c e r t a i n of the people's w i s h t h a t he urged the 
C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly to ac t f a s t i f i t wanted to p r e s e r v e i t s a u t h o r i t y : 
" S i vous a s p i r e z a ... conduire ( l a n a t i o n ) , ayez du moins l e 
courage de l ' e g a l e r dans s a marche r a p i d e ..." 5 
T h i s statement c o n t r a s t s s t r i k i n g l y w i t h the " c e l u i q u i va t r o p 
v i t e , ou s ' a r r e t e , ou s'egare" of 1789. 
He ended h i s speech to the C e r c l e S o c i a l w i t h an eloquent appeal 
f o r a convention, c l a i m i n g that the members of the Assembly were 
remaining s i l e n t on the qu e s t i o n of the monarchy only because "se 
regardant s u r c e s grands o b j e t s , non comme l e s a r b i t r e s , mais comme l e s 
i n t e r p r e t e s de l a volonte n a t i o n a l e , i l s a ttendent, pour l u i o b e i r , 
1. I b i d 230-231. 
2. I b i d 231-232. 
3. I b i d 232-234. 
4. Sur l ' i n s t i t u t i o n d'un c o n s e i l e l e c t i f O.C. X I I . 2 6 5 (23rd J u l y 1791). 
5. I b i d 266. 
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q u ' e l l e s e s o i t hautement m a n i f e s t e e " . ^ 
So s w i f t a change of a t t i t u d e and so unfounded a b e l i e f i n the 
w i l l of the masses to do away w i t h the monarchy may only be e x p l a i n e d 
by h i s awareness of the i n c o m p a t a b i l i t y which e x i s t e d between the new 
c o n s t i t u t i o n and the p r i n c i p l e s to which he adhered and of the need, 
once and f o r a l l , to f o r c e on the Assembly the n e c e s s i t y f o r the 
masses to express t h e i r opinion of the new c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
I n May and June Condorcet had i n f a c t a l r e a d y made i t c l e a r t h a t 
he was not prepared to t o l e r a t e f o r much longer the ambiguous a t t i t u d e 
adopted by c e r t a i n s e c t i o n s of the Assembly. Already, i n June, he and 
S i e v e s had attempted to unmask those who wished to take advantage of V 
the p e r i o d during which the Assembly was to review i t s reforms to 
q u e s t i o n a l l t h a t had been achi e v e d by p u b l i s h i n g a manifesto c a l l i n g 
on the population to s i g n a p e t i t i o n i n favour of the p r i n c i p a l 
2 
reforms. He had f a i l e d to go through w i t h t h i s plan on account of the 
o p p o s i t i o n of such important f i g u r e s as La F a y e t t e and D e s t u t t de T r a c y 
who f e a r e d t h a t so extreme a move would s p l i t the n a t i o n i n t o f a c t i o n s . 
The King's f l i g h t , however, provided him w i t h the i d e a l opportunity f o r 
a c h i e v i n g h i s purpose and t h i s p a r t l y e x p l a i n s the eagerness w i t h which 
he s e i z e d on the o c c a s i o n . 
There i s no doubt, however, that he s e r i o u s l y m i s c a l c u l a t e d the 
temper of the times. The p r e s s campaign r e l e a s e d a g a i n s t him by the 
R o y a l i s t s a f t e r the King's r e s t o r a t i o n on 15th J u l y was of a p a r t i c u l a r l y 
extreme and v i c i o u s k i n d . Apart from e x t r e m i s t s such as C a m i l l e 
Desmoulins and B a r e r e , few people shared h i s r e p u b l i c a n i d e a s . Among 
the "moderates", only Thomas Paine and B r i s s o t were prepared to support 
him; by t u r n i n g to them, he consummated the s p l i t w i t h La F a y e t t e and 
the " p r o g r e s s i v e s " of the o l d S o c i e t e de 1789 who remained l o y a l to the 
1. "De l a Republique" O.C. X I I . 237. 




Although he took no p a r t i n the Republican demonstration on the 
Champ de Mars on 17th J u l y , Hie massacre of the mob by La F a y e t t e ' s 
n a t i o n a l guardsmen and the v i o l e n t a n t i - r e p u b l i c a n r e a c t i o n which 
followed destroyed h i s f a i t h i n those who, up t i l l then, had c o n t r o l l e d 
the R e v o l u t i o n and l a i d down the b a s i s f o r the conduct which he was 
to f o l l o w i n the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly. When the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly, 
pursuing i t s r e p r e s s i v e p o l i c y , suppressed two " l e f t - w i n g " papers, the 
Orateur and the Ami du peuple, on 3 1 s t J u l y and r a i s e d the property 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r v o t i n g on 14th August, Condorcet r e f u s e d to remain 
s i l e n t . I n the P a t r i o t e f r a n g a i s he s t r o n g l y a t t a c k e d a measure 
which l e f t the e l e c t i o n of the judges and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n the hands 
2 
of ten per cent of the population. More s i g n i f i c a n t was h i s bold 
3 
defence of the l e f t - w i n g p r e s s , a move which i l l u s t r a t e s an e v o l u t i o n 
i n h i s i d e a s away from the f e a r of the more p r o g r e s s i v e elements which 
he had f e l t d u r i n g the previous months. 
However, i t would be wrong to t h i n k t h a t t h i s p e r i o d i s i n t e r e s t -
i n g only i n so f a r as i t c l a r i f i e s Condorcet's t r u e f e e l i n g s w i t h regard 
to the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly's work and provides an e x p l a n a t i o n of the 
a t t i t u d e which he was l a t e r to adopt. I t i s i n f a c t a t t h i s time t h a t 
we may d e t e c t an e v o l u t i o n i n h i s i d e a s on two very important s e c t i o n s 
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theory. 
The f i r s t concerns h i s p l a n s f o r the o r g a n i s a t i o n of the e x e c u t i v e 
and f o l l o w s l o g i c a l l y from h i s d e s i r e to a b o l i s h the monarchy. I n the 
King's absence, the r o l e and formation of the c a b i n e t had i n e v i t a b l y to 
be modified; however, the plan d e s c r i b e d by Condorcet i n h i s a r t i c l e 
1. Cf. " J u s t i f i c a t i o n " O.C. 1.583. 
2. I n s t . e t c . no. 5. " P a t r i o t e f r a n c a i s " 14 aout 1791. C i t e d by 
Cahen op c i t . p. 267. 
3. " C o u r r i e r de G r o s a s " 4 aout 1791 XXVII.58 Cahen op. c i t . p. 267. 
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of 23rd J u l y 1791 "Sur 1 1 i n s t i t u t i o n d'un c o n s e i l e l e c t i f " 1 marked 
a c o n s i d e r a b l e departure from the i d e a s expressed i n the 1790 essay 
"Sur l e c h oix des m i n i s t r e s " . 
His f i r s t scheme was motivated by the d e s i r e to c r e a t e a 
c a b i n e t which would a c t as a b a r r i e r a g a i n s t the danger of what he 
c a l l e d " l e hasard", namely the a r b i t r a r y r u l e of a King whose 
importance depended e n t i r e l y on the p e r s o n a l i t y of the man who 
occupied the p o s i t i o n . Consequently, he had i n s i s t e d t h a t the Assembly 
have the e x c l u s i v e r i g h t of choosing the c a n d i d a t e s f o r the m i n i s t r y . 
I n t h i s way he had wished a l s o to balance the King's r i g h t to choose 
h i s m i n i s t e r s , a r i g h t which could not be denied him i n h i s c a p a c i t y 
as head of the e x e c u t i v e . 
Now t h a t " l e h a s a r d " had disappeared, Condorcet saw the 
opportunity f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g an e x e c u t i v e based on " r a t i o n a l " grounds 
and i t i s t h i s t h a t he emphasised at the beginning of h i s essay when 
he c o n t r a s t e d the s t a b i l i t y which would r e s u l t from a p r o p e r l y con-
s t i t u t e d " c o n s e i l e l e c t i f " w i t h the u n c e r t a i n t i e s of an u n e l e c t e d , 
h e r e d i t a r y monarchy. 
• i ' ' 
Un pouvoir h e r e d i t a i r e ... d o i t m a i n t e n i r l a paix, e t , 
cependant, s e s p a r t i s a n s et s e s a d v e r s a i r e s , occupes de l e soutenirj£ 
(ou) de l e combattre ... d i v i s e n t sans c e s s e l e peuple en deux 
f a c t i o n s . Un c o n s e i l e l e c t i f n'a pas l e m&me inc o n v e n i e n t : l e 
nombre des membres de ce c o n s e i l , l a d i s t r i b u t i o n , l a duree de l e u r s 
f o n c t i o n s , l a forme de l e u r e l e c t i o n peuvent e t r e changes par des 
conventions; mais ce s changements n'auront s u r l ' o r d r e e t a b l i qu'une 
i n f l u e n c e i n s e n s i b l e " . 2 
He now a t l a s j attempted to b r i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
e x e c u t i v e and the l e g i s l a t u r e i n t o l i n e w i t h the t h e o r e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s 
which he had d e s c r i b e d i n the e s s a y "Sur l'etendue des pouvoirs de 
l'Assemblee n a t i o n a l e " , t h a t of two d i s t i n c t powers p o s s e s s i n g a 
common source i n a n a t u r a l law which e x i s t e d p r i o r to s o c i e t y . 
1. O.C. XII.243-266. 
2. I b i d 244. 
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The f i r s t consequence of t h i s was t h a t the e l e c t i o n of the 
e x e c u t i v e had now to be p l a c e d i n the hands of the p e o p l e . 1 I t i s a 
measure of Condorcet's awareness of the novelty of t h i s i d e a t h a t he 
A ' 
r e s e r v e d the r i g h t of e l e c t i o n to " l e s memes e l e c t e u r s que l e s 
' ..2 
membres des l e g i s l a t u r e s , and thus bowed to the e l e c t o r a l reforms 
of the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly. I t i s worth no t i n g however, t h a t 
whereas he had c o n s i d e r e d popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 1790 only v i a the 
e l e c t i o n of a body of E l e c t e u r s who were to meet i n P a r i s , he now 
d e l i b e r a t e l y i n v o l v e d a l l the "departements" i n t h e s e e l e c t i o n s . He 
thereby wished t o ensure t h a t , i n c o n t r a s t to the monarchy, the new 
government would have the confidence of the n a t i o n as a whole and 
could l e g i t i m a t e l y c l a i m to emanate from i t . 
" J ' a i p r e f e r e l e c h o i x par l e s e l e c t e u r s des departements a 
l a convocation d'un corps e l e c t o r a l , ... parce que l a c o n f i a n c e 
n e c e s s a i r e a tout bon gouvernement exige que'ceux q u i l e composent 
s o i e n t c h o i s i s non par un p e t i t nombre d ' e l e c t e u r s , mais par l a 
t o t a l i t e des e l e c t e u r s de t o u t e s l e s p a r t i e s de l'empire, lorsque 
l ' e l e c t i o n immediate, par l e s c i t o y e n s , e s t i m p o s s i b l e " . 3 
He a l s o wished to u n d e r l i n e the u n i t y of purpose of the 
l e g i s l a t u r e and e x e c u t i v e and to show how both operated a c c o r d i n g to 
the same c r i t e r i a of reason and j u s t i c e . 
" ( L a ) f o r c e (du) pouvoir e x e c u t i f s e r a i t d'autant p l u s grande, 
que c e t t e a u t o r i t e n'etant po i n t , comme c e l l e du c o n s e i l monarchique, 
dans une o p p o s i t i o n d ' i n t e r e t avec l ' a u t o r i t e du corps l e g i s l a t i f , 
e l l e i n s p i r e r a i t moins de c r a i n t e aux amis de l a l i b e r t e " . 4 
However, he was a f r a i d t h a t t h i s u n i t y of purpose would b l u r 
the fundamental t h e o r e t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between l e g i s l a t i v e and 
e x e c u t i v e power and i t was to prevent t h i s t h a t he now r e v e r s e d h i s 
e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n to a l l o w the e x e c u t i v e to be chosen from among the 
members of the Assembly. His aim i n doing t h i s was a l s o to i n s t i l i n 
1. I b i d 247 A r t . I I I . 
2. I b i d 260-261. 
3. I b i d 261. 
4. "Sur l ' i n s t i t u t i o n d'un c o n s e i l e l e c t i f O.C. X I I . 255. 
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the new e x e c u t i v e a sense of i t s own u n i t y and coherence. I t was 
f o r t h i s purpose t h a t he c a l l e d f o r such measures as frequent 
meetings between the departments of the e x e c u t i v e and long terms of 
o f f i c e . 1 
The r i g h t of d i s m i s s a l was now to l i e e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h the 
2 
N a t i o n a l Assembly and the l a t t e r would a l s o have the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
of s e l e c t i n g the l i s t of ca n d i d a t e s f o r posts to the c a b i n e t . T h i s 
would be done j u s t before i t s d i s s o l u t i o n , so as to prevent the 
3 
e x e c u t i v e from coming too much under the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s c o n t r o l . 
Condorcet's plan was thus s t i l l very c a u t i o u s . Powers r e s e r v e d 
p r e v i o u s l y to the King now passed to the Assembly, w h i l e those r e s e r v e d 
to the Assembly passed to the people. But the Assembly's r o l e was 
c e n t r a l to the scheme and continued to overshadow th a t of the people. 
The second major development i n Condorcet's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i d e a s 
concerns the measures whereby the people were to be a b l e to p a r t i c i p a t e 
i n the changing of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . T h i s had been one of h i s main 
concerns during the previous y e a r and a h a l f , but the events which took 
p l a c e i n June 1791 - the King's f l i g h t and the re-examination of the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n which followed - gave the s u b j e c t a new i n t e r e s t . R e a l -
i s i n g a t long l a s t t h a t i t was dangerous to make no p r o v i s i o n s f o r 
reforming the c o n s t i t u t i o n , the Assembly h a s t i l y added a seventh 
s e c t i o n of laws t o the ones which i t had a l r e a d y made. However, the 
new p r o v i s i o n s were extremely moderate and e f f e c t i v e l y prevented any 
change from t a k i n g p l a c e f o r at l e a s t ten y e a r s . 
Condorcet r e a c t e d to t h i s i n a speech "Sur l e s conventions 
4 ' i i n a t i o n a l e s " d e l i v e r e d to the Assemblee f e d e r a t i v e des Amis de l a 
1. I b i d 258-259. 
2. I b i d 258-259. 
3. I b i d 259. 
4. O.C. X.207-222. 
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V e r i t e on 1st A p r i l 1791. Not only d i d the new r e g u l a t i o n s j e o p a r d i s e 
a l l chances of immediate changes,^" they l e f t the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
judging whether changes should be made e n t i r e l y i n the hands of the 
Assembly. 
"On a d i t qu'en e t a b l i s s a n t une convention, en ne l a remettant 
pas a un temps e l o i g n e , i l e t a i t a craindre que l a c o n s t i t u t i o n f r a n c h i s e 
ne f u t re n v e r s e e ... Les homines q u i f e r a i e n t c e t t e o b j e c t i o n ignor-
e r a i e n t done bign profondement l a pente v e r s l a q u e l l e l e s progres de 
l a r a i s o n e n t r a i n e n t tous l e s e s p r i t s ... Renvoyer une convention a 
un terme tres e l o i g n e , e ' e s t r e m p l i r l e u r s voeux. L'interSt p e r s o n n e l 
ne c a l c u l e que pour l u i , e t pour une courte duree". 2 
I n the absence of any method whereby the people could express 
t h e i r approval or d i s a p p r o v a l of the new c o n s t i t u t i o n , i t was only 
n a t u r a l t h a t the i n i t i a t i v e f o r c a l l i n g a r e v i s i o n a r y body should be 
l e f t , not to the Assembly which had made the c o n s t i t u t i o n , but t o the 
people. 
P e u t - e t r e a u r a i t - o n du a t t e n d r e du p a t r i o t i s m e de 1 Assemblee 
n a t i o n a l e , q u ' e l l e appelat c e t t e convention n o u v e l l e ? ... Mais n ' e s t -
i l pas p l u s genereux encore de l a i s s e r prononcer l a n a t i o n e l l e — 
meme?" 3 
The tone i s moderate but the i n f e r e n c e i s q u i t e c l e a r . By 
c o n t r a s t i n g " l a n a t i o n " w i t h "l'Assemblee n a t i o n a l e " , Condorcet made 
i t e x p l i c i t t h a t the l a t t e r had no r i g h t , i n the context of the times, 
to c l a i m i t r e p r e s e n t e d the n a t i o n and t h a t the only s o l u t i o n was t o 
summon a convention. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , the q u e s t i o n which had t r o u b l e d him throughout the 
previous year s t i l l remained. How was i t p o s s i b l e f o r the masses to be 
co n s u l t e d ? I n 1790 he had a l r e a d y pointed out that the only bodies 
which could t r u l y c l a i m to r e p r e s e n t the c i t i z e n s were the primary 
a s s e m b l i e s . As the s e numbered some f o r t y thousand, a b s o l u t e chaos 
would ensue i f each was asked to d i s c u s s those s e c t i o n s of the 
1. Cf. C o n s t i t u t i o n de 1791 T i t r e V I I A r t s . I I and I I I . 
2. " D i s c o u r s s u r l e s conventions n a t i o n a l e s O.C. X.218-219. 
3. "Sur l e s conventions n a t i o n a l e s " O.C. X. 220. 
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c o n s t i t u t i o n which i t c o n s i d e r e d needed changing. As the p r o v i n c i a l 
conventions f o r which he had c a l l e d i n 1790 had not come i n t o being, 
he was f o r c e d to d i s c o v e r a new method f o r b r e a k i n g the deadlock. 
I n h i s speech, Condorcet simply sidestepped the problem. The 
primary a s s e m b l i e s would not be allowed to hold debates; t h e s e would 
take p l a c e only i n the convention which they would e l e c t . The 
convention would draw up a new c o n s t i t u t i o n , each a r t i c l e of which 
would be submitted f o r approval to the primary a s s e m b l i e s . When the 
new c o n s t i t u t i o n was complete i t would be submitted a second time and 
would become law i f approved by a m a j o r i t y of the primary a s s e m b l i e s . 
I n other words, Condorcet simply adapted the system which he 
had d e s c r i b e d i n h i s 1789 essay "Sur l a n e c e s s i t e de f a i r e r a t i f i e r 
l a c o n s t i t u t i o n " . But i t r e f l e c t s a d e f i n i t e departure from the 
method d e s c r i b e d i n the f i r s t l e t t e r which he wrote to the Comte de 
Montmorency where the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r changing the c o n s t i t u t i o n 
was to l i e e x c l u s i v e l y i n the hands of the N a t i o n a l Assembly. I n 
e f f e c t , i t i l l u s t r a t e s Condorcet's growing d e s i r e to i n v o l v e the 
people more and more i n the running of the n a t i o n ' s a f f a i r s . 
B. THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 
1. The " l o y a l t y " p o l i c y 
The d e c i s i o n to e s t a b l i s h a l e g i s l a t i v e assembly symbolises the 
complete f a i l u r e of Condorcet's e f f o r t to use the King's f l i g h t as a 
means of br e a k i n g the deadlock i n which the R e v o l u t i o n found i t s e l f . 
He could now no longer accept the compromises which had enabled him 
to t o l e r a t e f o r a time the weaknesses of the 1791 c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
D e s p i t e t h i s , he was f o r c e d to r e c o g n i s e t h a t the people i n power had 
no i n t e n t i o n of even c o n s i d e r i n g a method whereby the c o n s t i t i o n c o u l d 
be re-examined. 
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The King's r e s t o r a t i o n d i d not so much s i g n i f y t h a t the 
R e v o l u t i o n had come to a s t a n d s t i l l as t h a t i t was beginning to l o s e 
ground. The panic which had s e i z e d the n a t i o n s h o r t l y a f t e r Varennes 
had s w e l l e d the ranks of those who had opposed the R e v o l u t i o n from 
the beginning by adding to t h e i r numbers a c o n s i d e r a b l e p r o p o r t i o n of 
the l i b e r a l s who had t i l l then opposed the emigres and t h e i r s u p p o r t e r s . 
That t h i s was one of the p r i n c i p a l reasons f o r Condorcet's 
d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t at t h i s time seems to be i n d i c a t e d by a passage i n 
the " J u s t i f i c a t i o n " 1 i n which he speaks of L a f a y e t t e . 
"La F a y e t t e f a i s a i t p r o f e s s i o n de h a i r l e s r o i s , quinze j o u r s 
avant de voter pour l a r e s t a u r a t i o n de L o u i s XVI. Je l ' a v a i s vu r i r e 
avec moi ... des p l a i s a n t e r i e s de Thomas Paine s u r l e r i d i c u l e de l a 
royaute h e r e d i t a i r e . Sans doute i l pouvait c r o i r e n e c e s s a i r e de l a 
c o n s e r v e r encore en F r a n c e : une e r r e u r de bonne f o i e s t t o u j o u r s 
e x c u s a b l e ; mais d e v a i t - i l f a i r e i n s u l t e r par des hommes q u i l u i 
a p partenaient une opinion q u i e t a i t a u s s i l a s i e n n e ? P o u v a i t - i l 
devenir tout a coup l e z e l e p a r t i s a n d'un r o i ? ... Je l u i e c r i v i s 
l e 17 j u i l l e t 1791: 'Depuis douze ans vous e t e s compte parmi l e s 
defenseurs de l a l i b e r t e ; s i vous ne changez de conduite ... vous 
s e r e z compte parmi s e s opp*resseurs'. Le s o i r meme ma prophetie f u t 
accomplie, e t j e ne l ' a i pas revu depuis". 2 
I n the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , he could have decided e i t h e r to t u r n h i s 
back on p u b l i c a f f a i r s and become a detached observer; or e l s e he 
could u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y have or g a n i s e d a r e s i s t a n c e movement aimed 
at b r i n g i n g down the Assembly. That he d i d n e i t h e r i n d i c a t e d t h a t , 
d e s p i t e appearances, he b e l i e v e d t h a t time was on the R e v o l u t i o n ' s 
s i d e . 
A v i o l e n t a t t a c k on the c o n s t i t u t i o n would not only have added 
weight to the f o r c e s of r e a c t i o n , but i t was q u i t e c l e a r t h a t the 
balance of power was such t h a t i t would have been condemned to f a i l u r e . 
3 
The a t t a c k s made on Condorcet and the r e p u b l i c a n s a f t e r Varennes, the 
massacre of the r e p u b l i c a n p e t i t i o n e r s a t the Champ de Mars by La 
1. O.C. 1.574-604. T h i s work was w r i t t e n by Condorcet when he was i n 
h i d i n g i n 1793. 
2. I b i d 583-584. 
3. Cf. Cahen op. c i t . p. 263-265. 
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F a y e t t e ' s N a t i o n a l Guard on 17th J u l y , and the D e c l a r a t i o n of 
P i l l n i t z on 27th August were a l l warnings t h a t a d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n 
w i t h the e s t a b l i s h e d powers was out of the q u e s t i o n . 
The balance of power was r e f l e c t e d a l s o i n the t e n d e n c i e s of the 
de p u t i e s who were e l e c t e d to the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly at the end of 
September 1791. Opposite the two hundred and s i x t y - f o u r F e u i l l a n t s were 
to be found a mere one hundred and t h i r t y - s i x members of what may be 
d e s c r i b e d i n a very g e n e r a l manner as the " l e f t " . 1 
Apart from t h i s , Condorcet's d e c i s i o n to bide h i s time may be 
e x p l a i n e d by other f a c t o r s . He f e l t t h a t past events had shown t h a t 
the c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , i f unprovoked, would soon make the mistakes 
which would r e v e a l t h e i r t r u e i n t e n t i o n s to the people. T h i s was 
i n d i c a t e d by a s e r i e s of i n c i d e n t s which took p l a c e i n August 1791, 
notably the u p r i s i n g s organised by the r e f r a c t o r y p r i e s t s i n the 
-> 2 
Vendee. Condorcet f e l t t h a t the p a t i e n c e of the r e a c t i o n a i r e s could 
not match t h a t of the p r o g r e s s i v e s and he foresaw the e v e n t u a l i t y of 
3 
such i n c i d e n t s as the a r i s t o c r a c t i c u p r i s i n g i n Avignon on 16th October 
and the danger which they re p r e s e n t e d f o r the r e a c t i o n a r y cause. 
R e a l i s i n g t h a t the R i g h t , i f allowed to pursue i t s own course, 
would soon show i t s d e s i r e to destroy the c o n s t i t u t i o n , he decided to 
f o l l o w the only l i n e of a c t i o n open to him. Thus, d e s p i t e h i s 
o p p o s i t i o n to the Assembly, he f e l l back on the p o l i c y which had been 
h i s i n 1789, 1790 and the f i r s t s i x months of 1791, namely t h a t of r a l l y i n g 
the people around the c o n s t i t u t i o n i n the hope t h a t i t s enemies would 
be f o r c e d i n t o the open. 
T h i s e x p l a i n s h i s d e c i s i o n to become a candidate f o r a s e a t i n 




Cf. Soboul op. c i t . p. 270. 
Cf. Soboul op. c i t . p. 274. 
I b i d 274. 
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swore the deputy's oath of l o y a l t y to the c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
"Je j u r a i de maintenirtf ( l a ) c o n s t i t u t i o n de tout mon pouvoir, 
e t , j ' a i e t e f i d e l e a mon serment ... Je n ' a v a i s promis d'&tre 
f i d e l e au r b i qu'autant que lui-menie g a r d e r a i t s e s serments, e t que 
c e t t e f i d e l i t e au premier m a g i s t r a t ne s e r a i t pas en o p p o s i t i o n avec 
c e l l e que j e d e v a i s a l a n a t i o n . Autrement l e serment eut e t e 
c o n t r a d i c t o i r e . Quel e t a i t done ce serment? C ' e t a i t ... c e l u i de 
ne proposer aucune l o i , aucune mesure c o n t r a i r e a l a c o n s t i t u t i o n , 
p r i s e dans l e sens l e p l u s f a v o r a b l e a l a l i b e r t e " . 1 
U l t i m a t e l y , h i s p o l i c y was nothing more than a gamble, a 
weighing up of p o s s i b i l i t i e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s he had good reasons f o r 
being o p t i m i s t i c . The most s i g n i f i c a n t of th e s e was h i s triumphant 
e l e c t i o n to the Assembly on 26th September, and t h i s d e s p i t e the 
str o n g o p p o s i t i o n of the predominantly F e u i l l a n t e l e c t o r s a t the 
Eveche and the i n t r i g u e s of the r o y a l i s t f a n a t i c s of the S a i n t e -
2 
C h a p e l l e . I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t a l s o t h a t h i s s u c c e s s was l a r g e l y due 
to the recommendations made i n h i s favour by s e v e r a l of the pro-
v i n c i a l s o c i e t i e s , a f a c t which was to strengthen h i s b e l i e f t h a t 
n a t i o n a l u n i t y was the most e f f e c t i v e weapon which c o u l d be used 
i n the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t r e a c t i o n . 
A f i n a l reason f o r h i s apparently p a r a d o x i c a l swing back t o the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n which he had so b i t t e r l y a t t a c k e d i n June 1791 may be found 
i n the s t a t e of chaos p r e v a i l i n g i n F r a n c e towards the end of 1791 and 
i n the opening months of 1792. I n November, g r a i n convoys and s t o r e s 
were p i l l a g e d by mobs i n v a r i o u s p a r t s of the country. I n c e r t a i n 
p r o v i n c e s such as Beauce, the mobs f o r c e d the m u n i c i p a l i t i e s to impose 
f i n e s on the hoarders of v i t a l f o o d s t u f f s and even went so f a r as to 
k i l l those, among them the wealthy mayor of Etampes, Simoneau, who 
r e f u s e d to pay. I n the c e n t r e and south the chateaux of the emigres 
3 
were p i l l a g e d and burnt down i n March 1792. 
1. "Fragment de J u s t i f i c a t i o n " O.C. 1.585. 
2. Cf. Cahen op. c i t . p. 273. 
3. Soboul op. c i t . pp. 273-274. 
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Condorcet's behaviour during the f i r s t few months of the new 
Assembly was i n keeping w i t h the p o l i c y which he had decided to 
f o l l o w . On the one hand, he a t t a c k e d any attempt on the p a r t of the 
e x e c u t i v e to tamper w i t h the c o n s t i t u t i o n ; on the other, he c a l l e d 
r e p e a t e d l y to the " L e f t " to have p a t i e n c e and to avoid c r e a t i n g 
dangerous s p l i t s w i t h i n the Assembly's ranks. At the same time he 
pursued h i s plan of using the c o n s t i t u t u i o n i t s e l f as a weapon to 
b r i n g p r e s s u r e on the King and h i s m i n i s t e r s . 
A few random examples i l l u s t r a t e q u i t e c l e a r l y these two a s p e c t s 
of h i s a t t i t u d e . On 6th October, he supported the decree which 
requested t h a t the d e p u t i e s of the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly be permitted to 
welcome the K i n g w i t h t h e i r h a t s o n . 1 He a l s o c a l l e d f o r s e v e r a l 
2 
decrees to be exempted from the r o y a l s a n c t i o n and, on 17th November, 
demanded t h a t the King be r e f u s e d the r i g h t to i s s u e proclamations or 
to appeal d i r e c t l y to the people concerning d e c i s i o n s taken by the 
Assembly, arguing t h a t the people's s o l e r i g h t , a c c o r d i n g to the 
3 
c o n s t i t u t i o n , was to e l e c t t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . 
T h i s f i d e l i t y to the l e t t e r of the c o n s t i t u t i o n was backed up 
by the numerous appeals he made to the L e f t i n the columns of the 
4 
p r o g r e s s i v e Chronique de P a r i s , a s k i n g i t s members to remain f a i t h -
f u l t o the Assembly so as to avoid the v i o l e n c e which he was s u r e 
5 
could l e a d only t o r e a c t i o n i n the c i r c u m s t a n c e s of the times. 
1. J o u r n a l de P a r i s 7th October 1791; c f . Cahen op. c i t . p. 278. 
2. Chronique de P a r i s 17th November 1791; Ami des P a t r i o t e s IV.206; 
c f . Cahen op. c i t . p. 278. 
3. P a t r i o t e f r a n c a i s 5th November 1791 p. 517; J o u r n a l g e n e r a l de 
France 3rd November 1791 p. 1241; Mercure de France 12th November 
1791; P a r t i h i s t o r i q u e p. 106; c f . Cahen p. 279. 
4. He was f o r c e d to leave the J o u r n a l de P a r i s i n December 1791 because 
of h i s a n t i - m i n f t s t e r i a l a t t i t u d e . 
5. Chronique de P a r i s 26th November p. 1327, 2nd December p. 1351, 
11th November p. 1427 Cahen p. 280. 
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The manner i n which Condorcet moved away from t h e e x t r e m i s t 
a t t i t u d e which he had adopted i n June and J u l y 1791 i s w e l l 
i l l u s t r a t e d by the way i n which he approached the f i r s t major debate 
on the agenda of the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly, the one which took p l a c e 
towards the end of October 1791 on the q u e s t i o n of the a c t i o n t o be 
taken a g a i n s t the emigres. 
I t i s s l i g h t l y i r o n i c a l t h a t i n h i s f i r s t important speech to 
the Assembly he spoke as a c o n s e r v a t i v e . I n c o n t r a s t t o Go u p i l l o u ' s 
v i o l e n t a t t a c k on the Emigre's i n the opening speech of 15th October, 
and to B r i s s o t ' s demand on 20th October t h a t the land of the King's 
1 2 br o t h e r s be c o n f i s c a t e d , h i s own speech was p e a c e f u l i n tone and 
moderate i n content. 
He repeated the argument which he had put forward i n 1790 con-
c e r n i n g the f a c t t h a t i t was a v i o l a t i o n of a man's r i g h t s to prevent 
him from l e a v i n g h i s country - "... l a nature accorde a tout homme l e 
d r o i t de s o r t i r de son pays; l a c o n s t i t u t i o n l e g a r a n t i t a tout c i t o y e n 
3 
f r a n ^ a i s , e t nous ne pouvons y p o r t e r a t t e i n t e " and went f u r t h e r than 
t h i s by c l a i m i n g t h a t i t was wrong to d e p r i v e a man of h i s property 
even i f he became the c i t i z e n of another country: "Tout homme a ... 
l e d r o i t de changer de p a t r i e ... Des ce moment, c i t o y e n de sa 
no u v e l l e p a t r i e , i l n e s t p l u s qu un et r a n g e r dans s a premiere; mais 
s ' i l y r e n t r e un j o u r , s ' i l y a l a i s s e des b i e n s , i l d o i t y j o u i r de 
1. Cf. Moniteur X. 121, 159, 163-4, 171-3. 
2. 'Opinion suV l e s emigrants O.C. X.223-242." 
3. I b i d 227. 
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/ . . . i 
l a p l e n i t u d e des d r o i t s de 1 homme . 
Having gone so f a r he was, n e v e r t h e l e s s , prepared to admit t h a t 
i t was absurd f o r a n a t i o n not to take v i t a l measures to defend her-
s e l f . 
"... j e demande pourquoi ( l a n a t i o n f r a n c h i s e ) he p o u r r a i t 
u s e r du d r o i t n a t u r e l a tout i n d i v i d u de prendre des p r e c a u t i o n s pour 
s a s u r e t e ? " 2 
Consequently, he went on to propose an e l a b o r a t e scheme whereby 
i t would be p o s s i b l e to d i s t i n g u i s h between those Frenchmen who had 
l e f t F r ance f o r " l e g i t i m a t e " reasons such as t r a v e l or b u s i n e s s , those 
who had l e f t out of h o s t i l i t y to the R e v o l u t i o n , and those who had l e f t 
w i t h the s p e c i f i c purpose of s e e k i n g a i d i n order to c r u s h the new 
regime. 
I t i s not n e c e s s a r y to go i n t o the p r o j e c t i n d e t a i l . I t i s 
worth mentioning, however, t h a t i t l e f t him open to the a t t a c k s of 
the L e f t whose papers argued t h a t so " l e g a l i s t i c " a scheme was q u i t e 
inadequate a t a time of n a t i o n a l emergency. Condorcet's i n s i s t e n c e 
t h a t a l l men be c o n s i d e r e d equal b e f o r e the law was a t t a c k e d because 
of i t s too scrupulous f i d e l i t y to p r i n c i p l e s which the urgency of the 
3 
times rendered a n a c h r o n i s t i c . 
I n f a c t , h i s speech, f a r from r e f l e c t i n g a p u r e l y a b s t r a c t 
adherence to i d e a l s and p r i n c i p l e s , was governed by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of 
a very p r a c t i c a l nature. Having sensed, a f t e r the b i t t e r a n t i c l i m a x 
and r e a c t i o n which followed the b u r s t of enthusiasm provoked by the 
f l i g h t to Varennes, t h a t only f i d e l i t y to the c o n s t i t u t i o n could enable 
the R e v o l u t i o n to pursue i t s course, he chose a p o l i c y which would 
appeal to the k i n d of people who he f e l t would be the l e a s t e a s i l y 
1. I b i d 229. 
2. "Discours s u r l e s emigrants" O.C. X/229. 
3. Cf. J o u r n a l u n i v e r s e l no. 709 p. 249; P a t r i o t e f r a n c a i s 29th 
October 1791. Cf. Cahen p. 287. 
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swayed by the r h e t o r i c of e x t r e m i s t s on e i t h e r s i d e . 
That he was s u c c e s s f u l here was i l l u s t r a t e d by the way h i s 
speech was acclaimed by the mass of the t h r e e hundred and f o r t y - f i v e middle 
of-the-road deputies known as the " c o n s t i t u t i o n n e l s " . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , i t 
was h i s p r o j e c t , not B r i s s o t ' s , which came before the Assembly. 1 His p l a n 
to f o r c e the t r u e enemies of the R e v o l u t i o n i n t o the open was a l s o w e l l 
served by the speech, f o r the t r u e c h a r a c t e r of the v i o l e n t r e a c t i o n s 
2 
to h i s p r o j e c t which appeared i n the R o y a l i s t p r e s s was r e v e a l e d a l l 
the more e f f e c t i v e l y p r e c i s e l y by the f a c t t h a t the p r o j e c t was so 
" l e g a l i s t i c " and more moderate than the w i l d schemes of the e x t r e m i s t s . 
I n s h o r t , Condorcet f e l t t h a t f i d e l i t y to the c o n s t i t u t i o n ' s 
p r i n c i p l e s was a more powerful weapon i n the hands of the R e v o l u t i o n 
than the f a l s e l y pragmatic a t t i t u d e of the e x t r e m i s t s who wished to 
rush through u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l measures which, i n the long run, would 
only t u r n to the advantage of those who they aimed to d e s t r o y . Only 
l o y a l t y to the c o n s t i t u t i o n could be co n s i d e r e d t r u l y " u s e f u l " and i t 
was w i t h t h i s argument t h a t he began h i s speech. 
"C'est une grande e r r e u r de c r o i r e que l ' u t i l i t e ' commune ne se 
trouve pas constamment unie avec l e r e s p e c t pour l e s d r o i t s des 
i n d i v i d u s , et que l e s a l u t p u b l i c p u i s s e commander de v e r i t a b l e s i n -
j u s t i c e s . C e t t e e r r e u r a e t e partout l ' e t e r n e l l e excuse des 
a t t e n t a t s de l a t y r a n n i e , et l e p r e t e x t e des menees a r t i f i c i e u s e s 
employees pour l ' e t a b l i r . " 
"Au c o n t r a i r e , dans toute mesure propose'e comme u t i l e , i l f a u t 
d'abord examiner s i e l l e e s t j u s t e . Ne l ' e s t - e l l e pas, i l f a u t en 
c o n c l u r e q u ' e l l e n ' a v a i t qu'une vaine et trompeuse apparence 
d ' u t i l i t e . " 3 
However, d e s p i t e h i s i n i t i a l s u c c e s s , Condorcet's hopes were 
soon dashed. F o l l o w i n g a dramatic speech by. I s n a r d , the Assembly 
1. C f . J o u r n a l g e n e r a l de 1'Europe 26th October 1791 pp. 399-400; 
Chronique de P a r i s 26th October 1791 p. 1206; P a t r i o t e f r a n c a i s 
26th October 1791 p. 486; J o u r n a l g e n e r a l de France 26th October 
1791 p. 126; Cahen p. 286. 
2. Mercure de France p a t r i o t i q u e 5th November 1791 pp. 14-15; Gazette 
de P a r i s 29th October 1791. 
3. "Opinion s u r l e s emigrants" O.C. X.225. 
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r e j e c t e d h i s motion and i t was B r i s s o t ' s which came before the 
dep u t i e s on 31st October. The r e s u l t was the decree of that day 
c a l l i n g on the King's b r o t h e r s to r e t u r n w i t h i n two months and t h a t 
of 9th November which s t a t e d t h a t the land of a l l the emigres who 
had not ret u r n e d w i t h i n the same per i o d would be c o n f i s c a t e d . ^ 
As Condorcet had fo r e s e e n , t h i s played s t r a i g h t i n t o the King's 
hands by a l l o w i n g him to r e j e c t the decrees on the grounds t h a t they 
went a g a i n s t the s p i r i t of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . T h i s course of a c t i o n 
would have been denied him had Condorcet's p r o j e c t been voted. Two 
y e a r s l a t e r he r e c a l l e d w i t h a c e r t a i n b i t t e r n e s s the f e e l i n g s which 
the whole episode had i n s p i r e d i n him. 
"(Mon) p r o j e c t f u t r e j e t e avec humeur apres a v o i r e t e app l a u d i , 
e t j ' a p p r i s par l a q u ' i l s e formait dans l'Assemblee un p a r t i 
p o p u l a i r e p l u s passionne qu'eclaire', q u i s e r v i r a i t l a l i b e r t e c o n t r e 
l e r o i , mais q u i n u i r a i t par son z e l e au su c c e s des moyens propres 
a l a sauver. 
On f i t c o n t r e l e s emigres un d e c r e t s e v e r e e t s u r t o u t mal combine. 
Le r o i r e f u s a l a s a n c t i o n , et en donna l e s mo t i f s par une proclamation 
i n j u r i e u s e a 1'Assembled. 2 
Condorcet remained t r u e to h i s g e n e r a l p o l i c y i n the second 
major debate of the new Assembly, the aim of which was to determine the 
measures which were to be taken a g a i n s t the p r i e s t s who had r e f u s e d 
to swear an oath of l o y a l t y to the C o n s t i t u t i o n C i v i l e du C l e r g e . 
Here again, he r e f u s e d to support any measures which v i o l a t e d 
the r i g h t s of man as these were d e f i n e d i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n . Thus, 
d e s p i t e h i s a n t i c l e r i c a l i s m , he a t t a c k e d a l l forms of g r a t u i t o u s a c t i o n s 
1. Moniteur X, 268. 
2. Mercure de France p a t r i o t i q u e 12th November 1791; Chronique de P a r i s 
2nd November 1791 p. 1233; P a t r i o t e f r a n c a i s 1st November 1791 p. 
501. Cf. Cahen p. 288. S 
- 1 9 2 -
taken a g a i n s t the c l e r g y . 
"La l o i ne peut r e c o n n a i t r e aucun d e l i t r e l i g i e u x ; l e s v i o l e n c e s 
a l ' e g a r d d'un pre*tre ... doivent e t r e punies comme l e s a u t r e s a t t e i n t e s 
a l a l i b e r t e ; toute d i s t i n c t i o n de personne b l e s s e r a i t l e s d r o i t s de 
l ' e g a l i t e " . 1 
Once t h i s had been accepted, however, i t was the duty of the 
n a t i o n to take every s t e p i n i t s power to l i m i t the danger r e p r e s e n t e d 
by the p r i e s t s who opposed the R e v o l u t i o n . 
"Lorsqu'une c l a s s e d'hommes f a i t s e r v i r un systeme r e l i g i e u x de 
p r e t e x t e a un plan de c o n s p i r a t i o n c o n t r e l a t r a n q u i l l i t e publique ... 
c e t t e c l a s s e d'hommes ne p e u t - e l l e pas d e v e n i r l ' o b j e t de l o i s 
p a r t i c u l i e r e s ? " 2 
The measures suggested by Condorcet r e p r e s e n t an e v o l u t i o n i n 
h i s i d e a s i n so f a r as they were more s e v e r e than those mentioned two 
y e a r s e a r l i e r . Incensed by the i n c r e a s i n g l y dangerous r o l e played by 
the c l e r g y , he now proposed, i n a d d i t i o n to o l d e r measures such as the 
3 4 s e p a r a t i o n of Church and S t a t e , and the s u p p r e s s i o n of s t i p e n d s , 
5 
new measures such as banishment and f o r c e d r e s i d e n c e . 
The arguments which he used to j u s t i f y these s t e p s echo those 
he had put forward during the debate on the emigre q u e s t i o n ; i n both 
c a s e s the p r i n c i p l e s of the c o n s t i t u t i o n were shown to j u s t i f y a l l 
l e g i s l a t i o n made a g a i n s t these two groups of people. 
However, the tone which he adopted i n h i s a t t a c k s on the c l e r g y 
was more s e v e r e . He was as yet r e l u c t a n t to c r i t i c i s e the emigres 
too h a r s h l y . He s t i l l b e l i e v e d t h a t the support of p a r t of the 
n o b i l i t y was v i t a l f o r the R e v o l u t i o n to be s u c c e s s f u l ; t h i s i s c l e a r 
from the statement he made i n h i s speech concerning the w i l l i n g n e s s of 
1. "Fragment de j u s t i f i c a t i o n " O.C. 1.587. Cf. " R e v i s i o n des travaux 
de l a premiere l e g i s l a t u r e " O.C. X. 403-404 f o r a much more formal 
account. 
/ / / / 
2. Sur l a n e c e s s i t e d o t e r au c l e r g e 1 e t a t c i v i l des c i t o y e n s 
O.C. X I I . 1 4 . 
3. "Sur l a n e c e s s i t e d'oter au c l e r g e l ' e t a t c i v i l des c i t o y e n s " 
O.C. X I I . 1 3 T 1 4 . 
4. I b i d . 13. 
5. Cf. Chronique de P a r i s 18th November 1791 p. 1295; c f . Cahen p. 289. 
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the emigres to r e t u r n to France i f they were given the o p p o r t u n i t y . 1 
He r e a l i s e d a l s o t h a t i f the measures taken a g a i n s t the emigres were 
too s e v e r e , the King's veto would be p e r f e c t l y j u s t i f i e d . 
With the c l e r g y , however, the matter was q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . 
Condorcet was at p a i n s to show that i t c o n s t i t u t e d a f a r more s e r i o u s 
problem. Whereas the emigres could operate i n F r a n c e only at second 
hand and were not a l l h o s t i l e towards the R e v o l u t i o n , the c l e r g y was 
a c t i v e w i t h i n the n a t i o n and was l o y a l by d e f i n i t i o n to an organised 
body w i t h i n the S t a t e whose p h i l o s o p h i c a l b a s i s was such t h a t i t could 
not accept such fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of the D e c l a r a t i o n of R i g h t s 
as freedom of c o n s c i e n c e and freedom of worship. 
T h i s i s the essence of the argument he put forward i n h i s 
Chronique du Mois a r t i c l e d e a l i n g w i t h the decree passed a g a i n s t the 
2 
c l e r g y . He had of course s a i d the same t h i n g b e f o r e 1789, but the 
f a c t t h a t he now f e l t i t n e c e s s a r y to repeat the argument i s 
symtomatic of h i s p o l i c y of showing to the people the a p p a l l i n g n a ture 
of the r o y a l veto. The Assembly's decree a g a i n s t the emigres had 
r u i n e d h i s f i r s t attempt to do t h i s . T h i s time he was determined not 
to f a i l and he gave h i s f u l l support to the decree passed a g a i n s t the 
c l e r g y on 29th November 1791. 
He r e c e i v e d the news of the King's veto w i t h joy f o r he f e l t 
t h a t the people would at l a s t see to what extent the King's powers 
were incompatible w i t h the s p i r i t of the new regime. 
"On s a v a i t d e j a , d'un bout de France a 1'autre, que l e veto^ 
oppose a une l o i temporaire e*tait un v e r i t a b l e veto absolu. On 
commencait a s e n t i r qu'en bornant a i n s i l e corps r e p r e s e n t a t i f a 
f a i r e des l o i s g e n e r a l e s , on changeait l a nature de l a n o u v e l l e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n , on e t a i t insensiblement ramene a l'ancienne c o n s t i t u t i o n 
1. Cf. Opinion s u r l e s emigrants O.C. X.237. 
2. Cf. " R e v i s i o n des travaux de l a premiere l e g i s l a t u r e O.C. X.409-416. 
3. I n i t a l i c s . 
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f r a n c h i s e , ou, c o n s u l t e s seulement s u r l e s impots e t s u r l e s ordonnances 
g e n e r a l e s , l e s e t a t s generaux l a i s s e r a i e n t au r o i une a u t o r i t e absolue 
s u r tout l e r e s t e " . 1 
Condorcet b e l i e v e d t h a t h i s plan had succeeded. A f t e r only a 
month the King had i n d i c a t e d q u i t e c l e a r l y t h a t he had no i n t e n t i o n of 
cooperating w i t h the new Assembly and t h a t he wished to make the new 
c o n s t i t u t i o n unworkable. 
I n the ci r c u m s t a n c e s , Condorcet r e a l i s e d t h a t the time had come 
to change t a c t i c s . I t was no longer p o s s i b l e to c r e a t e the u n i t y of 
purpose which he f e l t would save the R e v o l u t i o n ; one could not expect 
the people to r a l l y round a c o n s t i t u t i o n which they knew was moribund. 
But he had other reasons f o r q u e s t i o n i n g the va l u e of f i d e l i t y 
to the c o n s t i t u t i o n . The decree which the Assembly had passed a g a i n s t 
the c l e r g y i n c l u d e d among i t s measures the p r o v i s i o n t h a t p r i e s t s who 
r e f u s e d to swear an oath of l o y a l t y to the C o n s t i t u t i o n C i v i l e du 
C l e r g e be e x p e l l e d from t h e i r homes. The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r e f f e c t i n g 
t h i s was to f a l l on the a d m i n i s t r a t o r s of each "departement". I t i s 
most s i g n i f i c a n t , however, t h a t the King's d e c i s i o n to r e j e c t the decree 
was i n s p i r e d to a l a r g e extent by an address from the P a r i s " D i r e c t o i r e " . 
T h i s was the f i r s t s i g n of a s p l i t , long f o r e s e e n by Condorcet, between 
the "departement" a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , who were e l e c t e d by the " E l e c t e u r s " , 
and the " d i s t r i c t " a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , who were e l e c t e d by the " c i t o y e n s 
a c t i f s " . 
Looking back on these events two y e a r s l a t e r , Condorcet i n d i c a t e d 
t h a t i t was t h i s episode which r e a l l y brought home to him the f a c t t h a t 
F r a n c e was i n the hands of a movement which threatened to d i s r u p t 
e n t i r e l y what l i t t l e u n i t y s t i l l remained i n the n a t i o n . 
ii ' * 
Un dec r e t r e l a t i f aux t r o u b l e s r e l i g i e u x eut l e meme s o r t ( a s 
the one a g a i n s t the emigres) e t l e r e f u s de s a n c t i o n f u t provoque par 
1. " R e v i s i o n des tr a v a u x " O.C. X.417. 
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/ t v s. 
une a d r e s s e du d i r e c t o i r e de P a r i s . Les deputes commencerent des 
l o r s a s ' a p e r c e v o i r que l e s d i r e c t o i r e s de departements, que l e s 
tribunaux appuyaient a s s e z generalement l a cause du m i n i s t e r e dans 
c e t t e guerre q u ' i l d e c l a r a au pouvoir l e g i s l a t i f , e t q u ' a i n s i i l 
e x i s t a i t d e j a deux c o n s p i r a t i o n s de l a cour c o n t r e l a l i b e r t e : l'une, 
p l u s s e c r e t e , q u i se t r a m a i t par l e s c o n f i d e n t s du r o i avec l e s 
p r i n c e s emigres e t l e s p u i s s a n c e s e t r a n g e r e s ; e t l ' a u t r e , d i r i g e e 
par l a c o a l i t i o n de l'Assemblee c o n s t i t u a n t e , et q u i t e n d a i t a f a i r e 
s e r v i r l a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ' a c c r o i s s e m e n t du pouvoir r o y a l e t a l a 
d e s t r u c t i o n de l a l i b e r t e " . 1 
Condorcet was thus o b l i g e d to f i n d another b a s i s f o r c o n s o l -
i d a t i n g the support of the people f o r the R e v o l u t i o n . His s e a r c h was 
to culminate i n A p r i l 1792 i n the speech he made to the Assembly i n 
favour of F r a n c e ' s d e c l a r a t i o n of war on Bohemia and Hungary. But h i s 
support f o r war r e p r e s e n t s so great an e v o l u t i o n from the s t r o n g l y 
p a c i f i s t i d e a s which he had always h e l d t h a t i t may be e x p l a i n e d only 
i n the l i g h t of h i s r e a c t i o n s to the events which took p l a c e during 
the f i r s t seven months of the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly. 
2. The war q u e s t i o n 
The s t a r t i n g point of Condorcet's e v o l u t i o n towards a l l - o u t 
support f o r war may be found, as we have seen, i n h i s having become con-
vinced by November 1791 of the e x i s t e n c e i n France of f o r c e s which had 
as t h e i r aim the overthrow of the R e v o l u t i o n . Throughout 1792 he 
became i n c r e a s i n g l y convinced of the danger re p r e s e n t e d by these f o r c e s 
and f e l t the need f o r more e n e r g e t i c measures to d e a l w i t h them. 
Only a study of h i s w r i t i n g s , speeches and a c t i v i t i e s between 
November 1791 and A p r i l 1792 may enable us to judge j u s t how much h i s 
e v e n t u a l support f o r war evolved n a t u r a l l y out of h i s r e a c t i o n s to 
events and d i d not r e p r e s e n t a complete break w i t h h i s g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e 
towards the R e v o l u t i o n . 
1. "Fragment de J u s t i f i c a t i o n " O.C. 1.587-588. 
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Condorcet's d e s i r e f o r vigorous a c t i o n was l a r g e l y i n s p i r e d 
by the a c t i v e l y h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e of f o r e i g n powers who, u n t i l 1791, 
had been content to express t h e i r d i s a p p r o v a l of the R e v o l u t i o n i n 
a p a s s i v e manner. The f i r s t s i g n of a change i n t h e i r p o l i c y was 
provided by the d e c l a r a t i o n of P i l l n i t z i n August 1791; i n h i s view 
t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d a f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n of the 1756 T r e a t y 
between F r a n c e and A u s t r i a and he a t t a c k e d i t s e v e r e l y , along w i t h 
the Emperor's other a c t i v i t i e s , i n a speech he made to the Assembly 
on 25th January 1792. 1 
ft t ' ' t ^  
L empereur, q u i a v a i t m e r i t e pendant v i n g t - c i n q ans d e t r e 
p l a c e dans l a l i s t e s i cou r t e des p r i n c e s e c l a i r e s ... nous menace de 
troupes, dont, par une condescendance exageree, nous avons s o u f f e r t 
l a reunion, et q u ' i l ne p o u r r a i t employer co n t r e nous, s i nous 
n'avions pas t r o p legerement compte s u r sa bonne f o i persons-lie. L i e 
avec nous par un t r a i t e u t i l e a s a maison s e u l e ... i l forme c o n t r e 
son a l l i e e des l i g u e s s e c r e t e s ... I I o u b l i e l e t r a i t e de 1756 au 
bout de t r e n t e - s i x ans, precisement a 1 ' i n s t a n t me*me ou, pour l a 
premiere f o i s , c ' e s t a l u i que ce t r a i t e impose des o b l i g a t i o n s " . 2 
I n the same speech he a t t a c k e d the Spaniards who, c o n t r a r y to 
the c o n d i t i o n s of the Pacte de F a m i l l e of 1761, had taken a c t i o n 
a g a i n s t the French. 
"L'Espagne, par l a q u e l l e nous avons arme en 1790, repousse, en 
1791, l e s F r a n c a i s de son s e i n , ou veut l e s f o r c e r d ' a b j u r e r l e u r p a t r i e 
T h i s a c t i o n confirmed the f a c t t h a t the monarchy r e p r e s e n t e d a 
d e f i n i t e t h r e a t t o the R e v o l u t i o n f o r i t made i t c l e a r t h a t the f o r e i g n 
powers had no i n t e n t i o n of r e c o g n i s i n g the new c o n s t i t u t i o n and con-
s i d e r e d t h a t F r a n c e ' s i n t e r e s t was i n e x t r i c a b l y l i n k e d w i t h the 
King's. 
I t i s evident from the speech t h a t Condorcet d i d not c o n s i d e r the 
s l i d e i n t o war as an adventure born out of panic and d e s p e r a t i o n . H i s 
1. "D i s c o u r s s u r l ' o f f i c e de l'Empereur" O.C. X.281-299. 
2. I b i d 284-285. 
3. I b i d 284. 
4. He had a t t a c k e d the Pacte de F a m i l l e i n 1790 p r e c i s e l y f o r t h i s 
r eason of " E x t r a i t du Pacte de F a m i l l e " O.C. X. 35-45. 
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language i s l e g a l i s t i c i n form because he was i n t e n t on showing how 
the a c t i v i t i e s of the f o r e i g n powers c o n s t i t u t e d v i o l a t i o n s of o f f i c i a l 
t r e a t i e s and thus provided France w i t h l e g a l arguments f o r j u s t i f y i n g 
a war. These arguments dominate the d e c l a r a t i o n he had made the 
previous month on the Assembly's b e h a l f . 
"Qui p o u r r a i t regarder encore comme un t e r r i t o i r e ami, o e l u i ou 
i l e x i s t e une arm^e q u i n'attend, pour a t t a q u e r , que l'es p e r a n c e du 
s u c c e s ? E t n ' e s t - c e pas nous a v o i r d e c l a r e l a guerre, que de p r e t e r 
volontairement s e s p l a c e s , non seulement a des ennemis q u i nous 1'-
a u r a i e n t d e c l a r e e , mais a des c o n s p i r a t e u r s q u i l'ont commencee depuis 
longtemps? Tout impose done aux pouvoirs e t a b l i s par l a c o n s t i t u t i o n , 
pour l e maintien de l a paix e t de l a s u r e t e , l a l o i imperieuse 
d'employer l a f o r c e c o n t r e l e s r e b e l l e s q u i , du s e i n d'une t e r r e 
e t r a n g e r e , menacent de d e c h i r e r l a p a t r i e " . 1 
I t i s not c e r t a i n , however, th a t Condorcet would have adopted 
so a g g r e s s i v e an a t t i t u d e towards the f o r e i g n powers had i t not been 
f o r the i n t e r n a l d i s o r d e r s which threatened to destroy the n a t i o n . 
Foremost among the s e d i s o r d e r s were those which stemmed d i r e c t l y 
out of the a p p a l l i n g f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n of the time. Condorcet had 
always maintained t h a t the Re v o l u t i o n would stand or f a l l a c c o r d i n g 
to the s t a t e of the f i n a n c e s . And i t was thus w i t h great alarm t h a t 
he attempted to d e s c r i b e the d r a s t i c s i t u a t i o n i n which they found 
themselves a t the end of 1791. 
"Les a s s i g n a t s de d i v e r s e s v a l e u r s n ' e t a i e n t pas di s t r i b u e ' s dans 
l a p r o p o r t i o n q u ' e x i g e a i e n t l e s b e s o i n s du commerce et'de l a c i r c u l a t i o n . 
On a v a i t l a i s s e * des c a i s s e s p a r t i c u l i e r e s augmenter l a masse du p a p i e r -
monnaie, sans ordre, sans mesure^ sans aucune p r e c a u t i o n pour empecher 
qu'un moment de t e r r e u r n ' a n e a n t i t tout a coup, e n t r e l e s mains du 
peuple, l a s e u l e monnaie qui l u i r e s t a i t pour son usage ... Les impots 
d i r e c t s de l'annee q u i a l l a i t e x p i r e r n ' e t a i e n t pas encore e t a b l i s ... 
I I n ' e x i s t a i t aucun ordre dans l a depense publique ... Le montant de 
l a d e t t e e t a i t ignore; c e l u i des r e s s o u r c e s n ' e t a i t pas mieux connu: 
e ' e s t uniquement s u r c e t t e connaissance ... que s ' e t a b l i t l e c r e d i t 
p u b l i c ; ce c r e d i t n ' e x i s t a i t pas, e t i l e t a i t important de l e c r e e r " . 2 
1. D e c l a r a t i o n de l'Assemblee n a t i o n a l e " 29th December 1791 O.C. 
X.255-256. 
2. " R e v i s i o n des trav a u x de l a premiere l e g i s l a t u r e " O.C. X.385. 
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On 5th December 1791, as had so of t e n happened i n the p a s t , the 
pla n which he put forward f o r the c r e a t i o n of s p e c i a l committees to 
examine methods whereby the s i t u a t i o n could be remedied was r e j e c t e d 
by the Assembly. 1 By March 1792, however, the f i n a n c e s were i n as 
poor a shape as ever. 
Incensed by t h i s , Condorcet made an important speech to the 
Assembly on 12th March urging i t to take s e v e r e measures to reduce the 
2 
amount of " a s s i g n a t s " i n c i r c u l a t i o n . He began by emphasising y e t 
again the danger c r e a t e d by an u n s t a b l e f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n . 
"La s i t u a t i o n de nos f i n a n c e s e s t l e s e u l danger r e e l que nous 
ayons a combattre. S i l e s ennemis du dehors nous menacent, c ' e s t 
q u ' i l s comptent sur ce desordre q u ' i l s exagerent; i l e s t l e s e u l 
fondement des esperances coupables que l e s c o n s p i r a t e u r s conservent 
encore. C ' e s t en l e foqfaentant, en l'augmentant, que j u s q u ' i c i i l s 
ont pu nous n u i r e ; e t , s i on aperc^oit un r e f r o i d i s s e m e n t momentane 
dans quelques ^proportiDns de c i t o y e n s , s i quelques a u t r e s ont pu l a i s s e r 
4 c l a t e r des mecontentements, c ' e s t encore l a q u ' i l f a u t en che r c h e r 
l a cause unique". 3 
Des p i t e t h i s , the Assembly had, i n h i s view, taken no measures 
to put the f i n a n c e s on a s o l i d b a s i s and had been content to use the 
guarantee of the "biens nationaux" to r e l e a s e vast amounts of " a s s i g -
n a t s " . As e a r l y as November 1791 he had shown that the " a s s i g n a t s " 
had no i n t r i n s i c value and were u s e f u l only i n so f a r as they could 
be exchanged s w i f t l y f o r land. However, the s a l e of the lands could 
only be e f f e c t i v e i f done s l o w l y over a long p e r i o d of time. As soon 
as the purchasers r e a l i s e d they c o u l d not exchange t h e i r " a s s i g n a t s " 
f o r land, they would l o s e a l l confidence i n t h e i r v a l u e . Consequently, 
the " a s s i g n a t s " would become u s e l e s s , nobody would want them and the 
4 
economy would be p a r a l y s e d . 
1. Cf. I n s t . Mss. N.S. 21, d o s s i e r A no. 6; Cahen op. c i t . p. 315; 
G o m e l : H i s t o i r e f i n a n c i e r e de l a R e v o l u t i o n pp. 12-13 ( c i t e d 
by Cahen p\ 315). 
2. " D i s c o u r s s u r l e s f i n a n c e s " O.C. X I I . 69-103. 
3. I b i d 71. 
4. Cf. J o u r n a l de P a r i s 6th November 1791. 
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T h i s was p r e c i s e l y the stage which had been reached by March 
1792 - an e x c e s s of paper money and a corresponding l a c k of confidence 
i n i t s value. 
"La masse des b i l l e t s excede l e s besoins de l a c i r c u l a t i o n : 
c e l a e s t prouve e t par l a r a r e t e extreme de 1'argent, e t par 
1'augmentation des p r i x . E x i s t e - t - i l de l a d e f i a n c e ? I I s e r a i t 
d i f f i c i l e de l e n i e r . Ce n'e s t pas, a l a v e r i t e , de c e t t e d e f i a n c e 
du moment present, q u i a n e a n t i t , en quelque s o r t e , tout e f f e t p u b l i c 
q u ' e l l e a frappe\ mais de c e t t e d e f i a n c e q u i se porte s u r un temps 
plu s e l o i g n e , q u i , ... en augmentant l'empressement d'employer (un 
p a p i e r ) avec quelque p r o f i t , en f a i t necessairement b a i s s e r l a v a l e u r " . 1 
Condorcet's pl a n s thus a l l had as t h e i r o b j e c t i v e the removal 
of paper money from g e n e r a l c i r c u l a t i o n and i t s replacement as much as 
p o s s i b l e by hard cash. To t h i s end he d e s c r i b e d a whole s e r i e s of 
measures which a r e summed up a t the end of h i s speech. 
" E t a b l i r des echanges a bureau ouvert; c r e e r des bureaux de 
payements par r e g i s t r e s ; s e p a r e r une masse des biens nationaux d'environ 
deux m i l l i a r d s , d e s t i n e s des ce moment a l a s e u l e e x t i n c t i o n des 
a s s i g n a t s ; en former une a u t r e consacree a un emprunt en metaux; o f f r i r 
au r e s t e de l a d e t t e l i q u i d e e , sur l e s f o r e t s n a t i o n a l e s , s ur l e s 
pr o d u i t s des domaines a l i e n e s , une hypotheque c e r t a i n e e t une assurance 
de remboursement, ou bi e n y employer immediatement l a vente de ces 
f o r e t s ; a c c e l e r e r l a r e n t r e e du produ i t des ventes et diminuer l a 
masse des a s s i g n a t s par 1 ' a l i e n a t i o n des o b l i g a t i o n s c o n t r a c t e e s par 
l e s p a r t i c u l i e r s ; c r e e r une c a i s s e publique pour y p l a c e r l e s epargnes 
des c i t o y e n s pauvres". 2 
There i s no need to examine the arguments w i t h which he j u s t i f i e d 
t hese measures. That they were so numerous i s i n d i c a t i v e of h i s 
f r u s t r a t i o n a t the Assembly's e r r o r s and l e t h a r g y . However, more 
important than t h i s , he was aware t h a t t h e s e measures would be u s e l e s s 
u n l e s s they were backed up by such fundamental a c t s as the payment of 
ta x e s and the drawing up of a coherent l i s t of p r i o r i t i e s f o r 
expenditure. 
/ " L 1 a c c e l e r a t i o n du payement de l'impot peut s e u l e a s s u r e r l a 
r e u s s i t e de quelque op e r a t i o n que ce s o i t ; e t l e v e r i t a b l e moyen d'y 
p a r v e n i r , e s t de b i e n convaincre l e s c i t o y e n s , que, du prompt payement 
des c o n t r i b u t i o n s , depend l e s a l u t p u b l i c ... I I e s t evi d e n t qu'en 
v a i n presenterions-nous un m i l l i a r d , ou meme plu s d'un m i l l i a r d 
1. " D i s c o u r s s u r l e s f i n a n c j f e s " O.C. X I I . 75. 
2. I b i d 102-103. 
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d'excedant e n t r e nos r e s s o u r c e s et l e s b e s o i n s ou l e s d e t t e s , l a 
c o n f i a n c e ne peut r e n a i t r e , s i l'on a pas l a c e r t i t u d e d ' a v o i r , 
dans l e pavement des i m p o s i t i o n s , un moyen annuel de s u b v e n i r aux 
depenses". 1 
Hence the n e c e s s i t y f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g p r e c i s e p r i o r i t i e s of 
expenditure. 
"La f i x a t i o n des depenses d o i t e t r e comptee a l a f o i s , e t parmi 
l e s moyens d ' a s s u r e r l e payement de l'impot, et parmi ceux de r e l e v e r 
l e c r e d i t . Dans une c o n s t i t u t i o n l i b r e , l e s deux s e c r e t s l e s p l u s 
s u r s pour f a i r e payer l e s c o n t r i b u t i o n s , sont de prouver aux i n d i v i d u s 
que l e s taxes sont r e p a r t i e s avec une e x a c t e e t i m p a r t i a l e e g a l i t e ; 
au peuple, que l e produit des t a x e s e s t employe d'une maniere u t i l e 
pour l u i " . 2 
The payment of taxes was, t h e r e f o r e , a t r u l y p a t r i o t i c a c t . I t 
was the only way the economy could s u r v i v e and i t was on the s u r v i v a l 
of the economy th a t the f a t e of the R e v o l u t i o n depended. 
However, the r e i s a s i g n i f i c a n t development i n Condorcet's i d e a s 
i n t h i s speech which i n d i c a t e s a hardening of h i s a t t i t u d e towards the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e system which the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly had e s t a b l i s h e d . 
T h i s e v o l u t i o n i s seen i n the f a c t t h a t he made no mention of the 
"departement" a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , d e s p i t e the important r o l e which these 
had to play i n the c o l l e c t i o n of t a x e s . I n s t e a d , he appealed d i r e c t l y 
to the popular s o c i e t i e s whom he f e l t alone had the n e c e s s a r y i n f l u e n c e 
to g a l v a n i s e the masses i n t o supporting the regime. 
"C'est dans l a f o r c e de 1 ' e s p r i t p u b l i c q u ' i l f a u t p l a c e r nos 
p l u s fermes esperances. Que l e s s o c i e t e s p o p u l a i r e s , b i e n convaincues 
de l a l i a i s o n intime e t n e c e s s a i r e du payement des c o n t r i b u t i o n s e t 
du maintien de l a l i b e r t e , continuent de f a i r e a l e u r s membres un 
d e v o i r d ' a c q u i t t e r regulierement l e u r s impots; q u ' e l l e s donnent c e t 
exemple a t o u t e s l e s reunions d'hommes, v o l o n t a i r e s ou l e g a l e s ; 
q u ' e l l e s e x c i t e n t , q u ' e l l e s recompensent par l e u r estime l e s travaux 
de d e t a i l e n t r e p r i s dans l e s d i v e r s e s p a r t i e s du royaume, pour 
f a c i l i t e r l a composition des r o l e s , pour a i d e r l e s m u n i c i p a l i t e s dans 
l e u r s travaux". 3 
S i m i l a r l y , he c a l l e d f o r the c r e a t i o n of a body of men, drawn 
from among the most trustworthy members of the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly who 




I b i d 97. 
I b i d 97. 
"Discours s u r l e s f i n a n c e s " O.C. X I I . 96. 
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i n t r a v e l l i n g around the country i n order to s u p e r v i s e the f i n a n c i a l 
t r a n s a c t i o n s which were t a k i n g p l a c e and to help s o l v e any d i f f i c u l t i e s 
ensuing from the r e f o r m s . 1 
T h i s r e v o l u t i o n a r y measure re p r e s e n t e d y e t another attempt to 
bypass the a u t h o r i t y of the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e system e s t a b l i s h e d by the 
C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly and i t leads us to examine what was probably the 
main cause of Condorcet's e v o l u t i o n towards support f o r war, h i s 
growing l a c k of confidence i n the c a b i n e t . 
The r i f t which we have a l r e a d y noted between the popular 
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s and "departement" a d m i n i s t r a t o r s continued to widen i n 
the e a r l y months of 1792. As A l f r e d Cobban has noted: 
"By the summer of 1790 the departmental d i r e c t o r i e s had managed 
to a s s e r t t h e i r a u t h o r i t y up to a poi n t , and from then u n t i l August 
1792 t h e i r s was the stronge r i n f l u e n c e i n the country ... However the 
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s ... had not accepted the c o n t r o l of the 'd^partements' 
p a s s i v e l y . By the end of 1791 ... they were i n a s t a t e of almost open 
r e v o l t a g a i n s t the d i r e c t o r i e s . During the f i r s t h a l f of 1792 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y communes were being s e t up i n many d i s t r i c t s i n open 
d e f i a n c e of the l e g a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d a u t h o r i t i e s " . 2 
When we bear t h i s i n mind we may a p p r e c i a t e j u s t how extreme a 
p o s i t i o n Condorcet had reached i n 1792. An appeal to the p a t r i o t i s m 
of the popular s o c i e t i e s and m u n i c i p a l i t i e s i n March 1792 was t a n t a -
mount to a d i r e c t q u e s t i o n i n g of the v a l i d i t y of the departmental 
a u t h o r i t i e s s e t up by the c o n s t i t u t i o n which he had sworn to support 
only s i x months before. 
So great was the r o l e granted to the departmental d i r e c t o r i e s i n 
such matters as the c o l l e c t i o n of t a x e s t h a t t h e i r f a i l u r e to a c t could 
only be met by e q u a l l y d r a s t i c measures. However, i t seems u n l i k e l y 
that Condorcet would have r e a c t e d so s t r o n g l y u n l e s s he had l o s t a l l 
1. I b i d 95. 
2. Cobban op,, c i t . Ch. 6 " L o c a l government during the French R e v o l u t i o n " 
Op. c i t . p. 123. 
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f a i t h i n the pople who c o n t r o l l e d the departmental a u t h o r i t i e s them-
s e l v e s , namely the m i n i s t e r s . 1 
His main grie v a n c e a g a i n s t them was t h e i r r e f u s a l to provide 
the Assembly w i t h v i t a l i nformation, notably on f i n a n c i a l m a t t e r s , 
2 
thereby d i r e c t l y v i o l a t i n g one of the a r t i c l e s of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
He had made t h i s point to the Assembly as e a r l y as 29th December 
1791 a f t e r a j o i n t meeting of i t s m i l i t a r y , d i p l o m a t i c and f i n a n c i a l 
committees. 
La c o n s t i t u t i o n o b l i g e l e s m i n i s t r e s a p r e s e n t e r , au commence-
ment de chaque s e s s i o n , l'aperc^u des depenses de l e u r departement pour 
l'annee s u i v a n t e . C e t t e annee va commencer, et h i e r encore un s e u l 
m i n i s t r e a v a i t obei a l a c o n s t i t u t i o n ; deux seulement y ont obei 
/ X / / 
aujourd h u i , et^vous s e r e z f o r c e s , par ce retardement, a d e c r e t e r une 
p a r t i e de s e s depen&es sous une forme q u i ne s e r a point c e l l e qu'une 
l o i a n t e r i e u r e a v a i t e t a b l i e . Les m i n i s t r e s doivent, d'apres l a l o i , 
l e compte de l'emploi des sommes q u i l e u r ont e t e c o n f i e e s 
aucun de ceux q u i ont d i s p a r u du c o n s e i l n'a s a t i s f a i t encore a c e t t e 
o b l i g a t i o n s a c r e e " . 3 
The w i t h h o l d i n g of information, although most important i n r e l a t i o n 
to f i n a n c i a l q u e s t i o n s , extended t o s e v e r a l other v i t a l m atters. 
"Dans p l u s i e u r s o c c a s i o n s importantes, dans l e s d i s c u s s i o n s , s u r 
l e s emigres, ou sur l e s t r o u b l e s r e l i g i e u x , dans c e l l e s ou i l a u r a i t 
e t e n e c e s s a i r e de c o n n a i t r e l ' e t a t a c t u e l de nos r e l a t i o n s e x t e r i e u r s , 
l a v e r i t a b l e s i t u a t i o n des c o n j u r e s , l e s m i n i s t r e s ont t r o p n e g l i g e 
de donner, s o i t a vous, s o i t a vos comites, l e s l u n i e r e s q u ' i l s l e u r 
d oivent". 4 
T h i s l a c k of confidence i n the m i n i s t e r s was the d i r e c t cause of 
the hardening of h i s a t t i t u d e on a l l the important i s s u e s of the time. 
Thus, i n January 1792, he r e j e c t e d the moderate s t a n c e which he had 
taken on the emigre q u e s t i o n only a few months e a r l i e r . 
t i / 
"On a v a i t propose de commencer par e x i g e r (des emigres) une 
d e c l a r a t i o n pour un terme f i x e , e t de regarder comme ennemis ceux q u i 
r e f u s e r a i e n t de l a donner. 5 L'experience a prouve' depuis, que, pour 
1. Cf. " J u s t i f i c a t i o n " . "La F rance s e r a t r a n q u i l l e quand l e r o i e t 
l e s m i n i s t e r s l e voudront" O.C. 1/586. 
2. Cf. " C o n s t i t u t i o n de 1791" T i t r e I I I , Ch. I I , S e c t i o n IV, A r t . V I I . 
3. "Opinion s u r l e rapport des comites, e t c . " O.C. X/249. 
4. I b i d 249. 
5. A r e f e r e n c e to the l e g i s l a t i o n of October 1791; c f . above p. 191. 
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l e s grandes assemblees, l a marche l a p l u s r e g u l i e r e e s t t o u j o u r s l a 
p l u s r a p i d e ; e t s i l e s m i n i s t r e s a v a i e n t i n s t r u i t l e corps l e g i s l a t i f 
de l a s i t u a t i o n publiquement h o s t i l e des emigres, e t de l ' e c l a t de l e u r s 
demarches, i l a u r a i t vu que ce moment des d e c l a r a t i o n s h y p o c r i t e s 
e t a i t passe". 1 
I n the w i n t e r of 1792 he made renewed e f f o r t s to remove the c a b i n e t 
from c o n t r o l of f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s , g i v i n g h i s reasons f o r t h i s i n an 
important speech to the Assembly on 3rd February. 
"Le ( s e u l ) moyen ... de p r e v e n i r ce desordre des f i n a n c i e s 
d ' a s s i g n e r des bornes au pouvoir de corrompre ... c ' e s t de s e p a r e r 
absolument du pouvoir e x e c u t i f 1 ' a d m i n i s t r a t i o n du t r e s o r p u b l i c ; 
c ' e s t de l a s o u s t r a i r e entierement a son a u t o r i t e " . 2 
However, i n the absence of any method f o r changing the con-
s t i t u t i o n , t h e r e was no way i n which t h i s c ould be done. Condorcet 
approached t h i s d e l i c a t e problem by attempting to show t h a t the 
C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly had d e s i r e d i t s reforms i n t h i s f i e l d to be 
temporary and had d e l i b e r a t e l y l e f t the way open f o r l a t e r changes 
which could be made q u i t e l e g i t i m a t e l y w i t h i n the framework of the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
He proved t h a t these reforms were only meant to be p r o v i s i o n a l 
by mentioning the f a c t t h a t the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly had i n t e n t i o ' n a l l y 
omitted to i n c l u d e the appointments to the " t r e s o r e r i e n a t i o n a l e " 
among the l i s t of posts to which the King d i d have the r i g h t of 
appointment. L a t e r , by way of compromise, the Assembly had permitted 
the King to appoint whc+ihe wished to these posts, a d e c i s i o n which was 
confirmed when the. c o n s t i t u t i o n was r e v i s e d a f t e r the King's r e t u r n . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , however, the members of the " t r e s o r e r i e " were gi v e n the 
t i t l e of "commissaires de l a n a t i o n " i n c o n t r a s t to the other appointed 
members who were c a l l e d "commissaires du r o i " . I n Condor.cet's view, 
t h i s confirmed the p r o v i s i o n a l nature of the d e c i s i o n and l e f t the way 
1. " R e v i s i o n des travaux de l a premiere l e g i s l a t u r e " O.C. X.403. 
2. " D i s c o u r s s u r l a nomination et l a d e s t i t u t i o n des commissaires de 
l a t r e s o r e r i e n a t i o n a l e et des membres du bureau de c o m p t a b i l i t e " 
O.C. X I I . 56. 
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open f o r a change whenever the Assembly df c s i r e d . ^ 
The a c t u a l reforms which he now suggested r e p r e s e n t an e v o l u t i o n 
i n h i s i d e a s which may be t r a c e d d i r e c t l y to h i s d i s t r u s t of the 
departmental a s s e m b l i e s and to h i s d e s i r e to i n v o l v e the people much 
more i n the running of the country. I n h i s two e a r l i e r works on the 
2 ' s u b j e c t he had c a l l e d f o r the " t r e s o r e r i e " a d m i n i s t r a t o r s to be 
e l e c t e d e i t h e r by the Assembly or by the departmental a s s e m b l i e s . He 
now suggested t h a t t h i s be done by a group of E l e c t e u r s r e p r e s e n t i n g 
a l l the "departements". They would be e l e c t e d a t each l e g i s l a t i v e 
e l e c t i o n and would meet as a "corps e l e c t o r a l " i n P a r i s whenever 
they were summoned by the Assembly. U n t i l the next g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n 
they were, to be appointed by the Assembly, but t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s 
3 
would only l a s t one year. 
I n the remainder of the speech he concentrated on the q u e s t i o n 
of d i s m i s s a l , a matter which he had only mentioned i n p a s s i n g i n the 
e a r l i e r works. However, he added l i t t l e to what he had a l r e a d y s a i d 
then. Where i n the f i r s t work he had o u t l i n e d a system whereby none 
of the f i n a n c e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s could hold o f f i c e f o r more than two 
y e a r s , he now e l a b o r a t e d a l i t t l e on the i d e a , s u g g e s t i n g more p r e c i s e l y 
t h a t the Assembly alone would have the r i g h t of d i s m i s s a l and would 
meet at the beginning of each l e g i s l a t u r e to decide what course of 
4 
a c t i o n to t a k e w i t h regard to the a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . 
I n other words, the emphasis t h i s time was on c o n t i n u i t y , an 
obvious consequence of Condorcet's growing b e l i e f i n the value of 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a b i l i t y a t a time of great s o c i a l upheaval. The new 
1. " D i s c o u r s s u r l a nomination, e t c . " O.C. XI I . 5 7 - 5 8 . 
2. "Des l o i s c o n s t i t u t i o n n e l l e s s u r 1 ' a d m i n i s t r a t i o n des f i n a n c e s " 
O.C. X.105 e t sq.; "Sur l a c o n s t i t u t i o n d'un pouvoir charge 
d ' a d m i n i s t r e r l a t r e s o r e r i e n a t i o n a l e " O.C. XI. 541 e t sq. 
3. " D i s c o u r s s u r l a nomination, e t c . " O.C. X I I . 61-62. 
4. I b i d 65. 
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scheme was an improvement on the f i r s t p r e c i s e l y because i t allowed 
a b l e men to occupy t h e i r posts without the f e a r of an immediate 
t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e i r f u n c t i o n s every two y e a r s ; a t the same time, i t 
enabled the Assembly to d i s m i s s , every two y e a r s , those whom i t 
con s i d e r e d u n d e s i r a b l e . 
The p r i n c i p l e of c o n t i n u i t y i s found a l s o i n the p r o v i s i o n t h a t 
the Assembly could not d i s m i s s an a d m i n i s t r a t o r w h i l e a l e g i s l a t u r e 
was i n p r o c e s s . Not only would t h i s l eave the way open to i n t r i g u e s , 
i t would a l s o l e a d to an embarrassing c o n f u s i o n w i t h the terms of the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n where the only way a "commissaire" could be removed was 
i f i t could be proved t h a t he had committed a crime."'' No such con-
f u s i o n was p o s s i b l e i f the d i s m i s s a l took p l a c e a t r e g u l a r i n t e r v a l s 
v i a machinery l a i d down s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r t h a t purpose. 
The brunt of Condorcet's c r i t i c i s m s of the e x e c u t i v e f e l l on the 
F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r de L e s s a r t . He a t t a c k e d the l a t t e r r e p e a t e d l y i n h i s 
a r t i c l e s i n the Chronique du Mois, a c c u s i n g him notably of w i t h h o l d i n g 
v i t a l i n formation on such important i s s u e s as the a t t i t u d e the Emperor 
would adopt i f F r a n c e were to use f o r c e a g a i n s t the army assembled i n 
Koblenz. 
"La non-communication d'une note du 7 j a n v i e r , q u i eut e c l a i r e 
s u r l e s i n t e n t i o n s du c a b i n e t de Vienne, l a negl i g e n c e a i n s t r u i r e l e 
comite de l'assemblee des n o u v e l l e s i n t r i g u e s tramees par ce meme 
ca b i n e t ... tout annoncait dans l e m i n i s t r e , ou l ' i n c a p a c i t e ou l a 
p e r f i d i e " . 2 
He a l s o accused de L e s s a r t of n e g l e c t i n g to take elementary s t e p s 
i n the defence of Fra n c e . 
"Le m i n i s t r e , par son o b s t i n a t i o n a m a i n t e n i r l e t r a i t e f a i t en 
1748 3 avec l a maison d'Autriche, par sa negligence a former une a l l i a n c e 
avec l a Pr u s s e , dans un moment ou e l l e e t a i t presque en e t a t de guerre 




I b i d 63-64. 
" R e v i s i o n des travaux, e t c . " O.C. X.427. 
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n e g o c i a t i o n s un systeme c o n t r a i r e aux i n t e r e t s du peuple, mais 
f a v o r a b l e aux i n t e r e t s p r i v e s de l a f a m i l i e r o y a l e " . 1 
I t i s Qnly when we bear a l l t h i s i n mind t h a t we may e x p l a i n 
the e n t h u s i a s t i c support which he gave to the nomination to the post 
of War M i n i s t e r of the r o y a l i s t Comte de Narbonne on 9th December 
1791. Although w r i t t e n some time a f t e r the events to which i t r e f e r s , 
the "Fragment de J u s t i f i c a t i o n " seems to i n d i c a t e t h a t , at t h i s s tage, 
Condorcet was s t i l l keen on f i n d i n g a s o l u t i o n to F r a n c e ' s dilemma 
o u t s i d e war and he f i r m l y b e l i e v e d t h a t Narbonne was the k i n d of man 
who could a c h i e v e t h i s . 
" J e ^ c a u s a i avec l u i , e t i l me parut a v o i r des i d e e s a s s e z j u s t e s 
s u r l e s v e r i t a b l e s i n t e r e t s du r o i , q u i d e v a i t c h e r c h e r a regagner l a 
c o n f i a n c e du peuple et a gouverner conformement au voeu de l a m a j o r i t e 
de l'assemblee ... Son p r o j e t p r i n c i p a l e t a i t de d i s p e r s e r l e s emigres 
e t de d e t r u i r e par l a un des p r i n c i p a u x s u j e t s de d e f i a n c e envers l e 
m i n i s t r e s " . 2 
The f a i l u r e of t h i s p r o j e c t and Narbonne's d i s m i s s a l a t the end 
of January 1792 confirmed him i n h i s b e l i e f t h a t the c a b i n e t was i n 
/ / 3 
d i r e c t c o l l u s i o n w i t h the emigres and paved the way f o r h i s i n c r e a s -
i n g l y a g g r e s s i v e a t t i t u d e towards the m i n i s t r y i n 1792, c u l m i n a t i n g 
i n h i s a c t i v e support f o r the Assembly's formal " d e c r e t d ' a c c u s a t i o n " 
a g a i n s t B e r t r a n d de M o l l e v i l l e i n February and the s t e p s he h i m s e l f 
took to propose another such decree a g a i n s t the m i n i s t e r Duport-
D e r t e t r e i n March. The r e j e c t i o n of these decrees removed y e t another 
b a r r i e r i n the way of h i s e v o l u t i o n towards war. 
However, any a n a l y s i s of the hardening of Condorcet's p o s i t i o n 
i n 1792 would be incomplete u n l e s s we a t t e p t to answer one q u e s t i o n : 
was he s i n c e r e i n c a l l i n g f o r war? Did he r e a l l y b e l i e v e t h i s - w a s the 
only s o l u t i o n , or d i d he speak of war only as a t h r e a t d e s t i n e d to 




"Fragment de J u s t i f i c a t i o n " I . 590. 
I b i d 588, 589. 
I b i d 589. 
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I t i s d i f f i c u l t to imagine t h a t Condorcet was unaware of the 
f a c t t h a t the King h i m s e l f was i n favour of war. A l b e r t Soboul has 
shown how many of h i s i n t r i g u e s of the time were aimed at e x a c e r b a t i n g 
F r a n c e ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the other powers. On 14th December 1791, f o r 
example, L o u i s XVI sent an o f f i c i a l ultimatum to the E l e c t o r of T r i e r , 
t h r e a t e n i n g to d e c l a r e war on him of he took no s t e p s to e x p e l the 
emigres who had gathered t h e r e . On the same day he sent the E l e c t o r a 
s e c r e t l e t t e r u rging him to r e j e c t the ultimatum. 
" E t ce meme 14 Decembre, Marie A n t o i n e t t e a son ami F e r s e n : 
'Les imbeciles.' l i s ne voien t pas que c ' e s t nous s e r v i r ' . La Cour 
p r e c i p i t a l a France dans l a guerre, dans l e s e c r e t e s p o i r q u ' e l l e 
t o u r n e r a i t mal et que l a d e f a i t e p e r m e t t r a i t de r e s t a u r e r l e pouvoir 
absolu". 1 
I t i s of course f a r - f e t c h e d to suppose t h a t Condorcet was 
informed of a l l the King's s e c r e t a c t i v i t i e s ; however, h i s anger at 
Narbonne's d i s m i s s a l i n d i c a t e s t h a t he r e a l i s e d something was afoot. 
The very f a c t t h a t the King h i m s e l f now d e s i r e d war a f t e r having given 
examples of h i s bad f a i t h so o f t e n i n the past must i t s e l f have appeared 
extremely s u s p i c i o u s . That o t h e r s were aware of the danger i s r e v e a l e d 
by R o b e s p i e r r e ' s speech of 2nd January 1792 c a l l i n g f o r the sup p o r t e r s 
of the R e v o l u t i o n to seek the source of e v i l a t home r a t h e r than beyond 
the f r o n t i e r s . T h i s source was not only to be found i n Koblenz. 
" I I n 'est done pas a P a r i s ? I I n'y a done aucune r e l a t i o n e n t r e 
Coblence e t un a u t r e l i e u q ui n'e s t pas l o i n de nous? ... Commencez 
par ramener vos regards s u r votre p o s i t i o n i n t e r i e u r e ; remettez l ' o r d r e 
chez vous avant de p o r t e r l a l i b e r t e a i l l e u r s " . 
And he went on to l i s t the weaknesses which were r i f e i n F r a n c e ' s 
m i l i t a r y o r g a n i s a t i o n : a l l the o f f i c e r s had emigrated and had not been 
r e p l a c e d by q u a l i f i e d men, the troops l a c k e d arms and equipment, morale 
was low, and so on.^ 
Condorcet must have been aware of t h i s s i t u a t i o n f o r i t was he who 
d e s c r i b e d i t some weeks l a t e r ( 1 6 t h February) to the French people i n a 
1. Soboul op. c i t . pp. 277-278. 
2. I b i d p. 281. 
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speech made on the Assembly's b e h a l f . 
" ( L e s ) o f f i c i e r s , q u i ... g r o s s i s s a i e n t l'armee des r e b e l l e s , 
n ' e t a i e n t pas remplaces ... I I f a l l a i t r e p a r e r l e s dangers de c e t t e 
n e g l i g e n c e du d e r n i e r m i n i s t r e de l a guerre, examiner l a s i t u a t i o n de 
l'armee, c h e r c h e r par q u e l i e s l o i s on d e v a i t ... completer son 
o r g a n i s a t i o n ... La marine e s t une p a r t i e e s s e n t i e l l e de l a f o r c e 
publique, e t une l e t t r e du r o i , a d r e s s e e aux commandsfcants, a v a i t a p p r i s 
que l ' e m i g r a t i o n des o f f i c i e r s y f a i s a i t des progi-es funestei'. 1 
T h i s reads l i k e a catalogue of weaknesses which needed to be 
remedied. Although Condorcet wished to show t h a t the Assembly was 
doing a l l i t could to r e c t i f y the s i t u a t i o n , he showed a l s o j u s t how 
unprepared f o r war F r a n c e was i n the opening months of 1792. 
T h i s i n t u r n would seem to suggest t h a t h i s speeches i n favour 
of war were merely a facade aimed a t c o n c e a l i n g F r a n c e ' s weakness 
beneath a cloak of q u i e t s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e . I t i s when we bear t h i s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n mind th a t we may best a p p r e c i a t e the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of the speech on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s which he made to the Assembly on 
2 
25th January 1792, the "Discours s u r 1 ' o f f i c e de l'empereur". 
I t was a f i n e attempt to persuade F r a n c e ' s p o t e n t i a l enemies to 
c o n s i d e r whether i t would p r o f i t them g r e a t l y to e n t e r i n t o a war w i t h 
her. He argued notably that i t was not i n the i n t e r e s t of c o u n t r i e s 
which a l r e a d y had f a i r l y developed n o t i o n s of what c o n s t i t u t e d con-
s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s to d e c l a r e war on a n a t i o n which, f o r the f i r s t 
time, was attempting to put these r i g h t s i n t o p r a c t i c e . Nor was i t 
i n the i n t e r e s t of p r i n c e s and kings to take the r i s k of a l l o w i n g t h e i r 
s o l d i e r s to become "contaminated" by the new i d e a s which they could 
3 
p i c k up from t h e i r c o n t a c t s w i t h the French. 
I n h i s view, t h e r e f o r e , a country such as England, which acknow-
ledged the e x i s t e n c e of human r i g h t s , should be w i l l i n g t o bury i t s 
1. "L'assemblee n a t i o n a l e aux F r a n c a i s " O.C. X.338. 
2. O.C. 281-299. 
3. " D i s c o u r s s u r 1 ' o f f i c e de l'Empereur" O.C. X.286-289. 
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d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h F r a n c e i n the cause of freedom. Although he 
admitted t h a t the economic i n t e r e s t s of the two n a t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e d 
a p o t e n t i a l source of c o n f l i c t , he claimed t h a t the globe was b i g 
enough f o r the e n t e r p r i s e s of each to develop without c l a s h i n g . ^  
I f F r ance stayed c l e a r of the Netherlands, f o r example, she would 
r i s k nothing from England. 
Other a l l i e s would be found i n Poland, whose reforms could only 
be p r o t e c t e d by an a l l i a n c e w i t h a n a t i o n undergoing a s i m i l a r 
e v o l u t i o n , and i n P r u s s i a , whose i n t e r e s t s were threatened more by 
A u s t r i a than by France. S a r d i n i a and S w i t z e r l a n d a l s o t h r e a t e n e d the 
2 
i n t e r e s t s of A u s t r i a and were thus p o t e n t i a l a l l i e s . 
I f Condorcet's i n t e n t i o n i n making t h i s speech was to b o l s t e r 
up the morale of the Assembly, he was c e r t a i n l y s u c c e s s f u l . I t was 
t r a n s l a t e d i n t o E n g l i s h , German and Spanish and was sent to a l l the 
p r o v i n c e s of F r a n c e , t o the King h i m s e l f and to the c o u r t s of Europe. 
I t was even put i n t o v e r s e by a c i t i z e n of Caudebec and was d i r e c t l y 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r Condorcet's e l e c t i o n to the Presidency of the Assembly 
i n February and to the d i p l o m a t i c committee i n March. 
I n f a c t , as Leon Cahen, otherwise a staunch supporter of 
Condorcet, has pointed out, the speech's content i s hollow. Was i t 
p o s s i b l e to b e l i e v e t h a t Poland, crushed under the h e e l of R u s s i a , 
P r u s s i a and A u s t r i a , could be an e f f e c t i v e a l l y of F r a n c e , or t h a t 
England would f o r g e t F r a n c e ' s a i d to the Americans during the War of 
Independence, as w e l l as her c o l o n i a l r i v a l r y , out of r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
i d e a l i s m ? Was i t obvious t h a t the r i v a l r y which opposed the Hapsburgs 
to the Hohenzollerns was so s t r o n g as to d e s t r o y a l l hopes of c o l -
l a b o r a t i o n between P r u s s i a and A u s t r i a , or t h a t P r u s s i a ' s i n t e r e s t s 
1. I b i d 290-291. 
2. I b i d 292-295. 
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would best be served by a t t a c k i n g A u s t r i a r a t h e r than F r a n c e ? 
The e n t i r e speech i s based on r a t h e r w i l d w i s h - f u l f i l m e n t and 
bold s u p p o s i t i o n s . However, i t does have meaning when seen, not as 
a r e a l i s t i c a n a l y s i s of the d i p l o m a t i c s i t u a t i o n , but as a p i e c e of 
propaganda d e s t i n e d to make the h o s t i l e powers t h i n k a g a i n before 
launching a f u l l - s c a l e war a g a i n s t France. 
T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c e r t a i n l y seems to be corroborated by the 
d e c l a r a t i o n which Condorcet agreed to make on the Assembly's b e h a l f 
i n A p r i l 1792 j u s t i f y i n g F r a n c e ' s d e c l a r a t i o n of war on the King of 
Hungary. 1 The theme of the speech was th a t the d e c l a r a t i o n was a 
nec e s s a r y e v i l and was a b s o l u t e l y i n e v i t a b l e i f Fr a n c e were not to 
lea v e h e r s e l f wide open to the a s s a u l t s of her enemies. T h i s i d e a of 
n e c e s s i t y and i n e v i t a b i l i t y o ccurs a g a i n and again. 
"Forcee de c o n s e n t i r a l a guerre, par l a p l u s imperieuse 
n e c e s s i t e , 1'assemblee n a t i o n a l e n'ignore pas qu'on l ' a c c u s e r a de 
1'avoir volontairement a c c e l e r e e ou provoqu^e". 2 
"Une l i g u e a e t e formee c o n t r a (1')independance (de l a F r a n c e ) , 
e t e l l e n'a eu que l e c hoix d ' e c l a i r e r s e s ennemis s u r l a j u s t i c e 
de s a cause, ou de l e u r opposer l a f o r c e des armes". 3 
E l l e a continue de v o u l o i r l a paix, mais e l l e d e v a i t p r e f e r e r 
l a guerre a une p a t i e n c e dangereuse pour s a l i b e r t e " . 4 
As Condorcet was here speaking i n h i s o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y , i t 
could be suggested t h a t he was not v o i c i n g h i s own opinion. However, 
the same theme oc c u r s i n the newspaper a r t i c l e s which he wrote at the 
time. 
"Le r o i proposa l a guerre, e t 1'assemblee n a t i o n a l e l ' a c c e p t a . 
I I e t a i t i m p o s s i b l e de prendre une a u t r e r e s o l u t i o n . L i n t e n t i o n 
avouee de proteger en France l e p a r t i des ennemis de 1'assemblee 
n a t i o n a l e , de 1'employer a changer ce q u i , dans l a c o n s t i t u t i o n , 
4*tait c o n t r a i r e aux i n t e r e t s de l a maison d'Autriche s e s i n t r i g u e s 
publiques c o n t r e l a Fr a n c e ... ne permettaient p l u s de ne pas v o i r , 
1. P r o j e t d une e x p o s i t i o n des m o t i f s q u i ont determine 1 assemblee 
n a t i o n a l e a d e c r e t e r , s u r l a p r o p o s i t i o n f o r m e l l e du r o i , q u ' i l 
y a l i e u a d e c l a r e r l a guerre au r o i de Boheme e t de Hongrie". 
O.C. X.443-455. 
2. I b i d 445. 
3. I b i d 446. 
4. I b i d 449. 
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dans son chef, u n ennemi acharne de l a l i b e r t e f r a n c h i s e . I I e t a i t 
e v i d e n t que, s ' i l ne d ^ c l a r a i t pas l a guerre, c ' e s t q u ' i l n ' a v a i t 
pas eu l e temps d'achever s e s p r e p a r a t i f s , de mettre en'mouvement 
l e s troupes de s e s a l l i e s ... Devions-nous done l a i s s e r n o t r e ennemi 
c h o i s i r l e moment ou i l l u i s e r a i t l e p l u s avantageux de nous a t t a q u e r ; 
e t , pour s o u t e n i r une t e l l e opinion, ne f a u d r a i t - i l pas ou 1 ' i m b e c i l l i t e 
l a p l u s complete, ou l a p l u s n o i r e p e r f i d i e ? " 1 
I t would seem c l e a r from t h i s t h a t Condorcet, f a r from being a 
war-monger, would have p r e f e r r e d peace. He was aware of F r a n c e ' s 
i n t e r n a l weaknesses and of the very r e a l r i s k of d e f e a t . His a t t i t u d e 
towards war thus seems to have been more one of weary r e s i g n a t i o n to 
the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of a c o n f l i c t r a t h e r than a p o s i t i v e eagerness f o r 
f i g h t i n g to commence. At any r a t e , t h i s was c e r t a i n l y the i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n which he h i m s e l f gave i n h i s r e t r o s p e c t i v e account. 
"Je ne d e s i r a i s p a s ^ l a guerre ...; j ' a u r a i s voulu pouvoir f 
l ' e v i t e r . Mais i l e t a i t e vident que l e r o i de Hongrie ne l a d i f f e r a i t 
que pour se donner l e temps de f a i r e s e s p r e p a r a t i f s " . 2 
A g a i n s t a l l t h i s , however, i t i s p o s s i b l e to put forward a c a s e 
showing t h a t Condorcet's a t t i t u d e towards war was not n e g a t i v e at a l l 
and t h a t he saw q u i t e c l e a r l y t h a t , d e s p i t e the r i s k s i n v o l v e d , war 
could provide F r a n c e w i t h p o s i t i v e advantages which could u l t i m a t e l y , 
not only p r o t e c t the R e v o l u t i o n from i t s i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l enemies, 
but could i n f u s e i t w i t h new l i f e and vigour. So extreme an event as 
war would f o r c e the enemies of F r a n c e i n t o the open. T h i s i n t u r n would 
enable the l o y a l c i t i z e n s to see where t h e i r i n t e r e s t s l a y and to 
u n i t e i n t h e i r defence. 
Here h i s views c o i n c i d e d w i t h those of the G i r o n d i n s who had long 
argued the n e c e s s i t y f o r war p r e c i s e l y f o r these reasons. On 16th 
December 1791 B r i s s o t had addressed the J a c o b i n s i n t h e s e words: 
Un peuple q u i a conquis s a l i b e r t e apres d i x s i e c l e s d e s c l a v a g e 
a besoin de l a guerre: i l faut l a guerre pour l a c o n s o l i d e r " . 3 
1. " R e v i s i o n des travaux de l a 
2. "Fragment de j u s t i f i c a t i o n " 
3. C f . Soboul op. c i t . p. 278. 
x / 
premiere l e g i s l a t u r e " O.C. X. 430. 
O.C. I . 591. 
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A f o r t n i g h t l a t e r he had ret u r n e d to t h i s theme, but t h i s time 
i n the Assembly: 
"La guerre e s t actuellement un b i e n f a i t n a t i o n a l ; e t l a s e u l e 
c a l a m i t e q u ' i l a i t a redouter, c ' e s t de n ' a v o i r pas l a guerre ... 
C'e s t l ' i n t e r e t s e u l de l a n a t i o n q u i c o n s e i l l e l a guerre". 1 
I n a speech to the Assembly on 5th January 1792, another 
G i r o n d i n , I s n a r d , had s t a t e d e x p l i c i t e l y t h a t a war would save the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n by h i g h l i g h t i n g the t r e a c h e r y of those whose i n t e r e s t s 
were most threatened by i t . 
"La c l a s s e l a p l u s dangereuse de t o u t e s se compose de beaucoup 
de personnes q u i perdent l a r e v o l u t i o n , mais p l u s e s s e n t i e l l e m e n t 
d'une i n f i n i t e de gros p r o p r i e t a i r e s , de r i c h e s n e g o c i a n t s , e n f i n 
d'une f o u l e d'hommes opulents e t o r g u e i l l e u x q u i ne peuvent supporter 
l ' e g a l i t e , q u i r e g r e t t e n t une nob l e s s e a l a q u e l l e i l s a s p i r a i e n t ...; 
e n f i n , q u i d e t e s t e n t l a c o n s t i t u t i o n n o u v e l l e , mere de l ' e g a l i t e " . 2 
As we have seen, Condorcet was not an u n c o n d i t i o n a l supporter 
of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . However, he had made i t h i s duty to support i t 
at the beginning of the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly and had consequently 
endeavoured t o discourage any popular attempts, born out of 
f r u s t r a t i o n and impatience, to o u t s t r i p i t . T h i s e x p l a i n s why he 
defended w i t h such eagerness the a c t i o n s of an Assembly which contained 
w i t h i n i t s ranks a c o n s i d e r a b l e number of people w i t h whom he pro-
3 
foundly d i s a g r e e d , s e e k i n g to show the o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s how great 
a t a s k i t had to f a c e i n a l l spheres - the o r g a n i s a t i o n of the n a t i o n ' s 
4 5 6 f i n a n c i a l system, the c i v i l laws, and the armed f o r c e s . 
When we bear t h i s i n mind, i t i s p o s s i b l e to c o n s i d e r t h a t the 
p a s s i o n a t e tone of the A p r i l 1792 speech j u s t i f y i n g F r a n c e ' s d e c l a r a t i o n 
of war, notably i n the passages where he sought to e x p l a i n how F r a n c e ' s 
1. I b i d p. 279. 
2. Soboul op. c i t . p. 279. 
3. Although i t i s t r u e to say t h a t the present Assembly was g e n e r a l l y 
speaking, more a c c e p t a b l e to Condorcet than the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly 
had been; c f . i t s c a n c e l l a t i o n , on 24th March 1792, of an e a r l i e r 
decree o r d e r i n g troops to be sent to Saint-Domingue to c r u s h the 
s l a v e s ' r e v o l t . " R e v i s i o n des trav a u x de l a p r e m i e r e l e g i s l a t u r e " 
O.C. X.418-425. 
4. "Adresse de l'Assemblee n a t i o n a l e aux F r a n c a i s " O.C. X.323. 
5. I b i d 328. S 
6. I b i d 338. 
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behaviour towards the A l s a t i a n p r i n c e s , the Low C o u n t r i e s and the 
Comtat V e n a i s s i n was f u l l y i n keeping w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s of her 
c o n s t i t u t i o n , 1 does not r e f l e c t r e s i g n a t i o n to the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of 
c o n f l i c t , but a triumphant a s s e r t i o n t h a t the war was j u s t i f i e d by 
the French c o n s t i t u t i o n and t h a t the Assembly t r u l y r e p r e s e n t e d the 
w i l l of the French people. 
"Tant que ( l a c o n s t i t u t i o n ) s u b s i s t e , l e s pouvoirs e t a b l i s par 
e l l e ont s e u l s l e d r o i t de m a n i f e s t e r l a volonte n a t i o n a l e ; e t c ' e s t 
par eux que c e t t e volonte a e t e d ^ c l a r e e aux p u i s s a n c e s e t r a n g e r e s . 
C'est l e r o i q u i , s u r l ' i n v i t a t i o n de l'assemblee n a t i o n a l e , e t en 
re m p l i s s a n t l e s f o n c t i o n s que l a c o n s t i t u t i o n l u i a t t r i b u e , s ' e s t 
p l a i n t de l a p r o t e c t i o n accordee aux emigres, a demande i n u t i l e m e n t 
q u ' e l l e l e u r f u t r e t i r e e ; c ' e s t l u i q u i a s o l l i c i t e des e x p l i c a t i o n s 
s u r l a l i g u e formee contre l a F r a n c e ; c ' e s t l u i q u i a e x i g e que 
c e t t e l i g u e f u t d i s s o u t e . E t l'on d o i t s'etonner, sans doute, 
d'entendre annoncer, comme l e c r i de quelques f a c t i e u x , l e voeu 
s o l o n n e l du peuple, publiquement exprime par s e s r e p r e s e n t a n t s 
l e g i t i m e s " . 2 
The r h e t o r i c a l tone of the speech and the eloquent defence, 
not only of the Assembly, but of the King, i n d i c a t e a r e t u r n to the 
ol d p o l i c y of r a l l y i n g the people around the c o n s t i t u t i o n . But they 
a l s o suggest a r e v i v a l , i n a more extreme form, of the p o l i c y adopted 
during the opening weeks of the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly of f o r c i n g 
F r a n c e ' s i n t e r n a l enemies i n t o the open. When we bear t h i s p o l i c y 
3 
i n mind, as w e l l as the Giro n d i n s reasons f o r supporting the war, 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t to b e l i e v e t h a t Condorcet was merely l y i n g when he 
wrote two y e a r s l a t e r : 
" I I e t a i t evident ... que, par l a nature du gouvernement, ... 
l e s notres ( v i z . the French troops) s e r a i e n t l e n t s e t f a i b l e s , t a n t que 
l e peuple ne s e r a i t pas c e r t a i n que t o u t e s l e s t r a h i s o n s menagees 
dans nos troupes e t dans nos v i l l e s e c l a t e r a i e n t au moment ou 1'ennemi 
nous a t t a q u e r a i t avec t o u t e s s e s f o r c e s . ... ( L a guerre) e t a i t l e s e u l 
moyen de dejouer l e s complots d'une cour c o n s p i r a t r i c e . L e s p a t r i o t e s 
q u i a u r a i e n t voulu qu'avant de combattre, on eut d e l i v r e l a Fr a n c e d'un 




Cf. " P r o j e t d'une e x p o s i t i o n , e t c . " O.C. X,446-447, 449-451. 
I b i d 452. 
Cf. previous page and above. 
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a l o r s l e s regards que d'une t r e s f a i b l e p o r t i o n des c i t o y e n s ; qu'en 
a g i s s a n t d'apres l e s soupcons q u i ne pouvaient encore &tre appuyes s u r 
des f a i t s c o n s t a n t s , on r i s q u e r a i t de perdre l a cause de l a l i b e r t y " . 1 
The l a s t p a r t of the q u o t a t i o n i n d i c a t e s c l e a r l y t h a t , i n 
Condorcet's view, the o l d p o l i c y had f a i l e d and now needed to be 
r e v i s e d i n a much more d r a s t i c manner. 
Having s a i d a l l t h i s , however, i t should be made c l e a r t h a t h i s 
support f o r war i n A p r i l 1792 was the r e s u l t of a very gradual p r o c e s s . 
U n l i k e the G i r o n d i n s B r i s s o t and I s n a r d , he d i d not c a l l f o r i t at the 
bar of the Assembly as e a r l y as December 1791 or January 1792. 
Although he d i d make a p a r t i c u l a r l y b e l l i c o s e d e c l a r a t i o n on the 
2 
Assembly's b e h a l f i n December 1791, the whole tone and content of the 
d e c l a r a t i o n , notably when he a f f i r m e d t h a t France was f u l l y ready f o r 
war, suggest t h a t i t was more a t h r e a t to d e t e r F r a n c e ' s enemies than 
an a c t u a l c a l l to war. 
I n f a c t , he d i d not commit h i m s e l f to the war p o l i c y u n t i l h i s 
p a t i e n c e w i t h the R e v o l u t i o n ' s enemies had been pushed beyond a l l 
endurance. We have noted how h i s a t t i t u d e towards the emigres and 
m i n i s t e r s grew i n c r e a s i n g l y h o s t i l e i n the e a r l y months of 1792, but 
i t i s the e v o l u t i o n of h i s a t t i t u d e towards the c l e r g y which best 
i l l u s t r a t e s the extent of h i s e x a s p i r a t i o n i n March and A p r i l of t h a t 
y e a r . 
Thus, d e s p i t e h i s o r i g i n a l ( a l b e i t c o n d i t i o n a l ) acceptance of 
the C o n s t i t u t i o n C i v i l e du Clerge', he openly c a l l e d f o r the complete 
3 
s e p a r a t i o n of Church and S t a t e on 23rd March. S i m i l a r l y , d e s p i t e 
h i s e a r l i e r condemnation of i n e f f e c t i v e and petty measures a g a i n s t 




"Fragment de J u s t i f i c a t i o n " I . 591-592. 
" D e c l a r a t i o n de l'Assemblee n a t i o n a l e " O.C. X.253-259. 
I n s t . Mss. N.S. 21, A, no. 11. 
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p r a i s e d such people as the Archbishop of Bourges who c a l l e d f o r the 
sc r a p p i n g of vestments at Church s e r v i c e s . 1 
Even so, although he was convinced of the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of war 
2 
as e a r l y as February 1792, i t was not u n t i l two months l a t e r t h a t he 
a c t u a l l y argued i n favour of a d e c l a r a t i o n . 
The t r u e reasons f o r Condorcet's e v e n t u a l support f o r war would 
thus seem to l i e h a l f way between the two t h e s e s put foward. On the 
one hand, i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t a man who was so o b v i o u s l y aware of the 
3 
h o r r o r s of war could have p r e s s e d f o r i t so e a g e r l y u n l e s s he was 
convinced, both of i t s i n e v i t a b i l i t y and, above a l l , of the f a c t t h a t 
i t was j u s t i f i e d by the p r i n c i p l e s of s e l f - d e f e n c e e s t a b l i s h e d by the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . T h i s e x p l a i n s the occurrence i n h i s w r i t i n g s on 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y of arguments which a r e u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y f e e b l e 
u n l e s s seen as attempts to d e t e r F r a n c e ' s enemies from provoking her 
i n t o a c t i o n . 
On the other hand, i t was c l e a r t h a t , by A p r i l 1792, the p o l i c y 
which he had decided to f o l l o w s i n c e the beginning of the R e v o l u t i o n 
would c o l l a p s e u n l e s s extreme measures were taken to expose a l l the 
elements which threatened to des t r o y the u n i t y of purpose which alone 
could save the r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement. 
I n e i t h e r c a s e , h i s support f o r war cannot be viewed as con-
s t i t u t i n g a complete break w i t h h i s past i d e a s , but as a n e c e s s a r y 
e v o l u t i o n of them under the p r e s s u r e of events. 
Having examined a t some len g t h the reasons f o r Condorcet's 
u l t i m a t e support f o r the d e c l a r a t i o n of war i n A p r i l 1792, we must now 
1. Chronique de P a r i s 7th A p r i l 1792 p. 389. 
2. Cf. "L'Assemblee n a t i o n a l e aux F r a n c a i s " O.C. X.335 ( 1 6 t h 
February 1792). 
3. As l a t e as 25th January 1792 he repeated the statement he had made 
ten y e a r s e a r l i e r concerning the f a c t t h a t war was inhuman and had 
to be avoided as f a r as i t was p o s s i b l e ("Discours s ur 1 ' o f f i c e de 
l'empereur" O.C. X.296, 297). 
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s e e whether t h i s d e c i s i o n d i d i n f a c t s e r v e h i s purpose of f o r c i n g 
F r a n c e ' s enemies i n t o the open and f o r g i n g the u n i t y of the n a t i o n . 
I n the s h o r t term, the r e s u l t s were d i s a s t r o u s . B a r e l y a 
month a f t e r the s t a r t of the war the French g e n e r a l s assembled at 
V a l e n c i e n n e s on 18th May d e c l a r e d t h a t the o f f e n s i v e had to stop and 
asked the K i n g to end h o s t i l i t i e s immediately. Although the d e c i s i o n 
taken by the g e n e r a l s D i l l o n and B i r o n to withdraw t h e i r troops before 
making a s i n g l e attempt to a t t a c k t h e i n f e r i o r number of A u s t r i a n 
troops who confronted them on 29th A p r i l may be given as proof of 
the French high command's t r e a c h e r y , t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t the 
French armies were i l l - p r e p a r e d f o r a c o n f l i c t . D i l l o n ' s murder was 
only one of many examples of t h e i r i n d i s c i p l i n e . 
On the p o l i t i c a l f r o n t , Condorcet's hopes f o r u n i t y were 
threatened as never before. Not only d i d La F a y e t t e r e f u s e to advance 
w i t h h i s army i n the Ardennes, but he soon r a l l i e d to the ranks of 
the " L a m e t h i s t e s " and e v e n t u a l l y announced h i s i n t e n t i o n of marching 
o • 1 on P a r i s . 
More s e r i o u s even than t h i s , however, was the s p l i t which now 
openly o c c u r r e d w i t h i n the ranks of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement i t s e l f . 
Only t h r e e days a f t e r the d e c l a r a t i o n of war which they had b i t t e r l y 
opposed, th e Montagnards C o l l o t d'Herbois and Chabot accused Condorcet, 
B r i s s o t , Roederer., Fauchet and Vergniaud of t r e a c h e r y and demanded 
2 
t h e i r e x c l u s i o n from the J a c o b i n s . D e s p i t e B r i s s o t ' s eloquent defence 
of the G i r o n d i n s ' motives i n c a l l i n g f o r war, the t i d e of sympathy 
3 
was t u r n i n g a g a i n s them; t h i s was c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d by the e l e c t i o n 
to the key p o s t s i n the J a c o b i n Club of the R o b e s p i e r r i s t s M e r l i n de 
1. Cf. Soboul op. c i t . p. 285. 
2. Cf. P a t r i o t e f r a n c a i s 25th A p r i l 1792; Cahen op. c i t . p. 390. 
3. Cf. A u l a r d : J a c o b i n s I I I . 588. 
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Douai, Chabot and C o l l o t on 17th May 1792. 
Although Condorcet had o f t e n expressed h i s d i s t a s t e f o r t h e more 
extreme element w i t h i n the Assembly, t h i s was the f i r s t time t h a t he 
1 
and R o b e s p i e r r e c l a s h e d so openly and w i t h such b i t t e r n e s s . 
Repeatedly, Robespierre and h i s supporters a t t a c k e d him i n the 
columns of the new paper the Defenseur de l a C o n s t i t u t i o n , a c c u s i n g 
2 
him of being a f r i e n d of La F a y e t t e , of having c a l l e d f o r a r e p u b l i c 
i n 1791 merely i n order to provoke the massacre of innocent people 
3 
and paving the way f o r a r o y a l i s t r e a c t i o n , of supporting the r o y a l i s t 
4 
Narbonne, and so on. 
I n s h o r t , R obespierre was the f i r s t of a l i n e of c r i t i c s who have 
seen i n the numerous i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s of Condorcet's behaviour between 
1789 and 1793 evidence of a weak and v a c i l l a t i n g mind which was so 
out of touch w i t h r e a l i t y as to be unable to adapt i t s ideas to the 
events of the time. 
I t i s only when we a p p r e c i a t e h i s c o n s i s t e n t w i s h to tra n s c e n d 
what he co n s i d e r e d to be temporary disagreements on matters of pro-
cedure i n the i n t e r e s t s of p r e s e r v i n g the e s s e n t i a l g a i n s of the 
Re v o l u t i o n t h a t we may answer t h e s e c r i t i c s and q u e s t i o n the c r i t e r i a 
on which t h e i r judgements were based. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , Condorcet h i m s e l f 
r e f u s e d to r e p l y to the a t t a c k s made a g a i n s t him and concentrated a l l 
h i s a t t e n t i o n on important matters of s t a t e . 
There i s no doubt, however, th a t the c l a s h e s of A p r i l and May 
1792 r e p r e s e n t e d the beginning of a s e r i e s of c o n f l i c t s which were 
t o l e a d u l t i m a t e l y to h i s death. D e s p i t e t h i s , i t would be wrong to 
1. Cf. f o r a more d e t a i l e d account of t h i s c l a s h : J . Bouissounouse: 
Condorcet l e philosophe dans l a r e v o l u t i o n P a r i s Hachette 1962. 
pp. 235-239. 
2. I b i d no. 1, p. 2; Cahen p. 391. 
3. I b i d nos. 10 and 11; Cahen p. 391. 
4. Defenseur de l a c o n s t i t u t i o n nos. 252-256. 
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suggest t h a t h i s support f o r the war p o l i c y was a complete m i s c a l c u l a t i o n 
which threatened to destroy the s u c c e s s of h i s plan. On the c o n t r a r y , 
the war e v e n t u a l l y accomplished what he d e s i r e d by b r e a k i n g the dead-
lock which was p a r a l y s i n g the r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement and by p u t t i n g 
i n t o motion the sequence of events which l e d e v e n t u a l l y to the 
establishment of the r e p u b l i c and to the long awaited s e t t i n g up of 
a body formed f o r the t a s k of r e v i s i n g the c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
I n the f i r s t p l a c e , the war d i d f u l f i l one of the main purposes 
of Condorcet's plan, which was to f o r c e F r a n c e ' s enemies to r e v e a l 
openly which s i d e they supported. I t soon became c l e a r , f o r example, 
tha t the g e n e r a l s ' r e v o l t at Valenciennes had the King's support and 
the l a t t e r ' s r e a c t i o n to the t h r e e decrees passed by the Assembly i n 
May and June 1792 provided f u r t h e r proof of h i s h o s t i l e i n t e n t i o n s . 
The f i r s t s t a t e d t h a t any r e f r a c t o r y p r i e s t accused of t r e a s o n by 
twenty c i t i z e n s form h i s "departement" would be deported (27th May); 
the second a b o l i s h e d the r o y a l bodyguard (2 9 t h May); and the t h i r d 
e s t a b l i s h e d a g a r r i s o n of 20,000 N a t i o n a l Guardsmen near P a r i s w i t h 
the dual aim of defending the c a p i t a l and a c t i n g as a d e t e r r e n t to the 
designs of any g e n e r a l who might be tempted to s e i z e power ( 8 t h J u n e ) . 
The King responded to t h e s e d e l i b e r a t e l y p r o v o c a t i v e decrees by 
r e f u s i n g to s a n c t i o n the f i r s t and t h i r d of them; he bowed to the 
second, but made no e f f o r t to c o n c e a l h i s d i s t a s t e f o r i t . ' ' ' Condorcet 
d i d not underestimate the importance of the King's a t t i t u d e towards the 
decrees and he was to g i v e i t a prominent p l a c e i n h i s a r t i c l e of 13th 
2 
August 1792 j u s t i f y i n g the i n v a s i o n of the T u i l e r i e s by the mob. But 
the decrees a l s o had very i n t e r e s t i n g and s i g n i f i c a n t s i d e - e f f e c t s . 
1. Condorcet had greeted the v o t i n g of t h i s decree w i t h joy ( c f . 
Chronique de P a r i s 30 and 31st May pp. 602, 604-5), e s p e c i a l l y as 
t h i s was p a r t l y due to the p u b l i c i t y which he had h i m s e l f given to 
a s k i r m i s h caused by the r o y a l bodyguard at N e u i l l y a s h o r t time 
before. ( I b i d . 23rd May p, 601). 
2. Cf. " E x p o s i t i o n des m o t i f s d'apres l e s q u e l s l'assemblee n a t i o n a l e a ... 
prononce' l a suspension du pouvoir dans l e s mains du r o i " O.C. X. 548, 551. 
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By t a k i n g the form of an ultimatum addressed by the Assembly to a l l 
those who r e f u s e d to support the R e v o l u t i o n whole-heartedly they 
f o r c e d the King and h i s supporters i n t o adopting a more p o s i t i v e and 
a c t i v e a t t i t u d e . S e c r e t l e t t e r s , h a l f - h e a r t e d obedience to the 
Assembly's orders were no longer s u f f i c i e n t . D i r e c t a c t i o n had to be 
taken, and i t was. 
Within a week of the d e c r e e s ' r e j e c t i o n , the King d i s m i s s e d the 
Gi r o n d i n c a b i n e t and r e p l a c e d i t by one made up e n t i r e l y of F e u i l l a n t s 
(13th June 1792); two days l a t e r , Dumouriez, who had t i l l then appeared 
to support the Re v o l u t i o n , r a l l i e d to the ranks of the nort h e r n army; 
thr e e days a f t e r t h a t , La F a y e t t e c l e a r l y announced h i s i n t e n t i o n of 
u s i n g f o r c e a g a i n s t those who wished to destroy the r o y a l i s t con-
s t i t u t i o n . 
D e s p i t e a l l t h i s , however, Condorcet's plan of f o r c i n g the King 
to v i o l a t e the c o n s t i t u t i o n had s t i l l not met w i t h any s u c c e s s . A f t e r 
a l l , the King had every r i g h t to r e j e c t the Assembly's d e c r e e s . But 
an i d e a l opportunity soon presented i t s e l f . I n June 1792, two 
m i n i s t e r s , B e r t r a n d and Montmorin, r e a c t e d to a formal a c c u s a t i o n made 
by the Assembly's "Comite de s u r v e i l l a n c e " c h a r g i n g them w i t h belonging 
to the "comite a u t r i c h i e n " by o r d e r i n g the a r r e s t of t h r e e of the 
committee members - Merlin, Chabot and B a s i r e - and dragging them by 
f o r c e before a t r i b u n a l p r e s i d e d by the Juge de P a i x L a r i v i e r e . 
T h i s f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n convinced Condorcet 
t h a t h i s plan was beginning to work and he s e i z e d the opportunity to 
give maximum p u b l i c i t y to the d u p l i c i t y of the e x e c u t i v e and the 
j u d i c i a r y . 
I n a c a r e f u l l y argued a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "Opinion s u r l ' a t t e n t a t 
/ / „ 1 commis con t r e l a l i b e r t e des membres du corps l e g i s l a t i f , he attempted 
1. O.C. X.457-473. 
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to i l l u s t r a t e j u s t how s e r i o u s a breach of the c o n s t i t u t i o n had been 
made and to emphasise the g r a v i t y of the consequences which could 
ensue. 
The c o n s t i t u t i o n s t a t e d q u i t e c l e a r l y t h a t the people's 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s were inviolable."'" A deputy could be a r r e s t e d only i f 
he was caught i n the a c t of committing a crime and only a f t e r an o f f i c i a l 
warrant had been i s s u e d . F u r t h e r , he could only be detained w i t h the 
2 
Assembly's approval. I f these c o n d i t i o n s were not r e s p e c t e d , a man 
who wished to remove a deputy who threatened h i s i n t e r e s t s could have 
him a r r e s t e d on any p r e t e x t , a p r a c t i c e which would soon p a r a l y s e the 
parliamentary system. 
" A i n s i , ... l e j o u r ou Mirabeau ... d e v a i t a v e r t i r l a France des 
dangers q u i menacaient sa l i b e r t e n a i s s a n t e , ... un o f f i c i e r de p o l i c e 
... eut pu ( 1 ' ) e n l e v e r a l'assemblee des r e p r e s e n t a n t s du peuple.'" 3 
And y e t , i n the case of M e r l i n , Chabot and B a s i r e , none of t h e s e 
c o n d i t i o n s had been r e s p e c t e d . F i r s t , no warrant had been i s s u e d 
a g a i n s t them: 
" I I n'y a pas eu de mandat d ' a r r e t : a i n s i , l a c o n s t i t u t i o n a 
e t e v i o l e e " . 4 
Secondly, the "crime" of which they were accused was not a crime 
at a l l . 
"C'est ... d ' a v o i r p u b l i e des f a i t s contenus dans l e s p a p i e r s 
du comite de s u r v e i l l a n c e , que l e s t r o i s membres de ce comite sont a c c -
uses.' Or, 1 ce n'est pas l a un ' f a i t c r i m i n e l ' en lui-meme, c a r 
aucune l o i ne l ' a mis au rang des crimes; 2 l a l o i elle-meme a 
prononce que ce n ' e t a i t pas un ' f a i t c r i m i n e l ' ; c a r aucune a c t i o n 
commise par l a v o i e de 1'impression n'est un d e l i t , a moins qu'un 
j u r y ne l ' a i t d e c l a r e t e l . I I n'y a done pas eu de ' f a i t c r i m i n e l 1 . 
A i n s i , sous ce point de vue, l a l o i a encore e t e viole'e". 5 
F i n a l l y , the Juge de P a i x ' s s o l e r o l e i n such a c a s e would have 
1. Cf. C o n s t i t u t i o n de 1791 T i t r e I I I , Ch. I , S e c t . V, A r t . V I I ; 
"Opinion s u r l ' a t t e n t a t , e t c . " O.C. X. 463. 
2. I b i d 467; Const, de 1791 e t c . A r t . V I I I . 
3. "Opinion, e t c . " O.C. X. 465-466. 
4. I b i d 467. 
5. I b i d 467-468. 
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been to inform the Assembly of the d e p u t i e s ' a c t i o n ; but L a r i v i e r e had 
gone much f u r t h e r than t h i s . 
1 1 / v. La c o n s t i t u t i o n a e t e v i o l e e par l e juge de p a i x L a r i v i e r e ; ... 
i l a a t t e n t e c o n t r e l e t e x t e p r e c i s de l a l o i , a 1 ' e x e r c i s e de l a 
souverain\e n a t i o n a l e ; i l a attente' a l a l i b e r t e des membres de 
1 assemblee n a t i o n a l e , en l e s f o r ^ a n t , a main armee, a se rendre chez 
l u i , a y r e s t e r , en l e s f a i s a n t conduire e t garder par l a gendarmerie 
n a t i o n a l e , en l e u r i n t e r d i s a n t toute communication e n t r e eux, pendant 
l e temps de c e t t e d e t e n t i o n i l l e g a l e ; d e l i t pour l e q u e l l a peine de 
mort e s t expressement portee par l a l o i " . 1 
Condorcet was c e r t a i n t h a t so f l a g r a n t a v i o l a t i o n of the con-
s t i t u t i o n would g a l v a n i s e the Assembly i n t o t a k i n g measures a g a i n s t a l l 
those who were suspected of t r e a s o n and i t was to t h i s purpose t h a t he 
devoted the remainder of h i s a r t i c l e . 
"On ne peut s'empecher de r e c o n n a i t r e , dans l a conduite du juge 
de paix, un des f i l s de ce complot d ' a v i l i r 1'assemblee n a t i o n a l e aux 
yeux du peuple, a f i n que, d'un cote, s a f a i b l e s s e , de 1'autre, l e s 
menaces des t y r a n s , conduisent a c e t abandon de l a c o n s t i t u t i o n , ... 
a c e t t e r e s t a u r a t i o n de l a noblesse, ... a c e t t e dependance du c a b i n e t 
de Vienne dans nos r e l a t i o n s e x t e r i e u r e s ; en un mot, a c e t t e convention 
honteuse, o b j e t p u b l i c ou s e c r e t des voeux de tous l e s ennemis du 
peuple ... Un des f i l s de c e t t e trame coupable e s t aujourd'hui dans 
vos mains. Ne l a i s s e z pas a vos ennemis l e temps de l e b r i s e r " . 2 
He thus greeted w i t h joy the "decret d ' a c c u s a t i o n " which the 
\ 3 
Assembly passed a g a i n s t L a r i v i e r e . T h i s s i g n i f i e d t h a t the d e p u t i e s 
were at l a s t beginning to see who t h e i r enemy r e a l l y was, and, coming 
a f t e r L a r i v i e r e ' s panicky behaviour, i n d i c a t e d t h a t the war p o l i c y 
was f i n a l l y f u l f i l l i n g i t s dual aim of c l a r i f y i n g the g e n e r a l 
s i t u a t i o n and p u t t i n g p r e s s u r e on the King's s u p p o r t e r s . 
I n an attempt to p r e s s home the advantage which the L a r i v i e r e 
c ase had given him, Condorcet thus concluded h i s account of i t i n the 
R e v i s i o n des tra v a u x de l a premiere l e g i s l a t u r e " by v i o l e n t l y 
denouncing the "comite a u t r i c h i e n " -
"Y a - t - i l en France un p a r t i a u t r i c h i e n ? Oui ... Ce p a r t i 
a - t - i l des c h e f s ? I I e s t d i f f i c i l e q u ' i l n'en a i t pas". 4 -
1. "Opinion s u r 1 ' a t t e n t a t , e t c . " O.C. X 469. 
2. I b i d 470, 471. 
3. T t e v i s i o n des travaux de l a premiere l e g i s l a t u r e " O.C. X. 433-434. 
4. I b i d 434-435. 
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and by e l o q u e n t l y defending h i s war p o l i c y i n the form of an answer to 
the q u e s t i o n : " ( C e t t e guerre) a e t e n e c e s s a i r e , s e r a - t - e l l e u t i l e ? " * 
F i n a l l y , the war succeeded i n b r i n g i n g about what Condorcet.had 
d e s i r e d s i n c e 1789; i t i n s t i l l e d i n the masses a u n i t y of purpose 
which was t o have a d e c i s i v e e f f e c t i n f o r c i n g the R e v o l u t i o n out of 
the dangerous r u t i n which i t found i t s e l f s i n c e the King's r e t u r n . 
Even pro-Montagnards h i s t o r i a n s such as A l b e r t Soboul agree t h a t 
t h i s long sought f o r f e e l i n g of u n i t y came about as a d i r e c t r e s u l t 
of the s i t u a t i o n c r e a t e d by the war. 
Les r e v e r s m i l i t a i r e s , 1 a t t i t u d e des generaux, l e u r c o l l u s i o n 
avec l a Cour, donnerent, c o n t r e l e s a r i s t o c r a t e s q u i bafouaient l a 
n a t i o n , une n o u v e l l e impulsion a l ' e l a n n a t i o n a l i n s e p a r a b l e de l ' e l a n 
r e v o l u t i o n n a i r e ... La c r i s e n a t i o n a l e donna une n o u v e l l e impulsion 
aux masses p o p u l a i r e s , t o u j o u r s hantees par l e complot a r i s t o c r a t i q u e , 
et approfondit l e mouvement democratique". 2 
The movement gathered f o r c e through A p r i l , May and June and was 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d p r i n c i p a l l y by e f f o r t s to bridge the gap between P a r i s 
and the p r o v i n c e s and to end the d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the Assembly. On 
8th June, the Assembly passed a decree summoning 20,000 N a t i o n a l 
Guardsmen from the pr o v i n c e s to s e t up a camp near P a r i s . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
t h i s was followed, only twelve days l a t e r , by the "Journee du 20 j u i n " 
on which the c i t i z e n s of P a r i s invaded the T u i l e r i e s . On 28th June, 
both Robespierre and B r i s s o t made speeches c a l l i n g on the dep u t i e s to 
put an end to t h e i r q u a r r e l s , and i t was an un u s u a l l y determined 
Assembly t h a t , on 2nd J u l y , summoned the f e d e r a l troops to the F e t e de 
l a Fe'de'ration, thereby t o t a l l y i g n o r i n g the King's veto. The o f f i c i a l 
proclamation of the " P a t r i e en danger" on 11th J u l y and the subsequent 
recruitment f p r the defence of France of troops from every p a r t of the 
country was the prelude to the movement's climax. T h i s was announced 
1. I b i d 436-442. 
2. Op. c i t . pp. 285-286, 286. 
by the a r r i v a l of the " f e d e r e s " at the end of J u l y and the triumphant 
r e c e p t i o n given to them by the people of P a r i s grouped i n t h e i r 
" S e c t i o n s " . The Brunswick manifesto provided the f i n a l push r e q u i r e d 
to propel the movement to i t s l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n , the r e v o l u t i o n of 
10th August. 
" L * i n s u r r e c t i o n du 10 aout ne f u t pas l'oeuvre du s e u l peuple 
/ / i i r p a r i s i e n , mais du peuple f r a n c a i s r e p r e s e n t e par l e s F e d e r e s ; on a 
pu d i r e de l a ' r e v o l u t i o n du 10 aout 1792' q u ' e l l e f u t n a t i o n a l e " . 1 
Although i t would be r a s h to c l a i m t h a t Condorcet had f o r e s e e n 
t h a t the war would r e l e a s e f o r c e s of such power th a t t h r e e months 
would s u f f i c e to sweep away so many of the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s which i n 
1792 were t h r e a t e n i n g to destroy the R e v o l u t i o n , t h e r e i s no doubt 
tha t the 10th August came to him as a great r e l i e f . The i n s u r r e c t i o n 
was of course repugnant to h i s sense of order, but h e - f e l t t h a t i t s 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n l a y , i f nowhere e l s e , i n i t s very i n e v i t a b i l i t y . The 
treatment of the mobs by the King's guards i n the t r o u b l e d context of 
the times had destroyed any p o s s i b i l i t y of another outcome. 
" ( L e s s o l d a t s ) r e ^ u r e n t l ' o r d r e de f a i r e f e u s u r l e s c i t o y e n s ... 
A l o r s , r i e n ne put a r r e t e r l a vengeance du peuple, q u i e p r o u v a i t une 
t r a h i s o n n o u v e l l e , au moment meme ou i l v e n a i t se p l a i n d r e de c e l l e s 
dont i l a v a i t longtemps e t e l a v i c t i m e " . 2 
However, as he pointed out i n h i s r e t r o s p e c t i v e account, even 
t h i s would have made l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e a f t e r a l l the damage caused by 
the l i e s made a t the people's expense by the King's s u p p o r t e r s . 
"Les declamations de M. Vaublanc co n t r e l e peuple, et 1 ' a s s e r t i o n 
egalement i m p o l i t i q u e et f a u s s e , que l a demande de decheance (du r o i ) 
e t a i t l'ouvrage d'une f a c t i o n de sept a h u i t c e n t s hommes, a u r a i e n t 
determine l e mouvement, s ' i l n ' a v a i t pas e t e r e s o l u d'avance". 3 
1. Soboul op. c i t . p. 292. I t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t , only nine days 
l a t e r , L a f a y e t t e , among o t h e r s , f l e d the country, a f a c t which 
suggests t h a t the i n s u r r e c t i o n may be c o n s i d e r e d to symbolise the 
s u c c e s s of Condorcet's p o l i c y of f o r c i n g F r a n c e ' s enemies i n t o the 
open. C e r t a i n l y , the events of t h a t day s i g n i f i e d t h a t the i n f l u e n c e 
of the "comite a u t r i c h i e n " was at an end. 
2. " E x p o s i t i o n des m o t i f s d ' a p r l s l e s — q u e l s 1'assemble*.nationale 
aproclame' l a convocation d'une convention n a t i o n a l e " e t c . O.C. 
X/559-560. 
3. " J u s t i f i c a t i o n " . 1.601. \ 
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N e v e r t h e l e s s , so p a r a d o x i c a l does support f o r such d i r e c t a c t i o n 
on the p a r t of the mobs seem i n a man who, throughout the R e v o l u t i o n , 
had appealed to the people to have f a i t h i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e i r 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , t h a t the matter must not be allowed to pass without 
examination. 
3. The 10th August i n s u r r e c t i o n 
Some c r i t i c s have seen i n Condorcet's support f o r the i n s u r r e c t i o n 
f u r t h e r proof of h i s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and muddle-headedness. I t seems 
r a t h e r absord, however, to accuse him of i n c o n s i s t e n c y when a l l he d i d 
on 10th August was to w i t n e s s the u l t i m a t e l y i n e v i t a b l e consequence of 
a weakness i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n , the absence of any method f o r r e v i s i n g 
i t , f o r which he was not r e s p o n s i b l e and a g a i n s t which he had 
repeatedly p r o t e s t e d . 
T h i s does not mean to say t h a t he approved of the way i n which 
the deadlock was f i n a l l y broken. So great was h i s d i s l i k e f o r any 
form of d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n on the part of the masses t h a t he had 
always appealed to the people to support a c o n s t i t u t i o n which, as he 
knew only too w e l l , v i o l a t e d , by not i n c l u d i n g i t among i t s a r t i c l e s , 
one of the b a s i c r i g h t s of man. I f i n c o n s i s t e n c y t h e r e i s , i t l i e s i n 
the f a c t t h a t , as l a t e as 1792, he supported a movement which, accord-
i n g to the l o g i c of h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l i d e a s , he should have supported 
much e a r l i e r . 
Enough has been s a i d , however, about h i s awareness i n 1790 of 
the f a c t t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n r e p r e s e n t e d the only weapon which could 
be used a g a i n s t those who hoped to r e t u r n to the c o n s t i t u t i o n l e s s 
£ 
Ancien Regime. But t h e r e were other c o n s i d e r a t i o n s too. I n 1790 the 
people were d i s u n i t e d ; any spontaneous attempt to overthrow the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n would have l e d to anarchy and r e a c t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n to 
thus, the wave of emotional f e r v o u r which greeted the King's r e s t o r a t i o n 
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a f t e r the f l i g h t to Varennes, together w i t h the massacre of the 
r e p u b l i c a n s which followed, were b r u t a l reminders of the f a c t t h a t the 
m a j o r i t y of the population s t i l l supported the King. T h e r e f o r e , i n 
1791 a l s o , t h e r e seemed l i t t l e hope of changing the c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
However, a l l t h i s does not e x a c t l y answer the q u e s t i o n . I f 
Condorcet's r e l u c t a n c e to condone d i r e c t a c t i o n a g a i n s t the con-
s t i t u t i o n i n 1790 and 1791 i s understandable, how could t h i s be 
j u s t i f i e d i n the t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t context of 1792? By exposing 
the King's t r u e i n t e n t i o n s and i n s t i l l i n g i n the masses a new u n i t y 
of purpose, had not the war c r e a t e d a s i t u a t i o n i n which an i n s u r r e c t i o n 
had every chance of s e r v i n g the cause of the R e v o l u t i o n ? 
I f we examine the q u e s t i o n more c l o s e l y , we may understand 
Condorcet's a t t i t u d e a l i t t l e b e t t e r . I n the f i r s t p l a c e , one of 
the l e s s u s e f u l consequences of the war was t h a t i t had pushed many 
moderates who had t i l l then remained l o y a l to the R e v o l u t i o n i n t o 
r a l l y i n g around the King. T h i s p o l a r i s a t i o n of the n a t i o n i n t o two 
f a c t i o n s , both of whom were h o s t i l e to the c o n s t i t u t i o n , t hreatened 
to l e a d to c i v i l war and anarchy and only the N a t i o n a l Assembly had 
the a u t h o r i t y to p r e s e r v e order and l e g a l i t y . 
Secondly, and more important, Condorcet was aware t h a t the 
R e v o l u t i o n had reached a c r u c i a l stage i n which i t would e i t h e r triumph 
over the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s which had t i l l then p a r a l y s e d i t or would 
c o l l a p s e completely. The movement which would ensure i t s triumph 
would come e i t h e r as the r e s u l t of a spontaneous r e v o l t of the masses 
j u s t i f i e d by nothing save the r a t h e r vague no t i o n of the " d r o i t 
d ' i n s u r r e c t i o n " , or by the solemn e x p r e s s i o n of the people's w i l l v i a 
a method e s t a b l i s h e d by, and on the i n i t i a t i v e of, the N a t i o n a l 
Assembly. 
N a t u r a l l y enough, Condorcet p r e f e r r e d the second of these 
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s o l u t i o n s ; but i t was c l e a r t h a t t h i n g s had gone so f a r by the summer 
of 1792 that the f a i l u r e to employ the second method made the f i r s t 
one i n e v i t a b l e and v a l i d a t e d i t as a r e s u l t . T h i s matter was a 
source of great a n x i e t y f o r Condorcet as he f u l l y r e a l i s e d t h a t , on 
the eve of what had every chance of t u r n i n g i n t o a second r e v o l u t i o n , 
t h e q u e s t i o n of precedent had become, as i n 1789, one of great 
importance. A v i o l e n t u p r i s i n g , no matter how j u s t i f i e d , c ould never 
have the f o r c e of a t r u e precedent. An appeal to the people, coming 
on the i n i t i a t i v e of the l e g a l l y e l e c t e d Assembly, would have t h i s 
f o r c e . I n s h o r t , i t was a q u e s t i o n not merely of j u s t i c e being done 
( a popular i n s u r r e c t i o n would have achieved t h i s ) , but of j u s t i c e 
being seen to be done. 
Condorcet knew, however, t h a t , because of the very nature of the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n , i t would be i m p o s s i b l e to d i s c o v e r a s o l u t i o n t h a t was 
f u l l y l e g a l . At worst, whatever the method chosen, i t could always 
be accused of being u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ; at b e s t , i t c o u l d only be excused 
on the grounds t h a t a l l methods which the c o n s t i t u t i o n d i d not 
s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r b i d were j u s t i f i e d by c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
I t was i n f a c t w i t h j u s t such an argument th a t i n an a r t i c l e of 
1792 e n t i t l e d , "Sur l a n e c e s s i t e d'une convocation e x t r a -
t 
ordinaifee des assemblees p r i m a i f e s en 1792 , he countered the charge 
t h a t , under no c i r c u m s t a n c e s , c o u l d the Assembly inform the p u b l i c of 
i t s wish to change the c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
•N 
"La l o i nous i n t e r d i t de f a i r e aucun changement a l ' a c t e con-
s t i t u t i o n n e l . " 
r i ' " E l l e nous i n t e r d i t egalement d'appeler une assemblee de r e v i s i o n 
et meme une convention n a t i o n a l e , d e s t i n ^ e a changer l a c o n s t i t u t i o n . " ' 
Mais e l l e ne nous i n t e r d i t pas l a f a c u l t e de d e c l a r e r a l a n a t i o n 
que nous ne trouvons pas dans l ' a c t e c o n s t i t u t i o n n e l l e s moyens de 
sauver l a p a t r i e , e t nous devons a l o r s l u i developper l e s m o t i f s de 
c e t t e d e c l a r a t i o n " . 1 
1. O.C. X.263. 
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The complexity of the problems f a c i n g him and the great c a r e w i t h 
which he approached them i s best seen i n the two t e x t s which he wrote 
j u s t before 10th August, at a time when the need to come to a d e c i s i o n 
about what a c t i o n to take was becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y urgent. The t e x t s 
were w r i t t e n f o l l o w i n g two important events which occurred on 3rd 
August and which c o n s t i t u t e d a k i n d of prelude f o r what was to happen 
a week l a t e r . 
The f i r s t event c o n s i s t e d i n a p e t i t i o n , presented to the Assembly 
by Pe'tion, on b e h a l f of the P a r i s d i s t r i c t s , c a l l i n g f o r the King's 
suspension. The Assembly accepted the p e t i t i o n and appointed a s p e c i a l 
committee to examine i t . Speaking i n the committee's name a week 
l a t e r , Condorcet a d v i s e d the Assembly as to the course of a c t i o n i t 
should t a k e . 1 
T h i s report r e p r e s e n t s a b r i l l i a n t attempt to i l l u s t r a t e how the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n , as i t stood, was t o t a l l y inadequate f o r d e a l i n g w i t h a 
s i t u a t i o n f o r which i t had not been c r e a t e d . T h i s inadequacy stemmed 
from the f a c t t h a t the only c o n d i t i o n which i t had allowed f o r 
d e c l a r i n g the King to have ab d i c a t e d c o n s i s t e d i n h i s committing a 
f l a g r a n t a c t of t r e a s o n which could l e a v e a b s o l u t e l y no doubt as to h i s 
motives. 
"La c o n s t i t u t i o n ne p a r l e dans aucun a r t i c l e de ^la de'cheance du 
r o i ; mais e l l e determine p l u s i e u r s c a s ou i l e s t cense a v o i r abdique', 
et c ' e s t ce q u ' e l l e a p p e l l e une a b d i c a t i o n l e g a l e . " 
' v ' 
Dans l e c a s d absence prolongee au d e l a du terme f i x e par l a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n , da l a r e t r a c t i o n du serment, du d e l i t de se mettre a l a t e t e 
d'une armee ennemie dans c e l u i ou i l n ' e x i s t e r a i t de l a p a r t du 
r o i ... aucun desaveu de c e t t e e n t r e p r i s e , i l e s t e v i d e n t ... que l e 
corps l e g i s l a t i f p o u r r a i t d e c l a r e r 1'abdication legale". 2 
1. T h i s i s i n c l u d e d i n Condorcet's complete works under the t i t l e , 
"Rapport f a i t au nom d'une commission e x t r a o r d i n a i r e , a 1'assemblee 
n a t i o n a l e , s u r une p e t i t i o n de l a Commune de P a r i s , tendanttf a l a 
decheance du r o i " . X.521-530. 
2. I b i d 524. 
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U n f o r t u n a t e l y the King had on no o c c a s i o n v i o l a t e d the con-
s t i t u t i o n i n so f l a g r a n t a manner and the only way t h a t proof of h i s 
d u p l i c i t y could be found was to examine h i s a c t s and w r i t i n g s i n 
d e t a i l . But t h i s would r a i s e s e r i o u s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s . 
" I I s ' a g i t de v i o l a t i o n s du serment q u ' i l eut e*e r e t r a c t e , 
d'une connivance avec l'ennemi, malgre' des desaveux p u b l i c s ; comme 
a l o r s vous n'avez p l u s de f a i t s evidemment n o t o i r e s , comme i l f a u d r a i t 
a l a f o i s o b t e n i r l a preuve des f a i t s a l l e g u e s e t j u g e r s i l a l o i peut 
s'y a p p l i q u e r , vous aurez a p o r t e r un v e r i t a b l e jugement, e t l a 
premiere q u e s t i o n a resoudre e s t de s a v o i r s i l a c o n s t i t u t i o n vous en 
donne l e pouvoir". 1 
Even i f i t was decided t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n allowed the de p u t i e s 
to judge the King, the next problem would c o n s i s t i n d i s c o v e r i n g a 
method whereby t h i s judgement could take p l a c e . Here again, the 
2 
c o n s t i t u t i o n remained s i l e n t . 
But the d i f f i c u l t i e s d i d not end t h e r e . I f the Assembly d i d 
d e c l a r e t h a t the King had abdicated, power would a u t o m a t i c a l l y pass 
i n t o the hands of a regent. Should no one accept to become regent, 
as would most l i k e l y happen, e x e c u t i v e power would pass to the 
m i n i s t e r s . But what would happen i f the m i n i s t e r s r e f u s e d to accept 
i t , or i f they were considered too dangerous to be allowed to do so? 
Once again, the c o n s t i t u t i o n gave no answer. I t was c l e a r , t h e r e f o r e , 
t h a t i t had to be changed, and t h i s d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t i t s a i d 
3 
nothing about how t h i s c ould be done. 
I t i s obvious t h a t Condorcet's aim i n w r i t i n g the re p o r t was to 
show t h a t the cause of the deadlock l a y p r e c i s e l y i n the f a c t t h a t 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n was inadequate and t h a t i t could only be changed w i t h 
the approval of the people. 
The g r a v i t y of the s i t u a t i o n was u n d e r l i n e d by the second event 
1. I b i d 524-525. 
2. "Rapport f a i t au nom d'une commission, e t c . " O.C. X. 525. 
3. I b i d 525. 
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which took p l a c e on 3rd August. T h i s was the d e c i s i o n made by the 
c i t i z e n s of the Mauconseil s e c t i o n of P a r i s to renounce t h e i r c i v i c 
oath and to c o n s i d e r themselves no longer bound by the laws of the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . A f r a i d that t h i s was the f i r s t s i g n of a r e v o l t which 
could lead to a c i v i l war, Condorcet promptly wrote an a r t i c l e aimed 
at showing the Assembly where i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s l a y . 
The " I n s t r u c t i o n sur 1 * e x e r c i s e du d r o i t de s o u v e r a i n e t e " 1 i s 
i n t e r e s t i n g i n so f a r as i t i s the f i r s t * of h i s numerous w r i t i n g s on 
the nature of l e g i s l a t i v e power to have been w r i t t e n w i t h s p e c i f i c 
r e f e r e n c e to a c o n c r e t e c a s e . We may add t h a t i t was p r e c i s e l y 
because he had given so much thought to t h i s q u e s t i o n throughout h i s 
l i f e t h a t he was a b l e to r e a c t so f a s t to the s i t u a t i o n and to answer 
the c l a i m s of the Mauconseil c i t i z e n s c o h e r e n t l y and a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y . 
He began by a d m i t t i n g t h a t the behaviour of t h e s e c i t i z e n s was 
understandable i n the context of the times. 
"Lorsque l e peuple c r o i t v o i r l e s moyens de defense, c r e e s par 
son devouement e t son courage, s'evanouir e n t r e l e s mains chargees de 
l e s d i r i g e r ..., lorsque une longue s u i t e de t r a h i s o n s semblent 
j u s t i f i e r t o u t e s l e s d e f i a n c e s e t l e g i t i m e r tous l e s soupgons, on ne 
d o i t pas s'etonner ... de v o i r l e s c i t o y e n s n'attendre l e u r s a l u t que 
d'eux-memes, e t cher c h e r une d e r n i e r e r e s s o u r c e dans 1 ' e x e r c i s e de 
c e t t e s o u v e r a i n e t e i n a l i e n a b l e du peuple; d r o i t q u ' i l t i e n t de l a 
nature, et qu'aucune l o i l e g i t i m e ne peut l u i r a v i r " . 2 
However, u s i n g much the same arguments as those he had put 
forward during the Etats-Generaux, he went on to show the fundamental 
d i f f e r e n c e which e x i s t e d between the spontaneous a c t i o n of a group of 
c i t i z e n s and the t r u e e x p r e s s i o n of popular s o v r e i g n t y . He s t a t e d 
notably t h a t the people, having only delegated t h e i r r i g h t to make 
the laws to r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , could, at any time, withdraw t h e i r 
d e l e g a t i o n . However, as the o r i g i n a l d e l e g a t i o n was granted by the 
1. O.C. X.531-540. 
2. I b i d 533. 
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m a j o r i t y of the people taken as a whole, only the m a j o r i t y could 
withdraw i t . T h e r e f o r e , although the c i t i z e n s of Mauconseil had the 
r i g h t to express t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the c o n s t i t u t i o n , they 
had no r i g h t t o r e j e c t i t u n t i l the m a j o r i t y of the people had 
expressed i t s d e s i r e f o r a new c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
"Lorsque l ' u n i v e r s a l i t e d'une n a t i o n a vote dans des a s s e m b l i e s 
convoquees s u i v a n t une forme e t a b l i e par l a l o i e.t formees de s e c t i o n s 
du peuple, determinees a u s s i par l a l o i , a l o r s l e voeu de l a m a j o r i t e 
des c i t o y e n s p r e s e n t s a c e s assemblees ... e s t 1'expression de l a 
volonte n a t i o n a l e ; e t l'absence v o l o n t a i r e des a u t r e s c i t o y e n s d e v i e n t 
une preuve de l e u r adhesion p r e a l a b l e au voeu de c e t t e m a j o r i t e . 
Mais s i ces assemblees se sont formees spontanement, 1 absence 
des c i t o y e n s n'est p l u s une preuve s u f f i s a n t e de l e u r r e n o n c i a t i o n 
momentanee a 1'exerciGe de l e u r s d r o i t s ; e t l e voeu de l a m a j o r i t e r e e l l e 
d e s ' c i t o y e n s peut s e u l e t r e l ' e x p r e s s i o n de l a volonte n a t i o n a l e " . 1 
The important t h i n g here, however, was t h a t the i n i t i a t i v e f o r 
s e t t i n g up the machinery f o r d i s c o v e r i n g a method whereby the people's 
w i s h could be expressed, l a y w i t h the only body which r e p r e s e n t e d the 
delegated r i g h t s of the people. 
' ft ' A 
"Lorsque de grands i n t e r e t s peuvent f a i r e d e s i r e r de c o n n a i t r e 
l a volonte n a t i o n a l e avec une e n t i e r e c e r t i t u d e de d i s s i p e r tous l e s 
nuages ... i l e s t a i s e de s e n t i r combien i l e s t important q u ' e l l e 
p u i s s e se m a n i f e s t e r dans des assemblees regulierement convoquees ... 
Quand i l e x i s t e une r e p r e s e n t a t i o n g e n e r a l e , c ' e s t ... a e l l e q u ' i l 
a p p a r t i e n t ... d'indiquer c e t t e convocation". 2 
F a i l i n g t h i s , the people had no a l t e r n a t i v e but to c a l l f o r 
t h i s convocation themselves; the spontaneous a c t i o n of the masses 
would then r e p r e s e n t the l e g i t i m a t e m a n i f e s t a t i o n of popular s o v r e i g n t y . 
S i ... une grande portion^du peuple a v a i t marque l a volonte 
(d'une c o n v o c a t i o n ) , s i l e s r e p r e s e n t a n t s ne l ' a v a i e n t pas ecoutee, 
a l o r s c e t t e p r e r o g a t i v e q u ' i l s t i e n n e n t , non d'un d r o i t r e e l , mais de 
l a c o n f i a n c e dont i l s sont l e s d e p o s i t a i r e s presumes, mais de l a l o i , 
mais de l ' u t i l i t e commune, c e s s e r a i t avec c e t t e c o n f i a h c e . avec c e t t e 
u t i l i t e ; et l e premier voeu spontane du peuple s e r a i t ... l ' e x p r e s s i o n 
l e g i t i m e de l a volonte n a t i o n a l e " . 3 
Condorcet concluded the e s s a y w i t h an appeal to the Assembly to 
take the n e c e s s a r y s t e p s to prevent such a s i t u a t i o n from coming i n t o 
1. " I n s t r u c t i o n s u r 1 ' e x e r c i s e du d r o i t de s o u v e r a i n e t e " O.C. X.536-537. 
2. I b i d 538. 
3. I b i d 539. 
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being, implying t h a t he would support the people i f i t r e f u s e d to do 
so. When we bear i n mind t h a t the 10th August i n s u r r e c t i o n was the 
work, not j u s t of a s e c t i o n of the French population, but of the 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of thousands of communes s c a t t e r e d throughout F r a n c e , 
we may understand why he decided to g i v e i t h i s backing. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t i s c l e a r t h a t the i n s u r r e c t i o n cannot be con-
s i d e r e d l e g i t i m a t e a c c o r d i n g to h i s own d e f i n i t i o n s of popular 
s o v r e i g n t y . Other reasons, t h e r e f o r e , have to be found to e x p l a i n h i s 
support f o r i t . Two may be suggested. 
The f i r s t was the breakdown of h i s long-term p o l i c y of l o y a l t y 
to the c o n s t i t u t i o n between June and August 1792. As t h i s p e r i o d 
corresponds to the f i n a l s tage of the e v o l u t i o n of h i s i d e a s during 
the R e v o l u t i o n , i t i s worth examining f a i r l y c l o s e l y . 
I n r e t r o s p e c t , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to understand how the p o l i c y 
could p o s s i b l y have succeeded. By attempting to use a c o n s t i t u t i o n 
w i t h which he d i s a g r e e d as a means f o r r e v e a l i n g the King's h o s t i l i t y 
towards i t , Condorcet undoubtedly took a great r i s k . The p o l i c y ' s 
s u c c e s s dependend e n t i r e l y on f o r c i n g the King i n t o openly r e j e c t i n g 
the p r i n c i p l e s of the c o n s t i t u t i o n ; t h i s would have amounted to an 
a b d i c a t i o n and would a u t o m a t i c a l l y have made a change of c o n s t i t u t i o n 
p o s s i b l e . I f the King r e f u s e d to betray h i m s e l f i n t h i s way, then i t 
would be a b s o l u t e l y v i t a l to make i t c l e a r to a l l t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n 
was q u i t e powerless to d e a l w i t h the new problems fa c e d by the n a t i o n 
and hence to convince the Assembly of the n e c e s s i t y of a s k i n g the 
people i f they wanted a change. 
However, the war p o l i c y had, p a r a d o x i c a l l y enough, c r e a t e d j u s t 
the k i n d of s i t u a t i o n which could j e o p a r d i s e h i s plan. On the one 
hand, i t had succeeded i n u n l e a s h i n g popular f o r c e s which were of great 
value f o r b r e a k i n g the deadlock but which could b a r e l y be c ontained by 
a c o n s t i t u t i o n whose powerlessness was being u n d e r l i n e d everyday; on 
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the other hand, the p o l a r i s a t i o n of p u b l i c opinion caused by the war 
had l e d to the formation w i t h i n the Assembly i t s e l f of a group of men 
who had no i n t e n t i o n of supporting any move i n favour of changing the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . I n other words, the s i t u a t i o n was r i p e f o r what 
Condorcet had endeavoured to prevent from 1789 onwards, the outbreak 
of a c i v i l war which t h r e a t e n e d to destroy a l l t h a t the R e v o l u t i o n 
had accomplished. 
From June to August, t h e r e f o r e , we have the p i c t u r e of Condorcet 
dancing on a t i g h t r o p e between l o y a l t y to the c o n s t i t u t i o n ( i n order 
to show both the King's o p p o s i t i o n to i t and i t s inadequacy) and an 
i n c r e a s i n g l y a c t i v e support f o r emergency laws aimed a t c o n t r o l l i n g the 
new f o r c e s l e t loose by the war. The s i t u a t i o n reached a head i n August 
1792 as the f o l l o w i n g look a t h i s a c t i o n and w r i t i n g s during the two 
prev i o u s months w i l l show. 
I n June 1792, Condorcet c l e a r l y wished to remain f i r m to h i s 
" l o y a l t y " p o l i c y as i s i n d i c a t e d by the t e x t of a speech he was to have 
made to the Assembly on 1st June concerning the c i v i l l i s t . His aim 
was to de p r i v e the King of an important source of income, but i t i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t he avoided mentioning t h i s d i r e c t l y and based h i s 
c a s e e n t i r e l y on arguments d e r i v e d from c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theory and 
expressed i n very l e g a l i s t i c language. 
He argued notably t h a t the amount f i x e d by the C o n s t i t u e n t 
Assembly i n 1790 could be a l t e r e d by the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly. The 
c o n s t i t u t i o n had s a i d t h a t the amount would be reviewed a t the beginning 
of each r e i g n ; i n Condorcet's opinion, the King's s t a t u s a f t e r the 
acceptance of the constitution was so d i f f e r e n t from what i t had been 
before^ t h a t , under the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly, he could e f f e c t i v e l y be 
s a i d to have s t a r t e d a new r e i g n . 1 
1. "Sur l a l i s t e c i v i l e " O.C. X I I . 1 8 3 C f . "Le mot de 'changement de 
regne' d o i t ... s'entendre a u s s i des changements dans l e s c o n d i t i o n s 
de l a royaute". 
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He then went on to demonstrate how the aims of the o l d c i v i l l i s t 
had been so modified by new l e g i s l a t i o n t h a t i t had to be r a d i c a l l y 
a l t e r e d , i n other words reduced, 1 and concluded w i t h an e l a b o r a t e scheme 
fo r c a l c u l a t i n g the amount to be granted to the King i n such a way 
th a t the masses could be kept informed both of the amount and the uses 
2 
to which i t was put. 
These p o i n t s a r e worth mentioning p r e c i s e l y because they r e f l e c t 
w e l l h i s p o l i c y of the time - an e x p l o i t a t i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n aimed 
at t r a p p i n g the King and reducing h i s i n f l u e n c e , but without q u e s t i o n i n g 
the v a l i d i t y of the c o n s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f . That the a t t a c k on the c i v i l 
l i s t formed an i n t e g r a l part of t h i s p o l i c y i s i n d i c a t e d q u i t e c l e a r l y 
i n Condorcet's r e t r o s p e c t i v e account of the events of the time. 
"Je c r u s a l o r s ... q u ' i l f a l l a i t prof i t e r de ce ministe*re ( i . e . 
the G i r o n d i n m i n i s t r y ) pour f a i r e p a s s e r quelques l o i s u t i l e s , et 
propres a diminuer du moins l e s moyens de n u i r e que l a c o n s t i t u t i o n 
a v a i t donnes au r o i . On l e pouvait ... en diminuant l a l i s t e c i v i l e 
que l'Assemblee c o n s t i t u a n t e a v a i t provisoirement e t a b l i e , et que 
l'Assemblee a c t u e l l e a v a i t , d'apres l a c o n s t i t u t i o n a c t u e l l e , b i e n 
entendu, l ' o b l i g a t i o n e t l e d r o i t de f i x e r " . 3 
The f a c t t h a t the Assembly made no attempt to take such measures 
must have given Condorcet an idea of what to expect i n the f u t u r e , but 
he remained f i r m to h i s p o l i c y even a f t e r the d i s m i s s a l of the 
G i r o n d i n c a b i n e t on 6th June, urging the Assembly t e n days l a t e r to 
remain f a i t h f u l to the c o n s t i t u t i o n and not to rush through p a n i c 
4 
measures which v i o l a t e d i t . 
He was n e v e r t h e l e s s p e r f e c t l y aware of the danger of the s i t u a t i o n 
as i s i n d i c a t e d by h i s support f o r measures which, only two y e a r s 
before, he had s t r o n g l y a t t a c k e d . Thus, on 19th June, he h i m s e l f 
moved a motion before the Assembly c a l l i n g f o r the d e s t r u c t i o n of the 
1. I b i d 186-188. 
2. I b i d 189-190. 
3. "Fragment de J u s t i f i c a t i o n " O.C. 1.593. 
4. Chronique de P a r i s 16th June 1792 p. 669; c f . 
" t i t r e s geneologiques" belonging to the nobles." 1" T h i s a c t , which, i n 
the e a r l y days of the Rev o l u t i o n , he had i n c l u d e d among those 
i n e f f e c t i v e and demagogic measures which serv e d only to whip up the 
fury of the r e a c t i o n a r i e s , he now urged as v i t a l . T h i s e v o l u t i o n may 
only be e x p l a i n e d by h i s d e s i r e to s a t i s f y the growing impatience of 
the people. 
The 20th June announced the change which was to take p l a c e i n 
Condorcet's i d e a s i n J u l y and August. H is r e a c t i o n to the events of 
th a t day r e v e a l t h a t he was p e r f e c t l y aware of the new d i r e c t i o n which 
the King's a t t i t u d e was f o r c i n g the R e v o l u t i o n t o f o l l o w . 
"La c o a l i t i o n donna au r o i un m i n i s t e r e de v a l e t s : e t i l f u t 
prouve, pour tous l e s hommes un peu prevoyants, qu i l n y a v a i t p l u s 
de r e s s o u r c e que dans une r e v o l u t i o n n o u v e l l e , ou un mouvement q u i 
f o r c e r a i t l e r o i a changer de conduite et a l a i s s e r sans r e s e r v e l e s 
renes du gouvernement a des m i n i s t r e s p o p u l a i r e s . 
Ce f u t dans ces c i r c o n s t a n c e s q u ' a r r i v a 1 ' a f f a i r e du 20 j u i n " . 2 
As we have seen, the 20th June a c t e d as a c a t a l y s t which put an 
end to the d i v i s i o n s which had separated the Giro n d i n s and Montagnards 
over the q u e s t i o n of war. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t Condorcet re t u r n e d 
to the Jaco b i n s on th a t very day f o r the f i r s t time s i n c e the beginning 
3 
of the war. H i s plan of u s i n g the war to c r e a t e a sense of u n i t y among 
the masses had succeeded and the 20th June could be d e s c r i b e d as the 
symbol of t h i s new-found u n i t y . 
On the other hand, the 20th June was a s i g n to Condorcet t h a t 
h i s " l o y a l t y " p o l i c y had reached the l i m i t of i t s u s e f u l n e s s and would 
b a c k f i r e i f pushed too f a r . The t h r e a t s of G e n e r a l s L a f a y e t t e and 
Lukner, the demands of the "departements" d i r e c t o r i e s t h a t the r i n g -
l e a d e r s of the 20th June r e v o l t be a r r e s t e d , e t c . , were i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t 
1. " A n n i v e r s a i r e de l a seance du 19 j u i n 1790. P r o p o s i t i o n de Condorcet". 
O.C. 1.534-535. 
2. "Fragment de J u s t i f i c a t i o n " O.C. 1.594. 
3. Cf. A u l a r d op. c i t . IV.17. 
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the new u n i t y of the masses had succeeded i n f o r g i n g a l s o the u n i t y 
of the f o r c e s who opposed the regime, thus s e t t i n g the stage f o r ' c i v i l 
war. 
I t was i n t h i s atmosphere t h a t he made h i s important speech of 
6th J u l y 1792, the "Opinion s u r l e s mesures g e n e r a l e s propres a sauver 
, 1 
l a p a t r i e des dangers imminents dont e l l e e s t menacee". T h i s speech 
i s i n t e r e s t i n g i n so f a r as i t was h i s l a s t attempt to c o n c i l i a t e the 
" l o y a l t y " p o l i c y w i t h the need f o r s t r o n g measures to save F r a n c e from 
chaos. He b e l i e v e d t h a t the r e j e c t i o n of the measures he proposed would 
prove beyond a l l doubt th a t the King was h o s t i l e to a l l t h a t the 
R e v o l u t i o n stood f o r and would l e a d to the automatic suspension of the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n and the s e t t i n g up of machinery to c r e a t e a new one. 
To t h i s purpose, the measures he put forward were a l l shown to 
be v i t a l f o r the n a t i o n ' s s u r v i v a l and, above a l l , to be f u l l y j u s t i f i e d 
by the s p i r i t of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . He s t a t e d , f o r example, t h a t , as 
the King was i n v i o l a b l e , he should not be a t t a c k e d p e r s o n a l l y . However, 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n s a i d nothing about the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of the m i n i s t e r s , 
the g e n e r a l s or the a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . I t was a g a i n s t t h e s e , t h e r e f o r e , 
t h a t the bulk of the measures were to be taken. 
Thus, the m i n i s t e r s were to report d a i l y to the Assembly's 
committees on the a f f a i r s of t h e i r department; they were to be h e l d 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r any d i s o r d e r s ensuing from the King's r e f u s a l to s a n c t i o n 
an important decree; the F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r was to be a r r e s t e d i f he 
w i t h h e l d any information about the a c t i v i t i e s of a g i t a t o r s working 
a g a i n s t the S t a t e , and so on. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , Condorcet c a l l e d f o r 
the M i n i s t e r of the I n t e r i o r to inform the Assembly, on p a i n of a r r e s t , 
who i s s u e d the order which rendered the Assembly's decree dissolving the 
1. O.C. X.475-519. 
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l R o y a l bodyguard. 
Any g e n e r a l who des e r t e d h i s army (an obvious r e f e r e n c e to 
L a f a y e t t e ) , presented p r i v a t e p e t i t i o n s to the King or the Assembly, 
or who ne g o t i a t e d on h i s own i n i t i a t i v e w i t h the enemy, was to be 
2 
co n s i d e r e d g u i l t y of t r e a s o n and a r r e s t e d . 
F i n a l l y , he c a l l e d f o r the buying up of the land of a l l the 
emigres who had r e f u s e d to swear the oath proposed to them by the 
3 
Assembly i n the opening months of i t s s e s s i o n . 
However, Condorcet r e a l i s e d t h a t a l l these measures would be 
f u t i l e u n l e s s important reforms were made i n the f i n a n c i a l f i e l d . F or 
example, i t was im p e r a t i v e t h a t the King be prevented from e x e r c i s i n g 
any c o n t r o l on the f i n a n c e s ; t h e s e were to be pl a c e d i n the hands of 
4 
a d m i n i s t r a t o r s nominated f o r the purpose. 
I t i s c l e a r , however, th a t even a t so l a t e a stage, Condorcet 
s t i l l hoped t h a t the King would agree to support the c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
How e l s e may we e x p l a i n the appeal which he made to him at the end of 
h i s speech? 
"En acceptant l a c o n s t i t u t i o n , vous n'avez pu se p a r e r l e s 
pouvoirs q u ' e l l e vous donne des d e v o i r s q u ' e l l e vous impose; e t 
1 ' o b l i g a t i o n de desavouer, par un a c t e formel, toute f o r c e armee, 
employee, en votre nom, contre l a n a t i o n f r a n c h i s e , e s t l e premier, l e 
p l u s s a c r e de c e s d e v o i r s " . 5 
I t would seem t h a t , d e s p i t e the 20th June, he s t i l l r e t a i n e d an 
i n s t i n c t i v e f e a r of v i o l e n c e and d i r e c t r u l e and f e l t t h a t the King 
continued to w i e l d great emotional power over the people. 
However, the King's r e f u s a l to make the " a c t e f o r m e l " and to 
accept the measures put forward by Condorcet destroyed what remaining 
1. I b i d 507-509: "Acte du corps l e g i s l a t i f s u r l a r e s p o n s a b i l i t e des 
m i n i s t r e s " A r t s . 1, 2, 4, 5. 
2. I b i d 509-510: "Acte du corps l e g i s l a t i f s u r l a r e s p o n s a b i l i t e des 
generaux" A r t s . 1^3. 
3. I b i d 510-512: "Decret s u ^ l e s b i e n s des emigres" A r t s . 
4. I b i d 512-514: "Decret s u r l ' o r d r e a e t a b l i r dans l e s depenses 
p u b l i q u e s " A r t s . 1-3; "Decret s u r l a nomination ou l a d e s t i t u t i o n 
des a d m i n i s t r a t e u r s des d e n i e r s p u b l i c s " A r t s . 1-5. . . 
5. "Opinion s u r l e s mesures ge'ne'rales, e t c . " O.C. X..514. 
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hopes he had of r e t a i n i n g the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarchy. He t h e r e f o r e 
at l a s t abandoned h i s " l o y a l t y " p o l i c y and r a l l i e d to the ranks of those 
who now p r e s s e d f o r the c o n s t i t u t i o n ' s suspension. T h i s was done i n 
e f f e c t on 11th J u l y when B r i s s o t proclaimed " l a p a t r i e en danger". 
A week l a t e r Condorcet was among nine d e p u t i e s e l e c t e d t o the 
"Commission des Douze". T h i s body, the a n c e s t o r of the "Comite de 
S a l u t P u b l i c " , now became the most powerful f o r c e i n the country, i t s 
s p e c i f i c purpose being to ensure t h a t the Assembly's decrees were put 
i n t o o p e r a t i o n . 
I n o t h e r words, Condorcet's e l e c t i o n to the presidency of the 
commission i n p l a c e of the moderate P a s t o r e t marked the z e n i t h of h i s 
p o l i t i c a l c a r e e r and i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that t h i s event should have 
taken p l a c e p r e c i s e l y during the c r i s i s which he had always c o n s i d e r e d 
i n e v i t a b l e i n the absence of any l e g a l method f o r changing the con-
s t i t u t i o n . 
The second reason why Condorcet supported the 10th August 
i n s u r r e c t i o n was t h a t i t not only served to break the deadlock which 
threatened to destroy the R e v o l u t i o n , but t h a t i t d i d so without 
provoking a g e n e r a l breakdown of law and order. On the c o n t r a r y , 
events c o u l d not r e a l l y have taken a b e t t e r t u r n . The King's d e c i s i o n 
to seek refuge w i t h the people's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n the N a t i o n a l 
Assembly amounted to an admission of f a i l u r e . By h i g h l i g h t i n g the 
Assembly's a u t h o r i t y i n so f o r c e f u l a manner, he p a r a d o x i c a l l y paved 
the way f o r those who wished to see i n t h i s move the e q u i v a l e n t of an 
a b d i c a t i o n . 
I t became much e a s i e r i n the c i r c u m s t a n c e s to take the s t e p s 
which could now alone impose order on the n a t i o n - the suspension of 
the King and the e l e c t i o n of a convention. 
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The p e r i o d June 1791 to September 1792 was thus one of con-
s i d e r a b l e s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the e v o l u t i o n of Condorcet's i d e a s . D e s p i t e 
the l i n e a r p r o g r e s s i v e movement which saw them g r a d u a l l y evolve towards 
support f o r war and away from the t o l e r a n c e which he had p r e v i o u s l y 
shown to the emigres and c l e r g y , i t may best be compared to a c i r c l e . 
I t began a f t e r the King's f l i g h t w i t h the important breakthrough i n 
Condorcet's i d e a s on the o r g a n i s a t i o n of the e x e c u t i v e , was followed by 
a r e t u r n to the a t t i t u d e of compromise which c h a r a c t e r i s e d the 
Condorcet of the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly p e r i o d and ended w i t h what may 
be c o n s i d e r e d as the King's second f l i g h t . 
T h i s time, however, the King's departure was to be d e f i n i t i v e 
and the p e r i o d reached i t s c o n c l u s i o n w i t h Condorcet on the t h r e s h o l d 
of at l a s t p u t t i n g i n t o p r a c t i c e the i d e a s which he had d e s c r i b e d some 
nin e t e e n months before. I n s h o r t , t h i s p e r i o d marks the slow d i s -
i n t e g r a t i o n of the network of compromises and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s brought 
about by h i s attempts to adapt the plan he had draughted before 1789 
to the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of the y e a r s 1790 and 1791 and paves the 
way f o r the s y n t h e s i s which he at l a s t saw the opportunity of 
a c h i e v i n g . 
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CHAPTER IV 
a) CONDORCET.'g WRITINGS. AND ACTIVITIES BETWEEN 
10th AUGUST 1792 and 20th JANUARY 1793• 
I n a thesis concerned with the development of Condorcet's ideas 
during the Revolution there i s l i t t l e t o be said about his a c t i v i t i e s 
and writings during the weeks leading to the s e t t i n g up of the Convention 
and the f i r s t few months of i t s deliberations. The most important aspect 
of t h i s period was the need, greater than ever, to channel the new lease 
of l i f e given t o the Revolution by the 10th August uprising i n the 
d i r e c t i o n of u n i t y . P r a c t i c a l l y a l l Condorcet's a c t i v i t i e s during t h i s 
period were directed towards t h i s end and i t i s as the crowning phase of 
his policy throughout the Revolution that the months leading from 
August 1792 t o February 1793 appear most s i g n i f i c a n t . 
From I789 to 1791 Condorcet had concentrated his policy on seeking 
a compromise between the desires of those elements who wished to press 
ahead with the Revolution and those who were s a t i s f i e d with the s p i r i t 
of the Constitution and had no desire to go any further. I n effe c t t h i s 
meant supporting the l i b e r a l element of the aristocracy and upper 
bourgeoisie represented f o r the most part by those who were l a t e r t o 
be called the Feuillants. 
By August 1792 of course the Feuillants no longer represented the 
middle road and, as has been seen, t h e i r leaders now r a l l i e d to the 
ranks of those who had opposed the Revolution from the beginning. The 
break-through of the "passive" citizens and the consequent r i s e t o power 
of Robespierre's supporters l e f t the l i n e s of b a t t l e c l e a r l y drawn 
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between the two factions who were to dominate the Convention: Girondins 
and Montagnards. Behind these factions l a y a whole series of c o n f l i c t s and 
divisions which may, i n a very general manner, be reduced to two headings: 
the d i v i s i o n between Paris and the provinces and the d i v i s i o n between 
the passive citizens who now claimed t h e i r share of the power which had 
been denied them since the beginning of the Revolution and the property 
owners who wished to preserve the r i g h t s and privileges which had been 
accorded them by the constitution. 
For the purpose of c l a r i t y we may divide t h i s struggle i n t o two 
phases, the f i r s t l a s t i n g from 10th August 1792 t o the s e t t i n g up of 
the Convention on 20th September, the second l a s t i n g down to the f a l l 
of the Girondins i n June 1793-
1) 10th August 1792 - 20th September 1792 
As Soboul has shown''" two d i s t i n c t "powers" now governed Prance -
the National Assembly and the revolutionary Commune of Paris. The l a t t e r 
had ousted the old Commune of 1789 and, af t e r elections, had increased 
i t s membership to 288. The Assembly, faced with the " f a i t accompli", 
had been obliged to give way and continued to do so throughout August. 
I t thus allowed the Commune to nominate "commissaires" t o supervise the 
workings of the administrative bodies throughout the country and, under 
Commune pressure, ordered the municipalities on 11th August t o arrest a l l 
people suspected of opposing the new regime. 
On 17th August the Assembly* bowed to the Commune's wish for a 
"Tribunal criminel extraordinaire" consisting of judges elected by the 
Parisian sections. The sweeping measures brought i n against the Church 
1. Op. c i t . pp.303-304. 
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on the 10th, l 6 t h , l 8 t h and 20th August and 20th September (notably 
the decree expelling a l l priests who refused t o swear an oath of 
l o y a l t y t o the nation, and the Church's loss of control over the 
r e g i s t r a t i o n of b i r t h s , deaths and marriages) were further r e f l e c t i o n s 
of the Commune's influence. This reached a height w i t h i t s request on 
28th August that a l l houses be searched for arms, the consequent arrests 
of 30th August and the massacres of 2nd-6th September which the Assembly, 
was powerless to prevent or even stop.^" 
I t was against t h i s background that Condorcet struggled t o preserve 
the revolutionaries' u n i t y of purpose, and he did so, sometimes by 
attacking the more extreme demands of the Commune, sometimes by 
attempting t o j u s t i f y the necessity of such demands to the provinces. 
The most important step which he took i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n , and one 
which the c r i t i c s who accuse Condorcet of inconsistency are quick t o 
point out, was the unqualified support which he gave t o Danton i n 
August 1792. Condorcet i s inconsistent i n so far as his closest friends 
i n the revolutionary movement were t o be found among the Girondins who 
hated Danton. Helene Delsaux has also pointed out that, only a year before, 
Condorcet "declarait dedaigneusement dans l a Chronique (de Paris), q u ' i l 
i \ 2 
ne se commettait pas avec l u i et q u ' i l ne l e connaissait meme pas." 
I n retrospect, i t i s easy t o condemn Condorcet's decision t o 
support Danton; i t i s clear, however, that at a time when no one body 
could claim t o represent t r u l y the wishes of the people, i t was v i t a l that 
1. Cf. Soboul, op. c i t . pp.305-3H. 
2. Delsaux, op. c i t . p.133; Mathiez mentions Condoreet's angry 
reaction when Danton used the columns of the Chronique de Paris 
to announce his election to the post of "Substitut d©. procureur 
de l a Commune" on 6th December 1791- Cf. Autour de Danton, 
Paris, Payot, 1926, p-99-
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a strong personality should hold together the d i f f e r e n t parts of the 
revolutionary movement u n t i l the time when a new elected body could 
come in t o being. Danton seemed to possess a l l the q u a l i t i e s f o r the r o l e . 
A modern h i s t o r i a n has summed up the characteristics which are often 
associated with Danton i n the writings of a great many commentators 
on the Revolution: ... eloquent, d une maniere populaire et sans 
appret, r e a l i s t e , sachant manoeuvrer comme se decider avec audace, 
foncierement genereux et profondement jouisseur, pret a 1'emportement 
et incapable de rancune""'' and i t i s i n similar terms that Condorcet 
himself spoke of him: 
"On m'a reproche d'avoir donne' ma voix a Danton pour §tre 
ministre de l a j u s t i c e . V o i c i mes raisons. I I f a l l a i t dans 
l e ministere un homme qui eut l a confiance de ce meme peuple 
dont les agitations venaient de renverser l e trone; i l f a l l a i t 
... un homme qui, par son ascendant, put contenir les instruments 
tres meprisables d une revolution u t i l e , glorieuse et necessaire; 
et i l f a l l a i t que cet homme, par son t a l e n t pour l a parole, par 
son e s p r i t , par 8on caractere, n ' a v i l i t pas l e ministere n i les 
membres de l'Assemblee nationale qui auraient a t r a i t e r avec l u i . 
Danton seul avait ces qualites: je l e choisis et je ne m'en 
repens point. ... D'ailleurs Danton a cette quali t e s i precieuse 
que n'ont jamais les hommes ordinaires, i l ne h a i t ou ne cra i n t 
n i les lumieres, n i les t a l e n t s , n i l a vertu."^ > 
Soboul has shown the important r o l e played by the Conseil Exe'cutif 
3 
during the v i t a l weeks leading t o the election of the Convention . I t 
was the only body which could act as l i a i s o n between the two assemblies 
which now e f f e c t i v e l y governed the country. Danton's past h i s t o r y as a mem-
ber of the Cordeliers i n s t i n c t i v e l y led him to lean towards the Commune, 
and i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o quote the end of Condorcet's j u s t i f i c a t i o n of 
his decision to support Danton as a r e f l e c t i o n of his general a t t i t u d e 




Soboul, op. c i t . p.305. 
J u s t i f i c a t i o n I . 602-603. 
Op. c i t . p.304. 
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Peut-etre exagera-t-il les maximes des constitutions 
populaires, dans l e sens d'une trop grande deference aux 
idees du peuple, d'un trop grand emploi dans les a f f a i r e s , 
de ses mouvements et de ses opinions. Mais l e principe de 
n'agir qu'avec l e peuple et par l u i , en l e dirigeant, est 
l e seul qui dans un temps de revolution populaire, puisse 
sauver les l o i s ; et tous les pa r t i s qui se separeront du 
peuple f i n i r o n t par se perdre, et peut-etre par l e perdre avec 
eux."l 
These words c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e the conflict-, which affected Condorcet's 
a t t i t u d e towards events throughout the Revolution, between the supporter of 
order, keen to see that everything was done v i a the proper c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
channels, and the r e a l i s t who was quick to see where the balance of power 
lay and t o adapt his ideas i n consequence. 
Faced with t h i s dilemma yet again, Condorcet, between August and 
September 1792, opted for a three-fold course of action. The middle course 
consisted i n ex p l o i t i n g the one point on which the two factions which now 
dominated the Revolution could unite - namely t h e i r common h o s t i l i t y towards 
the emigre's ( c f . the decrees of l 4 t h and 25th August concerning the sale 
of t h e i r lands i n small portions and the a b o l i t i o n of the remaining feudal • 
dues). Hence Condorcet supported a l l the measures taken against them and 
dwelt at length, i n the various addresses which he wrote to the people, on 
the danger represented by the King and his a l l i e s . This theme he had 
expressed eloquently as early as 13th August i n the "Exposition des motifs 
d'apres lesquels l'Assemblee nationale a proclame l a convocation d'une conventioi 
nationale, et prononce l a suspension du fcei pouvoir executif dans les mains des 
2 /• r o i s , " but he returned t o i t s i x days l a t e r i n the "Adresse de l'Assemblee ' 
nationale aux Franq^ais, imprimee par son ordre, envoyee aux 83 departements 
1. J u s t i f i c a t i o n I . 602-603-
2. O.C. X. 545-564. 
-244-
et a. l'armee." This theme also runs through one of the l a s t a r t i c l e s 
he wrote before the Convention, the "Adresse de l'Assemblee nationale 
2 
aux Francais" and plays a major part i n the appeal f o r u n i t y which he 
made on the day the Convention actually met, the essay Sur l a necessite 
de l'union entre les citoyens". 
The second aspect of Condorcet's action lay i n his opposition t o any 
moves taken by the Commune and i t s extremist supporters which might 
jeopardise the nation's u n i t y . His anxiety i s ref l e c t e d i n the constant 
appeals he made to the people to remain l o y a l t o the Assembly, s t a r t i n g 
with a text published on the very day of the insurrection: "L'assemblee 
nationale s'occupe de preparer les l o i s que des circonstances s i extra-
ordinaires, ont rendu necessaires. E l l e i n v i t e les citoyens, au .nom de 
la p a t r i e , ... a se r a l l i e r a e l l e , a 1 aider a sauver l a chose publique, 
a ne pas aggraver, par de funestes divisions, les maux et les divisions 
.. 4 
de 1 empire. 
He was so af r a i d that the people i n the provinces might not 
understand the motives of the Parisians that he urged the Assembly, 
on l 8 t h August, t o inform the provinces c l e a r l y why they had agreed t o 
5 
suspend the King at the wish of the Paris d i s t r i c t s . His h o s t i l i t y t o 
the too d i r e c t action of the Commune and i t s extremists was c l e a r l y 
1. O.C. X. 573-577-
2. O.C. X. 579-585. 
3. O.C. X I I . 215-221. 
4. Adresse aux citoyens de Paris sur l e maintien de l a t r a n q u i l l i t e 
publique, O.C. X. 5^1-5^4. 
5- Chronique de Paris, l 8 t h August 1792, p.921; Cahen op.cit. p.425-
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expressed on two occasions. On l 8 t h August he strongly attacked the 
request of the Parisian d i s t r i c t s that the Tribunal Criminel Extra-
1 
ordinaire be made up of people chosen from among t h e i r members. The 
second occasion took place af t e r the September massacres which he 
considered to be the consequence of the a c t i v i t i e s of people such as 
2 
Marat. He i s at pains i n the " j u s t i f i c a t i o n t o emphasise that these 
people constituted a t i n y minority w i t h i n the Commune, but his words seem 
to betray a much more profound d i s t r u s t of the Commune's behaviour. 
"Les massacres du 2 septembre ... n'ont pas ete l'ouvrage du peuple ... 
C'est ce l u i d'un p e t i t nombre de factieux, qui ont eu l ' a r t ... de 
tromper les citoyens et 1 Assemblee nationale ... De l a cette l u t t e entre 
1 Assemblee nationale et l a Commune de Paris, l u t t e f a c i l e a eviter en 
s'adressant aux sections qui ne partageaient point l ' e s p r i t v i o l e n t ... 
de cette commune; en se servant de l a commune elle-meme, qui gemissait 
sous l a tyrannie de quelques v i l s agitateurs." The implication here 
seems to be that the whole Commune was i n fact controlled by these 
extremists and thus represented a danger. 
I t i s true t o say, however, that Condorcet's awareness of the 
basic importance of Paris as a bulwark against the dangers of reaction 
was stronger than his fear of alienating the provinces. I t i s perhaps 
for t h i s reason that c r i t i c s have r i g h t l y emphasised his r e l a t i v e l y 
moderate reaction to the massacres. At a time when France was invaded 
1. Chronique de Paris, l 6 t h August 1792, p.906. 
2. Cf. also his Chronique de Paris, a r t i c l e s of 4 and 8th September 1792. 
Cf. Delsaux op. c i t . pp.133-134. 
3. I b i d . I . 603-604. 
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by Prussian troops, whose siege of Verdun on 2nd September, following 
closely on the capture of Longwy s i x days before, had precipitated the 
massacres, and at a time when the f i r s t elections for two years were about 
to take place, i t would have been extremely clumsy, on Condorcet's part, 
to give p u b l i c i t y t o events which could only have destroyed the f e e l i n g 
of u n i t y which he was struggling so hard to create. 
I t i s thus the t h i r d aspect of his action - support for the Commune -
which i s the most important. On the 10th August he had already expressed his 
f a i t h i n the good w i l l of the majority of the citizens of Paris: 
Aujourd hu i , les citoyens de Paris ont declare au corps l e g i s l a t i f 
I ' / A / „ 1 
qu i l e t a i t l a seule autorite qui eut conserve leur confiance . 
Thereafter he bowed to most of the sweeping measures taken by the 
Assembly under the pressure of the Commune. He thus hailed the decrees 
which were aimed at the r e f r a c t o r y prie s t s , believing that they were 
2 
necessary i f a l l the t r a i t o r s were to be unmasked; at no time did he 
oppose such emergency measures as house-searches, arrest of suspects, etc. 
and, despite his b e l i e f i n the r i g h t of property^ and "laisse.z f a i r e " 
economics, made no protest when the Commune persuaded the Assembly to 
pass the decrees of 9th and l 6 t h September by which the " D i s t r i c t 
d i r e c t o r i e s " were t o proceed to the r e q u i s i t i o n i n g of grain. 
1. Adresse aux citoyens, etc. X. 543« 
2. Chronique de Paris, 15th August 1792, p.910; Cahen, p.427. 
3. Repeated as recently as 10th August: "Elle (l'Assemblee 
nationale) i n v i t e les citoyens ... de v e i l l e r a ce que les 
dr o i t s de 1'homme soient respectes, et les propriete's 
assurees" (Adresse aux citoyens, etc., X. 543-544.) 
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2. The Convention ' 
As a member of the Convention, Condorcet na t u r a l l y endeavoured 
to follow his policy of c o n c i l i a t i o n . From the beginning, however, 
i t was clear that the task he had set himself was going t o be extremely 
d i f f i c u l t . The very fact that he was deterred from presenting his 
candidature i n Paris and was eventually elected by f i v e provincial 
departements i s i l l u s t r a t i v e of the problems he was to face.. For the 
Montagnards, Condorcet was a Girondin and his numerous appeals to the 
provinces t o accept the measures imposed by the Parisian sections on the 
Assembly were interpreted as attempts t o gain the sympathy of public 
opinion outside Paris as a preliminary step towards using t h i s as a weapon 
against the c a p i t a l . 
Condorcet was b i t t e r l y disappointed not t o have been able t o 
represent Paris i n the Convention, as the " j u s t i f i c a t i o n " indicates''', 
and he attempted t o anticipate the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t o which t h i s f a i l u r e 
placed his policy by declaring, during the very f i r s t week of the 
Convention, that he would refuse t o follow the policy of any one group 
of people: " j e ne serai d'aucun p a r t i , comme je n'ai ete d'aucum 
jusque-la. I t i s clear i n the context of the times that he was here 
attempting t o disassociate himself from the Girondins with whom he had 
so often been i d e n t i f i e d i n the past; thus, i t i s w i t h reference to t h e i r 
ideas that the t r u t h of his declaration may be v e r i f i e d . 
I n the f i e l d of foreign a f f a i r s we cannot say that Condorcet 
departed very f a r from the a t t i t u d e of the Girondins. On 21st November 1792 
1. I . 605. 
2. I n s t . Mss. N.S. N° 21 dossier B, N° 1, c f . Cahen op. c i t . 4 j f ; 
Delsaux op. c i t . p.24l. 
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Brissot, then President of the Comite diplomatique, had called for the 
creation of a r i n g of small republics surrounding Prance and had 
announced that t h i s could be achieved i f the French armies continued to 
put pressure on the kings and princes of the various European states.^" 
This ideal was repeated several times by Condorcet i n his "Chronique de 
2 
Paris" a r t i c l e s of the time . I t recurs i n the three passionate 
"memoires" which he addressed t o the peoples of Spain, Prussia and the 
Netherlands during the same period, urging them t o tu r n away from the 
foredoomed enterprises of t h e i r respective rulers and t o follow the 
3 
example of the French people. 
I t i s true t o say, however, that Condorcet was here merely following 
the general w i l l of the Convention which had enthusiastically passed the 
famous decree of the 19th November 1792 by which France undertook t o offer 
4 
aid to any peoples who wished to overthrow t h e i r despots . 
To f i n d proof of his reluctance to follow the Girondins the whole 
way, we must look t o his a t t i t u d e towards the war i n the opening weeks 
of the Convention. This contrasts strongly with the bellicose a t t i t u d e 
which he was to adopt i n November and December. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note 
that i t coincided w i t h the ideas, i f anyone, of Danton. Thus, on 28th September 
he enthusiastically supported Danton's appeal f o r the French not t o follow 
5 
a policy of " l i b e r a t i o n " of the oppressed peoples of Europe . Condorcet 1. Soboul op. c i t . pp.336-337-
2. Cf. 6th November 1793, p.1242; 2nd December 1793, p.1345; 
16th December 1793* pp.l401-l402; Cahen, 448. 
3- Cf. Avis aux Espagnols O.C. X I I . 121-136; Adresse aux Bataves 
O.C. X I I . 137-148; Adresse aux Germains, O.C. X I I . 149-166. 
4. Cf. Soboul, p.336. 
5. Cf. Chronique de Paris, 30th September 1792. 
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was convinced that the war had now f u l f i l l e d i t s purpose and could not 
solve Prance's problems. Victory would only increase the dangers of a 
m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p while defeat would exacerbate the i n t e r n a l divisions 
and create a climate of insecurity which would lead to more massacres. 
Consequently, the two important memoires which he wrote during t h i s period, 
the essay "La Republique francaise aux hommes libres"^" and the "Lettre 
\ 2 
a M magistrat de l a v i l l e de ... en Suisse" represent appeals t o 
the governments of Prussia and Switzerland t o cease t h e i r war policy and 
come to terms w i t h the French republic. That both writings had the 
support of Danton i s indicated by the fact that they were very s w i f t l y 
printed and sent t o the d i f f e r e n t parts of Prance and abroad. I t was 
only when they were rejected by the nations t o which they were sent that 
Condorcet rejoined the ranks of those who wished to pursue the war t o 
the end. 
I n the f i e l d of i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s , however, there can be no doubt 
that Condorcet remained true t o his i n t e n t i o n of not siding with any 
party. Evidence i s to be found i n the a r t i c l e s which he wrote almost 
d a i l y i n the Chronique de Paris throughout the l a s t few months of 1792^, 
condemning with great consistency any moves, whether on the part of 
Girondins or Montagnards, which endangered the u n i t y of the nation. 
I t i s on the question of national u n i t y that Condorcet's opposition 
t o the Girondins may f i r s t be c l e a r l y seen. The truce between the two 
1. O.C. X I I . 107-119. 
2. O.C. X I I . 167-177. 
3. Many writers on Condorcet have drawn att e n t i o n t o the fact that his 
i l l n e s s and his i n a b i l i t y t o communicate his ideas i n the passionate 
atmosphere of the Convention were responsible for his increasing 
reliance on newspaper a r t i c l e s . 
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parties during the f i r s t few weeks of the Convention was symbolised by 
the passing of the two v i t a l decrees of the 21st and 25th September. 
The f i r s t abolished the monarchy and was triumphantly acclaimed by 
Condorcet i n his a r t i c l e of 22nd September"*". The 
second solemnly declared that " l a Republique franchise est une et 
i n d i v i s i b l e " , a move for which Condorcet had campaigned throughout 
the Revolution. I n fact the truce was a very uneasy one, i f only because 
of the d i f f e r e n t conceptions of national u n i t y which were held by the 
two parties. The Girondin conception was revealed i n the statement 
made by the deputy Lasource on 25th September desiring that the departement 
of Paris " s o i t r eduit a un Sje d'influence comme chacun des autres 
> ..2 
departements, a clear attack on the influence of the Parisian citizens 
and t h e i r deputies. This statement i s the antithesis of the one made 
by Condorcet i n his appeal of 20th September: "La France a besoin d'etre 
/ V IS , 
f o r t e pour r e s i s t e r a ses ennemis et pour etre f o r t e , e l l e a besoin d un 
centre commun" . One would have thought that Condorcet's f a i l u r e to be 
elected as a representative of 'Paris would have destroyed his f a i t h i n 
t h i s centralised conception of u n i t y ; however his writings of October 
and November 1792 indicate the opposite. 
Matters reached a head on the question of law and order and i t s 
importance for the cause of uni t y . On 24th September Condorcet had 
supported Roland's demands that law and order i n the c a p i t a l and elsewhere 
4 
be strongly enforced so as to prevent d i s u n i t y and anarchy and had even 
1. pp.1061-62; Cahen, 451. 
2. Cf. Soboul, p.320. 
•3- Sur l a necessite de l'union entre les citoyens, O.C. X I I . 220. 
4. Chronique de Paris, p. 1070. 
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taken the r i s k of supporting Kersaint's decree that anyone who i n c i t e d 
the mobs to murder should be very severely punished^. However when he 
discovered that the Girondin's conception of mob-control involved 
sending troops from the provinces to Paris an idea which, i n so far as i t 
2 
r e f l e c t e d the unity of the August days, he had o r i g i n a l l y accepted , he 
reacted very strongly, pointing out the grave consequences which such a move 
could have i f the c i t i z e n s of Paris chose to regard i t as a provocation"^. 
4 
His attack on the a r r i v a l of a contingent from Marseille on 20th October 
symbolises h i s awareness of how the balance of power had s h i f t e d since the 
a r r i v a l of the M a r s e i l l a i s only two months before. 
This i s indicated by the fact that, although Condorcet was aware 
that the Montagnards were i n part responsible for the atmosphere of 
tension which dominated the Convention, i t was the Girondins who were 
more often than not the victims of h i s attacks. His occasional 
complaints against the Robespierristes as when he accused them of 
gratuitously attacking B r i s s o t on l 8 t h December 1792 , are f a r outnumbered 
by h i s frequent defences of Robespierre against the accusations of 
6 7 
Girondins such as Barbaroux and Louvet , or even by h i s defence of Marat 
8 
whom he personally despised . S i m i l a r l y h i s occasional appeals to the people 
9 
of Paris to respect the Assembly are outnumbered by h i s attacks against 
1. 26th September 1792, i b i d p.1078; Cahen, 451. 
2. Cf. Chronique de Paris, 7th October 1792, p.1121; Cahen, 452. 
3. I b i d . 21st October 1792, pp.1177-78, Cahen, 452. 
4. I b i d . p.1174. 
5. I b i d , p.1409; Cahen, 454. 
6. I b i d , 27th September, pp.l08l-82; Cahen, 455. 
7. 31st October, p.1213. 
8. e.g. I b i d . 22nd October, p . l l 8 l ; Cahen, 455. 
9. e.g. l 8 t h December, p.l4l0. 
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those who wished t o di s c r e d i t the Convention by attacking the Paris 
Commune^, his repeated claims that Paris and the provinces were i n t e r -
dependent and his further protest at the idea of a "garde departementale" 
i n Paris^. 
I n contrast t o his opposition t o the Girondins rather w i l d schemes 
for ensuring the nation s uni t y , Condorcet f u l l y supported such ideas of 
Danton's as the re-election of the administrative bodies, a move which 
4 
he believed would r e v i t a l i s e the people's f a i t h i n t h e i r administrators,. 
This leads us t o the second point on which a divergence between 
Condorcet and the Girondins may be cl e a r l y seen. To condorcet, Danton 
,came increasingly t o represent the middle way between the two "parties" 
and i t was his defence of Danton which served, more than anything else, 
to separate him from the Girondins between September and December 1792. 
The brunt of his attacks f e l l on Roland who i s generally considered t o 
have been responsible for the Girondin onslaught on Danton. Thus, on 
1st October, he b i t t e r l y attacked the Convention f o r allowing Roland 
5 
to remain a minister while r e t a i n i n g his place i n the Assembly , an 
accumulation of functions which contrasted strongly with Danton's resignation 
( a l b e i t under Girondin pressure) from the post of Minister of Justice nine 
6 
days l a t e r . 
1. e.g. 12th October, p . l l 4 l - . 
2. e.g. 1st November, p.1222. 
3. 18th November, p.1289. 
4. I b i d . 23rd September, p.1065. 
5. I b i d . p.1097. 
6. Cf. Soboul, op. c i t . p.321. 
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On 31st October he vehemently denounced Roland's report on the 
s i t u a t i o n i n Paris as a pack of l i e s destined to destroy the reputation 
of the Commune^ and struck again at Roland on 21st November, accusing him 
of having concealed from the Assembly the whereabouts of Louis XVT's 
2 
secret papers . 
Condorcet's attacks on the Girondins were so frequent during t h i s 
period t h a t , despite his background and past a c t i v i t i e s , the Montagnards 
themselves gradually ceased t o i d e n t i f y him with t h e i r d i r e c t opponents. 
Thus, the Montagnard Chabot assured his colleague Thuriot that Condorcet 
was not responsible for an a r t i c l e i n the "Chronique de Paris" which had 
attacked them, saying notably that i t was no longer possible to prove that 
Condorcet was a B r i s s o t i n ^ . Albert Cahen cites the memoirs of another 
Montagnard, Paganel, who states that Condorcet's path during the 
4 
Convention could be assimilated to that of no single group . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
Condorcet, unlike Brissot, was not expelled from the Jacobins during t h i s 
period. 
Condorcet's solo r o l e i s nowhere better seen than i n the t r i a l 
of the King which took place between the 11th December 1792 and 
19th January 1793' A study of his a t t i t u d e towards the t r i a l i s of 
extreme importance i n so far as i t indicates how consistent, despite 
everything else, he remained to his fundamental b e l i e f s throughout the 
Revolution. He may be accused of v a c i l l a t i o n s and of having always 
1. Chronique de Paris, p.1212. 
2. I b i d . p.1302. 
3. Cf. Aulard: Jacobins, IV. 379, Delsaux, p.243. 
4. I I . 215-225; Cahen, 457. 
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sought compromises; however, i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o prove that at 
any time he had sanctioned a law which b l a t a n t l y violated the basic 
premise of his ideology - the doctrine of the r i g h t s of man. 
I t i s on t h i s question of ideology that Condorcet's position 
appears t r u l y unique and distinguishes him from both the Girondins 
and Montagnards. Although historians d i f f e r as to the true intentions 
of the former, i t i s clear from the weakness of the arguments which 
they put forward against the t r i a l of the King that t h e i r a t t i t u d e was 
governed more by the fear of taking so drastic a step than by any 
coherent philosophical p r i n c i p l e . Thus when Vergniaud sought t o protect 
the King by pointing out that the Constitution of 1791 declared him to 
be i n v i o l a b l e , he forgot that the c o n s t i t u t i o n i n question had been drawn 
up by an Assembly elected by a minority of the nation. We have seen how 
Condorcet, on " u t i l i t a r i a n " grounds, had accepted the v a l i d i t y of the 
Constituent Assembly. The 10th August revolution had e f f e c t i v e l y destroyed 
t h i s v a l i d i t y ; a new co n s t i t u t i o n had not yet replaced i t ; the sole 
c r i t e r i a which could serve as a basis for government during the interim 
were constituted by the r i g h t s of man. 
Consequently Condorcet gave no support t o the pseudo-constitutional 
arguments of the Girondins. He was himself convinced of t h e i r i n s i n c e r i t y , 
as i s indicated by the way i n which he strongly attacked the Girondin demand 
that the King's fate be placed i n the hands of the people, pointing out on 
28th December just how dangerous such a move would be at a time of i n t e r n a l 
crisis"'". He might also have pointed out that 
such a step destroyed the basis of Vergniaud's case and thus i l l u s t r a t e d 
unronique ae r a r i s , p.ngu. 
1. Robespierre had made the same point i n an e a r l i e r speech which Condorcet 
had supported. Cf. Chronique de Paris; 29th December 1792, p.l454. 
Cf. Mathiez: Girondins et Montagnards, Paris, Firmin-Didat, 1930, 
pp.62-64 f o r an account of the clash between the two parties at t h i s time. 
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the weakness of the Girondins' attempts t o clothe t h e i r feelings under the 
camouflage of ideological arguments. 
The case of the Montagnards too shows the same inconsistency, 
swinging from statements of an ideological nature t o arguments based 
on " u t i l i t a r i a n " considerations such as the defence of the nation; at 
times both ideas are combined. For Saint-Just, for example, the King 
symbolised the ideology of the Ancien Regime. I f the new ideology, that 
of the Republic, was to triumph, then the whole notion of Divine Right , 
would have t o be destroyed. This could only be done by destroying the 
incarnation of Divine Right, the King. I n Saint-Just's view, two . . 
conceptions of Government were at stake; a l l other considerations had 
no place on a question of such fundamental importance: "Les memes hpmmes 
qui vont juger Louis oht une republique a fonder: ceux qui attachent 
quelque importance au juste chatiment d'un r o i ne fonderont jamais une 
republique ... Pour moi, je ne vois pas de milieu: cet homme d o i t 
* . .,1 regner ou mourir. 
The same tone was adopted by Robespierre i n his speech of 3rd December: 
Proposer de f a i r e l e proces de Louis XVT de quel-que maniere que ce puisse 
etre ... est une idee contre-revolutionnaire, car c est mettre l a Revolution 
* «2 elle-meme en l i t i g e . 
Saint-Just's arguments are more "down-to-earth" at times: "(Louis) 
est l e meurtrier de l a B a s t i l l e , de Nancy, du Champ-de Mars, de Tourney, 
1. Cf. Soboul, op., c i t . p.330. Cf. also Albert O l l i v i e r : Saint-Just, 
ou l a force des choses,- Paris, Gallimard, 1952., pp.173-174; 
Geoffrey Bruun: Saint-Just, apostle of the t e r r o r , New York, 
Archon Books, 1966, p.30. 
2. Cf. Soboul, p.331. 
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des T u i l e r i e s , quel ennemi, quel etranger vous a f a i t plus de mal? 
Here Louis i s placed on a lower l e v e l i n so f a r as he i s compared to 
any one of the opponents of France ( a l b e i t the worst) and i s not seen i n 
purely abstract terms. I n his speech, however, Robespierre places both 
ideas on the same footing. "Le r o i n'est point un accuse, vous n'etes 
point des juges. Vous n'avez point une sentence a rendre pour ou 
2 
contre un homme, mais une mesure de salut public a prendre ; un acte 
* «3 
de providence nationale a exercer. 
Unlike the Girondins and the Montagnards, Condorcet does not judge 
Louis as King but, with implacable l o g i c , takes his stand on the one 
doctrine which, at so c r u c i a l a moment, he f e l t could alone keep the 
Revolution s t r i c t l y w i t h i n i t s ideological bounds, namely the doctrine 
of the Rights of Man. 
By considering Louis as a man, an ordinary c i t i z e n , Condorcet 
was able to oppose the arguments of both the Girondins and the Montagnards. 
As a man, Louis had f o r f e i t e d the i n v i o l a b i l i t y which the Constitution 
had granted t o the King. This i s the d r i f t of the superbly argued passage 
of the essay e n t i t l e d "Opinion sur l e jugement de Louis XVI" i n which he 
destroys one by one the e f f o r t s of the Girondins t o point out that the 
5 
nation did not have the r i g h t t o t r y the King . 
1. I b i d . p.330. 
2. i.e..,A " u t i l i t a r i a n " argument based on the fear of France's enemies. 
3. I b i d . p.331; i . e . an ideological argument where the national w i l l 
i s seen as the new god which w i l l destroy the old. 
4. O.C. X I I . 267-303. 
5. cf. pp.270-286. 
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The g i s t of these arguments i s as follows: the Constitution said 
the King was i n v i o l a b l e ; the only guarantee of t h i s i n v i o l a b i l i t y was 
thus the c o n s t i t u t i o n and i t was only i n so far as the King obeyed the 
co n s t i t u t i o n that he was i n v i o l a b l e . Now that i t was clear he had 
betrayed the c o n s t i t u t i o n , he had f o r f e i t e d his r i g h t t o i n v i o l a b i l i t y . 
He could not be judged as a King, but i n so far as he had betrayed his 
country, he could be judged as any other c i t i z e n who had done the same 
thing."'" 
. Having established that the King could be t r i e d precisely because 
he was a man, Condorcet was not able to oppose the Montagnard's wish 
fo r an immediate execution. As a man the King benefited from the human 
r i g h t of "securite", the f i r s t one mentioned by Condorcet i n his famous 
2 
summary of the doctrine i n 1788 and t h i s entailed a f a i r t r i a l w i t h a l l 
that that implied i n terms of j u r i e s , etc. 
Having thus attacked the Montagnards' arguments against the t r i a l 
i n the Chronique de Paris of 5th and 6th November , he proceeded t o outline 
the system which he alone believed could ensure that Louis was t r i e d 
according t o the conditions demanded by the doctrine of the r i g h t s of man. 
This meant, i n the f i r s t place, attacking the r i g h t s of the 
Convention t o set i t s e l f up as a Supreme Court. Not only did t h i s create 
a dangerous precedent; i t represented a regression to the days of a r b i t r a r y 
judgements and constituted a d i r e c t threat to the security of the people. 
1. I have of course considerably s i m p l i f i e d Condorcet's argument, but 
i t would be rather laborious t o go i n t o his views i n depth. 
2. "Lettres d'un citoyen des Etats-Unis," O.C. IX. 101. 
3. pp. 1357 and 1361. 
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"Le ci-devant r o i ... ne peut etre juge que d'apres un mode qui n'est 
pas encore e t a b l i . Si la Convention se permet cette cumulation de pouvoirs ou de 
fonctions, les premiers principes de l a jurisprudence seraient violes."^" 
Apart from t h i s , the Convention had already o f f i c i a l l y condemned 
the King and was thus badly placed to set i t s e l f up as a court, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
as many of i t s members had been members of one or other of the two previous 
assemblies, and were thus d i r e c t l y involved i n the case at hand. "Le 
principe non moins sacre, qui pres c r i t de mettre a 1 abri de toute espece 
de soupgon 1 i m p a r t i a l i t e des juges, ne se r a i t pas moins v i o l e (...) 
Les hommes qui, d apres ces projets bien connus, ( i . e . the plans devised by 
the King and the emigres t o re-establish the Ancien Regime) etaient 
marques pour victimes aux tribunaux d'un nouveau despotisme, les membres 
des deux Assemblees pourraient-ils rester les juges de celui qui les 
/ x ' 2 
avait deja designes a ses bourreaux?" 
Condorcet proposed, therefore, that the King be t r i e d by a judge 
3 
and j u r y elected for the purpose by the nation , that he be e n t i t l e d t o 
exclude from the jury those whom he considered undesirable, a r i g h t which 
4 
every accused person held by law, and that he be granted legal aid . 
Condorcet, who was r e a l i s t i c enough to re a l i s e that the verdict was a 
5 
foregone conclusion hoped by t h i s t o reconcile the necessity for punishing 
1. Opinion sur l e jugement, etc. X I I . 288. 
2. I b i d . pp.288-289. 
3. I t may be pointed out that t h i s idea i s a contradiction of Condorcet's 
arguments i n 1790 against the creation of a court whose purpose was 
to judge a man for a specific crime, but the High Court created by the 
Constituent Assembly was not v a l i d now that the Constitution of 1791 
had become a dead-letter. 
4. I b i d . pp. 292-296. 
5. Cf. Chronique de Paris, 15th December 1792, p.1397. 
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the King one way or another with the necessity of proving t o the 
world that the Revolution had come of age and was not to be a mere 
r e p e t i t i o n of the despotism of a Cromwell. 
I t could be said that such l e g a l i s t i c arguments were absurd 
when major principles of government were at stake and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
when the very safety of Prance was i n jeopardy. Certainly they made 
absolutely no impact on the Assembly and Condorcet could only gaze on 
powerlessly as Louis was brought t o t r i a l , found g u i l t y and executed. 
However, his l i n e of approach i s understandable when one bears i n 
mind a very important event which took place on 11th October 1792. On 
that day, he was elected t o the committee which was to provide Prance w i t h 
her new co n s t i t u t i o n . To Condorcet t h i s nomination represented the f i r s t 
great opportunity t o put i n t o practice laws and principles towards whose 
elaboration he had devoted the bulk of his writings since 1775 and which 
he had seen either p a r t l y adopted or rejected or simply ignored through 
the three long and f r u s t r a t i n g years of the Revolution. We can appreciate, 
therefore, that he considered the co n s t i t u t i o n towards whose draughting 
he was t o devote a l l his energy between October 1792 and March 1793 as 
a work of great importance destined to provide France, not wi t h a 
temporary body of laws to l a s t u n t i l the war was over and the Republic 
was f i r m l y established, but with a frame of reference f o r a l l succeeding 
l e g i s l a t o r s . This explains the sense of urgency with which he now 
rei t e r a t e d his b e l i e f i n the doctrine of the Rights of Man and his passionate 
desire that so important an event as the t r i a l of the King be seen t o be 
carried out i n the l i g h t of that doctrine. 
I t would be wrong, however, t o exaggerate the importance which 
1. Cf. Opinion sur l e jugement, etc. X I I . 292. 
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Condorcet accorded t o the King's t r i a l . He refused to be carried away 
by the almost apocalyptic visions of Saint Just who saw the struggle 
between the King and the Convention i n terms of a metaphysical clash 
between Good and E v i l . As far as he was concerned, the monarchy was dead; 
the objective now was to draw up the principles and laws on which the new 
Republic was t o be established. I t i s thus w i t h a cer t a i n amount of 
i r r i t a t i o n that he intervened i n the t r i a l , urging that i t take place 
as quickly as possible: Songeons ... que nous sommes charges de preparer 
l a c o n s t i t u t i o n qui d o i t etre proposee au peuple ... Pouvons-nous, au 
milieu de tant d'occupations, consacrer une portion de notre temps a l a 
suite d'une procedure dont i l faudra nous soumettre a suivre rigoureusement 
toutes les formalites.""'" This a t t i t u d e i s ref l e c t e d even more c l e a r l y i n 
the speech he made to the Convention during the debate on the Girondin 
proposition that the King's execution be deferred. Although he repeated 
2 
his distaste f o r the death penalty he urged the Assembly t o come t o a 
decision quickly and concluded by l i s t i n g a series of measures which had 
3 
to be taken urgently t o a l l e v i a t e the suffering of the masses . 
The King's execution on 20th January 1793 symbolised the end of the 
Ancien Re'gime. The stage was now set for the next major debate which was 
to divide the Convention between A p r i l and May 1793* the discussion of the 
f i r s t Republican c o n s t i t u t i o n a l project. As t h i s project i n effe c t represents 
the f i n a l stage i n the evolution of Condorcet's ideas, i t i s w i t h an 
examination of i t that t h i s thesis l o g i c a l l y ends. 
1. Opinion sur l e jugement, etc. X I I . 290-291. 
2. Opinion de Condorcet prononcee dans l a seance du samedi 19 janvi8r 1793* 
O.C. X I I . 308. 
3. I b i d . X I I . 309-311-
-261-
THE GIRONDIN CONSTITUTION 
1) The co n s t i t u t i o n a l committee 
The committee elected on 11th October t o draw up the c o n s t i t u t i o n 
consisted of nine people - Condorcet, Sieyes, Petion, Vergniaud, 
Brissot, Paine, Gensonne, Barere and Danton. The f i r s t question t o 
ask, therefore, i s : t o what extent may the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l project 
which came before the Convention for the f i r s t time on 15th February 1793 
be said t o represent the views of Condorcet? 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to give a precise answer as l i t t l e i s known, beyond 
the memoirs of contemporaries, of the contribution made by each of the 
nine members of the committee. I t i s known, for example, that Barere 
was largely responsible for the parts concerning the Declaration of 
Rights and the judiciary" 1". 
I n the absence of any precise information, however, i t would seem 
that the arguments i n favour of a prominent part being played by 
Condorcet are very strong. I f we look at the other members of the 
committee, only three could be said to have had any kind of reputation 
as thinkers on co n s t i t u t i o n a l matters - Sieyes, Barere and Paine. 
Petion, Vergniaud, Brissot, Gensonne and Danton were chosen more on 
account of t h e i r importance as p o l i t i c a l figures than as thinkers. 
I t i s w e l l known that a l l took a very active part i n the King's t r i a l 
which lasted for three of the f i v e months during which the committee met. 
This argument could also be le v e l l e d at Barere who, i n c i d e n t a l l y , i n 
1. Barere: Memoires, Paris, J. Labit t e , 1842-44. Four Volumes. 
Vol.11, p.286. 
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his Memoires , admitted that the project was largely inspired by 
Condorcet^". 
Of the remaining two, other reasons may be given for suggesting 
the insignificance of t h e i r contribution. Sieyes had played p r a c t i c a l l y 
2 
no part i n the Revolution since the days of the Constituent Assembly 
and i t seems u n l i k e l y that a man so out of touch with events and so 
eager to preserve himself f o r future developments should have been able 
t o provide much t o a project which, i n the atmosphere of the times, 
could easily have backfired on i t s creators. 
Tom Paine's views were very close to those of Condorcet but, once 
again, i t i s doubtful i f he personally had much influence on the actual 
deliberations of the committee. I t i s known, f o r example, that he 
never actually attended the meetings, perhaps because his French was 
3 
poor, and submitted his ideas i n w r i t i n g . 
Condorcet, on the other hand, intervened only occasionally i n 
the King's t r i a l and usually t o urge the Assembly t o press ahead w i t h 
other important matters of l e g i s l a t i o n ; he had no active p o l i t i c a l 
commitments, unlike Vergniaud, Brissot and Danton and had i n fact more 
or less abandoned the Convention to assume the role of commentator on 
d a i l y events; f i n a l l y , and t h i s i s perhaps the most important consideration 
of a l l , no man had devoted so much time or energy t o con s t i t u t i o n a l questions. 
Indeed i t i s only because his reputation i n t h i s sphere was well established 
that he was chosen, as i t i s obvious he had no claims to be a p o l i t i c a l 
leader i n the true sense of the word. This l a s t point seems t o be 
1. Barere I I , 110,285; IV, 165. 
2. Cf. J.H. Clapham: The Abbe Sieyes, London, P.S. King, 1912, p . l 4 l . 
3- Cf. Conway: The L i f e of Thomas Paine, New York, Putnams, 1892. 
Two volumes, Vol. 1, p.362. 
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confirmed by the fact that i t was he the Convention chose to be the 
"rapporteur" of the committee, i n other words i t s spokesman and 
u n o f f i c i a l chairman. As Helene Delsaux has pointed out: "... c'est 
dire que tout l e t r a v a i l retombait sur l e philosophe, les autres membres 
se contentant d'uh r o l e tout a f a i t secondaire. 
Having established t h i s point, we must now examine the project 
i t s e l f i n order t o see to what extent i t r e f l e c t s ideas which Condorcet 
had expressed before 1789 and to suggest the influences behind the 
evolution of these ideas. 
2 
The "Girondin" c o n s t i t u t i o n a l project of 1793 consists of a 
Declaration of the Rights of Man followed by 13 sections covering the 
t e r r i t o r i a l divisions, the status and r i g h t s of citizenship, the organisation 
of the primary assemblies, l o c a l government, l e g i s l a t u r e , executive, 
j u d i c i a r y and treasury and includes such elements as the r i g h t of the 
people to censure laws and the organisation of conventions which are 
t o t a l l y absent i n the Constitution of 1791. 
"Projet de declaration des d r o i t s naturels, c i v i l s et 
politiques des hommes." 
Although we have said that the man most responsible for the 
Declaration was Barere, i t s resemblance w i t h Condorcet's e a r l i e r views 
and obsessions i s such that i t would be impossible to suggest that he 
played no part i n i t s draughting. 
1. Op. c i t . p.86. 
2. O.C. X I I . 417-501 
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One of the main characteristics of the Declaration i s i t s concern 
wi t h defining abstract terms and wit h grouping the a r t i c l e s which 
correspond to these terms i n t o coherent wholes. Thus i n Art. 2 we are 
given a d e f i n i t i o n of the word " l i b e r t y " which i s followed by four 
a r t i c l e s corresponding to basic principles concerning the freedom of 
the i n d i v i d u a l 1 . S i m i l a r l y the d e f i n i t i o n of "ega l i t e " (Art.7) i s 
followed by the corresponding r i g h t s mentioned i n the two following 
2 / ' 
a r t i c l e s , and the same may be said f o r the term "securite", defined 
i n Art.10 and re f l e c t e d i n the r i g h t s enumerated i n the seven a r t i c l e s 
which follow^. 
I n other words, the new Declaration i s much clearer and more 
coherent than that of 1789* The l a t t e r gives the impression of a work 
h a s t i l y assembled under the pressure of events without any guiding 
p r i n c i p l e . Alengry has shown how the a r t i c l e s i n i t which correspond 
to the basic r i g h t s of " l i b e r t e " , " e g a l i t e " , " i n t e r e t general" and 
souverainete nationale" occur i n almost any order, the f i r s t i n 
Arts. 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, the second i n Arts. 1, 6, 13, 
the t h i r d i n Arts. 2, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 and the fourt h i n 
Arts. 3, 6, 14, 15, 16 and 17. I n the project of 1793 the a r t i c l e s are 
arranged i n the following.groups: 
a) " l i b e r t e " Arts. 2-6 
b) "eg a l i t e " Arts. 7-9 




I b i d . pp.4l7-4l8. 
I b i d . p.48. 
I b i d . Arts. 11-17, pp.419-420. 
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d) "proprie'te" Arts. 18-21 
' \ i t ' 
ej contributions publiques, education, 
securite publique 1' Arts. 22-24 
f ) "garantie sociale" Arts. 25-50 
g) "resistance a l'oppression" Arts. 31-32 
h) "revision de c o n s t i t u t i o n " Art. 33-
Similarly, r i g h t s which are jumbled together i n a single a r t i c l e 
i n the 1789 co n s t i t u t i o n are expressed i n separate a r t i c l e s i n the 
1793 project. As an example, we may take A r t i c l e 7 of the o r i g i n a l 
Declaration which goes as follows: "Nul homme ne peut etre accuse, 
arrete n i detenu que dans les cas determines par l a l o i et selon les 
formes qu e l l e a prescrites. Ceux qui s o l l i c i t e n t , expedient, executent 
ou font executer des ordres a r b i t r a i r e s doivent etre punis; mais tout 
citoyen appele ou s a i s i en vertu de l a l o i d o i t obeir a 1 instant: i l 
se rend coupable par l a resistance. I n the 1793 Declaration these terms 
are repeated, with a few additions, but they are divided i n t o three 
d i s t i n c t a r t i c l e s , namely A r t i c l e s 11, 12 and 13^. As a r e s u l t they 
gain i n c l a r i t y and i n emphasis. 
The form of the Declaration thus t e s t i f i e s t o the thoroughness 
wi t h which i t was drawn up and r e f l e c t s the work of a man who, more than 
most perhaps, had devoted a great deal of his time to the elaboration of 
imaginery declarations, aware as he was of t h e i r great importance. 
However, i t i s the Declaration's content which gives r i s e t o the 
most in t e r e s t i n g observations. 
F i r s t , i t i s important to note that the Declaration c a r e f u l l y 
avoids the weaknesses which Condorcet had pointed out i n the o r i g i n a l one, 
1. I b i d . X I I . 419. 
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notably the inclusion of phrases of a " u t i l i t a r i a n " nature. This i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y clear when we compare A r t i c l e 10 of the old Declaration t o 
A r t i c l e 6 of the new one. I n the former, the r i g h t t o worship as one pleases 
i s modified by the phrase "pourvu que leur manifestation ( i . e . the manifesta-
t i o n of re l i g i o u s opinions) ne trouble pas l'ordre public e t a b l i par l a l o i . " 
A r t i c l e 6 of the new co n s t i t u t i o n merely announces the basic principle of the 
r i g h t t o worship, and includes no modification of a more " p r a c t i c a l " nature.^" 
Si m i l a r l y such expressions as " l ' u t i l i t e commune" which occur i n the old 
Declaration ( c f . A r t . l ) and which Condorcet had condemned, do not occur i n 
the new one. 
Secondly, the new Declaration contains a r t i c l e s which are t o t a l l y absent 
i n the f i r s t and stem d i r e c t l y from concerns which were very close t o Condorcet's 
heart. A r t i c l e 33* f o r example, concerning the r i g h t of the people t o change . 
2 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n at regular pre-ordained intervals , contains an idea which 
lay at the heart of Condorcet's preoccupations throughout the Revolution. But 
mention must be made also of A r t i c l e 23 concerning education: " L T i n s t r u c t i o n 
/ / ' • " * „3 
est l e besoin de tous, et l a societe l a d o i t egalement a tous ses membres. 
/ 
This aspect of Condorcet's a c t i v i t i e s has been neglected i n the thesis as i t 
l i e s somewhat on the periphery of the question of the evolution of his ideas, 
but i t would be quite wrong to give no mention t o i t . I t played a 
fundamental part i n his a c t i v i t i e s as chairman of the Legislative Assembly's 
educational reform committee from October 1791 t o A p r i l 1792, a period which 
culminated i n the publication of the f i v e Memoires sur 1*instruction publique 
1. I b i d . X I I . 418. 
2. I b i d . p.422. 
3. I b i d . p.421: Mention was made of t h i s only i n the revised part of the 1791 
Constitution. Cf. Lefebvre: The Coming of the French Revolution, 
Princetown, Princetown University Press, 1947, p.176. 
4. O.C. V I I . 167-437. 
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i n 1791 and 1792 and, notably, i n the "Rapport et projet de decret 
sur l'organisation generale de 1 1 i n s t r u c t i o n publique"^" which was 
2 presented to the Legislative Assembly on 20th and 21st A p r i l 1792. 
Condorcet's educational ideas are i n fact fundamental to an 
understanding of his general a t t i t u d e towards the organisation of 
society as he believed that progress was u l t i m a t e l y dependent on the 
spread of knowledge and the emancipation of the masses from indoctrination. 
I t i s not surprising therefore, that he referred to the educational 
reform project on numerous occasions i n 1792, a l t e r n a t i v e l y praising the 
3 
Legislative Assembly fo r i t s work or attacking i t f or not acting fast 
4 
enough . I t would be j u s t i f i a b l e therefore t o claim that t h i s a r t i c l e 
r e f l e c t s the influence which Condorcet must have had on the drawing up of 
the new Declaration. 
Another example of t h i s influence i s t o be found i n A r t i c l e 24: 
"Les secours publics sont une dette eacree de l a societe; et c'est a l a 
l o i a en determiner l'etendue et l ' a p p l i c a t i o n . " This a r t i c l e also i s 
not to be found i n the Declaration of 1789 and i t r e f l e c t s the concern of 
a man who had devoted numerous a r t i c l e s before and during the Revolution 
to the question of public r e l i e f . The fear that poverty would undermine the 
1. O.C. V I I . 449-573. 
2. For deta i l s of t h i s , and for Condorcet's work on educational reform 
i n general, c f . Buisson: C.ondorcet,. Paris, F. Alcan, 1929* passim, j 
J. Jaures: Histoire Socialiste de l a ReV ol u t i o n Francaise, Paris, 
Editions de l a l i b r a i r i e de l'Humanite, 1922, Eight volumes, V o l . I l l , 
pp. 232-235. 
3- Cf. L'Assemblee nationale aux Frangais, O.C. X. 329* l&th February 1792; 
Revision des travaux de l a premiere l e g i s l a t u r e , X. 392. 
4. Chronique de Paris, a r t i c l e s of May-June, 1792. 
5. O.C. X I I . 421. 
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work of the Revolution by destroying the people's u n i t y was always 
with him and influenced his views on several sections of reforms; 
hence his plea f o r a strong and u n i f i e d administration i n Paris i n 
1789* his c a l l f o r a central reserve fund t o be kept i n Paris so as 
to respond t o the need for emergency expenditure and, above a l l , his 
sweeping plans for the creation of savings banks and social insurance 
which would preserve the people from the dangers which arose from the 
economic upheavals created by the war and by the somewhat too abrupt 
reforms of the Constituent Assembly.^ 
The t h i r d and, perhaps, most i n t e r e s t i n g series of observations which 
may be made concerning the content of the new Declaration stems from the 
influence on i t of the s i t u a t i o n created by the second revolution of 
10th August. 
This may be seen, f i r s t of a l l , i n the emphasis given by the 
new Declaration t o the notion of equality. The 1791 Declaration 
l i s t s as the four basic r i g h t s : La l i b e r t e , l a propriete, l a surete 
et l a resistance a l'oppression" ( A r t . 2) and makes only a passing 
mention of equality i n A r t . 1. I n the 1793 Declaration equality comes 
second only to l i b e r t y ( A r t . 1. X I I . 417). There i s nothing new i n 
t h i s i n so f a r as Condorcet, as we have seen, had included equality 
among the f i v e fundamental r i g h t s given i n his f i r s t complete presentation 
of the doctrine of the Rights of Man i n the "Lettres d'un citoyen des 
Etats-Unis sur les a f f a i r s presentes" of 1788^. However i t i s clear 
1. Cf. Sur les caisses d'assumulations, O.C. XI. 387-^03; and 
especially Discours sur les finances, X I I . 80 (12th March 1792). 
2. O.C. IX. 101-102. I t i s also mentioned i n his essay on the 
Declaration des d r o i t s of 1789 (O.C. IX. l84, 206-211). 
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t h a t the authors of the new Declaration intended the inclusion of 
equality t o be seen as an o f f i c i a l acknowledgement of the fa c t that a 
new state of a f f a i r s had come i n t o being. A good i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s 
i s t o be found i n A r t . 27 - "(La souverainete nationale) reside 
essentiellement dans l e peuple entier, et chaque citoyen a un d r o i t 
egal de concourir a son exercice"^ - where the word "egal" stands out i n 
contrast t o the corresponding a r t i c l e ( A r t . 6) of the old Declaration. 
Another important consequence of the 10th August i s to be found 
i n the emphasis given to the notion of "resistance a l'oppression". 
This i s mentioned i n the l i s t of fundamental r i g h t s by both Declarations 
but the terms of the corresponding a r t i c l e i n the 1789 Declaration -
"Toute societe dans laquelle l a garantie des d r o i t s n'est pas assuree, 
n i l a separation des pouvoirs determinee, n a point de co n s t i t u t i o n " 
(Art.16) - are much weaker and vaguer than those which we f i n d i n the 
corresponding a r t i c l e of the new Declaration (A r t . 32): 
" i l y a oppression, lorsqu'une l o i v i o l e les d r o i t s naturels 
c i v i l s et politiques qu'elle d o i t garantir. 
I I y a oppression, lorsque l a l o i est violee par les 
fonctionnaires publics, dans son application a des f a i t s 
i n dividuels. 
I I y a oppression, lorsque des actes a r b i t r a i r e s v i o l e n t 
les d r o i t s des citoyens contre l'expression de l a l o i . 
Dans tout gouvernement l i b r e , l e mode de resistance a ces 
di f f e r e n t s actes d'oppression d o i t etre regie' par l a 
con s t i t u t i o n . " , 
What i s condemned here i s the action of a l l those who had endeavoured 
between 1789 and 1792 to destroy the con s t i t u t i o n of the nation, s t a r t i n g 
with the King and passing from the ministers to the Juges de Paix (the 
1. X I I . 421. 
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Lariviere case), emigres, rebel priests and l o c a l administrators. I n 
other words, i t represents a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the insurrection and a 
warning that a l l such insurrections could occur again quite l e g a l l y i f 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n had not made any provisions f o r dealing with v i o l a t i o n s 
of i t i n an orderly way. 
The t h i r d , and perhaps most important, i l l u s t r a t i o n of the influence 
of the 10th August i s t o be seen i n the inclusion for the f i r s t time among 
the l i s t of fundamental human r i g h t s of the term "garantie sociale" (Art. l ) 
and the s i x a r t i c l e s (Arts. 25-30) which correspond to i t . 
These six a r t i c l e s represent the kernel of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
project. F i r s t they i l l u s t r a t e t h a t , f o r Condorcet, the period of 
compromise was over and that the time had come to put i n t o practice those 
theories of popular sovereignty about which he had w r i t t e n before the 
Revolution. Secondly, they r e a f f i r m the importance of approaching once 
and for a l l the concrete problems raised by the necessity for 
reconciling the inalienable r i g h t of the people to run t h e i r own a f f a i r s 
d i r e c t l y with the p r a c t i c a l need for a representative system of government. 
Thus A r t i c l e s 25-28"*" emphasise the fact that the ultimate authority f o r 
running the country lay w i t h the people taken as a whole (a point which 
Condorcet had made i n r e l a t i o n to the i n i t i a t i v e taken by the Mauconseil 
1. A r t . 25: La garantie social© des d r o i t s de l'homme repose sur 
l a souverainete nationale. 
r f A r t . 26: La souverainete est une, i n d i v i s i b l e , imprescriptible 
et inalienable. 
A r t . 27: El l e reside essentiellement dans l e peuple entier, et 
chaque citoyen a un d r o i t egal de concourir a son exercice. 
A r t . 28: Nulle reunion p a r t i e l l e de citoyens et nul individu ne 
peuvent s'attribuer l a souverainete, exercer aucune a u t o r i t e , et 
remplir aucune fonction publique sans une delegation formelle de 
l a l o i . 
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section of Paris on the 3rd August 1792, while Art. 29 - "La garantie 
sociale ne peut exister s i les l i m i t e s des fonctions publiques ne sont 
pas clairement determinees par l a l o i , et s i l a responsabilite de tous 
les fonctionnaires publics n'est pas assuree." - implies that i t was 
legitimate for the people to delegate a portion of t h e i r power, provided 
that t h i s portion was c l e a r l y established by law. 
I t i s clear, therefore, that Condorcet accepts the p r i n c i p l e of 
representative government as he had done i n 1789« But the great emphasis 
placed on the idea of the sovereign w i l l of the people taken as a whole, 
as well as the emphasis given t o the r i g h t of the people to react v i o l e n t l y 
i f t h e i r representatives abused t h e i r power (Art. 32), indicates that 
he believed that the 10th August insurrection, by sweeping away the 
monarchy and a l l the divisions among the people created by the 
Constituent Assembly, had paved the way f o r a p o l i t i c a l system drawn up 
on the l i n e s of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l project described by Condorcet i n the 
"Essai sur l a c o n s t i t u t i o n et les fonctions des assemblees provinciales" 
of 1788 and i n the "Lettres d'un bourgeois de Newhaven" of the previous 
year^where Condorcet describes the l i m i t s of the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly's 
powers and the way i n which a l l i t s acts were controlled by the people 
grouped i n t h e i r l o c a l assemblies). 
I t i s the massive intervention of the people i n the d i r e c t running 
of the a f f a i r s of the nation that characterises the Girondin c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
project of 1793 and which enables us to consider i t as a natural evolution 
from the system described by Condorcet as an ideal i n I787 and 1788. I n 
order to bring out the main characteristics of the project and to l i n k 
1. Cf. notably O.C. IX. 29-31-
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them to the p r i n c i p a l ideas of Condorcet as they were expressed before 
and during the Revolution, we have decided to follow the system adopted 
by Alengry i n his exhaustive study of the Girondin c o n s t i t u t i o n ^ . This 
consists i n approaching the project according t o the nature of the 
d i f f e r e n t types of "powers" which i t describes. 
According t o Alengry these may be reduced t o three: delegated 
powers, i . e . powers which rested only with the people but which for 
p r a c t i c a l reasons they delegated to representatives elected by them and 
acting on t h e i r behalf; retained powers, i . e . powers which rested only 
with the people and which they did not delegate t o any representatives; 
and, f i n a l l y , powers which were held i n common by the people and t h e i r 
representatives. 
Retained powers: 
We w i l l s t a r t with an examination of the retained powers as these 
represent the decisive break-through made by Condorcet's project i n i t s 
attempt t o bring the people as much as was p r a c t i c a l l y possible i n t o the 
di r e c t running of the a f f a i r s of the nation. These powers are described 
i n T i t r e VTII under the heading: "De l a censure du peuple sur les actes 
* i „2 de l a representation nationale, et du d r o i t de p e t i t i o n . and may be 
divided, as Alengry has shown, i n t o f i v e parts: 
"1°) censure ou reforme, par consultation populaire, 
des l o i s existantes; 
2 i n i t i a t i v e d'une l o i nouvelle: c'est l e referendum 
l e g i s l a t i f , pour toutes les l o i s , y compris les l o i s 
c onstitutionnelles; 
Alengry: Condorcet, guide de l a Revolution franc aise 
constitutionnel et precurseur de l a science sociale TT 
Briere, 1904 
2. X I I . 469. 
, theoricien du d r o i t 
La ", Paris, Giard et 
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3 ) referendum c o n s u l t a t i f pour certains cas p a r t i c u l i e r s 
4 ) d r o i t de p e t i t i o n 
5°) d r o i t d'accusation des fonctionnaires publics par l e peuple.""^ 
The system described by Condorcet i s as follows: i f a c i t i z e n f e l t 
i t necessary to draw the attention of the representatives t o any weakness 
he detected either i n the con s t i t u t i o n , l e g i s l a t i o n or administration of 
the nation, or i f he desired the reform of an ex i s t i n g law or even 
wished to propose a new one, he would have the r i g h t t o mention t h i s t o the 
"bureau" of the primary assembly t o which he belonged. The "bureau" would 
meet on the following Sunday and would examine the citizen's request provided 
i t was accompanied by the signatures of f i f t y l e g a l l y registered members 
of the primary assembly. The "bureau" would summon a l l the members of the 
primary assembly for the following Sunday and the request would be put 
to the vote. I f a majority decided i n favour of the request the "bureau" 
would c a l l on a l l the primary assemblies of the area t o meet on the 
following Sunday t o discuss the request. I f the majority of the primary 
assemblies voted i n favour of the request, the "bureau" of the f i r s t 
primary assembly would inform the administrative body of the "departement" 
of the r e s u l t and would c a l l on i t t o summon a l l the primary assemblies 
of the "departement" w i t h i n a f o r t n i g h t to vote on the request. I f the 
majority of these primary assemblies voted i n favour of the request, the 
administrative body of the "departement" would c a l l on the National Assembly 
to examine the o r i g i n a l request. This signals the conclusion of the f i r s t 
phase ( T i t r e V I I I , Arts. 1-15). 
1. Cf. Alengry: "Le referendum, ou Essai l i m i t e du gouvernement 
di r e c t dans Condorcet", Revue d'histoire p o l i t i q u e , Vol. I l l , 1959> 
pp. 215-229-
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Phase two ends either with the passing of a new law or with the 
dissolution of the Assembly. The new law i s passed i f a majority of the 
representatives votes i n i t s favour. I f t h i s does not happen the process 
does not end there. The Assembly would be obliged to summon a l l the 
primary assemblies of the nation i n order to obtain t h e i r approval or 
disapproval of the r e j e c t i o n of the request. I f the majority of the 
primary assemblies voted i n favour of the Assembly's decision, then 
the process comes to a stop. I f , on the other hand, the Assembly's decision 
i s rejected, then the Assembly i s considered to be i n the minority and 
i s obliged to dissolve i t s e l f . Not only does a new Assembly have t o be 
elected, but the deputies who had voted against the request would be 
i n e l i g i b l e . Once the new Assembly had met i t would be obliged t o 
examine the o r i g i n a l request again and, as before, i t s decision would 
go before the people. ( T i t r e V I I I ; Arts. 14-26.) 
This extraordinary reform, whereby one c i t i z e n could put i n motion 
a whole series of processes leading ul t i m a t e l y t o the passing of a law 
or to the di s s o l u t i o n and re-election of a National Assembly, na t u r a l l y 
raises several questions. 
I n the f i r s t place, i t i s clear that the idea i s not completely 
new. I t may be found i n embryo i n the scheme described by Condorcet i n 
the "Lettres d'un bourgeois de Newhaven" of 1787 1 where the citizens 
grouped i n t h e i r " d i s t r i c t " assemblies were to have the r i g h t t o sanction 
or r e j e c t every law passed by the National Assembly. 
1. Cf. IX.' 30-31. 
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However, there are numerous differences between the 1787 project 
and that of 1793 and i t i s by enumerating these differences that we 
sh a l l be able t o see the decisive influence on the f i n a l evolution of 
Condorcet's ideas of the insurrection of 10th August. 
The f i r s t important difference i s that the new idea i s much more 
progressive even than the f i r s t i n so far as the ordinary c i t i z e n i s given 
a great deal more i n i t i a t i v e . Not only could he s t a r t a process which 
could lead ul t i m a t e l y t o the passing of a new law or t o a general election, 
but he had the r i g h t to question a l l laws and not jus t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l laws. 
This marks a considerable evolution i n Condorcet's ideas for he had 
always argued that i t would be quite impractical f o r the people to question 
every single law that was passed, a point which he repeated as l a t e as 
November 1792 i n an a r t i c l e published i n the "Chronique de Mois" and 
included i n his complete works under the heading: "De l a nature des 
pouvoirs politiques dans une nation libre"*": 
" I I faut observer ... que toute l o i ... peut etre consideree 
sous deux points de vue: 1°) sa conformite avec l e d r o i t 
naturel de chaque ind i v i d u ; 2°) l ' u t i l i t e ou l e danger des 
combinaisons adoptees par les redacteurs de l a l o i ... Dans 
une societe etendue, on peut regarder comme impossible de 
f a i r e prononcer 1'universalite sur ce dernier objet."^ 
I t i s clear, therefore, that only a very good reason could have 
led him to include machinery for just such a consultation only three 
months l a t e r . This reason must surely l i e i n his great fear of another 
insurrection on the lines of 10th August and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , of the 
recurrence of individual revolts against the l e g i s l a t i o n similar to that 
1. o.c. x. 587-613. 
2. I b i d . 593. 
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perpetrated by the Mauconseil section of Paris on 3rd August 1792. 
As we have seen i t was as a consequence of t h i s r e v o l t that Condorcet 
was impelled to write the famous " i n s t r u c t i o n sur l'exercice du d r o i t 
/„1 
de souverainete of 9th August 1792 i n which he argued notably that 
the only acceptable way i n which a minority of the citizens could make 
t h e i r opinion f e l t was by mobilising the whole nation. Only then could 
the w i l l of the majority be known and a remedy be introduced. The 
absence of any method whereby t h i s could be done had precipitated the 
v i o l e n t uprising of 10th August and i t was precisely t o prevent t h i s recurring 
that the Girondin project contains a method whereby the opinion of a small 
section of the community could lead to the consultation of the citizens 
as a whole. 
The Girondin commentator of the project i l l u s t r a t e d Condorcet's 
int e n t i o n perfectly when he wrote i n the Feuille v i l l a g e o i s e : "Cette 
censure du peuple est 1'insurrection pacifique de l a raison et de l a 
r e f l e x i o n , c est 1 insurrection legale et organisee. E l l e previent les 
h „2 troubles et f a i t mieux connaitre l e voeu du peuple. 
Nevertheless t h i s does not answer a l l the questions. I n 1789 Condorcet 
had w r i t t e n that a system whereby the people could have any say at a l l i n 
the running of the country could only come i n t o being a f t e r a whole mass 
of preliminary reforms had been carried out. He considered that these 
reforms would take at least twenty years t o e f f e c t . And yet, only four 
years l a t e r , here he was describing an even more progressive scheme of 
direct.popular government. 
1. O.C. X. 531-540. 
2. Cited by Alengry i n "Essai l i m i t e de gouvernement d i r e c t , etc." 
p.224. 
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Once again, i t i s the 10th August insurrection which provides 
the answer to t h i s paradox. The Revolution, f o r good or for i l l , had 
precipitated reforms which, under normal circumstances would have taken 
place very gradually. This movement had come to a head i n the second 
revolution of 10th August which had at l a s t established the un i t y without 
which any coherent form of public intervention i n the running of the country 
would have been impossible. By uni t y i s meant geographical and p o l i t i c a l 
u n i t y and these were the two preconditions without which Condorcet's 
scheme could not work. 
Geographical u n i t y was proclaimed by the Convention on 25th 
September 1792 and the terms of the decree are incorporated verbatim 
i n t o the f i r s t a r t i c l e of the Girondin project; "La Republique francaise 
est une et i n d i v i s i b l e " ^ . This u n i t y at l a s t having been established, 
Condorcet was now able t o f i x the d i f f e r e n t hierarchical divisions about 
which he had w r i t t e n so much before 1789- For administrative purposes, 
he adopted the three-tiered system devised by the Constituent Assembly, 
div i d i n g the nation i n t o 84 departements, the "departements" i n t o 
"grandes communes" and the "grandes communes" i n t o "municipalites" 
( T i t r e I , Arts. 2-7). The all-important difference of course i s that, i n 
the old co n s t i t u t i o n , these areas each represented a stage i n the system 
whereby the various categories of citizens elected the National Assembly. 
This has now disappeared and the only p o l i t i c a l u n i t i n the nation i s 
represented by the primary assemblies. Thus, although Condorcet, f o r the 
purpose of organisation, implies that the number of both primary assemblies 
1. T i t r e I , A r t. 1, O.C. X I I . 42J. 
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and municipalities i n a given "grande commune" would be f i x e d i n r e l a t i o n 
to the size of the "commune" i n question ( T i t r e I , A r t . 4), he makes i t 
quite clear that the primary assembly was a u n i t quite d i f f e r e n t i n nature 
from the "municipalite", a point which he underlines by s t a t i n g that t h e i r 
geographical l i m i t s would be d i s t i n c t ( Art. 6). 
I n fact Condorcet has here returned (despite one fundamental 
difference) to the system described i n the "Lettres d'un bourgeois de 
Newhaven" where the basic p o l i t i c a l u n i t i n the nation was represented 
by what he referred t o at that time as the " d i s t r i c t " assembly^". F i n a l l y , 
the separation of the "administrative" bodies - i . e . the "departement" 
administration and the "municipal" administration - from the primary 
assemblies, represents the l o g i c a l conclusion of an idea f i r s t seen i n 
the "Essai sur les assemblies provinciales" of 1788 where, at each l e v e l , 
Condorcet called f o r an electoral assembly d i s t i n c t from the administrative 
body of the corresponding area. 
I n other words the France which i s described i n the Girondin project 
i s a France divided, f o r administrative purposes, i n t o 84 equal areas w i t h 
two sub-divisions and, for " p o l i t i c a l " purposes ( i f we may so make the 
d i s t i n c t i o n ) i n t o a vast network of primary assemblies through which the 
citizens of the nation could exercise t o the f u l l the d i r e c t intervention 
i n the running of t h e i r a f f a i r s t which the new c o n s t i t u t i o n allowed them. 
I t i s obvious, however, that i f Condorcet was able t o dispense with 
the hierarchy of " p o l i t i c a l " areas established by the Constituent Assembly 
and to seek to implement his idea of d i r e c t popular intervention, t h i s was 
because the revolution of 10th August had succeeded i n bringing about what 
1. O.C. IX. 10. 
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may be called, for want of a better word, the " p o l i t i c a l " u n i t y of the 
nation, namely the a b o l i t i o n of a l l hereditary authority and, above a l l , 
the a b o l i t i o n of the d i s t i n c t i o n s between active and passive c i t i z e n s . 
I n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l project, the republic i s proclaimed i n the 
preamble and i n the f i r s t a r t i c l e ^ , while Arts. 1 and 9 of T i t r e I I 
( De 1 etat des citoyens et des conditions necessaires pour en exercer 
les d r o i t s " ) abolish nearly a l l conditions fo r possessing the r i g h t to 
vote or t o be e l i g i b l e for o f f i c e . I n other words, for the f i r s t time, 
the conditions were such as to enable the masses, on an equal footing, 
to participate as f a r as possible i n the d i r e c t running of t h e i r own 
a f f a i r s . 
I t would be true to say, therefore, that the s i t u a t i o n i n 1793 
was so d i f f e r e n t from the conditions prevailing at the time when 
Condorcet was drawing up his vast schemes for a t r u l y popular c o n s t i t u t i o n 
that he was perfectly j u s t i f i e d i n attempting to establish his system so 
early. To have hesitated would i n a way have meant denying the v a l i d i t y 
of the e a r l i e r schemes. 
Against t h i s , however, we may point out certain elements i n the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l project which indicate that Condorcet was not e n t i r e l y 
master of the s i t u a t i o n i n 1793 and was as much forced i n t o bringing i n 
his reforms out of a fear of the masses born from the tense s i t u a t i o n 
created by the 10th August insurrection as by a perfectly legitimate 
desire to witness the implementation of ideas which were close t o his heart. 
An i n d i c a t i o n of t h i s unease i s provided by a r t i c l e s i n t h i s part of the 
1. O.C. X I I . 423 
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co n s t i t u t i o n a l project which cancel each other out and create confusion. 
For example, i t i s obvious that Condorcet feared the consequences which 
his reforms could have i f allowed t o go too f a r . For t h i s reason he 
exempted from the " d r o i t de censure" "les decrets et les actes de simple 
administration, les deliberations sur les i n t e r e t s locaux et p a r t i e l s , 
l'exercice de l a surveillance et de l a police sur les fonctionnaires publics, 
i\ I ' I l 
et les mesures de surete generale . However, i n A r t . 33* he suddenly 
allows the citizens the i n i t i a t i v e "de provoquer l a mise en jugement 
des fonctionnaires publics, en cas d'abus de pouvoirs et de v i o l a t i o n 
2 
de l a l o i . " This contradiction and the vagueness of the terms employed 
by Condorcet would seem t o indicate that he had introduced the a r t i c l e 
as a mere sop to the masses. 
The preceding a r t i c l e s also create the same impression of 
uneasiness on Cpndorcet's part. While i t was normal for him t o introduce 
the idea of a "referendum c o n s u l t a t i f " ( Art. 30) whereby the Assembly 
could c a l l on the primary assemblies t o give t h e i r opinion on any question 
3 
concerning the running of the nation , his experience of the rowdy 
interventions of the mob during the debates i n the Convention had made him 
wary of allowing the people too great a freedom to use t h e i r r i g h t t o 
p e t i t i o n the Assembly on important questions. And yet the r i g h t t o p e t i t i o n 
1. T i t r e V I I I , Aet. 28; O.C. X I I . 475. 
2. O.C. X I I . 476. 
3- This was a l o g i c a l consequence of his e a r l i e r ideas, c f . Lettres 
d'un bourgeois de Newhaven (O.C. IX. 30-31) and of his fear that 
the complicated machinery whereby the citizens could press for the 
changing of a law needed to be supplemented by a system which 
allowed the Assembly a certain amount of i n i t i a t i v e i n discovering 
the w i l l of the people. 
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was a fundamental r i g h t which had t o be included i n t h e new c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
The r e s u l t of t h i s c o n f l i c t i n Condorcet's views i s r e f l e c t e d i n the 
confusing terms which we f i n d i n A r t i c l e s 31 and 32. Thus, t h e r i g h t 
t o p e t i t i o n i s acknowledged i n the f i r s t : 
Independamment de 1 exercice du d r o i t de censure s u ^ 
l e s l o i s , l e s citoyens ont l e d r o i t d'adresser des p e t i t i o n s 
aux a u t o r i t e s c o n s t i t u e e s , pour l e u r t n t e r e t personnel et p r i v e . " 
But i n the second, t h i s r i g h t , i n nature so d i r e c t , i s l i m i t e d by-
other f a c t o r s which are r a t h e r vaguely described: 
" l i s seront seulement a s s u j e t t i s , dans l ' e x e r c i c e de ce 
d r o i t , a l ' o r d r e p r o g r e s s i f e t a b l i par l a c o n s t i t u t i o n 
y / „ 
entre l e s diverses a u t o r i t e s c o n s t i t u e e s . 
Despite t h i s , we may nevertheless say t h a t t h i s p a r t o f the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o j e c t allows the people an unprecedented share i n the 
running of t h e i r a f f a i r s and marks a considerable advance even on the 
ideas expressed by Condorcet before 1789-
Powers held i n common between Assembly and people 
Under t h i s heading we i n c l u d e the whole of T i t r e IX of t h e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o j e c t concerning the o r g a n i s a t i o n of the conventions whose 
task would be t o r e v i s e the e x i s t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n according t o A r t . 33 of 
the P r o j e t de D e c l a r a t i o n . 
There i s no need t o elaborate on t h i s s e c t i o n t o o much. Enough 
has been sai d on Condorcet's b e l i e f i n the absolute n e c e s s i t y of a method 
of r e v i s i o n and also on the three forms of convention which he d e s i r e d , 
the p e r i o d i c a l convention meeting a u t o m a t i c a l l y every twenty years, the 
convention c a l l e d by the people through p r o v i n c i a l conventions every time 
they f e l t t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n as a whole needed t o be examined and the 
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convention summoned by the l e g i s l a t u r e a f t e r a c o n s u l t a t i o n of the people 
grouped i n t h e i r primary assemblies. The f i r s t i s embodied i n A r t . 4, 
the second i n A r t s . 5-6 ( w i t h the important d i f f e r e n c e t h a t t h e people 
here operate d i r e c t l y v i a t h e machinery described i n A r t s . 1-29 of 
T i t r e V I I I and t h a t t h i s convention has a l l t h e powers of the f i r s t ) 
and the t h i r d i n A r t . 7 - 1 
The powers are i n each case considered t o be h e l d i n common i n 
the sense t h a t the reforms are the consequence of the j o i n t a c t i o n of 
the people and t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a c t u a l l y make 
the reforms, but they do so w i t h the approval of the people and i t i s the 
people who u l t i m a t e l y have the r i g h t t o approve or r e j e c t the reforms 
2 
which are made. 
Once again the primary assemblies represent the cornerstone of the 
system, f o r i t was only thanks t o these assemblies, u n i f o r m l y spread 
throughout the n a t i o n and i n c l u d i n g a l l the c i t i z e n s w i t h o u t d i s t i n c t i o n of 
rank, t h a t Condorcet was able t o by-pass the d i f f i c u l t i e s placed i n the 
way of h i s e a r l i e r schemes f o r popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the need t o f i n d 
a compromise w i t h the reforms of the Constituent Assembly and r e t u r n t o a 
system which enabled him t o c o n c i l i a t e as f a r as possible the r i g h t o f 
the people d i r e c t l y t o r u n t h e i r own a f f a i r s w i t h the p r a c t i c a l n e c e s s i t y 
f o r a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e system of government. 
Delegated powers 
By "delegated powers" i s meant a l l the tasks not assumed d i r e c t l y 
by the people but passed on by them t o persons a c t i n g i n t h e i r name. 
1. O.C. X I I . 477. 
2. A r t s . 11-13. 
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These powers occur i n Condorcet's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o j e c t under the 
f o l l o w i n g headings or " t i t r e s " : V I I ( o r g a n i s a t i o n of the l e g i s l a t u r e ) , 
V ( o r g a n i s a t i o n of the e x e c u t i v e ) , V I ( o r g a n i s a t i o n of the " T r e s o r e r i e " ) , 
I V ( l o c a l government), X ( o r g a n i s a t i o n of the j u d i c i a r y ) and X I I , X I 
and X I I I concerning the laws d e a l i n g r e s p e c t i v e l y w i t h the t a x system, 
the "force publique" and f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s . 
The aim of the anal y s i s of these delegated f u n c t i o n s , as they are 
t o be found i n the Girondin p r o j e c t , i s t o i l l u s t r a t e t o what extent they 
i n c o r p o r a t e ideas and p r i n c i p l e s which Condorcet had expounded before 1789-
I t i s impossible t o do t h i s , however,, w i t h o u t r e f e r r i n g t o the 1791 C o n s t i t u t i o n 
f o r t h i s represented the f i r s t attempt made by p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s t o give 
new p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s concrete p o l i t i c a l form and g r e a t l y helped 
Condorcet h i m s e l f when he came t o draw up the new C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
This i s i l l u s t r a t e d , as we hope t o make c l e a r , by the f a i r l y 
s u b s t a n t i a l elements which he c a r r i e d d i r e c t l y over i n t o the new p r o j e c t . 
However, i t i s n a t u r a l l y i n the d i f f e r e n c e between the two t h a t i s t o be 
seen the extent t o which the Girondin p r o j e c t r e f l e c t s an attempt on 
Condorcet's p a r t , both t o adapt t o the new s i t u a t i o n created by the 10th 
August r e v o l u t i o n and t o r e t u r n t o the p u r i t y of the " i d e a l " scheme which 
he had o u t l i n e d before the Re v o l u t i o n . 
I n our a n a l y s i s , t h e r e f o r e , we s h a l l concentrate on the d i f f e r e n c e s 
and s i m i l a r i t i e s which e x i s t between the two p r o j e c t s and seek thereby t o 
i l l u s t r a t e the d i f f i c u l t i e s experienced by Condorcet i n h i s t a s k . 
The L e g i s l a t u r e 
The two most important p o i n t s which both c o n s t i t u t i o n s have i n 
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common concern the immunity of the deputies and the g a t h e r i n g of t h e 
2 
nation's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n t o a s i n g l e chamber . 
These were of course o l d ideas which Condorcet had defended 
several months before. However, as the i n t r o d u c t o r y speech which he made 
3 
concerning the p r o j e c t i n d i c a t e s , the unicameral system d i d not suggest 
i t s e l f as the only automatic s o l u t i o n . Condorcet was c l e a r l y against 
the idea of having two Chambers, and t h i s f o r the same reasons as i n 
4 
1790 ; however h i s fears t h a t the new assembly would be tempted t o 
rus h through l e g i s l a t i o n u n t h i n k i n g l y was so great t h a t he toyed w i t h the 
idea of e i t h e r d i v i d i n g the Assembly i n t o two pa r t s each time a b i l l had 
t o be debated, or of s e t t i n g up an unelected upper Chamber which would act 
as an advisory body w i t h o u t l e g i s l a t i v e power. Although he abandoned b o t h 
ideas on the ground t h a t they would t h r e a t e n the u n i t y of the l e g i s l a t u r e , 
5 
i t would seem t h a t he d i d s.o r a t h e r r e l u c t a n t l y . 
Condorcet e v e n t u a l l y s e t t l e d f o r a scheme based on t h e one he had 
recommended f o r the Etats-Gene"raux i n 1789* the s e t t i n g up of a "bureau" 
el e c t e d every month by the deputies from among themselves, which would 
1. Const, de 1791, T i t r e I I I , Ch.I, Sect.V, A r t s 7 & 8; 
Girondine, T i t r e V I I , Sect.V, A r t s . 13 & 14. 
2. I b i d . A r t . 1; I b i d . Section I , A r t . 1. 
J.{ E x p o s i t i o n des p r i n c i p e s et des m o t i f s du plan de c o n s t i t u t i o n , 
o.c. XII. 363. 
4. I b i d . 356-360. 
5. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t the p r i n t e r of the Girondin p r o j e c t 
mistakenly included the f i r s t scheme i n the footnotes of the published 
v e r s i o n , w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t the Montagnards were able t o accuse the 
Girondins i n February 1793 of su p p o r t i n g the d i v i s i o n of the Assembly 
i n t o two f a c t i o n s . I t i s worth n o t i n g also t h a t Condorcet makes no 
mention i n h i s p r o j e c t of the system of graded p l u r a l i t i e s which he 
had described so p a i n s t a k i n g l y before 1789» He obviously f e l t t h a t 
i t would be too d i f f i c u l t t o put i n t o p r a c t i c e and could be j u s t as 
e f f e c t i v e l y replaced by other systems. 
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have the task of analysing each b i l l i n d e t a i l between readings and which 
would thus ensure t h a t every p o t e n t i a l law was thoroughly examined before 
being passed.^ 
His f e a r of p r e c i p i t a t i o n was equalled only by h i s f e a r , born out 
of h i s experiences w i t h the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly, t h a t parliamentary 
procedure could be brought t o a s t a n d s t i l l . This i s t o be seen i n 
f u r t h e r d i f f e r e n c e s between the two c o n s t i t u t i o n s . 
The most important of these l i e s i n Condorcet's c a l l , f o r the 
2 
f i r s t time, f o r annual l e g i s l a t i v e e l e c t i o n s . This represents a d e f i n i t e 
e v o l u t i o n over h i s e a r l i e r scheme where only o n e - t h i r d of the N a t i o n a l 
Assembly was t o be renewed, and t h i s every two years. 
S i m i l a r l y the quorum c a l l e d f o r i n the Girondin p r o j e c t , two 
hundred, was much smaller than the 1791 C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s t h r e e hundred 
and seventy-three;'"' l i k e w i s e , the time l e f t aside f o r t h i s quorum t o 
. 4 
be reached, a f o r t n i g h t , c o n t r a s t s w i t h the f i r s t c o n s t i t u t i o n s month. 
Condorcet had become too aware of the dangers c o n s t i t u t e d by an i n a c t i v e 
Assembly t o allow the r i s k of p a r a l y s i n g i t f o r as long as a month. 
N a t u r a l l y enough the major d i f f e r e n c e s between the two c o n s t i t u t i o n s 
r e f l e c t the e n t i r e l y new s i t u a t i o n created by the second r e v o l u t i o n . This 
i s seen most c l e a r l y i n T i t r e V I I , Sect. I I , A r t . 2, where the Assembly's 
l e g i s l a t i v e powers are shown not t o extend as f a r as the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
laws. 
1. T i t r e V I I , Sect. I l l , A r t s . 5-l6; Sect. IV, A r t s . 1-6. 
2. I b i d . Sect. I , A r t . 1. 
3- Const, de 1791, T i t r e - I I I , Ch.I, Sect. V, A r t . 3; 
Girondine, T i t r e V I I , Sect. I , A r t . 8. 
4. I b i d . A r t . 3; A r t . 11. 
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I t i s seen also i n the r e t u r n t o Condorcet's o r i g i n a l c r i t e r i a 
f o r f i x i n g the number of deputies. These were t o be chosen only-
according t o the pop u l a t i o n of a given area and no longer according t o 
the s t a t u s of the people l i v i n g t h e r e . 
But other d i f f e r e n c e s r e f l e c t Condorcet's own personal obsessions. 
2 
The d i s t i n c t i o n . between laws and decrees, f o r example, i l l u s t r a t e s 
h i s long-held d e s i r e t o r e c o n c i l e the need f o r s t a b l e , c a r e f u l l y thought-
out laws and short-term p r a c t i c a l measures which had t o be taken q u i c k l y . 
His fear t h a t the R e v o l u t i o n would pave the way f o r a d i c t a t o r who 
would be only too happy t o step i n t o the vacuum l e f t by the King's 
departure i s seen i n Section I , A r t . 12, which l i m i t e d t o a month t h e 
term of o f f i c e of the Assembly's pr e s i d e n t . 
I t i s curious t o note, however, t h a t a c e r t a i n number of f a i r l y 
important p o i n t s i n the 1791 C o n s t i t u t i o n are not mentioned i n the 
Girondin p r o j e c t . Among the more important o f these i s the absence of 
any remark concerning the question of whether a deputy could, or could not , 
also be a m i n i s t e r . ^ Perhaps he considered t h a t the q u e s t i o n was answered 
by the f a c t t h a t , i n h i s scheme, the executive was t o be elected separately. 
I t i s nevertheless r a t h e r odd t h a t , d espite the f a c t t h a t he d i s l i k e d any 
4 
form of power cumulation, he made no attempt t o c l a r i f y what was, a f t e r 
a l l , an important p o i n t . 
1. Const, de 1791, T i t r e I I I , Ch. I , Sect. I , A r t s . 1-5; 
Girondine, T i t r e V I I , Sect. I , A r t s . 4 & 5. 
2. I b i d . Sect. I I , A r t s . 3-7-
3- Const, de 1791, T i t r e I I I , Ch. I , Sect. I l l , A r t s 4 & 5. 
4. Cf. h i s a t t i t u d e towards Roland's r e f u s a l t o r e s i g n from 
h i s post i n 1792. 
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The Executive 
As we have seen, Condorcet had paid l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n of t h e executive before 1790; i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , 
t h e r e f o r e , t o f i n d t h a t a considerable s e c t i o n of the 1791 C o n s t i t u t i o n 
has come over i n t o the new p r o j e c t , d espite the great d i f f e r e n c e s i n 
the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s out of which both c o n s t i t u t i o n s grew. 
The f i r s t important s i m i l a r i t y concerns the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
the executive and the l o c a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . I n both c o n s t i t u t i o n s the 
r o l e of the m i n i s t e r s was t o c o n s i s t i n a c t i n g as i n t e r m e d i a r i e s between 
the l o c a l assemblies and the N a t i o n a l Assembly; i t was t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
t o see t h a t the laws were t r a n s m i t t e d t o the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s and t h a t 
they were executed.^" Furthermore, they were t o watch over the l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s and would have the power t o declare v o i d any acts on t h e i r 
p a r t which went against the law and suspend any of them who abused t h e i r 
2 
a u t h o r i t y . 
The second s i m i l a r i t y concerns the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
m i n i s t e r s and the N a t i o n a l Assembly. I n both c o n s t i t u t i o n s i s t o be 
found the important a r t i c l e concerning the f a c t t h a t the m i n i s t e r s were 
not immune, but could be a r r e s t e d only on t h e passing of a s p e c i a l decree 
3 
t o t h a t e f f e c t . On the p u r e l y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l e v e l the m i n i s t e r s were t o 
r e p o r t t o the N a t i o n a l Assembly at the beginning of each session t o give an 
estimate of the expenditure which would be necessary d u r i n g the next session, 
1. Const, de 1791, T i t r e I I I , Ch.IV, S e c t . I , A r t . 5 ; 
Girondine, T i t r e V, S e c t . I , A r t . 5 . 
2. Const, de 1791, i b i d . S e c t . I I , A r t . 5 ; Girondine, S e c t . I , Arts. 8 & 9. 
3- C h . I I , Sect.IV, A r t . 8 ; T i t r e V, Art.2 1 . 
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t o inform the Assembly of the amount which had been spent d u r i n g the 
previous session and t o give t h e i r view on any aspects o f government which 
they f e l t t o be i n need of improvement.^" 
F i n a l l y the whole mass of r e l a t i v e l y minor d u t i e s which the f i r s t 
c o n s t i t u t i o n had l e f t t o the King, such as the nomination of o f f i c e r s , 
2 
the drawing up of annual l i s t s of rewards, e t c , now pass t o the 
. . . 3 
m i n i s t e r s . 
The fundamental d i f f e r e n c e between the two c o n s t i t u t i o n s o b v i o u s l y 
l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t , by t h e end of 1792, the King had been removed. 
As Condorcet had foreseen t h i s e v e n t u a l i t y a f t e r the f l i g h t t o Varenries, 
a l l he had t o do was t o i n c o r p o r a t e almost piecemeal the system which he 
had described i n 1790. The cabinet which i s described i n the Girondin 
p r o j e c t thus has a l l the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the o l d Conseil E l e c t i f . 
F ive basic s i m i l a r i t i e s may be mentioned. 
F i r s t , i t was t o be r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l , c o n s i s t i n g only of seven 
m i n i s t e r s ( T i t r e V, S e c t . I , A r t . l ) . This time Condorcet describes what 
these m i n i s t e r s were t o be responsible f o r , the only i n n o v a t i o n being a 
m i n i s t e r f o r a g r i c u l t u r e ( A r t . 2 ) . 
Secondly, the basic p r i n c i p l e governing the cabinet's o r g a n i s a t i o n 
was t o be t h a t of " c o l l e g i a l i t e " . This meant t h r e e t h i n g s ; f i r s t , no 
m i n i s t e r was t o be considered more important than, another; secondly,-
no m i n i s t e r could act w i t h i n h i s department w i t h o u t f i r s t c o n s u l t i n g the 
1. C h . I I , Sect.IV, A r t . 7 ; S e c t . I l l , A r t . l . 
2. Ch.IV, Arts. 2 - 4 . 
3. S e c t . I , Arts.13-15. 
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C o n s e i l ; t h i r d l y , the Conseil's d e c i s i o n could not be considered v a l i d 
unless a l l the m i n i s t e r s were present when i t was made. The second 
idea i s inc o r p o r a t e d i n t o A r t i c l e 17; the f i r s t i s seen i n Condorcet's 
d e c i s i o n t o r e j e c t the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the Conseil be presided over 
by a permanent President. He argued i n t h e " E x p o s i t i o n " t h a t such a post 
would have d i s t u r b i n g s i m i l a r i t i e s w i t h the o l d monarchy and i n war-time could 
encourage the man who occupied i t t o take c o n t r o l of the executive,^" a fe a r 
which i s understandable when we bear i n mind the power wielded by the 
vari o u s committees which were dominant at the time Condorcet was drawing 
up h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n . Thus, the Conseil was t o be presided over a l t e r n a t i v e l y 
by each m i n i s t e r , a change t a k i n g place every two weeks ( A r t . 3 ) . 
A t h i r d important s i m i l a r i t y l a y i n the f a c t t h a t the executive 
was t o be el e c t e d d i r e c t l y by the people (Sect. I I ) . The only e v o l u t i o n 
here was t h a t the N a t i o n a l Assembly would no longer have the r i g h t t o 
draw up the l i s t of candidates. The o l d p r i n c i p l e of se p a r a t i n g the 
executive from the l e g i s l a t u r e was thus respected. 
F o u r t h l y , the King's absence s i g n i f i e d t h a t the r i g h t t o dismiss a 
2 
m i n i s t e r was t o l i e e n t i r e l y w i t h the N a t i o n a l Assembly. 
F i n a l l y , the executive was t o have no c o n t r o l over the nation's 




I b i d . O.C. X I I . 366-372. 
Sect. I , A r t s . 21 et seq. 
Sect. I , Art.1 8 . 
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" T r e s o r e r i e Nationale" 
The for m a t i o n of a " t r e s o r e r i e n a t i o n a l e " i s o f course another idea 
incorporated d i r e c t l y i n t o Condorcet's p r o j e c t from h i s w r i t i n g s of 1790. 
Once again, however, the e v o l u t i o n we have n o t i c e d i n h i s o r g a n i s a t i o n 
of the executive comes through i n t h i s s e c t i o n . 
Thus, f o r the f i r s t time, the commissioners of the " t r e s o r e r i e " 
and of the "bureau des comptes" were t o be elected d i r e c t l y by the people 
1 
and not appointed by the N a t i o n a l Assembly as i n the e a r l i e r scheme. 
Secondly, Condorcet has g r e a t l y s i m p l i f i e d the o r g a n i s a t i o n of these 
two bodies. The number of commissioners has been reduced from t e n t o 
three ( A r t . l ) and the two posts o f " T r e s o r i e r n a t i o n a l " and "Procureur 
des creanciers de l a n a t i o n " have been scrapped, an attempt on Condorcet's 
p a r t t o move away from i n d i v i d u a l power towards c o l l e g i a l i t e . 
However, only one genuine i n n o v a t i o n i s t o be noted here - the 
appointment of s p e c i a l j u r i e s t o examine the annual expenditure of the 
2 
departmental a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . But t h i s idea, due no doubt t o the 
immensity of the t a s k a t hand, r e f l e c t s more a change o f form than of 
content; the basic r o l e of the " t r e s o r e r i e " i s the same as the one 
designed f o r i t i n 1790 - t o prevent the l e g i s l a t u r e and the executive 
from e x e r c i s i n g any c o n t r o l over the nation's finances. 
1. T i t r e V I , A r t . 1, 7• This had been one of the measures c a l l e d f o r 
by Condorcet on 6th J u l y 1792. 
2. T i t r e V I , A r t . 10. 
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L o c a l Government 
Of a l l the sections of the Girondin p r o j e c t , T i t r e IV, d e a l i n g 
w i t h l o c a l government, i s the one which most resembles the 1791 C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
The reason f o r t h i s c l e a r l y l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t t h e events of 1789 and 
1790 had d e f i n i t i v e l y put paid t o the scheme described by Condorcet 
before the Re v o l u t i o n . 
By making the primary assemblies the basic p o l i t i c a l u n i t of the 
n a t i o n , the Con s t i t u e n t Assembly had ensured t h a t the task of the 
assemblies at the l e v e l of the "departements" and "cantons" was t o be 
purely a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and t h a t t h ey were t o be placed d i r e c t l y under the 
a u t h o r i t y of the c e n t r a l powers, the executive and l e g i s l a t i v e . 
These aspects of the 1791 c o n s t i t u t i o n are thus taken over wholesale 
i n t o the new p r o j e c t , as the f o l l o w i n g b r i e f summary w i l l i n d i c a t e . 
The l o c a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s were not t o be considered as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
1 2 of the people, they were t o be elected by the people and were t o come 
under the c o n t r o l of the executive^. T h e i r f u n c t i o n s were t o be l a i d 
4 
down by the N a t i o n a l Assembly and would c o n s i s t p r i n c i p a l l y i n t h e 
5 
c o l l e c t i o n of taxes . 
The executive would have the a u t h o r i t y t o suspend the "departemental" 
a d m i n i s t r a t o r s and t o n u l l i f y any of t h e i r a c t i o n s which v i o l a t e d the law 
1. Const, de 1791, T i t r e I I I , Ch. IV, Sect. I I , A r t . 2; 
Girondine, T i t r e IV, Sect. I , A r t . 7-
2. A r t . 2; Section I I . 
3- A r t . 2; T i t r e V, Sect. I , A r t . 7-
4. A r t . 4; T i t r e IV, Sect. I , A r t . 13-
5. A r t . 4; A r t . 10. 
6. A r t . 5i T i t r e V, Sect. I , A r t s . 8 & 9. 
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and the "departemental" a u t h o r i t i e s were t o be able t o do the same 
t o the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s beneath them.^" 
Of course there are a number of s u p e r f i c i a l d i f f e r e n c e s between 
the two c o n s t i t u t i o n s . Functions which were reserved f o r the King i n the 
f i r s t now pass t o the m i n i s t e r s and the Girondin p r o j e c t provides many more 
2 
d e t a i l s about the i n t e r n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n of the various assemblies. That 
these d i f f e r e n c e s are more i n the form than i n the s p i r i t however, i s 
i n d i c a t e d by one of the a r t i c l e s of the new p r o j e c t which most c l e a r l y 
r e f l e c t s the i n f l u e n c e of t h e new s i t u a t i o n brought about by 10th August. 
True t o h i s o l d pre-Revolutionary ideas, Condorcet replaces the o l d 
C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s "canton" assemblies by those r e p r e s e n t i n g the "grandes 
communes". However, he makes i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t the "commune" 
a d m i n i s t r a t o r s were i n f e r i o r t o those of t h e "departements" and could be 
suspended by them. This may only be explained by two t h i n g s : f i r s t t he 
grouping of a l l the c i t i z e n s i n the primary assemblies ensured t h a t t h e i r 
p o l i t i c a l power was guaranteed and consequently g r e a t l y reduced the 
importance which the "communes" had acquired i n 1790"^ ; secondly, the 
e l e c t i o n of the departmental a d m i n i s t r a t o r s by a l l the c i t i z e n s ensured t h a t 
the o l d charges of s u b j e c t i n g the people t o the w i l l o f the men chosen only 
hy the wealthy elements of the p o p u l a t i o n was now a t h i n g of the past. 
1. A r t . 6, T i t r e IV, Sect. I , A r t s . 17 & 18. 
2. Cf. T i t r e IV, Sect. I , A r t s . 2 - 6 . 
3. But t h i s d i d not prevent the Montagnards from p o i n t i n g out, w i t h 
some j u s t i f i c a t i o n , t h a t t h i s reform considerably reduced t h e 
i n f l u e n c e of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y "communes" i n the towns. Cf. Godechot: 
Les c o n s t i t u t i o n s de l a France depuis 1789 > P a r i s , Garnier -
Flammarion, 1970. I n t r o d u c t i o n t o 1793 C o n s t i t u t i o n , p.71• 
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F i n a l l y , mention should be made of the only genuine innovations 
i n Condorcet's plan - the nomination of a "commissaire n a t i o n a l " by the 
executive i n each "departement" t o act as a kin d o f l i a i s o n o f f i c e r between 
the provinces and the c e n t r a l government,^" a move which r e f l e c t s h i s s t r o n g 
d e s i r e f o r n a t i o n a l u n i t y and cohesion between the c a p i t a l and the provinces. 
More important than t h i s , however, i s the a r t i c l e concerning t h e nomination 
by t h e government of s p e c i a l agents who would have t h e ta s k of ensuring t h a t 
a l l t h e m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n the provinces were being w e l l administered 
( A r t . 14), an idea c l e a r l y i n s p i r e d by the war o f 1792 and the c r e a t i o n by 
the Convention o f the "representants en mission". 
We have come a long way from t h e d e c e n t r a l i s e d system r e f l e c t e d i n the 
remarkably powerful " d i s t r i c t " assemblies of the " l e t t r e s d'un bourgeois de 
Newhaven". 
The J u d i c i a r y 
As we have seen, the p a r t of the Con s t i t u e n t Assembly's work which 
Condorcet most approved of was t h a t d e a l i n g w i t h the reforms of the 
j u d i c i a r y . Thus, many of the fundamental reforms r e f l e c t e d i n the 1791 
C o n s t i t u t i o n are taken over by the Girondin p r o j e c t - the separa t i o n of the 
5 4 j u d i c i a r y from the executive and l e g i s l a t i v e , the e l e c t i o n of judges , 
5 6 the p r o t e c t i o n of the accused , the freedom of the press , e t c . 
1. Sect. I , A r t . 15. 
2 . These "commissaires", nominated by the c e n t r a l power, c o n t r a s t 
n o t a b l y w i t h those allowed t o the Communes i n August 1792 t o 
supervise t h e departmental a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . 
3. T i t r e I I I , Ch. V, A r t . 1; T i t r e X, Sect.. I , A r t . 5. 
4. A r t . 2; A r t . 3-
5. A r t . 9, 10 - 16; Sect. I l l , A r t s . 5 - 8 ; Sect. V I , A r t . 3, 4 - 13. 
6. A r t s . 17, l8> Sect. V I , A r t s . 16, 17. 
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The d i f f e r e n c e s - and they are numerous - u s u a l l y add l i t t l e t o 
thoughts which Condorcet had expressed when r e v i e w i n g the l e g a l reforms 
i n 1790. The Girondin p r o j e c t thus includes matters which are fundamental 
t o Condorcet's ideas as they were expressed before the R e v o l u t i o n and which have 
no echo i n the 1791 C o n s t i t u t i o n . Among the most important of these are 
the f o l l o w i n g : the Republic was t o have a code of c r i m i n a l and c i v i l laws"*" 
2 
c i v i l j u s t i c e was not t o be confused w i t h c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e and the c o u r t was 
t o be composed according t o the nature o f the crime committed^; j u r i e s 
4 
were t o be el e c t e d ; c a p i t a l punishment was t o be abolished f o r 
5 6 n o n - p o l i t i c a l offences as was the o l d r i g h t o f pardon . 
Other d i f f e r e n c e s are once again more a matter o f form than of s p i r i t . 
This may be seen most c l e a r l y i n the methods devised by Condorcet i n h i s 
new p r o j e c t t o put an end t o the appeal system which he had considered 
one of the great e s t weaknesses i n the Constituent Assembly's l e g a l reforms. 
Among the methods which he devised f o r t h i s purpose i s t o be found 
the greatest s i n g l e i n n o v a t i o n of t h i s s e c t i o n - t h e c r e a t i o n of "censeurs 
j u d i c i a i r e s " e l e c t e d by the people and ent r u s t e d w i t h the t a s k of r e c e i v i n g 
complaints or appeals on l e g a l matters. They would have the a u t h o r i t y t o 
7 
quash any judgement which they considered d e f e c t i v e and t o order a r e - t r i a l . 
I n t h i s way Condorcet replaced the o l d r a t h e r feeble appeal courts by people 
1. T i t r e X, Sect. I , A r t . 1. 
2 . Here they are t r e a t e d under d i f f e r e n t headings i n the Griondin 
p r o j e c t , r e s p e c t i v e l y Sects. 2 and 3« 
3. Sect. I l l , A r t . 3. 
4. Sect. I I , A r t s . 9 - 12, although the method i s s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t from 
the one described i n 1790. 
5. Sect. I l l , A r t . 1. 
6. Sect. I l l , A r t . 2. 
7. T i t r e X, Sect. I V , A r t s . 1, 4. 
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whose sole purpose was t o examine the v a l i d i t y of judgements and who 
derived t h e i r a u t h o r i t y from the people. As i n the 1791 C o n s t i t u t i o n , 
however, only the N a t i o n a l Assembly could quash a judgement which had already 
been quashed twice"*". 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note i n t h i s respect t h a t Condorcet seems t o have 
abandoned h i s o l d idea of a "Cour de cassation". The reason f o r t h i s , as 
he h i m s e l f admitted i n the"Exposition"^, was t o strengthen the l e g a l u n i t y 
of the n a t i o n by t r a n s f e r r i n g the maximum amount of a u t h o r i t y t o persons' 
el e c t e d by the people, working a t grassroots l e v e l throughout the n a t i o n 
and remaining i n constant contact w i t h the N a t i o n a l Assembly. I t was 
f o r t h i s reason t h a t the "censeurs"' other r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s consisted 
i n p r o v i d i n g the Assembly w i t h r e g u l a r r e p o r t s on every t r i a l which took place 
i n t h e i r area^. 
The same s p i r i t dominates the innovations introduced i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n 
of the c o u r t s . I n place of the "procureur syndic" and the "commissaires du 
r o i " the c i v i l courts were t o be supervised by "commissaires nationaux", 
4 
" d i r e c t e u r s " and "rapporteurs" and the c r i m i n a l oourts by "accusateurs 
n5 6 p u b l i c s , a l l of them elected by the people and a l l entrusted w i t h the 
h i g h l y important task of ensuring, w i t h the c o l l a b o r a t i o n of the "censeurs 
j u d i c i a i r e s " , t h a t the t r i a l s took place according t o the l e t t e r o f the law . 
1. Const, de 1791, Ch. V, A r t . 21; Girondine, Sect. IV, A r t . 5. 
2. O.C. X I I . 382. 
3. Cf. Sect. TV, A r t . 11. 
4. Sect. I I , A r t . 15. 
5. Sect. I l l , A r t . 10. 
6. S.ect. I I , A r t . l4 j Sect. I l l , A r t . 9. 
7. Sect. TV, A r t s . 6 and 9. 
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Such preoccupations had of course played an important r o l e i n 
Condorcet's w r i t i n g before 1789, but the September massacres no doubt 
h e l p t o e x p l a i n why he paid so much more a t t e n t i o n t o the question of 
ensuring t h a t t r i a l s took place according t o the proper forms t h a n the 
1791 C o n s t i t u t i o n had done. I t i s important t o note also t h a t , i n every 
case, the people responsible f o r s u p e r v i s i n g the t r i a l s were not t o be 
appointed from above, as i n the o l d C o n s t i t u t i o n , but e l e c t e d by the 
c i t i z e n s . 
I t i s here also t h a t l i e s the great d i f f e r e n c e i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n s 
as regards the r o l e played by the J.P.s. We have seen how Condorcet 
welcomed t h e i r c r e a t i o n i n 1790, and a great many of t h e i r f u n c t i o n s are 
incorporated d i r e c t l y i n t o h i s own project"*". However, u n l i k e the 1791 
C o n s t i t u t i o n , the J.P.s i n h i s p r o j e c t were t o be e l e c t e d annually and 
t h e i r d u t i e s are described i n greater d e t a i l . 
F i n a l l y , Condorcet replaces the o l d c o n s t i t u t i o n ^ "Haute Cour 
Nationale" by a " j u r e N a t i o n a l " , the e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e between the 
two being, once again, t h a t the members of the l a t t e r were t o be e l e c t e d 
2 
by the people . 
The Tax System, T i t r e X I I 
As Condorcet began h i s a t t a c k on the Aneien Re'gime by h i t t i n g a t 
i t s system of t a x a t i o n , i t i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h i s s e c t i o n of h i s 
p r o j e c t contains many fundamental ideas expressed w e l l before the 
Revolu t i o n had s t a r t e d . 
1. A r t . 7; Sect. I I , A r t s . 2 - 5 . 
2 . T i t r e , X, Sect. V. 
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Thus A r t i c l e s 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, which sum up a l l Condorcet's 
basic principles concerning taxation, may be traced back t o works 
w r i t t e n by him as early as 1776^. I t i s indicative of Condorcet's 
di s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the work of the Constituent Assembly that the 
1791 Constitution contains only f i v e of the a r t i c l e s found i n the 
2 
Girondin project: 3 , 7 - 10 (Art. 3). 
Of the four a r t i c l e s i n the Girondin project which cannot be 
traced back t o ideas expressed by Condorcet before 1789* three, namely 
Arts. 8, 9 and 10 have t h e i r o r i g i n i n Condorcet's attempts i n 1790 
t o establish a "tresprerie" which would put an end to the chaos e x i s t i n g 
i n the nation's finances. I t i s worth noting however, t h a t , i n 1786, he 
had already pointed out the fact that the new c o n s t i t u t i o n of the United 
States contained an a r t i c l e whereby Congress would have t o inform the 
nation annually on the state of the finances, i . e . the balance between 
3 
expenditure and receipts . However, the necessity for obliging the 
lo c a l administrators and ministers t o keep the nation regularly informed 
about the f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n only made i t s e l f r e a l l y f e l t i n 1792 w i t h 
the coming of war. I t i s i n t h i s period that Condorcet's views on the question 
t r u l y began t o take shape. 
A r t i c l e 6 seems to have created problems f o r the people who have 
studied the Girondin project. The Girondin commentator of the Feuille 
v i l l a g p i s e claimed that an a r t i c l e condemning any tax "qui ... n u i r a i t 
a l a l i b r e disposition des propriete's, au progres de l ' i n d u s t r i e et du 
commerce, a l a c i r c u l a t i o n des capitaux" could c l e a r l y only be r e f e r r i n g t o 
1. Cf. Remarques sur les 'pensees' de Pascal, O.C. I l l , 652; Eloge de Michel 
de l ' H f l p i t a l , O.C. I l l , 474, dealing respectively with the pri n c i p l e that 
the minimum required by a man t o l i v e should not be taxed and that taxation 
should be carried out e n t i r e l y i n the interests of the people. 
2. T i t r e V, Art. 1. 
3. Cf. Influence de l a revolution d Amerique sur 1 Europe, O.C. V I I I . 99-
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the progressive tax. 
I t i s obvious, however, that Condorcet was here r e f e r r i n g to the 
i n d i r e c t taxes which he had attacked before 1789 precisely on these 
grounds. 
He had never opposed the p r i n c i p l e of a progressive tax and had, 
on the contrary, hoped to introduce one i n 1790. Any further doubts 
are removed by an important a r t i c l e which he contributed to the Journal 
d I n s t r u c t i o n Sociale on 1st May 1793 on the Impat progressif . I n i t he 
stated e x p l i c i t l y that a progressive tax, i f levied with discretion and 
care "non-seulement est juste, mais .. u t i l e , parce q u ' i l soulage l e 
pauvre d o n t - i l diminue les charges, sans l e punir de ce f a i b l e soulagement 
par des coups funestes portes a l a c i r c u l a t i o n et a l ' i n d u s t r i e " . 
"Force publique" ( T i t r e XI) and foreign relations ( T i t r e X I I I ) 
Before 1789* Condorcet had remained very vague on the question of 
what the "force publique" was to consist of. He said r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e 
about the creation of a force w i t h i n the country t o supervise the behaviour of the 
people and ensure that the laws were enforced, and merely expressed his preference 
for the nation's defence to be placed i n the hands of a voluntary m i l i t i a 
recruited on a l o c a l basis, rather than i n a permanent standing army. He 
refused to distinguish c l e a r l y between the two roles which t h i s "force" would 
assume - that of ensuring law and order and that of defending the nation 
against attack. 
1. Cf. Alengry op. c i t . p.650. 
2. i . e . only two months before his f l i g h t . 
3. O.C X I I . 625 - 636. 
4. I b i d . 632 - 633. 
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I t was l e f t t o the Constitution of 1791 to make t h i s distinction^"; 
i n fact i t was not u n t i l November 1792 that Condorcet actually gave 
detail s concerning the creation of an i n t e r n a l force t o take care of law 
and order and suggested that i t consist of a body of professionals recruited 
either on a l o c a l basis and operating i n the area from which i t was 
2 
chosen, or on a national basis and deployed throughout the country. 
However, his distaste f o r a permanent professional army remained 
throughout the revolution. Already, i n 1790, he had attacked conscription, 
claiming that an army of valunteers would be more e f f i c i e n t , because more 
enthusiastic, than an army of conscripts'^, and on 20th A p r i l 1792 he 
4 
celebrated the c a l l i n g up of popular voluntary m i l i t i a s . 
His b e l i e f i n the value of a volunteer army was i n t e n s i f i e d by the 
idea, shared by most of the revolutionaries, that the war was one i n which 
the people were opposed to the monarchs. This idea was implied as early 
as 1790 i n Condorcet's essay on the Pacte de f a m i l l e and was repeated with 
more emphasis i n the speech of 1792 " l a republique francaise aux hommes 
l i b r e s . " 5 
I t comes through i n the f i r s t a r t i c l e of the Girondin project: "La 
force publique est composee de tous les citoyens en etat de porter les armes", 
an a r t i c l e which contrasts with the equivalent one i n the 1791 Constitution 
6 
where only the active citizens are mentioned . 
1. T i t r e IV, Art. 1. 
2. Cf. l a nature des pouvoirs politiques dans une nation l i b r e , 
O.C. X. 597 - 600. 
J. Cf. Idees sur l e despotisme, O.C. IX. 170. 
4. Cf. Projet d'une exposition, etc. O.C. X. 455. 
5. O.C. X I I . 113. 
6. l i t r e IV, A r t . 2. 
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However, the very magnitude of the war had made i t clear t o 
Condorcet that i t was not s u f f i c i e n t t o r e l y e n t i r e l y on volunteers. 
The Girondin project thus c a l l s f o r paid soldiers to supplement the 
ranks of the m i l i t i a and the National Guard (Art. 2). 
The section concerning the organisation of the National Guard i s 
of course very similar t o the 1791 Constitution as t h i s body only came 
i n t o being with the Revolution. Both constitutions r e f l e c t the fear that 
i t might become a source of r e v o l t against the central government: thus, 
the o f f i c e r s (who, i n both cases were to be elected^were not t o be 
2 
allowed t o take charge of the National Guard of more than one area . This 
i s reinforced i n the Girondin project by the a r t i c l e forbidding the 
National Guard of one area from passing i n t o another without f i r s t 
informing the National Assembly (A r t . 5)-
However, i n the context of 1793* Condorcet's r e a l fear concerned 
the autonomy of the generals i n the army. The s p i r i t of the decree 
against them which he had wished to see adopted i n July 1792 thus comes 
through very strongly i n his project. Not only does he repeat the old 
Constitution's a r t i c l e which stated that the army's sole r o l e was t o 
obey^ but adds two more: o f f i c e r s were to receive commissions for only 
one campaign ( A r t . 10); only the National Assembly was authorised t o 
begin negotiations w i t h the enemy or order a cease-fire ( T i t r e X I I I , A r t . 8). 
The memory of General Dillon's a c t i v i t i e s i n A p r i l 1792 and of those of the 
French generals at Valenciennes i n May of that year was s t i l l too much 
alive for matters t o be otherwise. 
1. T i t r e IV, A r t . 6; T i t r e X I, Art. 12. 
2. Art. 6; A r t . 12. 
3. Const, de 1791. T i t r e V, A r t . 12; T i t r e X I , A r t . 9-
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F i n a l l y , we must look at Condorcet's organisation of the r o l e of 
the executive and l e g i s l a t u r e i n time of war, f o r i t was at t h i s that many of 
the Montagnards' attacks i n 1793 were directed. 
Condorcet had paid l i t t l e a t t e ntion t o the role of the executive 
before 1789* merely s t a t i n g that the war would be conducted by a 
"Conseil" nominated by the National Assembly. Now, however, t h i s r o l e 
has passed t o elected ministers: "Toutes les parties de l a force 
publique employee contre les ennemis du dehors, agiront sous les ordres du 
* i . l 
conseil executif. Furthermore, the Conseil was to be allowed to take 
2 
measures to defend the nation i n case of attack and t h i s on i t s own i n i t i a t i v e . 
I t was also t o nominate the "agents nationaux" responsible f o r negotiating 
peace t r e a t i e s and alliances with the other nations ( A r t . 9). 
I n a way, we may understand Saint-Just's claim that Condorcet wished 
to set up . " l a royaute des ministres" , especially as the powers mentioned 
i n the f i r s t two a r t i c l e s above correspond t o those which the old 
4 
Constitution had granted t o the King . 
Though there i s l i t t l e doubt that the shape of Condorcet's project 
was inspired by his conception of the executive as forming an e n t i t y d i s t i n c t 
from the l e g i s l a t u r e and his-consequent wish t o put an end t o the revolutionary 
"committees" which flourished i n 1793* i t would seem, nevertheless, that 
Saubt-Just's attack was rather u n f a i r . I t i s quite obvious, from the project, 
that power r e a l l y lay with the l e g i s l a t u r e . As we have seen, only the 
1. T i t r e XI, A r t . 7-
2. T i t r e X I I I , A r t . 6. 
3. Cf. Godechot, op. c i t . p.71. 
4. Cf. Const, de 1791* T i t r e IV, Art. 1. 
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National Assembly could order a cease-fire; furthermore, none of the 
executive's i n i t i a t i v e s could remain v a l i d unless i t immediately informed 
the legislature^" and only the Assembly could validate the t r e a t i e s 
negotiated by the "agents nationaux" ( A r t . 9)-
However, Condorcet's project was not a mere r e f l e c t i o n of abstract ideas 
and on these grounds too i t may be defended. For example, how could we blame 
him f o r allowing the executive such freedom i n taking the necessary steps 
t o defend the nation when we bear i n mind the lethargic behaviour of the 
War Minister de Lessart i n 1792? 
F i n a l l y , only the National Assembly was authorized t o declare war on 
2 
another nation , a move against which the Conseil, unlike the King of the 
3 4 old Constitution , could do nothing whatsoever . 
We w i l l conclude t h i s section by looking at what the project says 
about France's relations with other nations f o r t h i s too was a source of 
c o n f l i c t between Condorcet, the Girondins and the Montagnards. 
I n the f i r s t a r t i c l e of T i t r e X I I I , Condorcet states the basic 
pr i n c i p l e on which the revolutionaries as a whole, Condorcet included, 
wished to establish t h e i r war policy: "La Republique franchise ne. prendra 
les armes que pour l e maintien de sa l i b e r t e , l a conservation de son 
t e r r i t o i r e et l a defense de ses a l l i e s . " 
1. Cf. T i t r e X I I I , Arts. 6 and 7. 
2. T i t r e X I I I , A rt. 5. 
3. Cf. T i t r e I I I , Ch. I l l , Sect. I , A r t . 2. 
4. The old provision that a declaration of war be followed by a 
l e g i s l a t i v e election has of course been dropped; the fact that 
these elections were t o take place annually rendered i t superfluous. 
5. Cf. Const, de 1791» T i t r e VT, F i r s t sentence. 
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Following on l o g i c a l l y from t h i s , A r t i c l e 2 states that France 
would not refuse to incorporate any other state which requested i t , 
an obvious a l l u s i o n t o the vote made by the Comtat Venaissin on 
11th June 1790 and the decree of 19th November 1792. 
However, A r t i c l e s 3 and 4, although very "girondin" i n character 
do not seem to r e f l e c t Condorcet's personal views on the question of the 
ro l e which the French troops should adopt towards the peoples i n the other 
nations. By s t a t i n g t h a t the French generals "seront tenus ... d'assurer 
aux citoyens (des pays occupesj l a jouissance entiere de leurs d r o i t s naturels, 
c i v i l s et politiques . . . ( e t ) ne pourront ... proteger ... l e maintien des 
usages contraires a l a l i b e r t e , a 1 egalite,eta l a souverainete des peuples 
(Ar t . 3)* Condorcet f e l l i n w i t h the Girondin thesis that the war was 
a just one waged by the French armies i n order t o help a l l the peoples of 
Europe l i b e r a t e themselves from the despots who ruled over them. 
However, Condorcet had always remained much more reserved than Brissot 
on t h i s point. On 20th A p r i l 1792 he had attacked Brissot's c a l l f o r a l l 
the nations of Europe to j o i n i n the war on France's side''". As we have 
seen, his position throughout 1792 was very cautious, being based more on 
discouraging the other powers from invading France than i n threatening 
them with the prospect of a war of l i b e r a t i o n . He was to repeat these views 
i n February 1793: ("la nation franchise) a renonce aux conquetes ... parce 
qu e l l e n ignore pas que forcer des etrangers a partager ... les d r o i t s 
N / 2 
de nos citoyens, ce serai t ... attenter a leur independance." 
1. Cf. Projet d'une exposition, etc. O.C. X. 448. 
"N 2. La nation, francaise a tous les peuples, O.C. X I I . 510 - 511. 
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The Girondins' views are carried over also i n t o A r t i c l e 4 
where i t i s stated that the French republic "respectera les i n s t i t u t i o n s 
garanties par l e consentement de l a generalite des peuples"; t h i s 
meant presumably that i t would not respect the i n s t i t u t i o n s set up by 
the European despots and would therefore change them i n a l l the countries 
which i t occupied. However, i t would not impose i t s own i n s t i t u t i o n s 
on the "liberated" nations. 
Condorcet's views on t h i s question are not absolutely clear; i t 
would seem, however, that his a t t i t u d e was much more r e a l i s t i c than that 
of the w i l d l y i d e a l i s t i c Brissot. The l a t t e r wanted the French troops 
to leave the "liberated" nations e n t i r e l y i n the hands of t h e i r new 
leaders; Condorcet, however, r e a l i s i n g that the balance of forces 
would make t h i s an extremely dangerous step, had supported the decree 
put forward by Cambon and Danton on 15th December 1792 which stated 
that i t was quite legitimate f o r France to take over the administration 
of the conquered countries'*". 
These inconsistencies may be explained by two things. F i r s t , 
there i s the perfectly l o g i c a l explanation that Condorcet had at f i r s t been 
rather reluctant t o support a war policy; however, once the war had started, 
he quite n a t u r a l l y desired that France ensure by a l l possible means that 
i t be won. Secondly, he wished, as always, t o reconcile his views with 
those of the two leading factions i n the Convention - the Girondins and 
2 
Montagnards , He was aware tha t , on t h i s issue, both these factions were, 
1. Cf. Alengry, op. c i t . p.674. 
2. Robespierre himself called for t o t a l intervention i n the a f f a i r s of the 
other nations. He was to c r i t i c i s e the Girondin project f o r not going 
fa r enough i n t h i s matter ( c f . Alengry op. c i t . p.675) and attempted on 
24th A p r i l 1793 to persuade the Convention to vote i n favour of four 
proposals f o r increasing France's a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n the "liberated" nations 
( c f . G. Rude: Robespierre, Glasgow, W. Colli n s , 1975, p.254). But he was t o 
back down from t h i s bold position l a t e r i n the year ( c f . Hampson: The l i f e 
&.opinions of Maximilien Robespierre, Duckworth, 1974, p.189. 
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f o r once, i n agreement and. that i t was pointless t o r i s k jeopardising 
the success of the whole project on i t . These two a r t i c l e s are therefore 
something of a compromise: they accept i n theory the idea of a "guerre 
revolutionnaire", but remain vague as to the degree of intervention i n 
the a f f a i r s of others that the French Republic would allow herself. 
As t h i s study has shown, the Girondin c o n s t i t u t i o n a l project was an 
astute application of the old principles put forward by Condorcet before 
1789 to the s i t u a t i o n as i t existed i n 1793* Although many of i t s 
provisions are to be found i n old ideas, others are born d i r e c t l y out of 
the events of 1790 - 1793. 
A good example of t h i s , not mentioned above, i s to be found i n 
T i t r e I I concerning the c r i t e r i a whereby a man was to be considered a 
c i t i z e n of the republic. Although most of the conditions correspond t o 
those of the 1791 Constitution''", we may distinguish some which are c l e a r l y 
inspired by the anti-emigre l e g i s l a t i o n supported by Condorcet at the end 
of 1791 and i n 1792. This i s A r t i c l e 6, barring from citizenship for the 
space of s i x months any man who had resided abroad for s i x months on 
non-government business. 
Other characteristics which indicate that Condorcet was keen on 
adapting his c o n s t i t u t i o n t o the times i s seen i n the omission of women 
from the ranks of citizenship, a step which the pre-1789 Condorcet would 
have accepted only w i t h d i f f i c u l t y but which follows the a t t i t u d e he had 
adopted i n 1790. 
1. Cf, T i t r e I I , A r t s . 2, 3, 6. 
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However, i t i s the elaborate electoral system described at length 
i n the project^" which i l l u s t r a t e s more than anything else the extent 
of Condorcet's influence on the Constitutional Committee. That he 
wished t o maintain i t despite the danger which lengthy electoral periods 
represented at times of social unrest such as those Prance was 
experiencing i n 1793* indicates that he considered that an electoral 
method which did not ensure that the people chosen corresponded exactly 
to the wishes of the electorate, made nonsence of the very idea of a 
representative government. 
He f i r m l y believed that the system he had discovered i n 1785 was the 
only one which could guarantee a f a i r election and there i s no doubt that 
2 
i t represents one of the cornerstones of the new project . 
1. I t occupies an entire section of T i t r e I I I . 
2. K.M. Baker claims that the work upon which t h i s system was based, 
the Essai sur l ' a p p l i c a t i o n de l'analyse a l a probabilite des 
decisions rendues a* l a p l u r a l i t l des voix was the one that 
Condorcet "valued ... more highly than any other of his s c i e n t i f i c 
w r i t i n g s " , op. c i t . p.8l. 
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The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l committee, having completed i t s task, was 
dissolved on 15th February 1793 and, t h i r t e e n days l a t e r , Condorcet, 
together with Barere and Sieyes, returned t o his work on the educational 
committee. He had j u s t over a year t o l i v e , but, i n a thesis of t h i s 
kind, there i s l i t t l e t o say about his works and a c t i v i t i e s during t h i s 
period. They represent no evolution over the ideas which are expressed 
i n the Exposition t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l project; i n f a c t , they r e f l e c t 
the consistency of Condorcet's thought, i l l u s t r a t e d by his persistent e f f o r t s 
t o preserve at a l l costs the un i t y which he believed had been at l a s t 
achieved by the 10th August revolution. 
The desire t o preserve t h i s u n i t y l i e s behind a l l his actions of 
the time and explains his attempts t o reconcile the Girondins with the 
Montagnards, the masses i n the provinces w i t h Paris . and the electors w i t h 
the National Assembly. 
Thus, on 9th and 21st February, he defended the Girondins against 
those who accused them of preferring a federal system of government"'" yet, 
2 
the following month, blamed them for t h e i r continuing d i s t r u s t of Paris . 
Simi l a r l y , despite his hatred for the extremist elements who 
threatened t o disrupt the workings of the Assembly, he defended the 
Convention's work i n A p r i l i n an address to the electors of Saint-Quentin 
putting the rowdiness down t o enthusiasm. At the same time, however,'he 
1. Chronique de Paris, I . 157, 205. 
2. I b i d . p.24l. 
f t , / J>. Cf. Adresse des deputes de 1 Aisne aux citoyens de leurs departements, 
o.c. x i i . 569 - 580. 
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called on the parties i n the Convention to bury t h e i r differences and to 
vote through such v i t a l measures as the d i s t r i b u t i o n of land, the reduction 
i n the number of assignats, etc.^" 
Meanwhile, i n the Chronique de Paris, he b i t t e r l y attacked the War 
Minister Pache and proposed a plan for the transformation of the ministry 
2 
i n t o a War Council , one of the consequences of which was his appointment 
to the Defence Committee on 25th March 1793-
Even after the r e j e c t i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l project on 29th A p r i l , 
he refused to give up hope and, on 13th May, urged the Convention t o summon 
the primary assemblies immediately so that they could elect a new convention^, 
thus i l l u s t r a t i n g his extraordinary f a i t h i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l methods of change. 
That he preferred t o side with the Montagnards rather than the 
Girondins i n the c r i s i s which culminated i n the r i o t s of 31st May - 2nd June, 
may be put down p a r t l y to his b e l i e f that the former were better placed t o 
give the Revolution the impetus which i t needed. I t should be said also that 
his ideas were by now very similar t o t h e i r s . 
Thus, when he l e f t the Convention i n June 1793 to found, with Sieyes, 
the Journal d'Instruction Sociale, he used i t t o support a l l the progressive 
measures which were now passed - the laws against the emigres, against 
food hoarding, etc. - uncharacteristically defending these attawfts on 
4 
i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y on the grounds of necessity . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , i t was 
1. Ce que les citoyens ont d r o i t d'attendre de leurs representants, 
O.C. X I I . 545 - 568. 
2. Chronique de Paris, I . 121-122. 
3. Discours prononce a l a Convention sur l a convocation d'une nouvelle 
convention nationale, O.C. X I I . 583-604. 
4. Cf. Sur l e sens du mot revolutionnaire, O.C. X I I . 615-624. 
/ 
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at t h i s time that he wrote his famous a r t i c l e i n favour of the progressive 
1 
tax . 
However, although a week af t e r the publication of t h i s a r t i c l e , 
he made his l a s t great appeal for u n i t y i n the Journal d 1 I n s t r u c t i o n Sociale' 
i t was obvious that his support for people l i k e Robespierre and Marat could 
not be taken beyond a certain point. 
His patience broke on 24th June 1793 when the Montagnard con s t i t u t i o n , 
drawn up i n a month by Herault de Seychelles and incorporating large parts 
of the Girondin project, was almost unanimously accepted a f t e r barely 
a fo r t n i g h t ' s discussion. 
For the f i r s t time, Condorcet l o s t his s e l f - c o n t r o l and issued a 
v i o l e n t attack on the new c o n s t i t u t i o n : "Aux citoyens francais sur l a 
"3 
nouvelle c o n s t i t u t i o n . As a r e s u l t he was denounced to the Convention 
by the Montagnard Chabot on 8th July. 
He went i n t o hiding and during the following eight months wrote the 
Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progres de l ' e s p r i t humain, a l a s t 
great summary of his philosophical ideas. On 27th March.179^ he was 
captured at Clamart while escaping from Paris, and i t was i n the c e l l at 
4 
Clamart th a t his body was found on the morning of 28th March 1792*- • 
1. "Sur l'impot progressif," O.C. X I I . 625-636. 
2. "Que toutes les classes de l a societe n'ont qu'un meme i n t e r e t , " 
O.C. X I I . 645 - 650. 
3. o.c. 653 - 675. 
4. For d e t a i l s of his death, c f . Robinet Condorcet, sa v i e , son oeuvre 
1743-94, Paris, l i b r a i r i e s - imprimeries reunies 1895, pp.317 - 324. 
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CONCLUSION 
That Condorcet's f i r s t appeal to the people to r e v o l t a g a i n s t 
the N a t i o n a l Assembly should have occurred so soon a f t e r the r e j e c t i o n 
of h i s own c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o j e c t u n d e r l i n e s some of the p r i n c i p a l 
themes which the t h e s i s has sought to develop. 
These concern not only the d i f f i c u l t i e s which he had to over-
come i n order to transform the p r o j e c t f o r o v e r h a u l i n g the Ancien Regime 
which he had drawn up before 1789 i n t o the coherent c o n s t i t u t i o n a l plan 
of 1793, but a l s o h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the people, h i s wish t h a t they 
be u n i t e d around the R e v o l u t i o n so as to c o n s o l i d a t e i t s g a i n s . 
These themes a r e of course r e l a t e d f o r , as we have seen, 
Condorcet's a t t i t u d e towards the people and t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n 
the N a t i o n a l Assembly was d i c t a t e d p r e c i s e l y by the t a c t i c s he was 
f o r c e d to adopt i n order to ensure t h a t the chances of one day 
i n t r o d u c i n g a c o n s t i t u t i o n along h i s own l i n e s would remain i n t a c t . 
We may i n a way compare the people to a barometre by which he 
was a b l e t o d i r e c t h i s p o l i c y d u r i n g the R e v o l u t i o n . Thus, between 
1789 and 1791, r e a l i s i n g that the balance of power was weighed very 
much a g a i n s t the masses, he sought to impose on them the need f o r 
compromise, t a k i n g as h i s slogan the phrase " c e l u i q u i va t r o p v i t e , 
ou s ' a r r e t e ou s'egare". 
I n 1792, however, he r e a l i s e d that the balance was s h i f t i n g a l l 
the time i n favour of the masses and he q u i t e l o g i c a l l y followed the 
movement through the war p o l i c y to i t s c o n c l u s i o n i n the second 
r e v o l u t i o n of 10th August. 
I t i s of course p o s s i b l e i n r e t r o s p e c t , as Rene' Doumic has d o n e\ 
to accuse Condorcet of having been the v i c t i m r a t h e r than the guide 
1. Cf. i n t r o d u c t i o n p. 2. 
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of events. That he v a c i l l a t e d on one or two o c c a s i o n s i s undeniable. 
I t i s t r u e a l s o t h a t h i s c a l c u l a t i o n s were not always very a c c u r a t e , 
as i s i n d i c a t e d , f o r example, by the e x c e s s i v e support which he gave 
t o the r e p u b l i c a n cause j u s t a f t e r the King's f l i g h t . 
I t would be d i f f i c u l t , however, to accuse him of having been 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r any fundamental i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s . At a time of great 
s o c i a l upheaval, the only way of e n s u r i n g t h a t the gains of the 
R e v o l u t i o n were not thrown away was to r a l l y the people around t h e i r 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . T h i s Condorcet sought to do throughout 1789, 1790, 
1791 and 1792. The war p o l i c y , though going a g a i n s t h i s p r i n c i p l e s , 
grew q u i t e l o g i c a l l y out of the need to p r e s e r v e n a t i o n a l u n i t y w h i l e 
the 10th August i n s u r r e c t i o n was nothing more than the a p p l i c a t i o n of 
the " d r o i t d ' i n s u r r e c t i o n " which, as Condorcet had f o r s e e n , was the 
i n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t of the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly's f a i l u r e to make any 
p r o v i s i o n f o r changing the C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
As Condorcet's i d e a s were based on the fundamental p r i n c i p l e 
t h a t change should be gradual and should e v o l v e out of c o n c r e t e 
experience, the absence of such a p r o v i s i o n was i n t o l e r a b l e and i t s 
consequences i n e v i t a b l e . 
I n the l i g h t of what has been s a i d , however, h i s a t t a c k on the 
Montagnards i n A p r i l 1793 may appear somewhat misguided and unnecessary. 
C e r t a i n l y i t r e p r e s e n t s the f i r s t and last, time t h a t he abandoned h i s 
p o l i c y of l o y a l t y to the Assembly. There i s no need to defend 
Condorcet on t h i s point as i t i s by no means obvious that h i s motives 
were any longer i n s p i r e d by the need to p r e s e r v e n a t i o n a l u n i t y a t a l l 
c o s t . I t may best be e x p l a i n e d by the b i t t e r disappointment he must 
have f e l t a t s e e i n g h i s p r o j e c t r e j e c t e d on p u r e l y p o l i t i c a l grounds 
and r e p l a c e d by another very s w i f t l y drawn up p r o j e c t i n c o r p o r a t i n g a 
great number of h i s own i d e a s . 
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But the v o l t e - f a c e of A p r i l 1793 leads us d i r e c t l y to another 
of the main themes of t h i s study: the problems f a c e d by p o l i t i c a l 
t h e o r i s t s who attempt to put t h e i r i d e a s i n t o p r a c t i c e . 
We have seen t h a t the reform p r o j e c t developed by Condorcet 
between 1776 and 1789, although i n s p i r e d by c o n c r e t e events such as 
the reforms of Turgot and Brienne and the American Rev o l u t i o n , owed 
a great d e a l to the i d e a s expounded by the e i g h t e e n t h century 
"philosophes". We have seen a l s o how he intended i t to be put i n t o 
p r a c t i c e s l o w l y and over a long p e r i o d of time and how the events of 
1789 caught him o f f h i s guard. 
A f t e r 1789, however, he r e f u s e d to abandon hope of s e e i n g h i s 
i d e a s being put i n t o p r a c t i c e one day; i t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s very l i k e l y 
t h a t the t h e o r i s t ' s v i s i o n b l i n d e d him to the s u b t l e t i e s of the 
p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e which was t a k i n g p l a c e . His a t t a c k on the " t r i v i a l " 
c omplaints found i n s e v e r a l of the " c a h i e r s de d o l e a n c e s " of 1789, h i s 
anger a t the T i e r s E t a t ' s r e f u s a l to accept c a n d i d a t e s from the 
n o b i l i t y , h i s p e c u l i a r defence of the "emigres" as l a t e as October 
1791 a r e so many s i g n s that he was not e n t i r e l y aware of the f o r c e s 
i n presence and had f a r too " i d e a l i s t i c " a view of the events which 
were t a k i n g p l a c e . 
I t was not u n t i l 1792 t h a t he became aware of the f a c t t h a t the 
p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e was f u l l y r e l e v a n t to the r e a l i z a t i o n of h i s i d e a l ; 
i t i s i n t h i s p e r i o d t h a t he busied h i m s e l f w i t h such p r a c t i c a l matters 
as the war p o l i c y , the r e l a t i o n s between P a r i s and the p r o v i n c e s and 
the party p o l i t i c a l squabbles which culminated i n h i s apparently 
p a r a d o x i c a l support f o r Danton, the "man of a c t i o n " . 
H i s nomination t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l committee at the end of 
1792 i s o l a t e d him once more from the p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e , as i s 
i l l u s t r a t e d by the i r r i t a t i o n which he f e l t a t the importance accorded 
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by the major p o l i t i c a l groups to the " i r r e l e v a n t " matter of the King's 
t r i a l . Condorcet enjoyed t h i s i s o l a t i o n , f e e l i n g as he d i d t h a t t h e r e 
were f a r more important matters to a t t e n d to, namely the drawing up 
of F r a n c e ' s f i r s t t r u l y "democratic" c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
But the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o j e c t , f i n e s t e x p r e s s i o n as i t i s of 
the i d e a l s expressed by Condorcet before 1789, c o n t a i n s a number of 
elements which were incompatible w i t h the time i n which i t came out. 
The r i g o r o u s s e p a r a t i o n of the l e g i s l a t u r e from the e x e c u t i v e , 
the very complicated and l a b o r i o u s e l e c t o r a l system, the frequent 
e l e c t i o n s , the p r e f e r e n c e shown f o r an amateur army made up of 
v o l u n t e e r s , the freedom granted to the p r e s s - these were a r t i c l e s 
which i t would have been almost i m p o s s i b l e to apply i n a F r a n c e 
engaged i n a r e v o l u t i o n a r y war w i t h some of the most powerful n a t i o n s 
of Europe, i n a F r a n c e moreover dominated by r e v o l u t i o n a r y committees 
which drew t h e i r a u t h o r i t y d i r e c t l y from the l e g i s l a t u r e . 
But, more than t h i s , Condorcet's t o t a l and d i s i n t e r e s t e d 
commitment to h i s p r o j e c t had made him f o r g e t t h a t the R e v o l u t i o n ' s 
h i s t o r y had been f i l l e d w i t h c l a s h e s between r i v a l p o l i t i c a l f a c t i o n s 
F e u i l l a n t s , L a m e t h i s t e s , B r i s s o t i n s , Montagnards, H e b e r t i s t e s , e t c . 
I n p a r t i c u l a r , he had never r e a l l y a p p r e c i a t e d the importance of the 
s t r u g g l e between the Gironde and the Montagne and, as a t h e o r i s t , had 
pl a c e d f a r too much f a i t h i n the u n i f y i n g power of a r e p u b l i c a n 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
The events of A p r i l and June 1793 were a b r u t a l reminder of the 
f a c t t h a t i t was i m p o s s i b l e to e f f a c e p o l i t i c a l r i v a l r y by the mere 
drawing up of p o l i t i c a l systems and i t was Condorcet's r e f u s a l to 
r e a l i s e t h i s t h a t l e d u l t i m a t e l y to h i s a t t a c k on the Montagnards and 
to h i s death. 
I t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s both remarkable and f i t t i n g t h a t only a few 
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months before h i s death and very soon a f t e r the r e j e c t i o n of the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o j e c t which he had considered as the crowning 
achievement of a l i f e t i m e , he was a b l e to w r i t e the E s q u i s s e d'un 
t a b l e a u h i s t o r i q u e des progres de l ' e s p r i t humain", a work which 
provides the f i n a l great summary of the p r i n c i p l e s on which h i s reform 
plans were based and i n which he a c c l a i m s , i n a l l s i n c e r i t y , the 
achievements of the R e v o l u t i o n . 
< 
